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INTERNATIONAL

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OCTOBER, 1901.

THE USE OF MORAL IDEAS IN POLITICS.*

THE vice which is most often ascribed to our countrymen by Europeans—at any rate, with regard to our public actions as a people—is hypocrisy. Pecksniff is believed to be our "representative man." Our neighbors think, that is to say, that we commonly profess higher principles in our public actions than they do; but that the actions themselves are at least not in a corresponding degree better than their own. Like most indictments brought against whole peoples, this charge is no doubt only in part a just one. By way of illustrating what it means, I may refer to some criticisms that have been made, chiefly by German writers, with regard to our recent conduct in South Africa. I refer to this, of course, merely for illustration, and hope to avoid the vexed questions of party politics. We have had a good deal of criticism on that matter among ourselves. Many of our leadng moralists and lawyers have expressed a more or less adverse view of the action of our government; and we have also had trenchant criticisms from members of both political parties with regard to the way in which the war has been conducted. But all these criticisms have been in one way or another, attacks on what we did, or what we failed to do. We blundered, it is said, in our dip-

*An address delivered at the Congregational Memorial College, Brecon, on March 14th, 1901.

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lomacy; we were provocative; we showed duplicity; we had not properly ascertained the facts; we were not sufficiently prepared for the contest; and in its later stages we adopted barbarous methods. One at least of the German critics to whom I refer took quite a different ground of attack. We were quite right, he held, at least broadly speaking, in our actions; the only thing that was seriously blameworthy was our professions. It was important, he urged, for our imperial strength that the two Dutch Republics should be annexed; but in appropriating their territory we ought not to have pretended that we were influenced by philanthropic motives, by zeal for freedom and equality, by antagonism to corruption, or by any similar considerations. His general contention was, as I understood it, that Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Chamberlain were justified in forcing on the war; but that Lord Salisbury should not have said that we "sought no territories," and Mr. Balfour should not have proclaimed that the "conscience of the empire" was behind us. It was not an affair of conscience, according to this view, but of self-interest; and we ought to have frankly avowed it. I mention this view, not from any special interest that belongs to it in itself, or because it seems to me particularly wise or just, but because it serves to bring out a difference between the point of view commonly taken in this country in matters of international politics and that commonly taken in some other countries, and especially in Germany since the time of Bismarck. Our foreign critics commonly express the difference by saying that they are frank, while we are hypocritical. We, on the other hand, might perhaps prefer to express the same difference by saying that we have a certain belief, which they have not, that moral ideas have a place in practical politics, however difficult it may be to show that our actions are effectively guided by them. And this brings us to the problem to which I desire to refer in the present discourse. The problem is briefly this—What is the place that may legitimately be assigned to moral ideas in politics?

This problem is, I think, one of peculiar importance at the present time, and perhaps more important for us in this country than for any other people. It is true that it is a subject that

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has been a good deal discussed since the days of Machiavelli; but the changes that have taken place since his time have rendered it much more pressing and important than it ever was before. What he had to discuss was mainly the attitude of the "Prince," an individual whose business it is to act on behalf of the state as a whole. We have changed all that. The gradual spread of democracy, especially in this country, has brought about a condition in which the people may almost invert the saying that is ascribed to Louis XIV.: "The Prince, I am the Prince." At any rate, the problem which was once almost exclusively one for princes is now to a very large extent one that concerns every one of us.

I have said that the problem can be traced back to Machiavelli.* No doubt, on more thorough inquiry, it could be traced much further back; but I am not aware that it is to be found in a very definite form at a much earlier period. It is essentially a modern problem. The Jews, for instance, in ancient times never doubted that the expansion and strengthening of their nation was the most sacred of moral obligations; so that with them there could hardly ever, I imagine, be any serious sense of conflict between what is politically and what is morally best. The same is, I think, broadly true of the Romans and of most other ancient peoples. The good man and the good patriot were for them almost identical. The Greeks, as the most reflective of them all, show perhaps more traces of the dawning of a consciousness of possible conflict than is to be found in the case of any others. Certainly the whole question of the relation between morality and politics was considered by their leading thinkers with much fullness and thoroughness. But their tendency was either, as with Aristotle, to see in the political life the great field for the development of character, and so as that in which alone the moral life can be realized; or, as with some of the Cynics and Stoics, to withdraw as completely as possible from the life of the state and seek to cultivate a purely private

*I do not mean that the problem was definitely stated by him, but that his view tended to bring into prominence the antithesis between the point of view of the politician and that of the moralist.

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morality; or, as with Plato, to regard the life of the good man as standing in relation to an ideal community, and as having relation to the actual life of the state only in the effort to bring it into its ideal form. From none of these points of view did the problem of the reconciliation of the life of the politician with that of the good man present itself as specially important and urgent. From the practical point of view, we may note that two of the main factors in modern political problems were almost absent from the minds of Greek thinkers. The existence of a slave population to do the more menial kinds of work prevented the emergence of the great problem of democracy, which is so urgently present to the modern mind—the question, how to extend the full rights of citizenship to all the inhabitants of a country without undue complexity of machinery and consequent loss of efficiency. On the other hand, international policy was to a large extent simplified for them by the fact that they did not stand in close relationship with other states approximately their equals in civilization, except those that shared their own language and religion and leading ideas of life.

It was Christianity, I think, that first brought in definitely the element of strife, by its antithesis between the kingdoms of this world and the kingdom that is not of this world, an antithesis which brought into much sharper relief the contrast that was to some extent in the minds of Plato and the Stoics. The chief difference lay probably in the fact that with Christianity the call to become a citizen of the higher kingdom was definitely and emphatically addressed not merely to the philosopher, or to him who aspired to be in the most complete sense a "wise man," but to every man, woman, and child in every country of the world to which the ideas of Christianity could penetrate. Still, even Christianity did not at first present a very precise and pressing problem with regard to this particular point. The kingdom of heaven, like the Stoical πολιτεία του κοσμου, tended at first to be thought of as something quite separate from the kingdoms of this world; and with the latter the Christian was to meddle as little as possible. The early Christian "honored the king," but took no special interest in his doings. A Chris-

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tian king was as little thought of as a philosopher-king. It is, I suppose, this attitude of submissive non-interference that Nietzsche has chiefly in mind when he describes Christian morality as a "morality of slaves." But it changed considerably as it grew.

It was, I believe, the combination of Christianity with imperial power that first brought the problem effectively to the front. Christianity, as at first understood, involved a non-political morality, a morality of non-resistance—if you choose so to describe it, a "morality of slaves;" and the question of the possibility of combining this with the active exercise of imperial power was one that certainly required all the subtlety of the most skillful casuist. As a matter of fact, it was perhaps never quite seriously faced. The Roman empire crumbled away; and we can hardly point to any real effort to maintain its power as a great Christian agency. It was only when new political powers grew up on the ruins of Rome that the question began to be definitely stated; and even then, as I have indicated, rather as a problem for princes than as one for mankind in general. But in our own time it has acquired a larger significance, and especially for the citizens of our own country. For we are an imperial people in an even wider sense than the Romans ever were, having larger and more varied provinces to govern; we are a democratic people in an even more extended sense than the Athenians ever were, having more universal rights of citizenship; and we commonly reckon ourselves to be a Christian people in a perhaps more definite sense than almost any other nation, having at least a certain form of that religion incorporated in our national constitution. Thus we have all the elements of a great political problem. As the rulers of an empire, our government has to be continually interfering—often in the most active way—with the affairs of a larger number of diverse people than any other rulers have ever presumed to meddle with. As democrats, we must hold ourselves to a large extent responsible for the actions of our government. As Christians, we have to ask ourselves how all this is to be reconciled with our consciences and with the fundamental principles of our religion.

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Well, with one aspect at least of this problem I do not intend to deal—viz., the more specifically religious aspect. It would be vain and presumptuous for me to attempt in such a discourse as this, to discuss the precise significance of Christian morality; and I doubt whether there is any real necessity to attempt it. For, I suppose, it is only in a somewhat vague and general sense that we can properly describe ourselves as a Christian people. It is true that certain forms of the Christian religion are officially recognized in our country; but other forms are almost equally prevalent; and a considerable number of us do not adhere to any of them.

It is especially worthy of note that many of the most earnest of our moralists have more or less explicitly dissociated themselves from any definite theological creed; and, on the other hand, most of our churches, if I understand them rightly, do not profess to be very precisely guided, or to guide others, at least with reference to international affairs, by the Sermon on the Mount, or by any other principle of primitive Christianity. However that may be, I prefer, at least as far as possible, to set aside that aspect of the question. I suppose that, when we describe ourselves as a Christian people, what we have chiefly in view is that we are a people who have habitually before our minds certain ideals of conduct and a certain type of civilized life which has grown up more or less definitely in connection with the Christian religion. We can sufficiently well consider this general ethical standpoint or atmosphere without any reference to the special doctrines of Christianity.

Looking at the matter, then, from this point of view, we can hardly deny that a serious problem is presented for our consideration. I suppose it will scarcely be maintained by any one that there is no difficulty in the problem; that the ethical ideas which we indicate by the term Christianity can easily be reconciled with the actions that seem to be inseparably bound up with the political life of a great nation like our own. If anyone thinks there is no difficulty, he may perhaps be most easily made to feel it by looking at what takes place in other countries. The incidents of the Dreyfus case may be thought to be exceptional, but I think it is generally recognized by those com-

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petent to judge, that something not very unlike it might easily happen again in other countries—though hardly, we may hope, in our own. Or again, take the remarkable speech in which the Emperor of Germany sought to impress his countrymen with the necessity of emphasizing the spirit of Christianity by wreaking signal vengeance on the Chinese, in which no quarter was to be given, and in which the methods of Attila were to be revived. Nor can we flatter ourselves that our own record is free from similar occurrences. The passage from a letter* from one of our soldiers with regard to the slaughter after the battle of Eland's Laagte will probably long be remembered: "They asked for mercy, and we gave it with a long hook." And, more recently, we have all heard many tales, some apparently well authenticated, of deeds of atrocity that may be defended as inevitable incidents of war, but that cannot fail at least to give a certain shock to our moral consciousness. Of course such acts may be defended. It may be said that war is sometimes necessary and that war cannot be other than horrible. Excuse may even be made for the German Emperor's speech, on the principle laid down by Mr. Balfour, that it was provoked by something more than human nature could endure. But this only makes the problem the more apparent; for it cannot be denied at least that in all such cases we see examples of speech and action of a kind that seems to accompany imperial policy, and that it is hard to reconcile with the spirit of humanity and justice that we believe to be implied in Christian morality, —with the principle of love to enemies, and of turning the other cheek to the smiter. Of course, I am not affirming that the two things cannot be reconciled. All that I say is that the attempt to reconcile them is a serious problem. Now there are various ways in which this problem may be met; and I will proceed to indicate what appear to be the chief of them.

The first way that I shall refer to is a very easy and perhaps

*Of course I do not mean to imply that this passage, and many others like it, are to be taken as conclusive evidence that such atrocities were committed. But they are indisputable evidence of the spirit in which the work was done. Mr. Robertson, in his recent discussions, has possibly made rather too much of such evidence.

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a somewhat ostrich-like one. It is that of regarding the political life as a necessary evil, and trying to keep as far as possible aloof from it. A diplomatist has been described as "one who lies abroad for the benefit of his country," and sometimes the politician in general is regarded as one who renders a useful service to his community, but one whose conduct must not be too closely scrutinized. Our representatives in Parliament are supposed, according to a saying of Carlyle, to be there "to sin for us." According to the epigram of Mandeville, the "private vices" of the politician, are, on this view, regarded as "public benefits;" and it is wisest for us not to "look a gift horse in the mouth," but to accept the services of the politician, as we accept those of the hangman, as something that has to be done, but that we may be thankful we do not require to do. This is a view of the political life that one sometimes hears hinted at, and that may be taken as a curious inversion of the common Greek view of political activity. The Greeks in general thought that political work is almost the only kind of work that is worthy of a freeman, most other forms of labor being somewhat degrading. In the United States there seems now to be a certain tendency to recognize "the dignity of labor" in every kind of work except politics. But on the whole I do not think there is much tendency in that direction in this country. Though a view such as I have indicated is sometimes hinted at or tacitly implied, it is seldom, I think, openly stated, except as an argument against woman's suffrage. When men are hard put to it for some ground for not extending the rights of citizenship to women, they sometimes urge that the political life is utterly filthy, corrupt, and degrading; and that women at least should be kept free from that abominable taint. But perhaps it is hardly fair to treat seriously an argument that is only used as a convenient weapon in defence of the privilege of sex. On the whole the nation of Burke and Gladstone (I purposely choose two very different types) is not very likely to think that the political life is necessarily corrupt and degrading, or one in which the best and ablest men cannot find a fitting exercise for their highest powers. Occasionally no doubt some of our prominent public men lay themselves open to awkward suspic-

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ions; and our party system leads us to make the most of such suspicions; but I think it generally appears in the end, as Mr. Chamberlain said of himself, that our politicians are not as black as they are painted. At any rate, those with regard to whom any such suspicions are entertained are comparatively few; and it would be easy to name scores of our leading politicians of the most diverse parties with regard to whom the suspicion of anything dishonorable would be felt by everyone to be absurd. Most of us, I think, still feel considerable confidence in the honor of the great majority of our statesmen. Certainly, nothing could be more fatal to a great nation than the idea that its leaders in politics are there to do the dirty work which honest citizens would be ashamed to do for themselves. Unless we are ready to despair of our country and of the world, we shall hardly, I think, be prepared to acquiesce in that point of view.

We may, however, pass to a somewhat different point of view, which is in one way less extreme than the one that I have just indicated, but which is in another way much more thorough and consistent. It may be said that there is a good and a bad line of activity in politics, and that the excellence of the good one lies in the thoroughness of its opposition to the bad one. Now the bad, from the point of view to which I am referring, is that of "aggression," of "expansion," of "active interference," the good one is that which resists this tendency, and seeks to promote peace and non-intervention. From this point of view, the good man might be and probably would be an active politician, but his activity would be largely of a negative kind. He would be largely employed in trying to restrain the activity of others. All at any rate that we describe by such terms as Imperialism and Militarism would be utterly foreign to such a man's line of action. This is a point of view that we may find among us in various forms, more or less extreme. The most complete statement of its philosophic basis is to be found, I suppose, in the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer. As a practical ideal of conduct we find it among the Quakers, whose most eloquent exponent in the sphere of practical politics was John Bright. Gladstone gave a more modified assent

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to the same general position; and his line of action is carried on, with a rather more definite consciousness of philosophic grounds, by Mr. John Morley. On the other hand, if we want to find the general idea in its extremest form, and set forth with all the fervor of a prophet, we must turn to the utterances of Count Tolstoy. Now, it hardly falls within the scope of this lecture to discuss the political attitude of such a man as Gladstone or as Mr. John Morley. The work of such practical statesmen could only be properly appraised by a careful consideration of the special problems with which they had to deal and the special methods which they adopted in dealing with them. Such men are not primarily concerned with general ideas, but rather with particular applications; and the particular application seldom shows the general idea in its purity, but rather to a large extent modified by special considerations. But if we take the point of view to which I am referring in its most extreme form, as represented by such a writer as Tolstoy, I think we can more readily see that it is essentially one-sided. It comes before us explicitly as a restatement of the position of the early Christians; and that fact ought no doubt to give it a special interest for all who aim at carrying on the best traditions of Christianity. As far as I can judge, it on the whole fairly represents the attitude of primitive Christian morality, differing from it, I should say, only as the mechanical model of a seed might differ from a living seed. What I mean is that Tolstoy takes the attitude of primitive Christianity as a finished result, whereas I believe—but perhaps on this point some of my hearers have a better right to an opinion—that it was rather in its essence a growing germ. As far as I can judge, the Christian churches are substantially right in not adhering rigidly to the morality of primitive Christianity. In setting it to some extent aside, they are not necessarily adopting the irreverent attitude which Lowell ascribes to John P. Robinson in his saying that "they didn't know everything down in Judee." We may appreciate to the full the work of the early Christians, and yet believe that the attitude of the founders of a new principle must be somewhat different from that of people living in a world in which that principle has gained a consider-

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able hold. I shall try to make what I mean a little clearer in the sequel. In the meantime I must content myself with indicating that the extreme attitude of non-resistance to evil seems to me decidedly a narrow one.

The next point of view to which I shall refer is one of a very different kind. It is the point of view of those who maintain that the expert politician is above morality, as a certain emperor (Sigismund) was said to be "above grammar." This is the point of view represented by some of those German writers—Nietzsche is perhaps its most extreme exponent*—to whom I have referred; and we find trace of it among our own writers and sometimes in the utterances of "the man in the street." What it amounts to is substantially that moral principles "will not work" in practical politics; and, though it may be right that the welfare of an individual should be sacrificed to morality, yet the prosperity of a whole people is too large a thing to be offered up on such a shrine. A somewhat similar point of view has sometimes been put forward with regard to the commercial life, in which also it has been said that moral principles are impracticable, and that we must be guided by economic laws. With regard to the commercial life, I think this is a point of view that one does not now hear proclaimed so often and so confidently as was once the case; but with regard to imperial policy I believe that the corresponding position is becoming more common.† Now, when it is said that

*Nietzsche, however, opposes the Christian conception of individual morality; as well as that of national morality. His whole view is based on the idea of struggle as necessary for evolution. Some of his views are so extremely put that it is difficult to take them quite seriously—*e. g.*, the assurance of Zarathustra, "A good cause, you say, sanctifies war itself, but for me, I tell you that it is a good war that sanctifies every cause." But Nietzsche, mad though he is, is important as the spokesman of a point of view that, in a less extreme form, has great influence. For an excellent criticism of his general point of view, I may refer to Professor Fouillée's article in *The International Monthly* for February, 1901. The great mistake of Nietzsche is that he opposes a morality of *masters* to the morality of *slaves*: what is really wanted is a morality of *freemen*.

†See, for instance, "The Ethics of Expansion," by H. H. Powers, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, April, 1900. Professor Ritchie seems to come dangerously near to the same attitude.

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moral principles will not work, there are two questions that naturally suggest themselves—What do we mean by moral principles? and What do we mean by their "not working"? By giving a somewhat narrow interpretation to either or both of these expressions, it may not be difficult to establish the truth of the statement. It is somewhat on a par with the old paradox of Mandeville, to which I referred before, that "private vices are public benefits." The truth of the paradox depends largely on what we mean by a vice and what we mean by a benefit. And so it is here. If we mean by morality the morality of primitive Christians, morality as conceived by Tolstoy, it is very probable that that will not work in imperial affairs—especially if we mean by "working" producing benefical results that are at once apparent. But in a broader sense I think it is an absurdity to say that moral principles will not work. We mean on the whole by moral principles things that do work. We mean by them the general conditions for the realization of what we recognize as best in life. If on the whole and in the long run the best is not realized, there must be something wrong with our principles. Hence this point of view also seems to me unsatisfactory.

I have now indicated some of the leading points of view, and have tried to show briefly in what respects they fail to carry conviction. Next I must essay the much more difficult task of trying to lead up to a more excellent way. The remarks that I have just made in connection with the last-mentioned point of view may perhaps serve as a convenient point of departure. The difficulty seems to arise largely from a want of sufficient clearness with regard to the nature of moral principles, on the one hand, and of the important ends of life, on the other. Let me try to bring this out a little more definitely.

I may begin by making a general remark. Great moral teachers are perhaps in a peculiar danger of conveying a one-sided impression. The prophet aims at an immediate practical result. He has a vivid view of the evil principles that are at work around him, and his tendency is to state emphatically the principle that is most directly opposed to these, and that may be expected most immediately to counteract them. So long as the

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words of the prophet are simply spoken, or read only by those immediately around him, the effect of this tendency is perhaps almost wholly good. If the words are one-sided, they at any rate give a twist in the right direction. But it is chiefly of such utterances that Emerson is thinking when he says that the expressons of men of genius should be marked as "good for this trip only." When they are written down and treasured up and made the texts of sermons, they are apt to become vulgarized and to lose their special appropriateness. Hence it may be doubted whether in an age of popular literature the attitude of the prophet is an altogether desirable one; and perhaps the general influence of such diverse writers as Carlyle, Ruskin, Tolstoy, and Nietzsche is in this respect a dubious one. The longer one lives, I think, and the more one sees of human action, the more does one learn to appreciate the profound wisdom of the old Greek point of view, so thoroughly expounded by Aristotle, that all genuine practical excellence is to be found is a mean between two opposite extremes. This is what the prophet is always in danger of forgetting. And in so far as he forgets this, he is not only apt to do an immediate injury by conveying a one-sided view of the truth that he wishes to communicate, which is a great misfortune in itself; but he tends also to do a still greater injury indirectly, by provoking an equally one-sided assertion of the opposite view, and shaking men's confidence in the value of those moral principles in which he is most deeply interested.

Now, I think this is to a large extent the source of the difficulty with regard to the point that we are now considering. The difficulty of seeing how moral principles can be used by statesmen is to a considerable extent due to the one-sided way in which we have been apt to think of the way in which moral principles are used by private persons. In particular, there has been a tendency in the teaching of what is known as Christian morality to exaggerate the place—or rather perhaps to misconceive the place—of self-sacrifice in the moral life. The error has lain chiefly, I think, in speaking of self-sacrifice as if it were a good in itself, and even as if it were the highest good. The error is somewhat similar to that which has often pre-

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vailed with regard to almsgiving. Almsgiving used to be commended as if it were a good in itself, quite irrespective of its results upon individuals or society. Hardly anyone, I believe, would take that view now. It is now generally recognized that the duty of the comparatively prosperous towards the poor is not that of giving alms, but that of helping them to fight their own battles, and to cease to be poor, in the sense in which poverty implies dependence. But there are many who still speak of self-abnegation as if it were a good in itself; and as against this, it is important that we should insist that all genuine excellence is strong and self-assertive. I have referred, perhaps somewhat depreciatingly, to Carlyle; and I would like now to make some amends to that great writer by saying that his teaching, if not always as carefully balanced as it might be, seems to me nearly always to emphasize points that are greatly in need of emphasis; and that perhaps he never did a greater service than by proclaiming, as he was never weary of doing, that all "right is might." The good man is always a fighter, whether in private life or in public, never one who allows anything that he regards as important to be sacrificed.

Let me illustrate what I mean by a case which happens at present to be prominently before my mind. One of the most finely self-sacrificing men it has ever been my privilege to know was the late Professor Henry Sidgwick; and one of the finest instances of self-sacrifice in his career was the resignation of his Fellowship from a scruple of conscience. It was not an act, so far as I understand, that was required by common honesty; for he had quite honestly subscribed to the necessary theological test some years before. But, as he had abandoned the theological position that he then held, he thought it proper to give up his Fellowship. Now, if this were all, the sacrifice might have seemed to many almost quixotic; and, if it had spoilt his career as a philosopher and teacher, there might have been some ground for regarding it even as wicked. The wisdom and goodness of his action appears from the sequel.* His case at once attracted attention; and an agitation

*See the account by Professor Sorley in his article on Sidgwick in this JOURNAL (April, 1901), *Cf.* also the corresponding article in *Mind*, by Mr. Leslie Stephen.

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was set on foot, which led to the abolition of the theological tests both at Oxford and at Cambridge. The benefits of this were incalculable. Not only did it open up the advantages of the education given in the older universities to non-conformists and to those who are unable to subscribe to the dogmas of Christianity in any form; but it also removed a terrible temptation to perjury, or something approaching to that, to which it is to be feared that many succumbed—men who stood, as it were, on the borderland of belief. It did all this, at the cost of some personal inconvenience—very considerable personal inconvenience, I believe—to Henry Sidgwick, but happily without interfering to any serious extent with his work as a writer or teacher. That is, I think, a good example of a wise and noble form of self-sacrifice, the sacrifice of a small good for the sake of a great one. No doubt it would be easy to point to instances of self-sacrifice of a still more heroic type, cases in which a great good has to be sacrificed for the sake of one that is still greater; but these would not in general so clearly illustrate my point. What I wish to bring out is that the most genuine kind of self-sacrifice does not involve, from the point of view of the person who makes it, a real net loss. It may involve the loss of something considerable in the way of money, health, reputation, or even life itself; but it is done for the sake of something that is valued still more highly—for the sake, as Aristotle would say, of the beautiful. It is not the wretched action of a suicide, but rather that of a hero who gives what he counts but little for that which has the highest worth.

The nature of such self-sacrifice is often obscured, I think, by laying the emphasis mainly on its more negative side. In many cases, no doubt, this is very natural, and may even be quite proper—chiefly, I believe, because the positive side is sometimes almost too intangible to be definitely set before us. For instance, a man may often feel himself called upon to sacrifice himself in many small ways for the sake of the smooth working of an institution with which he is connected. He may often have to take a great deal of trouble about points that hardly seem to him worth while, to suppress his opinions even when he is convinced that they are true and important, to

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coöperate with men whom he distrusts, to check the ardor of others with whom he is in sympathy—all for the purpose of promoting harmony in the carrying out of a common work, the results of which may be very distant and incalculable. In such cases the man who makes the sacrifice may only dimly feel that the work in which he is coöperating is something larger and more important than anything that he could do for himself; and so he is led to sacrifice a near and apparent good for one that is somewhat distant and vague. This is perhaps especially to be seen in the case of men who give the best work of their lives to the public service of their country. They are convinced that their country stands for something great and valuable, though they may not be able very clearly to define it; and so they are willing to incur large sacrifices on its behalf. But something of the same sort may sometimes be seen in the relations of one person to another. A devoted servant, at least in the old-world times, might sacrifice himself for his master, from the sheer conviction that his master's life is a richer and nobler one than his own. And sometimes a friend may sacrifice his own good for another, even without any such inner conviction—perhaps even with the assurance that his friend's good is the lower of the two; and we pardon or even praise his devotion, because, if it is a failing, it is one that leans to virtue's side, being contrary to the more common and natural tendency. We admire the exaggeration that implies a power.

Now it is by dwelling on such instances as these, and regarding them as the types of the moral life, that we are led to feign an opposition between the best actions of an individual and those of a state. For it can hardly be denied that no state could reasonably be expected to sacrifice itself in such ways as I have indicated; and so it is apt to be said that the crowning excellence of an individual is self-sacrifice, while that of a state is self-asserting power. And no doubt there is a certain truth in this; but it is a truth that is grossly exaggerated when it is stated in such a way. It is an exaggeration to represent the good life as one of constant self-surrender. No doubt this is continually entering in as an element, but not always

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as a conscious element, and often as a very subordinate one. In what Wordsworth describes as the—

> "best portion of a good man's life,
> His little, nameless, unremembered acts
> Of kindness and of love,"

I fancy that he thinks chiefly of the satisfaction and benefit of those around him: the better he is, the less likely is he to be aware that he loses anything by helping them, and most likely he loses nothing that he greatly values. Still it is no doubt true that an individual is often called upon to renounce some apparent good of his own for some larger good that is somewhat dim and distant, and perhaps not very well understood. And I think it is true that a nation can hardly ever be called upon to do this. But the reason is obvious, and does not involve any real change of principle. So far as I understand the basis of morality, the only ultimate test of the goodness of a man's action is to be found in its tendency to promote the most complete mode of life in the human race; and I think this is also the only ultimate test for a nation's action. But a man may often perceive, more or less clearly, that the best path towards this end lies over his dead body, or perhaps involves the sacrifice of something that he values almost as much as his life; whereas a nation could hardly under any conceivable circumstances apprehend any similar truth.* A nation as a whole could hardly have so intimate a knowledge of the life of another people as to be aware that the life of that other people is of a higher type than its own, and so much higher that it is worth while to renounce its own achievements for the sake of furthering the life of that other people; and the better the inhabitants of a country are, the more heartily they have been devoting themselves to the ideals and institutions of their nation's life, the less likely are they to think that the advancement of any other nation could compensate them for the destruction, or even for the serious retardation, of what they most value in their own. The life of his own nation is in general

Cf. Mr. Bradley's article on "The Limits of Individual and National Self-Sacrifice," INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS, October, 1894.

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the largest unity of which any one can have an intimate knowledge; and what he does not really know he cannot reasonably prefer to what he knows. This, then, is a serious point of difference between the life of a man and the life of a state; and it carries with it very important consequences. But we must be careful that we do not exaggerate them, or fancy that they involve a complete severance in principle between what is good in the one case and what is good in the other.*

One consequence that is sometimes said to follow is that, while duelling may be completely suppressed among individuals, war can never be finally extinguished between nations. This view seems to have the support of the great name of Hegel;† and it must be allowed that there is a great deal to be said in defence of it. Even duelling was not easily crushed out in this country; and in most continental countries it still survives. And something may even be urged in defence of it. It may be said‡ that personal antagonism may sometimes arise on points with which no law can deal. If people cannot settle such disputes by some such method as that of duelling, it must mean either that they lose that fine sensitiveness on matters of honor which characterizes the best type of gentleman, or that their grievances rankle in their minds, and find vent in petty recriminations that lower the tone of life and embitter the intercourse of society. I think there is some force in this; but the common sense of mankind in this country has, I cannot but believe, rightly decided that the life of human beings is too valuable to be lightly thrown away for petty provocations, and that even in the case of more weighty provocations, it is on the

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*It is sometimes urged that a statesman could not be justified in sacrificing the interests of his country; because he would be sacrificing what is not his own to give. I cannot quite agree with this. No doubt a case of this kind is much more delicate than one of ordinary private self-sacrifice; but I think a statesman must regard himself as the representative of his country, and must act for it as he would for himself. It must be remembered that even in the most private self-sacrifice, a man nearly always involves others, (*e. g.*, his own family) to some extent in his loss. The distinction is one of degree.

† Professor Ritchie seems not to go quite so far as this.

‡ *Cf.* Paulsen's "System der Ethik," Vol. II., p. 507.

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whole best to pocket up one's wrongs for the sake of the general principle, comforting oneself as best one can with the reflection that "curses come home to roost," and that there are few things that cannot be lived down. In such circumstances, however, some may perhaps think that horse-whipping at least still has its place. But when nations come into collision, what escape can there be from the last extremity? There is no larger unity than that of a nation to which the disputants can appeal, as an individual may to his country's laws. Small points may be settled by arbitration; compromise may give a temporary relief; slight provocations may be condoned and forgotten. But when there is a real collision between opposing aims, what in the end can settle the dispute but force?

Now I yield to this contention so far as to admit that there are some wars recorded in history from which it is hard to see any possible escape, without supposing human nature to be fundamentally transformed. I will select an example that may perhaps come home to some of us here. I am a Scotchman, and I suppose most of those to whom I am speaking are Welsh. We come of fighting races; and much of the fighting of our ancestors was probably foolish and wicked. But do we in our hearts think that they could reasonably have submitted without a struggle to be ruled over by the English? I do not think they could. They had ideals and traditions of their own; and I think we should rightly despise them if they did not value these enough to think them worth fighting for. On the other hand, can we blame the English for aiming at the unification of the islands in which they lived? No doubt it may be answered that the union of Scotland and England was in the end brought about in a quite peaceful fashion, which permitted the two countries to a large extent to carry on their separate traditions; and we may think that the English might have waited for this. But could they reasonably be expected to look so far ahead? And can we even be sure that the peaceful union would have been possible without the previous struggle? On the whole, having regard to the limitations of human nature, it seems to me that in such cases war is as nearly as may be inevitable. It can, that is to say, be reasonably defended from

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both sides. The same is perhaps true of the struggle between North and South in America. It is sometimes said that the present war in South Africa was inevitable in the same sense—that it is a struggle between two incompatible ideals, each of which aimed at predominance. But on this point I am not at present convinced. There seem to be too many sinister influences in that case. Admitting, however, that some wars may fairly be described as inevitable, I do not think we need be forced by this fact to regard war as an inevitable element in human life. The civilized nations of Europe already form in some respects a unity, even in some respects a more coherent unity than some nations have been able to secure; and we may fairly hope that in time this larger unity will form a court of appeal almost as satisfactory for the nations as the law of the land is at present for individuals. When this is accomplished, war will be as much an anachronism as duelling is now. But I am afraid I am referring to a somewhat distant date.

I do not wish, however, to dwell further on this particular point. I have referred to it only as an illustration of the difference between international transactions and those that concern individuals. What such illustrations help us to see is, I think, on the one hand, that we must not simply pass from the analogy of the individual life to that of the state, and yet, on the other hand, that in passing from the one to the other we need not introduce any change in our fundamental principles. It is always dangerous to reason from analogy, and yet it is often very tempting. It has, I think, been rightly pointed out that we make such a misleading transition when we speak of the country occupied by a people as if it were on quite the same footing as the property of an individual; or when we speak of the treaties and conventions between nations as if they were quite similar to personal contracts. I am inclined to think also that some socialists have recently been tempted to push another analogy too far—the analogy, namely, between the policy of non-intervention in international affairs and that of *laisser faire* in industry. For a government to seek to regulate the industrial relations of its own citizens is one thing: it is a very different thing for it to seek to control the actions of the citi-

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zens of other states with which it has no organic relation. We must, I think, guard ourselves against such analogies, and try to judge each problem by itself, by a careful survey of the concrete situation. This brings out the importance of a precise knowledge of the facts of the case; and at this point I cannot refrain from remarking that in the troubles in which our nation has recently been involved the most deplorable circumstance to my mind has been the inaccuracy—to use no stronger word—of the reports that have been from time to time communicated to the public by the press. The first condition of a correct judgment is that we should know the exact state of affairs; and I am decidedly of opinion that blunders in diplomacy and atrocities in war can more easily be pardoned than dishonesty in the statement of facts. Simple truthfulness seems to me the absolutely necessary foundation for all other excellence in men or nations. Once we know the facts, however, and view the situation as a concrete whole, the principles by which we have to be guided are, I think, the same in essence as those by which we have to guide ourselves in the ordinary affairs of our private lives. We can fearlessly apply the general ideas of morality, and even of what may fairly be described as Christian morality. We need not fear that it will turn out to be a slave morality. The morality which was that of John Milton cannot, I am sure, be a morality of slaves. But we must not apply it thoughtlessly, without a study of the case: we must "mix it with brains."

Returning once more to our starting point, we are now perhaps in a better position to deal with the charge of hypocrisy that is brought against our country. In so far as this charge means that we profess one kind of principle, and act on another, it is no doubt a grave accusation. A brutal frankness would be better than such duplicity. But I hope that the charge means partly something different. It means that we are trying to face the complex problems of our national life in a way that is at once practical and reflective, trying to make use of moral ideas and yet so applying them as not to lose sight of the difficulties of the situation. Even hypocrisy is at least a homage to virtue. It shows that we cannot ignore

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moral ideas, even if we stumble in their applications. This is better, I think, than to imagine that they can be safely set aside. But what is chiefly wanted, I believe, is a firmer grasp of such principles, not as abstract formulas, but as illuminating conceptions. If we could really grasp them in this way, there is no reason why we should not elevate our conception of politics at least as high as that of the ancient Greeks. There is no doubt a good historic ground for the comparative divorce of morality from politics. It was necessary, in the growth of Christian or democratic morality, to begin with the building up of the individual life. But I am convinced that the time has fully come for a bold attempt to realize what is best not merely in the private life but in the wider fields of industry, commerce, and international relations. We must try to see once more, as the wisest of the Greeks saw, that there is nothing nobler in human life than politics, in the most comprehensive sense of that term. Few of us can do much to serve humanity in the widest sense: the best thing probably on the whole that most of us can do is to serve our country. But I think it should be added, to prevent misconception, that we can often serve our country best by attacking its faults and resisting its aims. I should like to add also that the smaller politics must in general come before the larger. It is from the home that most people learn the greater part of what is best in their lives; and it is, I believe, mainly by the gradual expansion of what they learn there that the life of the state must be purified and ennobled. This can only be done by degrees. The spirit of the family may spread out into the district, then from that to the province; and it is only by a slow expansion that it can reach the state, and penetrate into international relations. Hence, I think it is best for most of us to begin as near home as we can. If we take care of our schools, our churches, our hospitals, the work of our municipalities, if we make sure that this local work is carried on in the best spirit, with a view to the highest good of all concerned in it, we may feel confident that the "enthusiasm of humanity" that is developed in this small and humble way will in the end be a leaven that will purify the whole state. Few of us can

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hope to have much hand in the governing of the country; but we can all do something for the political life within the limits of our parishes. As a recent writer has said, "municipal governments fix, to a large degree, standards of political morality." The great thing, I think, is to live in the part with the constant sense that we are working for the whole; and then to try to spread out into the whole the spirit of brotherhood that can more readily grow up within the narrower circle.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

THE TASK OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.*

THE task of the ages—if, believing in evolution, we admit that they have any task—is the realization of self-conscious personalities, freely related to each other through the three attributes of knowledge, discriminating affection and originative will. Such personalities alone can be true ends, since they alone have value on their own account.

This task, though it can obviously have neither beginning nor end, is worked out through a progress marked by epochs, each of which has its own appointed share, so to speak, in the whole. These epochs having no clear lines of demarcation, it is customary to identify them with centuries, and to ask what forms of progress have marked each particular century—century being a perfectly arbitrary division of time.

With a view to determining the task of the twentieth century, it would be well if we should trace as far back as possible the whole course of human development (for each part receives the meaning from the whole); but as space forbids this, we must be content to gain what light we can by going back for a few centuries, say to the close of the Middle Age.

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*A lecture given before the Society for Ethical Culture of Philadelphia, by the late Thomas Davidson.

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The task of that age may be stated in a few words. It consisted in keeping steadily before each individual soul the fact of its own eternity and impressing upon it that its weal or woe, throughout that eternity, depended upon its pursuing a definite course of conduct. So far, nothing could have been better. But, unfortunately,—though, as we may well believe, necessarily,—these things were presented in an external, dramatic way, as arbitrary revelations from an external God, and backed by such awesome sanctions as made the soul feel itself a mere helpless worm of the dust, in presence of an irresponsible omnipotence. It felt that its eternity was a mere gift of grace or charity, utterly capricious, because utterly undeserved (the saints vied with one another in magnifying their own unworthiness!), while its conduct was determined by external laws, supported by a system of purely arbitrary rewards and punishments, such as made obedience a mere matter of slavish, selfish prudence, however it might cloak itself as love to the lawgiver. In one word, human life in these ages was entirely regulated by authority, which, though it might produce a certain amount of socially desirable conduct, as even the poorest of motives such as fear or avarice may, rendered all true morality, which depends upon a free, rational determination of the will, utterly impossible. The excuse for such authority was the fantastic belief that human nature, as such, was utterly fallen, degraded, and incapable of self-direction, that, hence, if ever it was to reach its true end, it must entirely submit itself, *ut cadaver,* to external guidance, that is, authority, or direct inspiration. This attitude of mind is admirably expressed in a hymn, still much and reverently sung in our churches:

> "Direct, control, suggest this day,
> All I design, or do, or say,
> That all my powers and all my might
> In Thy full glory may unite."

This is, of course, a complete abdication of self-guidance, an appeal to God to be moral for us—that we may glorify Him!

In a system which accepted authority as the guide of life on pain of damnation, there was, of course, no room for freedom

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of any sort, freedom of thought, freedom of affection, or freedom of will. And, as a matter of fact, all these forms of freedom were, as far as possible, vigorously suppressed. Free inquiry into the laws and nature of the world gave way to a timid, scholastic discussion of the meaning of authority. The natural affections, though they could not be entirely disowned, were grudgingly admitted to a place in life, and even as late as the Council of Trent, in the sixteenth century, an anathema was pronounced upon any one who should say that the state of virginity and celibacy was not better than the state of matrimony. And this is to-day the position of the Roman Catholic Church. Above all, free self-determination of the will, possible only through free inquiry and free affection, was placed under the ban. The mediæval church, in part directly, in part indirectly through the state, sought to regulate every thought, feeling, word, and deed of its members, and of all whom it claimed as such. When it was resisted, it shrank from no extremes.

The task of the centuries since the close of the Middle Age has been, gradually to remove this yoke of authority, and to raise men to freedom of thought, affection, and will—in a word, to rational self-guidance, or moral life. This has been done, partly through actual resistance to authority, a resistance necessitated by social suffering, and partly through discoveries in the worlds of nature, history and philosophy.

The sixteenth century was marked by great advances in all directions. The discovery of America, the proof positive of the earth's rotundity, and the Copernican astronomy utterly broke up the mediæval view of the universe, the science of astrology, and the astronomical ethics depending on both, and thus freed men from a whole load of ignorance and superstition in matters physical and moral. At the same time, the Reformation among the Germanic nations freed northern Europe from papal authority, and introduced the principle of free inquiry (without, indeed, recognizing its full import), while the Pagan Renaissance among the Latin peoples went far to free the south from that nature-distorting asceticism to which much of the church's authority was due, and to make the perfection of

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human nature, instead of the glory of God, the end of human activity. Under the influence of both these movements, education of a human sort spread rapidly, art revived, and the human mind advanced toward autonomy.

The seventeenth century is, unlike the sixteenth, which had been largely a period of destruction in matters spiritual, a period of reconstruction. Now, not only are the old sciences and philosophies put aside, but new sciences and new philosophies spring up to take their place. And, strange to say, these new sciences and philosophies, are all animated by a common spirit utterly different from that of the Middle Age. Just at the time when the earth, man's abode, ceased to be regarded as the centre of the physical universe, man himself came to be regarded as the centre of the spiritual universe. It is this fact that makes the modern world, as distinguished from the ancient and mediæval. Though the meaning of this fact has been but slowly coming to consciousness, it is now obvious enough to anvone who cares to think. It is this: whereas in the older world all truth was tried by an external authority, supposed to be revealed, and human reason was relegated to a thrall's place; in the modern world, human reason is elevated to the first place, and all authority, nay, even the existence of God himself, has to come before its tribunal, and accept its verdict. Thus, truth is no longer dependent upon authority but authority upon truth. If God cannot prove his existence and authority to human reason, then reason—man—will have none of them. It would be impossible to overstate the momentousness of this change. It is not only a change from authority to truth, and from faith to science; it is a change from moral servitude to moral freedom. For man is free only when reason is the ultimate court of appeal.

This great change is due mainly to two men—the English Protestant Locke, and the French Catholic Descartes; but we find it in earlier writers—in Hooker and Hobbes, for example. Both these latter writers place the origin and, therefore, the authority of human society in a social contract, and not in divine appointment, and are thus the parents of Rousseau and the French Revolution. Locke and Descartes, working on

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different lines, came practically to the same conclusion, namely, that in the human consciousness lie the test and reality of all truth, and, therefore, of all life guidance. From them come all modern thought, in all its different phases, from the crassest materialism to the flimsiest idealism. To the seventeenth century belong Leibniz and Spinoza, Newton and Galileo, Vico and Grotius—hence the beginnings of modern science in all its branches. To it also belong the first effective movements toward what may be called individualism, which was destined to play such a part in the subsequent world. They take their rise in Holland, England, Scotland, and find their overt expression in the three great anthropocentric movements of the century, the two English revolutions and the foundation of a new order of things, whose very essence is individualism, in the newly-discovered continent beyond the Western Sea. In all these men are more or less blindly asserting their moral rights, their right to freedom of action, guided by free reason and free affection. If the sixteenth century saw the collapse of external spiritual authority and the rise of rationalism, the seventeenth saw the collapse of external temporal authority and the rise of individualism, backed too by a philosophy which showed it to be rational and practicable.

In the eighteenth century the movements of the two previous centuries toward freedom of thought and individualism in life were carried to extremes, and a new movement begun, what may be called the movement toward economic freedom. It is *par excellence* the century of down-breaking in all the spheres of life and thought. Voltaire overthrew thrones with a jest, and made belief in revealed authority forever impossible; Rousseau discarded all conventionalities and external repressive institutions, called for a return to nature, and made subjective sentiment the rule of life—individualism with a vengeance! Hume, the friend of Rousseau, supplied a philosophy for all this, by reducing all thought to clusters of impressions and ideas, and defying these to get beyond themselves either to a world of objects, or to a subject. Kant, accepting this result, showed how the world that we know, subjects and all, can be built up of these clusters, provided we bring out all

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that is implicit in them. Goethe, with Titanic nature, showed that man works out his own destiny by casting off his limitations and rising to spiritual freedom among free men—that, as Tennyson puts it, "man is man and master of his fate." Lastly, Adam Smith, devoting himself to a sphere of human action which thinking men had too long affected to despise, demanded freedom in the economic world, asserted that the shackles should be struck from the hands of labor, and that complete freedom of production and trade should be permitted —*laissez faire, laissez passer*—insisting, with perfect truth, that freedom of subsistence is the condition of all other freedom. Meanwhile, individualism, the demand of the individual for recognition as an absolute end, found public utterance in the two great events of the century, the American and French Revolutions, in which men boldly declared that they were the lords, not the slaves or tools of institutions, and that any institution or law which they could or would acknowledge, on pain of denying their manhood, must be the expression of their own reason, a means toward the attainment of their own ends, as spiritual beings.

Such, after three hundred years of heroic toil and martyrdom, was the condition of things at the opening of the nineteenth century. One would be glad to be able to say that all the movements toward freedom, begun and carried on in those years were continued, without interruption, till the present day. Some of them have, indeed, been so, and new ones have been initiated; but others have suffered a setback and a reaction. This was, perhaps, inevitable, and is due to the fact that, in the transition from a theological, theocentric and supernatural view of the world, to a scientific, anthropocentric and natural one, and in the hand-to-hand struggle for individual liberty, two things dear to the human heart and essential to its peace were lost, to a large extent; (1) the sense of personal eternity and immortality, and those hopes that go with it—things which had for so long rested upon a supernatural basis, and seemed to vanish when this was withdrawn; (2) that settled and fixed condition of society which had been attained under monarchic institutions, and which had been greatly disturbed

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by the inroads of individualism, especially by that great explosion thereof, the French Revolution. The consequence was that, early in the century there set in a strong reaction against individualism, both in thought and practice, a reaction in favor of faith and supernaturalism, on the one hand, and of monarchy and despotism, on the other. In the Latin countries of Europe this took the form of a sentimental neo-Catholicism, whose hierophants were men like Bonnet, de Maistre, Chateaubriand, and of the Napoleonic empire succeeded by the restoration of royalty. In the Germanic countries, and in Russia, it produced various philosophies whose aim was to make the old supernatural religion palatable to awakened reason, and at the same time strengthen the hands of monarchies, ultimately developing some of them into empires, *e. g.,* Germany. America was not sensibly affected by any of these things, except by some of the reactionary philosophies—Scottish Reidism and German Hegelianism. The former, by depreciating human reason which seemed to have led to Hume's sceptical results, formed what seemed a vacancy left for revelation, whose content, in some form, human nature appeared to demand; and the result was eagerly seized upon by the friends of orthodoxy, so that not only in Great Britain, but also in America, the Scottish Philosophy became very widely popular. The latter, which frankly called itself a restoration-philosophy, by a firework of dialectics and an impudent distortion of the facts of history, undertook to show that Christianity, or that fairy changeling which it chose to call Christianity (for it had made away with the real thing) was the absolute religion; and these again have been believed by many champions of orthodoxy both in churches and universities. Hegelianism undertook, further, to show that the Prussian military state, of which, as professor in Berlin, Hegel was an official, was the ideal form of government, and belief in this has, in no small degree, contributed to the building up of the German despotic empire. All this the restoration-philosophy accomplished at a heavy expense—the expense of human individuality, human freedom, human immortality, and even of God. Hegelianism, whatever its author and disciples may say, knows none of these things, being only

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a framework of logical categories. It has been a great instrument of reaction, not merely in philosophy and politics, but also, and still more so, in economics; for socialism, which is a mere return to feudal economics, is simply Hegelianism in economics. Marx merely substituted for Hegel's dialectic process, the process of economic production. But it must be admitted that, besides the reactionary philosophy of Hegel, socialism has another root in the economic conditions of the time, which themselves are a result of advancing science. The application of discoveries in physics to machinery for production, transport and communication has brought about, in the economic world of the country, a condition of things, for which the old economic theories offer no guide, a series of problems for which they contain no solution. The workman no longer owns his tools, as in former days, and thus becomes inevitably in large measure the slave of the man who does. At the same time it has become possible for all the world to compete with all the world, and since, all other things being equal, the successful competitor is he who can obtain his products at the lowest wages, there is a continual tendency to make wages lower and lower till they reach the starvation point. Of the various attempts to remedy these two evils none can be said to have proved entirely successful, not even trades-unions or labor-unions. The owners of the instruments of production are still able to exercise a certain amount of tyranny over the workingmen, while the latter still lead a precarious life, and are, in many cases, subject to dire poverty and suffering. Here socialism steps in and says it can solve both difficulties. It calls upon the state to deprive the employers of labor of the instruments of production, and so become itself the employer of labor, in which case, the entire working class, to which then almost everybody would belong, would become state officials, and have their wages regulated equitably (so it is believed) by the state. In this way, economic tyranny, competition, and poverty would cease, and the result would be a "coöperative commonwealth," a blessed Utopia. The propounders of this scheme—mostly persons to whom true liberty does not seem dear—fail to see that, even if poverty could in this way be made to cease (and

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that is avowedly their chief object), it would be at the expense of some of the noblest privileges of the race—of personal liberty, enterprise, and initiative,—and that it could hardly fail to be fatal to all the higher manifestations of intellect and affection, to philosophy, science, art and literature. At all events, socialism is distinctly a reactionary movement, of the same nature as despotism in politics, and ecclesiastical authority in thought. In all these there is a retrogression from free variety in harmony, to dead monotony in authority.

But in spite of all these reactionary movements, from which we are still sadly suffering, in both thought and life, the nineteenth century has been marked by great and manifold progress toward freedom, in many and many directions. In the economic world, despite all drawbacks, the working class is in every way better off than it was a century ago, and has more opportunity and taste for culture; the power and tyranny of capital has been curbed and regulated. In the political sphere, slavery has been abolished in all civilized countries, and thus the dignity of the individual spirit, as an end in itself, universally acknowledged. France has returned to republicanism; England and Italy have become distinctly democratic; the United States has been confirmed in its devotion to freedom; a strong movement is at work in favor of suffrage and political power for women. Everywhere the reluctance to go to war is growing. In the religious world greater advance has been made toward toleration and freedom of thought than in any period in the world's history. Persecution for opinion's sake is rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Philosophy, science, historic research and literary criticism have combined to assault the gloomy Bastille of supernaturalism and revelation, and it is now as good as leveled to the ground, albeit the news of that fact, with all our newspapers, does not spread very rapidly. More and more religion has come to mean a rational ethical life suitable to the nature of free spirits. Education has increased and spread as never before; illiteracy is rapidly disappearing. Even our universities, half mediæval, half ecclesiastical as they still mostly are, have made considerable advance in adapting their instruction to the needs of modern life, and

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contributing their mite to the cause of freedom. Their number, too, especially in this country, has enormously increased. Of progress in the arts and sciences one can only say that it has been greater in this century than in all the other known centuries put together. It would be well if the same could be said of the science of sciences—philosophy. But alas! it cannot. Philosophy since Kant left it, has rather gone backwards than forwards, wandering off either into a crude materialism or an empty, merely formal idealism. At present it has come almost to a standstill, ashamed to go back openly to the absurdities of old theology and afraid to go forward openly to pure science destitute of theology. It is in a sore strait, and this largely owing to the fact that its professors mostly occupy paid positions in unemancipated colleges and universities. There are no free-lances hardly nowadays in thought, no Brunos, Spinozas, Schopenhauers. Yet there are not wanting signs of better things. Biology, physiology and psychology, which at present try to usurp the field of philosophy, may justify themselves by asserting, as they may with truth, that they are preparing the material for a truer system of philosophy than any that ever before appeared. If philosophy is the unification by reason of the world presented to it in consciousness, then every fresh discovery in science, every gap filled in that world, is an advance toward a complete philosophy. So that we have good reason to hope well even of philosophy in the next century.

We stand now at the end of a century looking backward with mingled joy and regret, and forward with mingled hope and anxiety. What has been done in the past centuries we have glanced at and tried to estimate; what remains to be done, that can be done, in that which is approaching, we must now consider. That is its task. And we may say at once that, since the task of all the centuries is to raise mankind, every member of it, to complete and actual moral freedom, which rests upon insight, just affection, and strong will, realizing themselves in a social order, the task of the twentieth is to perform its share in that. And it can do this only by carrying on those movements toward moral freedom which were set afoot in the past,

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and doing its best to crush out all reactionary movements toward unfreedom spiritual or temporal.

And, first and foremost, it must begin with a rejuvenated philosophy. Starting from the basis of Kant, from whom, barring a few inconsistencies, there is no getting away, avoiding the mistakes and misrepresentations of his more famous followers, and taking advantage of all that has been revealed by the sciences of evolution, in nature and culture, it must seek to unify the world in the only way possible—through the unity of the human spirit—without assuming any other principle of unity, God, nature, or the like. If such exist, that will appear in the process of unification.

The new philosophy will, of necessity, be an endeavor to account for the world as the evolution of consciousness and its content, or, more strictly, of the world as the content of a consciousness; for such is the only world we can speak of or know. In truth, if we consider carefully, we shall see that the world is nothing more than a complex of feelings grouped and distinguished in time and space with reference to the satisfaction of desire. If we ask how it has been evolved, and what is its moving principle, we shall be compelled to say that it is due to desire, the only prime mover conceivable, seeking its own satisfaction. Desire is the Absolute, the primal fact in the universe, the principle that accounts for the whole. Considering further, we shall come to see that such an Absolute implies a number of individuals, monads of desire, incommunicable, and therefore, indestructible, each seeking satisfaction through all the rest, and in so doing, evolving the physical world, which is the result of manifold desires seeking satisfaction through mutual aid. Nay, we may go further, and show that the moral world, with all its institutions,—a world which it has been customary to set over against the physical, as governed by entirely different principles—is evolved by a continuation of the same process, and that there is no break or gulf between them. We shall then recognize that morality itself is nothing more than the effort to satisfy to the full the desire that we, each of us, have; and since this can be done only through the satisfaction of all other desires, that the completest selfishness is also the

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completest unselfishness; that hedonism and rigorism, egoism and altruism are the same thing.

I cannot here enter further into the details of this philosophy, though it would not be difficult to work these out into lucidity. I merely wish to show in general its nature, method, and moral results, and to insist that without a philosophy, that is a completely rational account of the world, eschewing faith, agnosticism and every form of unintelligence, we cannot make any sure-footed progress at all. Before we can deal confidently with the world and our relations to it, that is, before we can live an open-eyed life, we must understand the world, including ourselves, or better ourselves including the world. It is all very well to say that a good life is worth striving for on its own account, and that no philosophy is needed in order to do that; but those who do so forget that without a philosophy it is impossible to say what a good life is, without falling back upon mere popular opinion or prejudice—a poor resort. Thus, then, the first and most fundamental task of the coming century is the elaboration of a philosophy of the world in consciousness. This cannot be too strongly insisted upon; for without it our best efforts are mere gropings in the dark, without clue and without aim; and whatever is without aim is without inspiration. And along with this philosophy must go an utter repudiation of everything that conflicts with it, no matter what authority it may claim. All pretended revelation, all supernaturalism, all unintelligible dogmas and mysteries, all religions that cannot make good their claims at the tribunal of reason, and romantic and sentimental views of life, all agnosticism must be quietly but resolutely brushed aside. We must live by truth and truth alone. If it be insisted that without supernatural religion we know nothing of immortality, that must be resolutely denied; for philosophy, when disburdened of theology, is fully capable of showing that the self-conscious being is above time. In continuing to palter with the dogmas of Christian supernaturalism to the exclusion of nobler things, we are disloyal to truth and to all the best interests of humanity. Nay, we are even disloyal to the first principles of the government under which we live. For while Chris-

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tianity finds the source of all authority in a will external to man's, this government finds it in man's. The former leaves man a slave, the latter makes him free. Between the two there is no compromise or truce possible, and the attempt to make such brings only confusion and complication such as retards our progress at the present day. The simple truth is that this republic is, in principle, a religion far nobler, and far more full of promise, than any that has ever before appeared on the face of the earth. It alone acknowledges man to be the source of moral authority, hence to be a free being, the carver of his own eternal destiny. Well did Washington say, in an early document, that this is in no sense a Christian country. It is something far higher than that: it is the country for the realization of divine humanity—the type and foreshadow of the only heaven that is conceivable. We might, indeed, fairly say that the task of the twentieth century, and of all the succeeding ones, is simply the realization of the ideal of individual freedom, involving self-existence, that lies at the basis of our republic. That ideal implies that the divine is not a single spirit, of which all other spirits, so-called, are merely creations, that is, self-less phenomena, but that it is a republic of self-existent spirits, each seeking the realization of its desires through love, through intimacy with all the rest, and finding its heaven in such intimacy. Such a republic ours endeavors to be, and as such it is the expression of the ultimate and absolute religion. For us, and perhaps for us alone, true patriotism and true religion are identical. And this we have half recognized in a curious way. We have disallowed external divine authority in our government, and we have refused to let supernatural religion be taught in our public schools; but yet we have not openly introduced into either the religion of free spirit, the religious ideal upon which all our institutions rest. Thus our state and our schools are without religious sanctions, except such as they surreptitiously borrow from a religion of external authority utterly alien to them in spirit, and continually tending to overthrow them. This sad condition of things it is part of the task of the approaching century to put an end to, wiping out that distracting and confusing

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dualism of church and state, of religious and civic life, which robs the former of content, and the latter of enthusiasm, thus degrading both. In the future American republicanism must be not merely a system of politics, but also a religion, the sole and sufficient religion of every American free citizen. As a religion, it will not only continually labor and tend to validate the rights of every individual spirit, as an end to itself and as a contributor to all other ends, and so to do away with all those pitiful conflicts that, for the sake of half-animal enjoyments, range class against class, giving rise to such morbid phenomena as socialism and anarchism, both subversive of true freedom, but it will also show us that this temporal life of ours on earth is a necessary phase of eternal life, which will and must be just what we, with our knowledge, love, and will desire that it shall be.

In order that our philosophy may be truly a unified account of the evolving world, we must labor unremittingly to know, that is, to arrange and classify the facts and processes of that world. And this means that one important part of the coming century's task will be to "make knowledge circle with the winds," to turn everybody into a devoted student. It is truly amazing how few people in our time are real students, how many know almost nothing of the view of existence revealed by modern science and philosophy; for how many the world is a meaningless show, full of grim hobgoblins, among which they stagger round in doubt or, at best, in blind faith, or yet blinder agnosticism. At first sight it seems preposterous to say that everybody must become a student, and it is sneeringly asked: How can people who have to spend all their time and energy in earning a bare livelihood find time or energy to be students? And yet that is the only condition on which the ideal of our nation can ever become a reality. This nation owes it to every one of its citizens to see to it that he has time and strength left to be a student. That is simple justice. And one of the tasks of the century must be to make that possible. It is not very long since the notion that every person should be taught to write and cipher was scouted as an impossible chimera. To-day this is almost an accomplished fact, and the state recog-

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nizes that, in simple justice, it owes this to its citizens. Now that we have attained universal common-school education, we must proceed and make universal college education a fact. I do not say that the state should undertake to give this education; far from it! but I do say that the state should insist upon every one of its citizens being raised to that grade of intelligence which renders its own existence, as what it claims to be, a government by and for free men, permanently possible, and should remove all economic and other obstacles that stand in the way of this. Citizenship should be a college degree, and the only degree, and all persons who have not taken it should be denied all share in political power. That is only justice to them, as well as to other citizens; for to put political power into the hands of those who do not understand the purpose and meaning of political institutions is the height of injustice and stupidity.

From what has been said, it must be evident that the educational task of the twentieth century cannot be performed without a great change in our present economic conditions; since under these such education is impossible. They must be replaced by others which will make it possible for every parent to give his children a college education. How is this to be done? The readiest answer will be, By socialism. But we have already seen that this involves the loss of the very thing for which the state exists, personal liberty. Some other way must, therefore, be found, which shall preserve the rights of free individuality, and yet insure it the material conditions for self-development. And this way, it seems to me, can be reached under the same circumstances that would render socialism possible; that is, when the majority of the people are convinced that such way ought to be found and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices. The great economic task of the coming century will consist in bringing this conviction home to the great body of the people, and preparing them for the needed progress. And this can be done only by introducing a new ideal of life, and a new valuation of the things that enter into it. This must be the outcome of our new philosophy, which by showing us that the only thing truly valuable in existence is

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spiritual perfection, and the only heaven the community of saints, that is, the intimacy of free, pure, wise, loving, and beneficent spirits, must induce us to transfer the interest which we now attribute to material wealth, to that for which wealth is merely a means. Then people, instead of entering upon business for the vulgar purpose of acquiring wealth for selfish comfort and vain display, will do so in order to obtain culture for themselves and families and to aid their fellows in doing the same. Their aim in the employment of labor will be, not to lower, but to raise wages; or better still, to give no wages at all, but a share and an interest in their business itself. They will ask themselves, not, How many material things can I possess? but, How many men can I enable to rise to the heights of spiritual culture and to live lives worthy of immortal beings, worthy of the deepest friendship and love? "To-day men's chief interest is in things, and not in men; real devoted friendship is a thing almost unknown. But surely there is something exceedingly uncultured and vulgar in the character of people who are willing to surround themselves with impudent luxury which in no way contributes to their spiritual elevation, while they allow perhaps hundreds of men and women in the immediate neighborhood to struggle on darkly in poverty, ignorance, and vice, which utterly unfit them for all the nobler forms of spiritual intimacy, for all the joys of heaven. There is something truly hideous in all this, and it is only our familiarity with it that prevents us from rising up in indignation against it.

I say then that the economic task of the twentieth century is to convince men and women of the true meaning and function of material possessions, to show them that the real "wealth of nations" is a body of cultured citizens, rich in knowledge, love, and will, not a mass of material things owned by a pack of spiritual boors. When this conviction has been reached, and each man makes the culture of all his chief end, then there will be no need for enslaving socialism; then the conflicts between capital and labor will cease, and with them other minor difficulties, such as the servant question, the land question, and the currency question.

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I have thus, I think, enumerated the main departments of the task of the twentieth century. What I have said may be recapitulated in a few words. The task before us is (1) to come to clearness with regard to the nature and destiny of man, by an appeal to science, and an eschewing of all authority however hoary, and (2) having discovered that he is an eternal being, destined to grow forever in knowledge, love, and will, through deeper and ever deeper relations to his fellow-beings, whose interaction constitutes the world, to supply the conditions most favorable to this growth, by making it the conscious aim of every member of the race. A serious effort to perform this task would initiate a new era in the world's history—the era of divine humanity, the era of the "Eternal Gospel" and of the "Holy Spirit," so long foreshadowed by poet and sage, and let no one say that, in eschewing authority and revelation, we are diminishing the hopes of men, or accepting a lower ideal of heroism and sainthood than has existed in the past. Far from it! We are turning hopes into certainties, and calling, for the first time in the world's history, for true morality —a morality which extends to every faculty of the human being, in all his relations with himself and fellows, and which looks forward to no reward which it can possibly miss, since that reward is itself. Furthermore, let no one say that such a life-view leaves nothing to the imagination, makes no place for art or poetry. The very reverse is true. By removing those grotesque and stereotyped imaginings of the future life, which dwarfed and stiffened the fancy, and contracted the field of ideal art, it throws open to imagination and art the entire field of possible spiritual achievement and spiritual bliss, and invites them to construct ever higher and more varied ideals of human nobility and human intimacy. For what is art but the depiction of the triumph of spirit, revealed to enthusiasm as beauty, as that form of existence which needs no excuse.

I suppose there is no difference of opinion with regard to the task of the future: it is to do away with poverty, ignorance, and vice, and to raise men to spiritual culture and freedom, to make of earth what we would wish heaven to be. But two questions still face us: (1) How shall this condition be

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brought about, and (2) What sort of social order does it imply? We shall treat them in this order.

As to the former: the task before us demands, first of all, apostles, earnest devoted men, who, having risen to a clear insight into man's nature and his eternal destiny, and recognized that as the only end worth working for, are ready to devote themselves, body and soul, like Paul of old, to its attainment. But alas! this demand is not easily met. Men of real earnestness in regard to spiritual attainment are to-day rare as perhaps never before. The day of spiritual heroism seems to have passed. Everyone is eager to find somewhere to lay his head, some comfortable nook or niche in which he may be free from struggle and the need for great moral initiative. There is moral and intellectual cowardice almost everywhere. There is, indeed, a widely spread sentiment of kindliness, miscalled humanity, which would be pleased to see every human being placed beyond the reach of pain and struggle, beyond the need of strong willing, and the world reduced to an easy-going, thoughtless garden of dalliance; but the fiery enthusiasm for human worth, for the divine-human ideal, where do we find it? And yet that is what must be found ere the task of the twentieth century can begin. Somewhere there must be found a small devoted band of men and women of fearless character, clear philosophic insight, and mighty spiritual love, who, living a divine life in their relations to each other, shall labor, with all the strength that is in them, to lift their fellows into the same divine life. Forming a "settlement" in some city or town, they must preach and teach and toil, not merely among the poor and needy, but also, and perhaps chiefly, among the well-to-do, until they have impressed upon them the true ideal of life as struggle for spiritual worth—for insight and love and will—and conjured up before them the picture of the new heavens and the new earth, the scene of the ever-deepening intimacy of pure, free spirits. They must make their settlement the very centre of the city's life, its school, its college, its university, its church, its ethical society, and its theatre, all in one, all guided by the same lofty aim. They must endeavor to withdraw those that join them from the world that is, with

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its selfishness, its vanity, its love of show and foolish, aimless amusement, and make them the first citizens of the world that is to come, with its friendship, its simplicity, and its active interest in all worthy things. They must interest themselves in all social movements and endeavor to give them a spiritual turn. They must establish an institution which shall do for the natural, freedom-guided life of the future what the church undertook to do for the authority-awed life of the past. And they will have much to learn from the church, above all, its discipline, and its care for souls, adding thereto the care of bodies. Discipline is the backbone of every gospel that has any chance of success. All great religions, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, have been, above all, disciplines, institutions for training the affections and the will, as well as the intellect. There is no worthy religion that does not set its followers a great task, demanding self-abnegation and heroic endeavor. Through such task alone does man become aware of his divinity, and blest in that awareness. And, after all, discipline is the nurse of freedom. We have to be trained to be free, in any sense in which freedom has any value.

When our little knot of men and women have fully established themselves in one city, have increased in numbers, and have learned by experience what regulations, forms, and activities are most conducive to their ends, they will send out bands of apostles to establish settlements in other cities, just as the mediæval monasteries did, until gradually the whole nation and, finally, the whole world, is leavened with the new spirit—the spirit that underlies our American institutions—buried, at present, alas! how deep!

As to our second question, relating to the future form of social life, it is not easy to give it a definite answer. That it will be different from the present form, is very certain: *that* is already giving way under the pressure of circumstances. The family, living in its isolated abode, with its servants, regarded and treated as inferiors, its private kitchen, laundry, and dining room, its exclusive parties, and the rest, belongs to an obsolete, inhumane, and un-American order of things, against which the apartment-house, and the family-hotel, are

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clear protests. No less so is the summer-hotel, where many families that in winter occupy separate houses, meet at a common table, and in a common drawing-room, and seem thoroughly to enjoy it. All this, I think, points to the conclusion that the type of future life will be the monastery, with the family, instead of the individual, for its unit. Such a mode of life would solve many difficulties—the servant question, the questions of the poor and the unemployed, and so forth. It would afford that combination of society and solitude which is best for man: it would enable families of moderate means to share and enjoy much, not accessible to them in their isolation, good art, good music, good literature, good conversation, etc., etc. It would be most civilizing and humanizing in its effect. The old, ascetic, other-worldly, nature-mutilating monasteries have almost passed away, with the view of life which gave them birth; but it may be that they will revive under a new form to meet the needs of the higher, humaner, completer life that is to be. Yet all this is merely a suggestion, a surmise. No one can at present tell with certainty, what the form of twentieth century life will be. Only one thing, I think, is certain. The family, as a moral institution, will attain increased significance; as the chief centre of the efforts of all its members, the goal of a man's business ambition, and the main outlet for his wealth, it will sink in importance as it ought, and give place to a larger object of interest. The man whose labor and thought are expended altogether on his family, is only one step above the man who labors and plans only for himself. A man is often an angel to his family and a demon to all the rest of the world. The diamonds for the wife often cost the bread of the poor. This should not be so.

This is not the first time I have spoken of these things, these aspirations and hopes. They are my daily and hourly companions. But I seldom find that they meet with much response, when I speak them out. They mean toil of mind and body; they mean courage, independence, self-abnegation, a laying down of one's own life and a taking up of that of the world; they mean willingness to undergo obloquy, neglect, derision; they mean dying in order to live. And for these things there

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are few people, in this morally unheroic and self-seeking time, prepared. Everyone feels that his task is the attainment of temporal well-being for himself; and so the task of the centuries, the task of eternity hardly appeals to him. Nay, he is often fain to forget that there is any eternity, and so is content to live the life of the ephemeron. But this cannot always be so. Even in this matter-ridden time, and even as a reaction against materialism, there must soon arise a few people for whom the interests of eternity shall outbid the interests of time, and an apostolate be found to begin the task of the twentieth century.

"For unto each man his handiwork, unto each a crown,
The just Fate gives;
Whoso takes upon him the world's life, and his own lays down,
He dying so, lives.

Whoso bears the whole heaviness of the wronged world's weight,
And puts it by,
It is well with him suffering though he face man's fate:
How should he die?

Seeing death hath no part in him any more, no power
Upon his head.
He hath bought his eternity with a little hour,
And is not dead.

For an hour, if ye look for him, he is no more found,
For one hour's space;
Then ye lift up your eyes to him, and behold him crowned,
A deathless face.

On the mountains of memory, by the world's well-springs,
In all men's eyes,
Where the light of the life of him is on all past things:
Death only dies."*

THOMAS DAVIDSON.

*Swinburne, *Super Flumina Babylonis.*

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SOCIALISTIC IMPERIALISM.

I.

Some liberals with socialistic leanings and a few professed socialists support the South African war and the Imperialism it embodies by two arguments which deserve attention. The first runs as follows: If an individual member of society, owning land, neglects to develop its natural resources or so uses it as to make it a public nuisance, or refuses permission to the public to utilize it for fair compensation, it is admitted that society has a right to compel him to refrain from such neglect or abuse and to deprive him of the control of his property if he resists. This is done on general principles of utility, amounting in extreme cases to necessity. The modern State so interprets the maxim, *Salus republicae suprema lex,* as to interfere more and more with the rights of individual property, not merely in land but in other sorts, on the ground that certain exercises of these rights are not self-regarding actions but are social wrongs. In similar fashion, runs the argument, if a nation or the government of a nation holding possession of a piece of territory refuses to utilize fully its resources or to permit others to do so or otherwise makes itself a nuisance to its neighbors, or to the international public, the sacred rights of nationality ought not to protect it from coercion imposed on behalf of the general good of nations. The Transvaal, it is contended, was such a State; it would not develop its resources properly nor would it let others develop them; its backward civilization was a contamination and a menace to the States around it. The conquest and annexation of the Transvaal by Great Britain is justified on the ground that the world will be gainers by a just, settled and effective administration of the country and that Great Britain, as the nearest neighbor and as otherwise the power most competent for such a task, may regard herself as delegated by the civilized world to perform this task.

Now, with the general principle which underlies this ar-

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gument no one but an individualist of the old school can quarrel. It cannot seriously be maintained that any group of inhabitants, by virtue of mere priority of occupation, or because they have for a certain time exercised government over a territory, would have a right (save perhaps in a strictly legal international sense) to neglect or abuse resources, the utilization of which might be an urgent need to the world at large. An extreme case rightly tests the issue. An inundation over the land of a nation causes it to be over-populated, or some persistent disease impairs its food supply, while beyond its national border lies rich land untilled and this by people belonging to some neighboring nation. An international court of equity would certainly accord to the people of the former State a right to use the land of the latter, and if necessary would enforce that right. If this holds in an extreme case, does it not hold of cases less extreme, where the need and the public utility of coercion are less?

This is clear. But let us see what is admitted. For the justification of such coercion we assume the existence of an International Court which represents the general good of nations, as distinct from the good of any particular nation; the right accorded to the needy nation is not a "natural" right but is international and rational in origin. To say that a nation, asserting its own needs in its own case without an express commission from the "international," has a right to apply, either on its own behalf or professedly for the general good, any such coercion, is to lapse into a national individualism which is as false as the individualism of absolute personal rights within the single nation.

Now, neither Great Britain nor any other imperial power, pleading "the general good" as a motive and result of its territorial aggressions, received a mandate or a sanction from any such International Court. In point of fact there exists no organized or recognized mode of expression of the general will of nations. So far as that will finds form in personal expression through diplomacy and the press, instead of sanctifying, it condemns each aggressive action of Great Britain,

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Russia, Germany and America. It may, indeed, be a gain for world-civilization that Great Britain should annex the Boer Republics, Germany Strassburg, Russia Manchuria and so forth, but no recognition of this gain is given by Christendom which, as far as in it lies, condemns such acts as motived in each case by selfish greed and fraught with gain only to the aggressor. Though envy may bias judgment, there is no reason to doubt that the general sense of the civilized world regards our annexation in South Africa as wanton theft committed by a stronger power against a weaker, and nowise as designed to secure any general good.

To this it may be replied: "The fact that there exists no organized form of the reasonable expression of the international will must not deter Great Britain or any other nation from doing what she genuinely believes to be for the general good. If in any rude society regular processes of justice are not established, a man is justified in taking the law into his own hands; and his action must be judged upon the actual merits of the case. The admitted fact that the bias of personal interest will be present in such a case need not disqualify a man from punishing a wrong, or forcibly abating a nuisance, when no appeal is open to an impartial tribunal." So here it is asserted that we are justified in annexing the Boer Republics because this action, though repudiated and condemned by the current unorganized and irrational sentiment of other nations, makes really for the general good of nations. The fact that we make some particular national gain for ourselves, or avenge some particular national injury, though it may naturally rouse suspicions regarding the net result of annexation, must not be allowed to prevent recognition of the actual world-gain of this policy. The Boer Republics, passing from incompetent into competent administration, will in fact, by the sound development of their resources and the freedom of access and security of life and property afforded by the British flag, yield gains in which all nations must participate. "Such an action," it is maintained, "is really international, in that it helps to realize a truly enlightened world policy, the 'real' or rational will of the community of nations."

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Here again the general reasoning, while it remains hypothetical, is impregnable; but its application is riddled by illicit particular assumptions. It is admitted that no act of aggressive imperialism is sanctioned by the direct expression of an international will. Can it be seriously maintained that consideration of the international gain, as distinguished from the selfish national gain, plays any considerable part as a motive in the policy of the expanding nation? Is it contended, in the particular instance of the Boer Republic that the good of any entity larger than the British Empire exercises any influence whatever in determining the act of annexation? The consideration that such wider good is consistent with, or incidental on, the pursuance of our selfish national end, though it is not present as a conscious determination of policy, surely borders on a region of most dangerous casuistry. If we are justified, in default of any constituted court of justice, in acting as judges in our own case, it is surely essential to show that some consideration transcending our own private gain, operates consciously in our minds as a standard of utility.

Before a stronger farmer, on a frontier where no regular justice is established, can rightly compel a neighboring farmer to adopt a more enlightened method of working and of living, and on his proving refractory, can shoot him down and seize his farm, a case of overwhelming strength must be made out, and, on his proving refractory, can shoot him down and seize ercing farmer will not be the sole gainer by his policy of force. Against a man or a nation acting as judge and executioner in its own cause there must always lie the onus of showing that it is not dominated, though it may be influenced, by purely self-regarding motives. It cannot be presumed that a course of action which is profitable to the stronger coercive nation will by some general process of international reactions prove profitable to the world in general, or that such profit, if it emerges, can safely be taken to overbalance the injury which such coercion always inflicts and which is graver where it appears, as it always does, to be the persecution of a weaker by a stronger nation.

The Utilitarianism which argues that because Egypt has

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been a direct material gainer by our seizure of its government, that seizure was justified, though that gain was in no sense the directing motive of our seizure, is a short-sighted utilitarianism, because it ignores the utility of faith among nations, and the injury which the violation of distinct national pledges inflicts upon the moral relations between nations.

So, in the annexation of the Boer Republics, there is no evidence that we have been actuated in the policy by any consideration broader than a short-sighted calculation of British imperial interests, or that any broader interests are in fact likely to be subserved. The case for international good could hardly be weaker. The only material resources of the Transvaal which are known to exist were already in rapid course of development; nothing is gained by increasing the rate of output, nor indeed can it seriously be held that the occupation of capital and labor in these mining industries is a world-gain at all—it is rather a world-loss. Apart from the mines and the mining population it is not even pretended that any political issues would have arisen grave enough to warrant the expenditure of blood and money which has occurred, even from considerations of a purely British policy. It is difficult to show that even Great Britain will make any net industrial or political gain through annexation either on a short or a long range focus of utility: it is impossible to show that the transfer of power from the self-governing burghers to the British crown confers or will confer any general gain to the world, or that any slight industrial gain which might arise from more efficient development of the annexed countries will not be immediately outweighed by the cynical repudiation of our policy as it was defined at the outbreak of hostilities, and by the distrust and indignation which our conduct has aroused in every nation of the world.

The case of the South African War and Annexation is made still worse by the special circumstances. I have admitted that a nation may take justice into its own hands when no court of international justice exists, though it can only justify war and annexation by the clearest evidence of necessity. But in the South African business we have debarred ourselves from

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pleading that we are in reality the executive of a sound world-policy in pursuance of the general good of nations, by refusing to have recourse to a method of arbitration which, though not a perfect instrument of the general will of nations, is the best instrument available, and that upon our own recent admission. A Court of Arbitration for the determination of the whole issue might not have been constituted with absolute impartiality, but it must at any rate have been less partial than an appeal to the arbitrament of arms. The reason given for our refusal to arbitrate is conclusive against any pretence that our policy of imperial aggression is really designed for, or fraught with, the general good of the world. We refused to arbitrate on the ground that we had in the past forced upon the Transvaal terms of technical political inferiority. The Transvaal government disputed and denied the application of these terms: the issue resting upon the interpretation of written conventions. These conventions we refused to submit to a Court of Arbitration, although recently at The Hague we had expressly assented to a doctrine which assigned the interpretation of documents expressing international relations as a proper province of arbirtation. It is true that by making the exclusion of the Transvaal a condition of our entering the Conference, and by refusing the assent to the arbitration proposals, save on the condition that no outside powers could be admitted to their benefits without the unanimous sanction of the signatory powers, we had excluded the Transvaal from claiming arbitration as a technical right. But our assent to The Hague proposals is a complete admission of the ethics of the case, and carries precisely the same moral condemnation of our forceful policy, as if the Transvaal had been a full participant at the Conference. If any reader is disposed to evade the point by falling back upon the fact that the Boers opened hostilities, it is sufficient to remind him that the words used by the British representative at Pretoria some time before the war, "Her Majesty's government will, if necessary, press their demands by force," form an adequate statement of our intentions.

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II.

It is a law of modern industry that the big business swallows up the smaller business, and that a number of small businesses coalesce in order to work more cheaply and more profitably: instead of a large number of little industrial units we find a smaller number of large units, and this process of combination or absorption proceeds until a few gigantic trade competitors find competition such a costly, wasteful thing that they decide to put an end to it by a culminating act of combination. This law, it is suggested, is likewise applicable to the business of government: small states federate or combine, big states swallow and absorb their smaller or weaker neighbors; a few big empires rapidly extend their areas, putting down the constant internecine struggles and substituting a rivalry of a few great political bodies which only indulge in occasional warfare, and which, in time, when the whole desirable territory of the earth is partitioned between them, will come to terms with one another and secure a peaceful federation of the world. This process is going on apace in the history of modern empires: each step of aggression or coercion may seem indefensible, but after all the absorption of smaller by larger states, of backward by civilized states, is an inevitable operation and makes for net economy in government. It is on the whole desirable that those nations who have best developed the arts of effective government shall extend the practice of those arts over the widest possible area. The larger an empire is the better and the more economically it can be administered, if due regard be paid to the special needs of provinces and districts under a properly devised form of local self-government with a system of central checks. It is entirely a matter of business organization, and the nation which shows most capacity for this work should undertake it. Great Britain, developing sound political methods, based on no vague abstract theories of government, but upon careful experience of all sorts and conditions of men, is able to find trained administrators of incorruptible honesty who shall ingraft these sound methods upon the new states which pass under her control. A capable

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and honest public service, equal justice for all men, greater security against external foes and intestine strife and more practical freedom of the individual than is found under any other government—such are the business advantages offered on the prospectus of Great Britain unlimited. Other civilized nations in proportion to their ability to apply the arts of government may participate, but since the Anglo-Saxon race has gone further and succeeded better than any other, it is well that she should do as much of it as possible.

The case of the Boer Republics is admirably to the point. Africa south of the Zambesi is physically and economically one country, the same race combinations occupy the different states, the same social and political problems present themselves for solution: a political federation of all these states is inevitable and desirable, it should take place under the British flag and the sooner the better. This political ideal, conceived by Lord Carnarvon more than twenty-five years ago, has now been realized by a later master-builder of the British empire.

Now this simple business view of imperial expansion is suspicious for its very simplicity, and when we see what it assumes on the one hand, and ignores on the other, the suspicion deepens into condemnation.

The big business analogy makes two assumptions, first that politics is rightly regarded as a business, secondly that it belongs to a class of businesses to which no limit of advantageous growth can be assigned. Let us take the second first. It is not true that there exists a law of general application in the economic world, according to which small businesses are swallowed by larger businesses and these again by larger still, the process terminating in a single giant business which secures industrial peace under the form of a private or public monopoly. In some trades, and in some branches of other trades, this law of economy by combination is operative until complete unity is attained. In many trades combination and growth of business form is attended by profitable economy up to a certain point, but beyond that point each increase of size and restraint of competition causes unwholesome corpulency with loss of vigor and capacity of progress. In many trades no such

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tendency is seen: businesses are small and numerous and remain so for sound reasons of economy. Of course, everywhere, certain economies attend growth in the size of business, but they are attended by certain causally related defects, and the net economy is different in every trade. Is government a business of which we can safely predict that every increase in its area is attended by greater economy and efficiency? In order to answer this question we must ask another: What is the essential character of the businesses which grow to the largest size with most advantage? The answer is quite clear: Adaptability to minute routine, to mechanical organization, for the supply of the common needs of large masses of consumers. To some it may seem that government in eminently a business of this order. Justice, security to person and property, and other protective services, which are the first chief objects of government are, it may appear, essentially of a routine character. In one sense this is true, in another false. The "commodities" supplied by the official classes who constitute the administrative side of government, justice, security, etc., are distinctively routine, conformable to rigid rules and of certain fixed sorts and sizes. Just in so far, therefore, as there exist tolerable homogeneity and constancy in the needs of citizens which these public commodities are designed to supply, do we get really efficient government: ideal justice, exact security, etc., are not obtained, but the official measures are fairly applicable. However big the area of a really homogeneous population might be, it is arguable that the area of government might so expand as to cover it, and perhaps even to develop increased efficiency and economy in doing so. What really limits the expansibility of a governmental area is that which limits the growth of a routine business, the necessity of satisfying the needs of heterogeneous and changing markets. The notion that there are certain common brands of "justice," "freedom," "civilization," which can profitably, or even possibly, be imposed upon widely divergent types of peoples so as to satisfy their needs, is a dangerous fallacy. The notion that even what are called "the elements of justice" are the same everywhere, and that therefore a just British civil servant can

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be safely trusted to satisfy the demands of justice in India or China, only survives on account of the inherent incapacity of English people for the study of psychology and the lack of imagination which disables them from understanding the psychical temperaments and valuations of other peoples. A British lawyer imposing British "elements of justice" in China would in every concrete case offend the ethical susceptibilities and violate the elementary sense of right in the best men of the Chinese community. It is, indeed, universally admitted, how utterly all European nations fail to understand that delicate multiform thing which is rudely generalized as "the Oriental mind." How then can we govern properly or "civilize" the owners of this mind? Routine methods of the big "governmental machine" are plainly incompetent to supply the elemental political needs of widely divergent bodies of consumers. We admit these when we apply measures of local self-government and endeavor to furnish elasticity to the machinery. But this very action serves to bring out the central fallacy. Devolution of power from a central government, always accompanied by forcible retention of a central veto, while complicating the mechanism of the single machine, does not confer that true freedom of local will that is essential to sound government of the "federal" type.

Not only is a definite limit set by considerations of efficiency and economy to the size of a single area of central government, but this limit cannot be got rid of by mere devolution from the centre, for that devolution is vitiated at the start by the arbitrary determination of the central power as to what subordinate powers shall be devoluted, and it is further vitiated by the temptation to overrule those very cases where the diverging will of the subordinate government is testimony to the radical defect of centralization.

This criticism implies not merely that government is not to be classed as one of the great routine businesses which grow stronger as they grow bigger, indefinitely, but that it is not rightly regarded as a business at all. Common parlance even dignifies it by the title Art. Now an art differs from a business precisely in the fact that its work is rightly dominated by con-

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siderations of the organic nature of man, the individual character of his wants and the necessity of applying individuality to procure their satisfaction. Just in proportion as government succeeds in being an art is it really successful. In order to be an artist an official must be in close knowledge and sympathy with the personality of the governed class. Now where there is great heterogeneity among the governed classes this is impossible; the attempt to make allowance for this heterogeniety only imparts more elaboration into the "machinery" of government and makes it more mechanical and so less capable of fulfilling the real functions of government. The extent and nature of this vice is hidden by the autocratic idea and temper which Empire commonly assumes and by a certain spurious temporary strength which emanates from military organization. The more Great Britain attempts to infuse Empire with Democracy, to implant, water and grow "free" institutions in her conquered states, the more glaringly apparent will become the contradictions between Empire and Democracy. Strong centralization based on and defended by Militarism may supply a powerful and tolerably effective machine for doing such inferior work as a machine can do, but attempt to "force" free institutions and British notions of self-government upon states whose native spirit we have crushed, and the failure will be evident.

This central vice of Empire is best shown by pointing out how the "business" view of economy of government ignores nationality. Our socialists who think it advantageous to break down the boundaries of nationalities, and force all men to become brothers, are not really the scientific gentlemen they claim to be. They want to substitute artificial catastrophe for natural growth. To them nationality is little better than a silly sentiment. If the Transvaal burgher can get better government under the British flag, more security against Kaffir incursions, better markets for their farm produce, and more even-handed justice, it is idle to let a sentiment stand in the way! The "business" man who "runs" British politics to-day naturally believes that a people who gain so much will soon settle down comfortably under the new form of government.

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It is needless to point out how all "history" gives the lie to the business man by showing this sentiment as one of the most stubborn facts. But the case of the Boer Republics presents an even more important lesson. By breaking down the form of nationality in small peoples, and by seeking to break the spirit of it, we are destroying the most essential means of attaining in the future that solid federation of all civilized peoples which is the only hopeful security against the recrudescence of barbarism in the shape of war. As in certain parts of the ancient world there sprang up the City State, representing the best form of society then attainable, so our age is distinctively that of the Nation State, or, one may rightly add, the small nation-state. This is not a mere contradiction of the claims of Imperialism to represent the advanced civilization of Christendom. A candid consideration of the most valued essentials of social life will compel us to admit that the small European peoples such as Denmark, Holland and Belgium, Switzerland, Norway and Sweden, present more wholesome and progressive types of civilization, as we ourselves understand the thing, than any others, and that their smallness and their national self-concentration are chief conditions of this excellence.

The false economy of size which clings to the great autocratic empire (and every empire *quâ* empire is autocratic) conceals the true test of national greatness, the free effective expression and realization of the will of the people. That same quality of present nearness, neighborhood, which is the very essence of civic life, is also essential, though in a somewhat different way, to effective nationality. A militant Imperialism can cultivate and maintain a false form of *exclusive* nationalism which has its essence in hostility towards other nations, but a true *inclusive* nationalism demands the possibility of such personal relations among the members and classes of which a nation is composed, as shall yield a vigorous moral bond of sympathy. A small nation, with some approximate equality of economic and social conditions, can alone yield this moral basis of union. To imagine that the cause of an ideal internationalism can be promoted by breaking down the

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forms of nationalism and seeking to destroy its spirit in those little peoples where alone it truly thrives, is wholly to misunderstand the social problem. Internationalism is not the negation but the expansion of the national spirit. As sound civic forms and feelings are essential to strong nationalism, so sound national forms and feelings are essential to the slow gradual growth of an internationalism which shall develop for itself in due time valid laws and institutions. To maintain and foster the forms and spirit of inclusive nationalism in every state where they have taken firm root is the plain duty of every statesman who wishes to see grow up in the future true bonds of peace and brotherhood among nations. This is no idle speculation but verifiable hypothesis. Those best acquainted with the spirit and temper of the citizens of small states like Switzerland and Denmark will testify that life in these small democratic states, while stimulating an intense love of country, equally favors a tolerance of foreigners, a sympathetic interest in their affairs, and a desire to be on friendly terms with them and to learn from them. On the contrary, just in proportion as imperial habits and temper are manifested in the policy of a nation, and it develops territorial pride and expansive proclivities, goodwill towards foreigners diminishes, and definite antagonisms are set up. A comparison between Germany before the Franco-Prussian war and Germany to-day is convincing evidence. The forcible breaking down of small national boundaries, and the welding of huge empires out of the pieces, retards the process of world-civilization by crushing the external expression of the social nature of man in their largest and most valuable forms. The process of this mechanical coercion is bad, the result is worse. It substitutes for patriotism based on the mutual good will of countrymen an exclusive antagonistic "imperialism" based on force and finding its most appropriate expression in aggressive violence.

Our glory in the recent display of loyalty by the colonies of the British empire is the glory of blind folly. Do we call upon these children to love us, fend us, help us in our proper work, trusting by this common service in good doing to bind them closer to us? Not at all. We call upon them to help us hate

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our enemies and destroy them, to help us break down the constitutional liberties of two sister colonies and to found new colonies by forcing enemies to become British subjects. Will this experience really bind our colonies to us more closely in the lasting bonds of affection? Is confederacy in violence a sound pledge of friendship? Will the total union of colonies within our empire be really strengthened by making two new hostile colonies, and making secret foes of a majority of the subjects in another?

No! Unless politics are entirely a thing of paper constitution and of colored maps, these paths of Imperialism are not paths of peace leading to internationalism and world-civilization.

Nationalism is a necessary and a serviceable instrument of social growth. It has indeed no absolute validity or right that it should be respected where it is a grave scandal and danger to its neighbors or to civilization as a whole. But its utility is so great that nothing but the gravest urgency attested by the warrant of an impartial Court of Nations should justify the destruction of a nation and the annexation of its territory. Those who chatter about absorbing nations, as a big screw factory absorbs little ones, are either fools who know not what they say, or reckless politicians prepared to endanger the interests alike of the world and of their own nation to satisfy some lust of immediate self-aggrandizement.

The presumption must always hold that a nation in being is better adapted to its territorial environment than any other nation seeking to subjugate it, and should be left free to utilize its land and to grow its own political institutions.

Forcible aggression upon nationality strikes at the very root of civilization. Even were it true and determined by an impartial tribunal that the civilization of the conquering nation was better in kind or more advanced in degree than that of the conquered, this would not legitimatize such absorption. Either a nation, such as the Transvaal or China, is growing a radically different civilization with different arts of government from ours, or else such a nation is backward in the same course of civilization. In the one case it is impossible for us to civilize

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it, in the other "forcing" the pace is unwise and ultimately defeats its end by substituting artificial for natural progress.

The notions that the arts of government are portable commodities, that there is one best brand, the Anglo-Saxon, and that forcibly to fasten this upon as large a portion of the globe as possible makes for the civilization of the world, imply an utter misunderstanding of the very rudiments of social psychology.

That the attainment of anything which can be called a world-civilization involves some growing assimilation of national life, and even of forms of government between different nations, is obvious. Economists of two generations ago fondly dreamed that mutual trading interests and the intercommunication of men and ideas consequent on trade would secure rapid progress toward this goal. Wildly exaggerated as this dream may have been, it is not so manifestly chimerical as the dream of the new Imperialism that a forcible destruction of national barriers will advance the harmony of mankind. To substitute bonds of iron for the organic ligaments of international goodwill, and to pretend that this coercive process is sanctioned by laws of social evolution, is the grossest possible abuse of scientific method and of scientific terminology. A world federation of nations, in so far as it is ever possible, must proceed from the free will of enlightened nations approaching one another along voluntary paths of peace and goodwill. Such enlightenment is itself the latest and the choicest fruit of free nationalism. Every attempt to check this natural growth, or by force or menace to impose a policy, chills the atmosphere of national life and sterilizes the most promising seeds of the wider, saner nationalism which will seek to realize itself by cherishing the friendship of other nations, and coöperating with them for the attainment of the widest human ends.

JOHN A. HOBSON.

LONDON.

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MONOPOLIES AND FAIR DEALING.

HAD this paper been written a few years ago it would have been necessary to prove to a hostile audience the prevalence, persistence, and growth of industrial combinations. And in England till quite recently, the great monopolies of America, and the decay of free competition, were set down to the protective tariff; and it was held that if the Americans were so lacking in sense and uprightness as to reject the pure gospel of free trade, the action of the laws of political economy might for a time be suspended by their abnormal misconduct. This explanation contained some ingredient of truth, inasmuch as the protective tariff of the United States probably facilitated and accelerated the great movement towards combination that marked the later years of the nineteenth century; but was never an adequate explanation, some of the greatest combinations being precisely in goods, such as petroleum and coal, which were not protected by the tariff. And now this last feeble defence of decaying theory has been swept away by the rising flood of fact —by the "wave of combination," if I may borrow the phrase of Professor Flux in his most instructive "Presidential Address" of November, 1900, to the Manchester Statistical Society. The sanctuary of free trade has been submerged; and free competition in the very land of Adam Smith and Bentham, of Cobden and Bright, is visibly failing, not merely in those industries which are often assigned to public authorities, such as railways, tramways, electric, gas, and water supply; but also in a multitude of others, such as shipping, banking, insurance, the wholesale and retail liquor traffic, the supply of meat, fish, grain, tobacco, salt, soap, sewing thread, rubber tires, lead pipes, iron bedsteads. Indeed, the "man in the street" can scarcely open a newspaper without finding a notice of some new amalgamation, alliance, or other description of combination, all of which tend towards monopoly as their issue; and our language has symbolized the change in our conditions by raising the word "combine" from being a mere fleeting verb to the solid dignity of a substantive.

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Under these circumstances, the task that lies before the economists of the early twentieth century seems threefold; first, to purge their science of doctrines incompatible with facts; secondly, to provide a critical estimate of the power and effects of combination; thirdly, to advise on measures to secure fair dealing in the face of masterful monopolists. Let a few words be said on each of these tasks.

First, then, the elaborate doctrines of normal value and normal earnings based on the assumption of the predominance of free competition must be finally abandoned. Whether at any time, for example in America when Francis Amasa Walker was a boy, and in England when John Stuart Mill was in his prime, such an assumption could have been justified as a useful working hypothesis, giving results capable of correction, need not for our present purpose be discussed. It is enough that such an hypothesis is nowadays not merely unfruitful but sterilizing, being in contradiction to known and pertinent facts. We might as well assume that all laborers, male and female, were so incurably intemperate, that all extra wages paid them above the bare minimum of subsistence must inevitably be spent in drink; and we might work out an elaborate theory on these assumed conditions. They would not be more remote from the real world than those assumed (to take a very conspicuous instance) by Professor Marshall for normal value:

> "We assume that the forces of demand and supply have free play; that there is no combination among dealers on either side, but each acts for himself, and there is *free competition;* that is, buyers compete freely with buyers, and sellers compete freely with sellers. But although everyone acts for himself, his knowledge of what others are doing is supposed to be generally sufficient to prevent him from taking a lower or paying a higher price than others are doing. This is assumed provisionally to be true both of finished . . . . goods and of their factors of production, of the hire of labor, and of the borrowing of capital." "Principles of Economics," Fourth Edit., p. 421.

Let us hope that in the Fifth Edition of this great work, which gives us so much help precisely on monopoly prices, these assumptions may disappear, and the lingering mists of Benthamism and *Manchesterthum* be dispelled by the rising sun of the new century. That they need dispelling even on the west of the Atlantic is seen by the example of so able a reasoner

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as Dr. C. W. Macfarlane in his volume on "Value and Distribution." For after admirably recognizing the need of bringing economic theories into harmony with facts, and the utter collapse of the ideal of free competition that seemed to Mill about to be realized; after many brilliant criticisms and valuable contributions towards a proper theory of Monopoly, he loses himself at last in a mist, imagining an abstract mobile, homogeneous fund of capital, and an abstract mobile, homogeneous fund of labor, and proceeds to reason about them and their progeny, normal value and normal wages, to the confusion of his readers, and without being able to draw from these phantoms of the imagination any explanation of the historical past or any solution for the urgent problems of the present.

But, lest I be totally misunderstood, let me repeat that I am not complaining of the two writers just mentioned as if they ignored monopolies; on the contrary, as already indicated, they are among the foremost of those who have dealt with the new problems that face us. I am only complaining that, like some of St. Paul's Corinthian converts, they have not sufficiently purged out the old leaven, and lapse at times into language ill-fitting the neophyte, and recalling the unregenerate old pagan days when Mill announced that he only contemplated those cases where value and prices were determined by competition alone; when he declared that only so far as they were thus determined could they be reduced to any assignable law ("Polit. Econ.," Bk. III., Ch. 1, § 5); and when he concluded with faultless logic that the value of peasant-grown or slave-grown produce was anomalous (Ch. VI., § 2 and 3). If he were now alive he would have, on the same principle, to admit that the value of a great deal of other produce was "anomalous," indeed that the whole world was falling into a condition of ἀνομία or lawlessness.

This brings us to the second task for our modern economists, to establish law and order (if we may so speak) in the vast regions that their predecessors had abandoned to anarchy. Instead of refusing to look at any cases where the rule of the market is inapplicable, and free competition ineffective, it appears reasonable to look at all social forces, whose action we

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can observe, instead of only one; and while continuing to trace the operation of free competition where it exists, to pay attention to its limits, and to recognize that combination in various forms, and public authority in various forms, and custom in various forms, are forces quite as constant in the determination of prices and often quite as powerful as free competition. Hence to treat them as abnormal or anomalous is radically unscientific. No doubt it is not easy to trace the action of these different forces on each other, and to estimate the total result. It is much easier to say, for example, that railway rates for all items of traffic between any two places must in the long run be such as to allow ultimately all concerned to get their normal profits and normal wages, rather than face the real difficulties of the inquiry as President Hadley and Mr. M. Acworth have faced them. Take the conclusion of the latter (in a lecture delivered at Oxford and published in the *Economic Journal,* September, 1897) as a specimen not of grand empty words, but of a conclusion that is really helpful:

"Almost the whole railway expenditure is incurred on the behalf of the traffic as a whole. Against the traffic as a whole the entire cost must be charged. The apportionment is, and ought to be, made as between the various items and categories of traffic on the basis of what each item or category can bear. The word 'can' has, however, a very elastic signification. Sometimes it signifies 'can pay and yet leave an advantage to the customer'; sometimes 'will consent to pay rather than turn aside to a rival route'; sometimes 'has been wont to pay'; sometimes even 'ought morally to be asked to pay.' Such is, I believe, a rough analysis of the motives which govern, and economically speaking ought to govern, the practical conduct of rate-making authorities." P. 330-331.

The theory of monopoly, in good truth, is no simple inquiry; but speaking roughly we may notice two broad facts which the discussions of combination have established, and which seem to lead us to a paradox. The first is the immense advantage of combination in preventing industrial waste, and thus lessening the national costs of production. Part of this saving is simply due to combination enabling production to be on a larger scale, and securing the advantages, for example, of elaborate machinery, of its use with scarce any interruption, of specializing faculties, putting each man to what best suits him,

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reducing storage to the minimum, utilizing bye-products to the maximum. But another part of the saving is directly due to the absence of competition; advertising and all forms of pushing sales, involving a gigantic waste of goods and faculties, becomes unnecessary; unnecessary also the cross-delivery of goods, as when railway trucks, carriers' wagons, tradesmen's carts, pass each other carrying identical goods in opposite directions. Trade secrets moreover are not jealously confined to a single factory, but can at once be utilized, as Professor Flux has pointed out, in every branch of a great combination. And the motives for fraud, for adulteration, and for pushing the sale of inferior or deleterious goods, if not wholly removed by combination, at least are much weakened. Hence to revert to competition would seem like reverting to horse power for our tramways or to oil lamps for our streets.

But then there comes the second fact, that combination issues in monopoly, and the interest of monopolies is not identical with the interest of the public, which is threatened with divers unpleasing consequences. First and foremost is the endurance of a monopoly price, which means, or ought to mean, a price enhanced by artificial limitation of supply. A monopolist indeed cannot raise his prices *ad libitum;* in the arithmetic of monopoly, as in that of the Customs, twice two may sometimes make one instead of four; short-sighted greed may be defeated by the use of substitutes for the monopolized article, and by shrinkage of demand; not to speak of the strong stimulant given by high prices to an assault on the monopoly. But with fair average prudence, especially for articles for which it is difficult to find a substitute and for which the demand is not elastic, the monopolist can enhance prices considerably above what they would have been in open market; and it is cold comfort when I am paying, say, 30 shillings a ton for household coal instead of 20 shillings, to be told that economic forces are in existence that will never suffer me to be charged 50 shillings or 60 shillings. Then besides the rise of prices, other inconveniences are only too likely to be the issue of monopoly, especially in the forms that it now assumes. Law courts and legislatures have been corrupted; stock exchanges manipulated;

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the working classes confronted with arbitrary dominion; inventors compelled to sell their patents to the monopolist at his own price; individuals who incur his enmity exposed to ruin by discrimination in prices. Finally there is the risk that much of the advantage of combination—the saving in costs already mentioned—may gradually be lost, as the monopoly becomes long-established, by the growth of indolence, apathy, and the spirit of routine. And thus the degenerate combination may no longer be able, even if willing, to pay higher wages than in the days of competition, and to charge lower prices; the very materials of what Marshall calls "compromise benefit" ("Principles," p. 549), to be shared between the monopolist and the public are dissipated; instead of the waste of competition there is the still greater loss of national resources being withheld: lands untilled, mines unworked, workshops unbuilt; and in general the rule of few goods and high prices, small traffic and high charges, so that the last state of national production may be worse than the first.

The foregoing reasoning seems to have brought us to a paradoxical conclusion, to the dilemma of wasteful competition or paralyzing monopoly. We must therefore adopt the logical procedure proper to those confronted by a paradox, and must examine whether we have not omitted some important item from our reckoning. If indeed for the purposes of economic reasoning we are to be looked on as noble savages running wild in woods; or if, while admitted to be citizens of a state, we must yet set our hearts and minds against the impertinent interference of kings and ministers; then indeed I have no solution to offer, and must leave the reader to shift for himself as best he can, between (so to speak) the devil and the deep sea. But for those who regard it a matter of prime economic importance that we are members of a civilized state, and who look for a humane and reasonable government as the centre of its energy, there is an obvious issue from the difficulty. For industrial combinations presuppose the existence of law; and as by law they live, so by law they can be controlled. To leave them uncontrolled is no less foolish than to prohibit them altogether; and the obvious aim is to secure for the nation the vast increase

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of productive force resulting from combinations, and simultaneously to protect the nation from the inconveniences of their abuse. We need a sieve to allow the finer particles to pass through, while the coarser are excluded. No doubt the details of application present difficulties; and an intimate knowledge of the laws and circumstances of each country are needful before judging of any particular measure, such for example as the Austrian act of 1897, setting restrictions on *Kartellen*. But the general principles for our judgment are not very difficult, and some of them may be formulated as follows:

Let us avoid simple repression or prohibition of Trusts and similar combinations; for if the measures are enforced we injure production: if unenforced (as in America) the law is brought into contempt.

Let us enforce on all combinations full publicity of all prices, charges and payments, so as to strike at the root of unfair and arbitrary discrimination.

Let us enforce on all combinations a special responsibility for those they employ, notably responsibility for insurance against sickness, accident, disablement, old age and disemployment; and let the power be taken from them of arbitrary dismissal of workmen, or arbitrary reduction of wages.

Let us discriminate wisely in favor of coöperative combinations, recognizing in them, not some heaven-sent peacemaker between masters and men, nor some new-found magnified broom for sweeping away mastership, but much rather a suitable means, adapted to modern conditions, of reëndowing the mass of the people with small properties, and of modifying the effects of the Industrial Revolution so far as it turned them into a proletariat.

Last but not least, let us give to authorities, local or central according to circumstances, certain control over prices, such as a voice in fixing price-lists, and a veto or a temporary veto on any great and sudden changes. And if the reader is troubled by the spectre of Adam Smith, he can lay the ghost by repeating as a spell the words of an economist well known on two continents:

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"I see nothing for it, but that, in countries where the monopolizing movement is well under weigh, the Government should assume the duty of in some way controlling prices. The principle of public determination of maximum rates and maximum dividends has already been recognized in various countries in various directions; and it will doubtless have to be carried a good deal further." (Prof. Ashley, *Economic Journal,* June, 1899, p. 170.)

Moreover, having once accepted the bill which Professor Ashley has drawn, we find ourselves involved in further obligations. For the habitual control of prices by public authorities implies, unless we are to suffer arbitrary government, that the authorities aim at *fair dealing,* consider the *justum pretium,* fix such prices, wages, charges and payments as *ought* to be fixed if they are to be in accordance with *justice.* The mediæval economists sought to solve such problems; and the enlightened nineteenth century called them fools for their pains; but the problems have come back on us, not even economists being able to alter the nature of man and his surroundings:

Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.

Here, indeed, at the close of an article, it is not the place to work out a theory of fair dealing. It is enough to indicate a few points of the inquiry. For example, it would be needful to distinguish, whatever terms we used, between individual and social value, the latter implying, as distinct from any private and particular estimate, a *communis æstimatio;* and this general estimate being the important matter for our purpose, because fairness depends on what is common and general. So in Shakespeare (ever the mouthpiece of mediævalism) when Troilus exclaims: "What's aught but as 't is valued?" Hector replies:

> But value dwells not in particular will;
> It holds his estimate and dignity
> As well wherein 'tis precious of itself,
> As in the prizer. —"Troilus and Cressida," II., 2.

The general will indeed may make mistakes, and esteem little what is of great importance for the true end of man:

> What things there are
> Most abject in regard and dear [important] in use,

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> What things again most dear in the esteem,
> And poor in worth! —*Ibid.*, III., 3.

Still, however mistaken may be the general "esteem," yet according as it is high or low, the fair price must be high or low.

Again, it would be needful to set forth how both the utility and the costs of any commodity, just as in a market they are duly considered by the dealers, and in a free and open market issue in a fair price: in like manner can be estimated by experts where there is no market; and how a jury of these experts, namely men "in the trade" could state within reasonable limits what was a fair price. The notion of reasonable limits, let us add, is quite in conformity with the doctrine of the Canonists, who being well aware of the complications of the concrete, and that it is a mistake to draw a hard and fast line between fair dealing and unfair, recognized the elasticity of the *justum pretium,* and that it might be *summum* or *medium* or *infimum.*

Again, we should have to ascertain the real cost of production as distinct (to use Marshall's terms) from the expenses of production, lest the supply-price, which, given the antecedents, is a fair price, may yet imply unfair antecedents. In other words, not merely the private but also the public costs of production must be scrutinized; and if public authorities are, for example, to regulate the price of sugar or indigo, they must look into facts such as those disclosed in a recent Prospectus, giving reasons for the public to believe that "sugar growing in North Behar should prove a very lucrative business indeed"; one chief reason being set forth in a letter to the Directors as follows:

> "The planters have perfect control of labor. On these estates which I have visited, the lands together with their villages, owned and leased by the proprietors, are densely populated . . . . and the obtaining rates for skilled and unskilled labor are extremely low. The pay to the field coolie averages about two annas per day, while tradesmen, carpenters, blacksmiths, etc., receive about four annas per diem. For weeding, by women and grown children, the pay is about one anna per day. There never is any lack of labor, and the orders of the manager of the estate are implicitly carried out by the headmen in charge of the various divisions of the cultivation.
>
> "This system of control of labor has been well organized by the indigo

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planters in an experience of nearly a century, and can be applied in precisely the same way to the cultivation of sugar cane. I know of no such system of cheap labor elsewhere in the world."

With the advent of humane and reasonable government and the enforcement of fair dealing, such "lucrative business" based on "obtaining rates" of wages that range from a minimum of about a penny a day to a maximum of about fourpence, would pass away like a hideous vision of the night.

The foregoing argument points to the conclusion that for modern economic science one principal work is to ascertain what is fair dealing, what are just prices, to what extent and in what manner payments and charges should be controlled by authorities. And this fortifies the view already advocated by the present writer in this JOURNAL (January, 1897) that economics form a dependency of ethics; that it is a waste of energy to construct a "positive" science of economics separate from the "normative" science; that it is practically impossible to treat ethical pronouncements as a mere side show, or to prevent them pervading the whole scientific exhibition; that in spite of the protest of so excellent a logician as Mr. Keynes ("Scope and Method of Polit. Econ.," 2d Edit'n, p. 55 note), it is necessary to adopt a "systematic combination of economics and ethics"; that we cannot profitably pull warp and woof apart; that man's moral condition and economic life are inextricably interwoven.

CHARLES S. DEVAS.

BATH, ENGLAND.

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WOMEN AND THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

READERS of Aristotle's "Ethics" are familiar with the distinction there drawn between those virtues that are active or practical and those that are intellectual,—between the excellence of conduct due to its direction by reason, and the excellence of the intellectual faculties, culminating in reason itself, by which conduct may be directed. That the outer life of action and the inner life of thought are closely interrelated, and that both are susceptible to ethical judgment, Aristotle makes evident with his accustomed logical and psychological keenness. Our modern moral consciousness, complex, vague, and not always self-consistent in its correlation of Greek valuations with ideals that have come down to us from Roman, primitive Christian, and Jewish sources, speaks with less decision and clearness in regard to the intellectual virtues. Such recognition as we do give them as constituting an important factor in the moral life, is, historically speaking, an inheritance from Hellenic ethical systems; yet it finds its adequate justification in the unfailing demands of modern civilization itself. It is not alone the teaching of Socrates and Aristotle and the Stoics, it is the experience of the individual and the history of the community that proclaim the need for the due development and exercise of the mental powers as essential to right living. Hence while our professional moralists sometimes speak as though the action and the feeling to which it is due were the sole objects of approval or condemnation, yet none the less do we constantly form and express valuations of character which are based largely on the evidence we have of the degree of candor, breadth and insight of which the conduct is the outcome. The mentally incompetent, however excellent his motives, is seen to be a less valuable member of society than the man who seasons his conscientiousness with the salt of common-sense. In so far as his intellectual qualifications are capable of development, the individual who neglects to improve or to make use of them is a fit object for blame and contempt, although we

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feel ourselves bound to take account of natural limitations and misfortune of environment before passing an adverse judgment.

Such considerations as these, at first sight ethical generalities of merely academic interest, acquire real meaning and importance if we bring them into relation with modern conditions, political, economic, and social. The term which most nearly sums up the trend of our time is the word democratic; and the indefinitely complex problem of the opening century may be expressed thus,—How shall an elaborate and highly evolved civilization, the control of which is passing more and more completely into the hands of the multitude, be preserved and improved? The laws, written and unwritten, which are to determine all family, social, and business relations, with the forms, methods, and aims of national and civic government, must express the will of the people,—the many. How shall it be brought about that the many shall will what is, even approximately, wise,—what is in their own true interests, and in the interests of the future of the race? If this is, in its simplest terms, the riddle which our modern sphinx propounds—failure to answer it correctly bringing with it certain destruction—is it not evident that no mere increase in intensity of altruistic feeling, in tenderness of conscience, or in loftiness of aim, however desirable these are, can be sufficient without a growth also in mental grasp, in foresight and in prudence?

And in truth the need of a sound and sane intelligence in matters affecting the general weal is sorely felt at the present time. Never heretofore has the world known so much of what we may call conscientiousness-at-large as now permeates our spiritual atmosphere. Anarchists, socialists, prohibitionists, female suffragists, Christian scientists, anti-vivisectionists, Christian associations, missionary societies, ethical societies, in addition to the hosts of workers gathered around the different churches, all these swarm and buzz, filling the air with the hum of their eager efforts for the enlightenment of the ignorant, the enrichment of the needy, the reformation of the depraved, and the inauguration of a new heaven and a new earth. From the nihilist who kills his sovereign to the amiable lady who

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devotes her spare afternoons to slumming, all are enrolled under the banner of beneficence. Nor is the enthusiasm fictitious; mixed often with other motives,—restlessness, greed of notoriety, love of excitement,—we yet find altruism to be the greatest force in most of the social movements of our day. Yet we can hardly question that in proportion to the energy expended the results are meagre. Too often the workers stand in each other's way or pull in opposite directions; the fighters strike at random and injure friends as much as foes. Their zeal is not according to knowledge.

Next to the vast bulk of this good endeavor, the large share in it contributed by woman is the most noticeable characteristic of our time. Formerly the coöperation on their part in philanthropic undertakings was restricted to work done under the authority, or on the initiative, of the churches; but secular as well as religious movements are now promoted by women, and their influence in the control of them grows rapidly and steadily. The reasons for this change are many, and we need only note here a few of the more obvious of them. One lies in the increased importance of woman's share in industrial life. Far more women are now bread-winners for at least a part of their lives than was the case fifty years ago. With changes in economic conditions and in business methods a much greater variety of occupations is now open to an active girl. Hence many more women have been brought into personal contact with economic and industrial problems. Labor questions, such as the right length of a day's work, the claim for a living wage, the benefits and shortcomings of trade-unions,—all such matters no longer must filter slowly and uncertainly down to a woman's consciousness through the medium of husband or brother, they affect her directly. Her experience quickens her imagination to perceive the grievances suffered by those whose position more or less closely resembles her own; and, under the influence of her easily aroused feelings, she throws herself ardently and unselfishly, if often unreflectingly, into whatever current seems to set towards a needed reformation.

Another cause for this growth in feminine activity lies in the

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greater leisure now enjoyed by women of the well-to-do class, owing to the invention of innumerable domestic conveniences and contrivances for saving household labor, and also, in the case of America more particularly, in the vast increase in the number of the women who, living in hotels and boarding houses, have few or no home duties to claim their time and thought. Such of them as have no need to earn their living and yet possess mental activity and physical strength, inevitably seek for outside interests and find a ready outlet for their superfluous energy in such of the innumerable schemes for the betterment of mankind as happen to make an appeal to their feelings or their imagination. Men of the same social position are of course often interested in these schemes, but for the most part they have professional or business concerns to claim their time, so that to a great extent the furtherance and management of them passes into the hands of those who really constitute our "leisure class."

Closely connected with the foregoing is yet another reason for this state of things,—namely the very noticeable spread among women, and especially among young women, of general information on all sorts of social, economic, and moral topics. Far more girls now receive a liberal education than was the case with any preceding generation; and the enthusiastic bright young woman, fresh from her college or high school, has, if not a knowledge, at least the tools for obtaining a knowledge of sociological, economic and political subjects, which when hastily acquired is often superficial and inaccurate, but yet is sufficient to stir her interest and to enlist her sympathy,—a knowledge which we must remember her mother and her grandmother had usually neither possessed nor coveted. Such information, moreover, is not now to be had only from dry monographs or lengthy treatises; popularized in essays and lectures, it is found in diluted form on the stage and in the novel. The "young person," once the bugbear of the writer who would broach difficult social questions with the frankness of science, is now prepared to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest what would formerly have been thought somewhat strong meat even for those of riper years. Such subjects

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as the inheritance of the effects of vice, the origin and justification of monogamy, divorce, Malthusianism, are discussed in current works of fiction often with more of the boldness of youth than of the wisdom of mature and well-disciplined minds. Naturally many a clever and high-spirited girl, whose ambition is unsatisfied with the opportunities of the ball-room and the golf links, is ready to rush heart and soul into the ranks of those who profess to fight against evils that have been so vividly stamped upon her imagination, and that have roused her disgust and indignation.

In this influx of feminine energy into the work of reform there is very much to approve. The forces enlisted on the side of moral progress are not so strong that they can afford to leave one-half of society behind in ignorance and indifference. Moreover, if women are not with them, they will be against them, and their influence is as dangerous in the form of a blind conservatism as in that of even an ill-balanced and hysterical radicalism. The problem is, how to transmit the vast mass of womanly feeling that is now available into the service of rational and enlightened beneficence. To the present writer it appears that we have reached a point at which all discussion as to whether woman should or should not be admitted to a share in the world's work beyond the limits of her own home is absolutely futile and effete. The question has been settled by the irresistible logic of facts. Woman, we may rest assured, will never again in any civilized community be subjected to the restrictions, legal, social, educational, and economic, from which they have become, or are fast becoming, free, and their influence in all public matters is likely to increase. We cannot rid ourselves of feminism, nor force back its currents into the old channels. Yet that feminism has its dangers, and that these dangers are imminent and serious, is only too apparent. For women's activity is too seldom guided by rational motives, and it is just the substitution of the merely emotional and impulsive springs of conduct for the judgments of reason which is the most characteristic and the most fatal fault of democracy. Thoughtful women as well as men can feel sympathy with the prominent Liberal statesman in England who,

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when the question of woman suffrage was discussed recently in the House of Commons, declared that he would not willingly live in a community governed by women. The distrust of feminism as now existing is surely not without sound foundation. But the remedy must be sought for in the improvement of women themselves, not in their elimination from matters of public concern. It is time that we should insist constantly and vigorously on the need for the cultivation of the intellectual virtues as essential to the well-developed feminine character. We must recognize frankly and cordially that a change has already begun to take place in our ideal of womanhood, that this must be allowed to develop further, and that there must be a corresponding modification in our own aims and methods in the upbringing and education of girls. In the past men and women have, as by a sort of tacit consent, divided between the sexes the ideal of human character,—men have been required to possess intelligence, courage, energy, and foresight; though it was admitted to be desirable that they should be, to some extent, "good,"—that is, religious, merciful, charitable, and chaste. Women were to be in the first place "good," next to be "charming,"—that is, pleasing in appearance, tactful in speech, and refined in manner, while for them, prudence and self-control, candor and courage in thought and speech, vigor and wisdom in action, were of quite subordinate importance, if not indeed qualities incompatible with the nature of the "womanly woman." In short, womanliness and manliness denoted almost wholly different sets of virtues; and intellectual qualifications hardly entered into the feminine ideal at all. This does not, of course, mean that they had no place in woman's character, but only that they were not generally regarded as essential, or even as highly desirable. Thus we find that the most delightful heroines of fiction, even those drawn by the hands of the great masters, were usually of the unintellectual type—Griselda, Ophelia, Desdemona, Sophia Western, all of Thackeray's good women, and, with perhaps two exceptions, all of Scott's heroines, are either mentally colorless or decidedly "below par" as regards common-sense and wisdom. Now so long as the work of the world was carried

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on by men alone, and women had only to deal with the simpler concerns of minding the house and caring for the children, this diversity of ideals for the two sexes, though obviously not without dangers for both, was on the whole adequate enough. Men's heads directed the affairs of nations and guided private enterprise; women's hearts softened the asperities of daily life, and sweetened and purified the domestic atmosphere. To many conservative minds this still seems the most excellent division of labor, and any interference of the "weaker" or "gentler" sex (the adjectives are used interchangeably) in affairs beyond the family circle is deprecated on this very ground of feminine mental incompetence. But it is useless to seek to turn back the shadow on the dial; women in great force have invaded what has hitherto been the masculine sphere of influence, and it is evident that they have come to stay. Their admission to colleges and universities has opened to them the privileges of higher education, and in America alone thousands of young women each year go out into the world as college graduates. In increasing numbers women fill factories and stores. Some occupations, such as stenography and typewriting, are almost wholly given over to them. They have pushed into the learned professions, and are beginning to follow mercantile pursuits. Their efforts for political emancipation have met with vigorous opposition, but success is almost certain to come in time,—already they have the full right of suffrage in several States of the Union and in some of the most prosperous of the British colonies, while the importance of their political influence at elections is recognized throughout Great Britain. The mysogynist may groan or rage, but the enemy has come in like a flood, and the appeal we still hear made to woman to stay at home and darn her husband's socks and rock the baby is as ineffectual a weapon as was Mrs. Partington's mop.

There is but one adequate safeguard against the dangers of feminism; it is that which corresponds to Disraeli's dictum on the political emancipation of the English working classes—"We must educate our masters." Our safety depends on the intellectual development of our women-folk. More is necessary than the opening of the doors of schools and colleges to

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girls. We must recognize frankly the lack in the average woman's character of vigor and soundness of judgment, and her dangerous tendency to be led by an unbalanced and unrestrained emotionalism. There still exists on the part of men no small distaste for the "strong-minded woman;" both vanity and generosity lead them to prefer the type of the "gentle clinger;" and in their justification it must be remembered how often the term "strong-minded" has been misapplied to those who have wantonly outraged social conventions for the sake of a vulgar notoriety. But, taking the words in their legitimate sense, we can see that it is just the woman of strong mind,—of well-trained intelligence, firm will, and controlled emotion,—who should henceforth be accepted as exemplar and leader for her sex. The weak woman, hysterical, vain, sentimental, and incapable of foresight or steadfastness of purpose, has always been mischievous even within the limits of her home and her small social circle;—when her influence extends into the wider fields of literary, philanthropic, or political enterprise, she becomes an intolerable nuisance and a serious source of danger. A little folly, even well-intentioned folly, may discredit the best causes, and reforms of grave importance have often been retarded by an unlucky association with fanatical and reckless partisanship.

What then are the intellectual virtues of which women especially stand in need to fit them for taking, wisely and well, an active part in the world's work? No exhaustive classification need be attempted here; it will suffice to indicate as a few of the more important qualifications, the love of truth, toleraance, prudence, and temperance or moderation.

Love of Truth. It is questionable whether intentional untruthfulness in speech is commoner with one sex than with the other, but there can be little doubt that the desire for exact knowledge and exact presentation of fact is deficient in many women. To strive to see things as they are, rather than as they are wished to be, is rarer with women than with men. The feminine mind is apt to feel bare reality hard and repulsive, and it calls in the aid of fancy to invest it with softer color and finer texture. Hence the ardor with which women embrace

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Utopian schemes; they stand expectant to greet the quick-coming millennium, because they would rather believe in it than in the painfully slow on-stepping of human progress with its too frequent stumblings and halts. To this, too, on the other hand, we may attribute much of the stubborn conservatism with which they are so often charged. Women oppose change, because they sincerely believe that whatever is, is right,—a belief not founded on an examination of the facts, but on the easy optimism that turns away instinctively from the unpleasant and discouraging. The hysterical female anarchist, and the complacent "Primrose Dame," can each maintain her "views" by the paradoxical method of shutting her eyes. Of course such careless or indolent blindness is not confined to one sex, it is a defect to which all humanity is liable, but women's education in the past has always taught them to exalt what is attractive and agreeable rather than to give a whole-hearted reverence to fact. In practical matters also it may be admitted that their position of relative weakness has often forced them to gain their ends by cunning or wheedling, rather than by more direct and open methods; and in consequence absolute candor and straightforwardness are not characteristic of feminine tactics. They have so often had to follow roundabout paths that their steps readily turn to them. This may seem a severe impeachment, but the responsibility rests with both sexes. It is man's fault if the small feminine artifice has often been found a more effective instrument to his conversion than an intelligent appeal to his conscience or his reason. But there is no need to point out how serious are the dangers of insincerity, alike to the individual and to society. To overcome this tendency to ignore, conceal, or misrepresent fact,—whether by parents and teachers setting an example of absolute candor in speech and life, or by the development of habits of rigid exactitude in thought and expression through a training in the natural sciences, logic and mathematics,—should therefore become an object of the first importance in the education of our girls.

Tolerance. The quickness with which a woman decides, the enthusiasm with which she throws herself into a part, the

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intensity of feeling which informs her convictions,—all tend to render her impervious to an opponent's arguments and to blind her to the strength of his position. Moreover, her imagination, rather lively than far-reaching, enables her to see with her comrade's eyes and to sympathize with those whose grievances resemble her own; but to put herself in the place of persons whose opinions she combats and whose conduct she perhaps detests, is often almost impossible. They who fight under the enemy's banner must surely be wholly vicious or hopelessly stupid. The orthodox Churchwoman cannot tolerate the sceptic,—to her his doubts are devil-born; the total-abstinence leader admits no rights to the saloon-keeper; the advocate of woman's suffrage looks on those who oppose her claims as masculine tyrants or feminine weaklings. Often intolerance is not admitted to be an evil but is encouraged as a righteous zeal. Certain of the goodness of her cause, its female champion sees in all that resists her only the power of darkness, an Agag to be hewn in pieces before the Lord. Surely here again we are conscious of a defect most injurious in its consequences to the higher life of mankind, and we must recognize how pressing is the need of teaching girls and young women that all important subjects should be carefully and deliberately studied from all sides, that there may be a soul of good even in things evil, and that zeal only gains in efficiency by alliance with that intellectual charity that enables us to recognize the value of points of view far removed from our own.

Prudence. As women are apt to reach a conclusion rather by a rapid intuition than by the slower processes of deliberate thought, so also are they likely to look exclusively to a desired end rather than to study in detail the steps by which it may most advantageously be gained. This impulsiveness no doubt gives to their actions a force and directness by no means to be despised; just as their conclusions have often a clearness and correctness that puzzle those whose intellectual operations are more slowly and consciously carried on. But this indifference to the stages which must intervene between the initiation of a scheme and its successful completion, has its grave perils. In

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every undertaking, public or private, there have to be considered not only what is in itself desirable and attainable but also the means by which it may best be reached, all essential circumstances being kept in view. In one word we need prudence, the guidance and control of action by rational thought. Especially is prudence demanded in the direction of those public movements which deal with forces still but imperfectly understood, and involve complex and often seemingly conflicting interests and rights. In the effort, for example, to find a practical solution to economic problems, and especially those connected with the relations between labor and capital, there is need of the most consummate prudence. Careful preliminary investigation, the patient waiting upon experience, an acceptance of the inevitable going slowly as the price of going surely, are necessary conditions of making real and permanent progress. It is not the hysterical outcries of the shrieking sisterhood that can bring harmony out of the economic discord. Yet women are concerned in such problems, and in many others that are vital to the interests of society; to render their help useful they need to have the discipline and training that will develop habits of caution and foresight.

Temperance or Moderation. The successful cultivation of this virtue, the σωφροσύνη of Plato, would do much to avoid the dangers of feminism. Rare at the best, and hardly to be won without prolonged self-discipline by any person of sanguine and emotional temperament, it is the most difficult moral quality for a conscientious, warm-hearted woman to appreciate, to acquire, and to hold fast. For the languid, sluggish individual, whether man or woman, there is indeed little danger of going to extremes, unless it be the extreme of selfish indolence. But for an earnest, tender soul, readily responsive to the cry of suffering, and heartily indignant at the sight of triumphant wrong, it is hard to keep the judgment constantly well-balanced and the outlook large and sane. It is little wonder if the sex in which the feelings, and especially the altruistic feelings, are most powerful, often lacks the self-control necessary for temperate thought and wise action. To combat an extreme opinion by promulgating another equally extreme, to

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seek to root out evils by measures the most drastic, to look upon all that is objectionable in habits and conduct as *ipso facto* fit subject for legislative interference, to believe rather in the immediate and coercive action of social and political revolution than in the slower but safer methods of gradual step-by-step reform,—are natural to the enthusiastic temper of an earnest warm-hearted woman. Her spirit, at once emotional and conscientious, is ever tempting her to fanaticism. The *sancta simplicitas* of her who brought the faggot for the martyrs' fire still exists. Rare indeed are those of either sex who, amid the excitement and nervous hurry of our time, are still capable of appreciating the supreme moral beauty of the old Hellenic maxim, "Nought in excess." Yet it is just now, when the mental and moral life of society is full of hysteria and feverish unrest, that the disciplined mind, the urbane temper, rather than the enthusiasm and passion of the agitator, are needed for the refreshment, the elevation, and the enlightenment of humanity.

It is then no slight task that is set before those who undertake the problem of fitting women for the work that is set before them. To inspire them with such a love of truth as shall free them from the blindness of prejudice and the degradation of underhand scheming,—to reveal to them that large intellectual charity which shall make them patient toward all, and capable of recognizing the legitimacy of an opponent's position,—to teach them the need of foresight and deliberative thought for the right guidance of their actions,—to cultivate in them that serene and controlled temper of mind from which result moderation in opinion and in conduct, such must be their aim if the eternal feminine is to be a blessing and not a curse to our modern civilization. For the ideal of womanhood must be nobly planned if the women of the opening century "with reason firm and temperate will" are to be efficient co-workers with men for the common weal.

E. RITCHIE.

HALIFAX, N. S.

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THE VALUE OF RELIGION.*

It is, I think, well known that a great many people nowadays believe in God. And it is also known that many people do not believe that any God exists. Each party, the believers and the unbelievers, the Christian and the infidel, does know in general that the other party numbers many members. Some time ago there was no little public controversy between these factions. Bradlaugh and Huxley, to mention well-known names, assaulted the believers very vigorously, and Matthew Arnold did his best to arbitrate. At present the question whether God exists or not, seems to have ceased to be of public interest. Books are, no doubt, still published on both sides of the question, Huxley and Matthew Arnold are still read; but in general neither side seems very anxious to convince the other. I doubt if the Christians ever think how many infidels there are. And the infidels, on their side, have ceased to question equally the right of other people to believe and their own right to disbelieve. In general no unpleasantness arises from this great difference of opinion: you do not even know whether your neighbor is a Christian or an infidel; you see no reason to inquire, even if the question should occur to you.

Now there was not always such indifference on this matter: the question has been one of life and death. Perhaps I have exaggerated the present state of acquiescence. If any of you think so, then there is hope that you may take more interest than I expect in what I have to say. For I mean to re-discuss this ancient controversy; to put before you, so far as I am able, what valid arguments there are in answer to the question: Ought we to believe in God?

My utmost hope in the matter is to make clear the issues, on which our answer to this question must depend. For it seems to me that on both sides false arguments are often used, and I do not know but what, if these could be dismissed, that utter

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difference of opinion which I have pointed out might disappear. For myself I share the opinion which, as I have said, seems from their actions to be that of most men,—the opinion that this difference between the Christian and the infidel is of little practical importance. On questions of much more importance, on moral questions, both sides agree for the most part even in opinion: and in practice they agree still more. Nevertheless, so long as many say, "There is a God," while others answer, "I see no reason for thinking that there is," it remains a possible danger that hostile action should result. This difference, I remind you again, has in the past been a large cause of violence and persecution: and so, not probably, but possibly, it may become again. Especially if the majority of Christians should once become fully aware how many people differ from them in belief and how completely, the present quiet state of things might be much altered. In any case, it is, I think, desirable that agreement should be reached, and, failing this, that each side should know at least what grounds will justify belief or disbelief. These grounds I shall try to give you.

I raise the question then: Ought we to believe in God? and I put it in this form partly because, apart from any general importance it has or lacks, this is a question which occurs to most people at one time or another, as one requiring that they personally should find an answer to it. The answer that they give will make little difference to their future conduct: they will probably become accustomed to the answer they adopt; they will take it as a matter of course and quite forget that it ever was a serious question with them. For some, however, though it makes no difference to their conduct, to their happiness it may make much. And in any case, when the question is first raised, however soon they answer it and cease to think about it, just then it is a question to which they want an answer. To help them to the right one will surely be a work of use. Arguments may appeal to those who have already raised the question of themselves; whereas they are thrown away on those whom habit has convinced of their own answer. Moreover it is those who raise the question now who will determine the habitual answer of the future.

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Ought we, then, to believe in God? You may say that to discuss this question is not to discuss the value of religion. Religion is a very vague word, and some may agree with Matthew Arnold that it does not imply a belief in a personal God. For my part, I disagree: I think that it is generally understood to imply this, although of course it includes much more besides. But my object is not to discuss the meaning of a word. If you think that I have used religion wrongly, I am content to apologize. The question I do wish to discuss is the value of belief in a personal God. This question, quite apart from any wider meaning of religion, is certainly a serious one for many people. When Matthew Arnold says that it *ought* not to be so, that it is not a valuable element in Christianity, perhaps I should agree with him, though Christians certainly will not. But that many people feel it to be serious, even he perhaps would not deny, although his arguments imply such a denial. At all events, this is the only question with which I am concerned: What is the value of belief in a personal God? You cannot have religion, in the sense I mean, without this belief; although, when you have this, you may also have much more in your religion.

But next I must say what I mean by a personal God. As for personal, all that I imply by the word is easily to be understood. I should hardly have thought it necessary to point the meaning out, but for Matthew Arnold's singular obtuseness in seeing what is meant when he is called a person, and his assumption that only the metaphysical ability of bishops can understand the matter. There are two properties which must belong to a person, whatever else may belong to him besides. (1) A person must be endowed with that which we call mind as distinct from our brains and our bodies; and (2) he must also have that positive quality whereby we distinguish ourselves from other people. These two marks of personality are quite sufficient for my purpose. All of us know what is meant by these two things, although we may not know exactly wherein they consist. We think that other people have minds—that they are not mere bodies—and we know from our experience of ourselves what we mean by this difference. And also

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we know that when we talk of another person's thoughts we do not mean our own thoughts. Two persons may think of the same thing, but each one's thought belongs to him and not to the other. We know what we mean by a thought belonging to a person from our own experience of the thoughts which belong to us: and we are never tempted to think that when you and I think of the same thing, there are not two thinkings but one thinking. That you think of it, is one fact, and that I think of it is another, whatever the difference between the two may be. And so when God thinks, that he thinks must be one fact, and not the same fact as the thinking of anybody else whatever, even if it can include these other thoughts. This property that his thoughts belong to him, as our thoughts belong to us, in a sense in which they do not belong to anybody else, a personal God must have. And he must also have that other property common to you and me, which we call mind, as distinguished from body. These two properties are surely very easy to identify, and when I say a personal God I merely mean a God possessed of these two properties, whatever others he may have besides—a God with mind or spirit, and a God with *one* mind.*

But God must not only be a person, he must also be a God: and by that I mean that he must be powerful, wise and good, all three in a greater degree than any one of us. *How much* more powerful and wise and good has been very differently thought in different religions. Some may even have held that he was not better but worse than themselves. But even though devil-worship deserve the title of religion I am not going to discuss it. The question: Ought I to believe that there is but one God, and that he is a Devil? is not, I think, a serious question for many people. In any case, I must neglect it, and so far agree with Matthew Arnold that the important question concerns a God, who, though he be a person also, yet does "make for righteousness." And finally the God, belief in

*Possibly the conception of the three Persons in the Athanasian Creed negates, or adds something contradictory to, part of what I have said. But I am concerned only with the manner in which most believers habitually think of God.

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whom concerns me, must be conceived as very greatly more powerful, more wise and better, than we ourselves, however many historical religions I may be thus excluding from discussion. That we can imagine a person all-wise, all-powerful and all-good I very much doubt, but the conception of God which I mean to discuss is one which comes as near to possessing these attributes, the attributes ascribed to God by Christianity, as any Christian is likely to imagine.

With this, then, I hope to have made plain to you, the minimum of what I mean by God. And my question is whether it is good to believe, as most religious persons do believe, that a God possessing at least these qualities, however many more he may possess, however much he may transcend anthropomorphic notions, does actually exist? Is it good to believe that such a God exists? Ought we to believe that he exists? What is the value of such a belief? This is an ethical question, and for that reason I believe it covers more completely than any other the whole ground of controversy between the believer and the unbeliever. For I admit or assume, whichever you please, that if it is true that God exists, if he really does exist, then it is good to believe that fact. It may not perhaps be much good, but it is *pro tanto* good to know the truth. It is sufficient justification for any man's belief that what he believes is true. If a thing is true, then no one can be blamed for believing it. This, so far as I know, has never been disputed, at least in this religious controversy. At all events I do not mean to argue it. The question of fact, then, of the evidence for God's existence which has played so large a part in this controversy, is completely covered by my question. Before we can fully answer the question, Is it good to believe in God? we must first decide whether God exists; for, if he does exist, then, I take it, we may say at once that we do well to believe in him.

But my question does not only cover this inquiry; it also includes another: and in this lies its advantage. For supposing we have argued the question of fact, the question whether God exists or not, and have come to the conclusion, to which, as I shall try to show, we must ultimately come, that there is

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not one atom of evidence, establishing the smallest probability either that God exists or yet that he does not exist: supposing, I say, that we have come to this conclusion on the factual question, there still remains another which is also covered by my ethical formula. There still remain what are called the moral reasons for belief in God. Appeals to these are very often made, and they often have great weight. But the weight they have is largely due, I think, to a confusion. Under this one head of moral reasons for belief we have two entirely different sets of arguments. One set attempts to prove from moral facts, of one sort or another, that God exists. It is argued that morality is without a basis, unless God does exist: this Matthew Arnold argues for his God, and Mr. Arthur Balfour for his. It is argued too by more humble persons that the goodness of the Christian is evidence that his belief is true. But all these arguments plainly fall only under the factual inquiry: the inquiry whether there be any evidence, moral or otherwise, establishing a probability that God exists. As for the other set of so-called "moral" arguments, they would I think lose much of their influence if they were clearly distinguished from these last. It is, in fact, contended, that whether we have any evidence for God or not, to believe in him produces good effects, —is a powerful aid to moral action. This is an argument which certainly deserves to be considered. We have, some people would urge, a right and a duty to indulge in positive belief, where the evidence alone would give us no right; and this because of its effects. It is, therefore, proper to consider how far a belief in God has the alleged effects. This inquiry is what you probably understood by my title, the "value of religion." It concerns the moral arguments for belief as such; and these must be distinguished from any moral arguments there may be for the truth of the belief. Yet, as I have said, the two lines of argument are frequently confused: and how important such confusions are in strengthening religion I can show, I think, from an obvious instance. We hear a great deal of the value of religion; it is urged that its influence on conduct is enormous. But all this is usually urged on the assumption that there is some ground for thinking it true. Yet plainly, wheth-

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er it be true or false, the evidence for its moral efficacy is just the same. Observation alone can assure us, whether it has good effects or not; and the results of observation will stand firm, although the belief be proved a false one. This fact, steadily held before the mind, cannot fail, I think, to be a chilling one to many supporters of religion. It does not usually occur to them that they are bestowing their enthusiastic praises on a belief, which, failing other arguments to prove its truth, *may* be a mere delusion. A mere delusion may, no doubt, have very good effects: but I think I am right in saying that earnest men are very loth to think so. If, then, it be brought home to them that religious belief is possibly mere error, they will then be apt either to cool in their praises of its excellent effects, or else to argue that its effects themselves are evidences for its truth. Now, in the former case, their moral argument for belief is sadly weakened; and, in the latter, they have fallaciously converted it into the moral argument for God's existence—for the truth of that belief. In short, if we are fairly to consider the value of religion, we must account the possible disadvantages of belief in what may be a mere delusion, as having a certain weight against alleged advantages. Many apologists, I think, are apt to forget that they are putting in the balance on their own side of the question an assumption that their belief in God is true. Now, unless they can prove by other arguments that so it is, they ought not only to remove a part of the weight from their own scale, but actually to add it to the other. For most men would admit, as I think rightly, that a strong belief in what is possibly false, is in itself a doubtful blessing.

Well, then, I hope to have convinced you that to think clearly in this matter is important. What I have called the factual inquiry into the *truth* of religious belief must be kept quite distinct from the moral inquiry into the worth of its effects. But at the same time the factual inquiry is necessary before we can decide upon the value of religion; because the truth of a belief, although it cannot alter its effects, has in itself some ethical importance. With this we may proceed to our discussion; and first to this same factual inquiry.

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The question here before us is this: Have we any evidence rendering it probable that God exists? The question is a large one, and I can do no more than summarize the arguments. And yet I think this summary, though brief, may be conclusive. The conclusion I wish to establish is as I have said:—There is *no* probability that God exists. That is all: a purely negative conclusion. I am an infidel, and do not believe that God exists; and I think the evidence will justify my disbelief. But just as I think there is no evidence for his existence, I think there is also no evidence that he does not exist. I am not an atheist in one sense: I do not deny that God exists. My arguments will only urge that there is no reason for thinking that he does; they will *not* urge that there is reason for thinking he does not. I do *not* believe that he does exist, but also I do *not* believe that he does not exist. That is the attitude I am concerned to recommend.

Is there, then, evidence that God exists? Is his existence at all probable?

We say we have evidence for a thing, when it can be inferred from another thing that we suppose established. The question of evidence for God's existence is then the question whether there are any other truths from which we can infer it. To mention evidence at all implies that other things are true beside the thing we want to prove. He who would prove by evidence that God exists must first assume that something else is true.

Now the truths from which we can start on such a proof are what we call the facts of common life—experience. We all believe that we are here, between four walls, alive and able to move; nay, more, thinking and feeling. Such are the facts of observation, from which the Natural Sciences infer their laws. In these things we all do believe; we cannot help believing them, whether we like it or not. That they are true indeed, we cannot prove. Our belief is no evidence that they are so. And so far they are just on a level with a belief that God exists: that belief also is no evidence that he exists. I believe that I exist, and some one else, I grant you, believes that God exists; and so far as these beliefs go, there is not a bit of difference between the two things that are believed. Both have an equal

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right to be taken for true and an equal right to be taken for false. But when we come to the question of evidence and probability, then there is all the difference in the world between them. There is evidence, in plenty, that I exist and there is none that God exists.

For my existence is an object of such a nature that it can be inferred from other objects of belief. These also are, like it and God, mere objects of belief, they cannot be proved true. But they are such that *if* any one of them be true, the others and my existence are so too. The simplest statement as that "This hand moves," involves a host of others, from which again a crowd of other simple statements, as that *I* moved it, may be deduced. And all the arguments to prove the existence of God rest upon evidence like this. The evidence is certainly as good as we can get; it is what we cannot help believing, although it may be false. To the evidence, then, I have no objection: *but*—the existence of God will not rest upon it. That I have a scar on my hand is excellent evidence of something: the scar is visible and palpable, and no doubt it had some cause. I cannot prove that these things are so; and you cannot either, except from premises equally doubtful in themselves. All of them are possibly not true. But if you grant me that the scar is there, then I maintain there is no evidence, no probability, that an angel with a burning sword came down and made it: but there is much evidence, much probability that it came about in a way that I could mention.

People take, then, the world as we think we know it, and they infer that because it is such as they and we all believe it to be, God must exist. To the facts they start from I have no objection, although we must admit they may be false: but the inference they draw from them is as absurd as the inference from my scar to that angel. There are two well-known arguments of this kind—the stock arguments of what is called Natural Theology—arguments which in one form or another are still in use. These are the arguments to a First Cause and the argument from Design. The inadequacy of both these arguments was finally pointed out a hundred years ago by Kant. With the first, as distinguished from the second, we

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need not deal, for, even if some First Cause were necessary, it would yet remain to prove that this Cause was intelligent and good: it must be both, you remember, to come within our meaning of personal God. That this Cause is intelligent and good as well as powerful is what the argument from Design attempts to prove. The only argument, therefore, with which we have to deal is that: From the nature of the world, as it appears on observation, we can infer that it or parts of it were or are caused by a being immensely intelligent, wise or good. The answer to this is summary but sound. We assume that useful and beautiful objects we find in the world were made by man—had for their cause a being of some intelligence and goodness. By these useful and beautiful objects I mean houses and drains, hospitals and works of art—if you like, a watch—and I call it an assumption that they were made by man, in order not to overstate my case. We have as our premise, then, that certain objects, which I am far from denying to be either useful or beautiful or sometimes both, had for their cause some tolerably good people. Then, says the Natural Theologian, we may infer that anything useful or good we find in the world, that is not a work of man's designing—man himself, above all, the most useful and beautiful of all—had also for its cause a person of intelligence and goodness. This is the argument. But what reason have we for supposing that anything at all of any kind in the world was caused by a good person? Simply the assumption that certain things of one kind were caused by man. And what reason have we for this assumption? Simply and solely the fact that we can follow the series of causes back from them to the working of man. And if we are therefore going to call man their cause, we must also ascribe all other events to those which preceded them in the same way as man's work plainly preceded houses and drains. If houses and drains are the effect of man's work, then man himself and all other things, must be the effect of events in the world which preceded him, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, on the other hand, houses and drains were not caused by man, then we have no reason for supposing that anything useful or beautiful ever was caused by a good person. Either of these two alternatives

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wrecks the theologian's argument completely. If we are to infer from the nature of an effect to the nature of a cause, we can only do so on the assumption that we can find the *complete causes* of events in the course of nature. But if every natural event has a natural cause, then unless God is a natural cause, he is not a cause of anything at all. I have put this argument in a simple instance, for the sake of clearness: but it is of universal application. It has the advantage of being a question of logic, and not of fact; no new instances can overthrow it. It is as with the law of contradiction. If you have contradicted yourself, within the meaning of logic, then you must have made some mistake, however trivial. And so, if you use this argument, in whatever form you dress it, it must be worthless since your conclusion will not follow from your premises. One of your premises must be: This is the cause of that; and the other: Every event has a cause. And your conclusion is: God is the cause of these other events; his existence alone will explain them. But your first premise assigns as the cause of one natural event, another natural event. And you cannot be sure of this, unless every natural event is caused by another natural event: otherwise the effect you began with might not have had the cause which you assign—the hospital might have been made by miracle and not made by man. Either then God must be one or more among natural events, or else you have no reason to assert that he is more like one than another, more like a man than a billiard-ball. But you have asserted him to be more like a man than a billiard-ball; and you certainly cannot show that any natural event is a personal God. Either then God is a cause in some sense utterly different from that in which man is a cause: and then we cannot infer either to his existence or his nature; or else he is a cause in the sense in which man is a cause, and then we can infer his existence but not his nature: we can infer that the events in question had a cause, but not that their cause was God. This dilemma applies in general to every argument from Design—and not only to these, but to every metaphysical argument that tries to mount from Nature and Mind to any superior Reality. All such arguments infer from the nature and existence of some or all the things that are

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agreed to exist that something else, of a different nature, also exists. But the only known valid principle by which we can infer from the existence of one thing to the existence of something else is this same principle of causality, according to which that "something else" must be one among natural events. All these arguments must therefore involve the fallacy involved in the vulgar argument from Design. On the basis of such arguments modern philosophers are fond of offering to us, in place of a personal God, a more or less consoling Reality or Absolute. But the skeleton of any such construction is nothing more than this old fallacy. They muffle it up in garments infinitely complicated, many of which are in themselves sound stuff. But the more they muffle and the sounder the stuff, the less attractive their Absolute becomes. We have, I think, every reason to prefer the old God of Christianity. In him the artifice is more transparent, and the product, none the less, by far more beautiful.

We cannot then make a single step towards proving God's existence from the nature of the world, such as we take it to be in common life or such as Natural Science shows it. That we are here to-night, that we were not here this morning, that we came here by means of cabs or on our feet: all facts of this sort, in which we cannot help believing,—these facts, with all the implications, which Science or Philosophy can draw from them, offer us not one jot of evidence that God exists. But there are other arguments which start like this one from experience. There is the argument from general belief. I will admit at once that most people, who have existed heretofore, have believed in a God of some sort. I have, indeed, no reason to believe that there are or have been other people and still less that they have had this belief, except on the same grounds as I believe in the facts of common life. If we are not here now, there is no evidence even that most people have believed in God. The mere fact of general belief, then, is no more certain than the facts of experience: if we reject the latter as untrue, we cannot use the former as evidence for God's existence. You cannot argue, as many people do: The facts of science are merely matters of general belief, and God's existence is the

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same; therefore the one is as certain as the other. For, unless the facts of science are true, you have no title to your statement that God's existence is a matter of general belief. But now, granting that it is a matter of general belief, does this fact establish any probability that God exists? I think it cannot. For many things which we now all admit to be errors, have in the past been matters of general belief: such, for instance, as that the sun went round the earth, which Galileo controverted. All the probability is, then, in favor of the supposition that many things which are still generally believed, will in time be recognized as errors. And what ground can we have for holding that the belief in God is not among their number? The probabilities seem all the other way. For I think it will be admitted that the belief in God has in the past derived much support from ignorance of Natural Science and from such arguments as those of Natural Theology. If, then, as I have tried to show, those arguments are fallacious, in proportion as this is recognized, the belief in God will become less general. You can therefore only hold that belief in God will persist undiminished, while other beliefs disappear, if you maintain the continued triumph of ignorance and fallacious reasoning. But a belief which persists from causes like these has surely no claim to be therefore considered true. In short, if you are to argue from general belief to truth, you must have independent grounds for thinking that the belief in question is true. If you can show a probability that it is true, then the fact of general belief may confirm that probability. But if, as I try to show in this case, there is no such probability, no evidence that God exists, then the fact of general belief is perfectly useless as evidence.

The argument from general belief must then break down, and I think I need hardly discuss at length any so-called historical proofs for God's existence. They are all from the nature of the case too obviously weak. If what they aim at is establishing the fact of miracles, then no historical proof can by any possibility show that an event, which happened, was in very truth a miracle—that it had no natural cause. That an event should have had no natural cause contradicts, as I tried to

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show, the very grounds of historical evidence, for this is all based on inferences from effect to cause, and if a miracle is ever possible, we can never say that any particular thing was the cause of any other. But if you mean by miracle only a great and wonderful work, then that a man can perform astonishing feats is no proof either that he knows the truth or that he tells it. And, miracles apart, historical proofs can only show that somebody said something: whether what he said was true must be decided on quite other grounds.

The facts of common life, then, the facts with which natural science and history deal, afford no inference to God's existence. If a man still believes that God exists, he cannot support his belief by any appeal to facts admitted both by himself and the infidel. He must not attempt to *prove* that God probably exists; for that is impossible. He must be content to affirm that he sees as clearly that God exists as he sees that he himself does. Many people, I admit, may really have had this strong conviction. And many people may be content to justify belief upon this ground alone. They, I think, are right. Their position is quite unassailable. If you have this faith, this intuition of God's existence, that is enough. You may, I admit, be as certain that God exists as that you yourself exist: and no one has any right to say that you are wrong. But these are two independent facts: one is perhaps *as* certain to you as the other: but the one is *not* more likely to be true, because the other is so. The moment you use that argument, you will be wrong. You cannot argue that if you exist, God also probably exists: as you can argue that if you exist, I also probably exist. Nor can you argue that because you are so certain of God's existence, I ought to admit the slightest probability that he exists: if you do this, you are appealing to an argument similar to that from general belief. In fact, if I were the only person who could not see that God exists, and all the world agreed with you, it would yet be just as likely that I was right, as that you and all the world were right. It is equally likely we are right and equally likely we are wrong: but only equally. I have no more right to argue that probably God does not exist, because I cannot see he does, than you to argue that probably

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he does exist, because you see he does. This is all I have tried to show, when I maintain there is no evidence for God's existence. It is mere faith, not proof, which justifies your statement: God exists. Your belief is right, because you cannot help believing: and my unbelief is right, because I have not got that intuition. We both are justified by mere necessity.

An appeal to faith, then,—to intuition—is the sole ground for asserting the truth of religion. That truth, if it be true, is coördinate with the facts of daily life, and cannot be inferred from them, as they can be inferred from one another. And so far it would seem that religious belief stands in the same position as our moral beliefs. These moral judgments, too, it may be said, are independent of beliefs about the world: their truth also can never be inferred from that of daily facts.

That moral truth cannot be thus inferred from any facts, is, I think, quite demonstrable. But since it is denied, I must say something on this head. The argument of Mr. Balfour's book on "The Foundations of Belief" depends in part on this denial. If, he seems to say, the view of Naturalism that all things were evolved from natural causes is true, then it is inconsistent still to hold that our beliefs in the goodness of this and the beauty of that are also true. And a similar view is implied by Matthew Arnold, who seems to hold, that unless we can verify the existence of a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness, then our belief that certain conduct is righteous and other conduct wicked, must also justly perish. But is this so? Is it inconsistent to hold that this is right and that is wrong, and at the same time to hold that we only think this right, that wrong, because in fact such beliefs have helped us to survive? Or can it be less true that right is right, even if there be no power that will reward it? The former argument refutes itself. For if it be true that beliefs were evolved, then the belief that they were so must also have been evolved. And this, according to Mr. Balfour, is a reason why we must doubt its truth. That is to say, the fact of evolution is a reason for doubting the fact of evolution. It is inconsistent to believe in the fact of evolution, if we at the same time believe in the fact of evolution. The inconsistency, we may well reply, is all the other way. It is, in

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fact, self-contradictory to hold that the validity of a belief depends in any way upon the manner in which it was acquired. And hence the truth of our moral beliefs *must* be independent of any scientific facts. Just so, we may answer Matthew Arnold: In order to verify the fact that righteous conduct is rewarded, we must already know what righteous conduct is: and to know that it is righteous is to know we ought to do it.

There is, therefore, no more evidence for moral than for religious beliefs; and the religious believer may be tempted to say, "I have as much right to my belief that God exists, as you have to any of your moral beliefs." But this claim, it should be pointed out, refutes itself. For his assertion that he has "as much right" to believe in God is itself a moral judgment. It can only rest upon the moral principle that necessity will justify beliefs: and this principle must have a prior validity to that of any particular instances which may be brought under it. The believer is therefore admitting that there is one moral principle to which he has more right than to his belief in God. It must be true, according to him, that necessity is a moral justification, whether his belief in God is so justified or not. In fact he cannot attempt to *defend* his belief in God except by a moral judgment; and by so doing he gives up the supposed parity between moral and religious beliefs in general, although it may still be true that such parity exists between religious belief and *most* moral judgments.

It remains true, however, that if a man really cannot help believing in God, nothing can be said against him. But I very much doubt whether this is often the case. With most believers, I think, the disparity between their moral and their religious convictions is much more striking. Their religious belief gains much of its strength from the fact that they think they ought to have it. They have a direct moral feeling that it is wicked to doubt of God's existence; and without this belief, which is a strong one, their direct religious certainty would offer but a weak resistance to scepticism. For such persons the final question arises: Are they right in thinking that infidelity is wicked?

Now they can no longer urge in defence of this opinion that belief in God is good, because it is true. On the contrary it is

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only because they believe it to be good that they hold it to be true. They must therefore rest their claim to its goodness solely upon its effects; and in the inquiry whether its effects are good, they must, as I pointed out above, carefully discount the vicious tendency to think the effects must be good, on the ground that the belief is true. They should bear in mind that the belief is possibly false; and that, if they shall decide that its effects are good, they will be committed to the theory that all this good is possibly a result of mere error.

Now whether they are or are not the better, the more strongly they believe that God exists is no longer a matter to dogmatize upon. The manners in which religious belief may act on different minds are infinitely various. But I think there is at least good room to doubt whether it ever does much good. That there is a power who is willing and able to help you would be, no doubt, an encouraging thought. But from this, if our argument holds, our believers are in any case excluded. God cannot interfere in the course of natural events. This belief, which has played such a large part in the religions of the past, is demonstrably untrue. At most, then, the encouragement must come from the knowledge that he sympathizes with us. And this is certainly no small comfort. But how are we to get it? We are faced by this dilemma. The encouragement will only be strong in proportion to our belief. But, on the other hand, our efforts to strengthen this belief are only too likely to fail, if we do not find we get the encouragement. That this difficulty is a real one I think most people for whom the present question has been raised, will acknowledge. That consolation, for the sake of which they desire to believe, must be already felt, before they can acquire it. They desire to "see that the Lord is good," in order that they may "taste" it; but on the other hand, unless they first do taste it, they cannot get to see it. It may well be urged that it would be better to give up this fruitless endeavor; especially when we consider that in so far they believe that God exists, is no longer a matter to dogmatize as they succeed, they are deliberately acquiring a belief, which, for all they know, is false.

And moreover, I agree with Matthew Arnold that a more important element in religion than this is the belief that the

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good will triumph. If we could rest in this belief, we might surely give up the belief in God, and yet get all the comfort that we needed. But for this belief also I am afraid we have no reason. That Good will triumph as that God exists is possible but only possible. Matthew Arnold's God, too, is not, as he thought, verifiable. Naturalism, as Mr. Balfour argues, does fail to verify him. We have reason to believe that human life upon this planet will presently be extinguished. We certainly have no reason to believe the contrary; nor yet that our souls will persist and grow better after death.

But though our belief in this God fails us too, I think it may be doubted whether we may not still retain the very elements which have rendered religion most effective for good in the past. They are in fact elements which have no logical connection with belief in God.

(1) First, there is that valuable element in religious emotion, which proceeds from the contemplation of what we think to be most truly and perfectly good. We are indeed only entitled to think of this as what ought to be; not as what is or will be. But I doubt if this emotion need lose much of its force, because its object is not real. The effects of literature show how strongly we may be moved by the contemplation of ideal objects, of which we nevertheless do not assert the existence. It may indeed be doubted whether the most effective part in all religious belief has not always been similar to that which we have in objects of imagination—a belief quite consistent with a firm conviction that they are not facts. (2) And secondly, that some good objects should be real, is indeed necessary for our comfort. But these we have in plenty. It surely might be better to give up the search for a God whose existence is and remains undemonstrable, and to divert the feelings which the religious wish to spend on him, towards those of our own kind, who though perhaps less good than we can imagine God to be, are worthy of all the affections that we can feel; and whose help and sympathy are much more certainly real. We might perhaps with advantage worship the real creature a little more, and his hypothetical Creator a good deal less.

G. E. Moore.

Trinity College, Cambridge.

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HAS THE INDIAN BEEN MISJUDGED?—A STUDY OF INDIAN CHARACTER.

In attempting to discuss this question, I disclaim all thought of the modern Indian who has either been brought by education and force of circumstances to a life essentially that of his Caucasian neighbors, or has maintained a quasi-independence under a species of governmental paternalism and individual corruption which has rendered him a nondescript mixture of the vices of both barbarism and civilization. To see the real Indian, we must look back through two, three or four centuries of history and, even then, must view him through the media of observers untrained in those modern sciences, ethnology and sociology.

To the average settler, Spanish, Dutch, English or French, Catholic, Lutheran, Puritan or Quaker, the Indian was a means to an end, or, worse still, an obstacle between him and that end. With comparatively few exceptions, the only Europeans who took an interest in the Indian himself, were missionaries and, mainly, the Jesuits.

The southern aborigines, occupying the Gulf coast, Mexico, and tropic South America, were, for the most part, in a semi-civilized state with a political organization, sometimes monarchic, sometimes republican, but always essentially aristocratic or rather presbyteric, as the ruling class was never a stable herditary oligarchy.* In arts and crafts, including sculpture, architecture, engineering and hieroglyphic writing, the best of these tribes were fairly comparable with the Mediterranean peoples at the dawn of history,† 3000 or 4000 A. C. While brave and intelligent, they were not a match for the arms and treachery of the Spaniards and they have either been exterminated or have lost their identity, except among the mountainous districts. An old narrative, published in Drake's Voyages

* "History of Conquest of Mexico and Peru."

†See "Memoirs Peabody Museum," Vol. I., Nos. 4 and 5, and Drake's "Collection of Voyages," 1767.

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(1767, the narrative being much older) describes the finding of hundreds of mummified bodies of natives, on one of the small West Indies. A guide explained that a whole village had committed suicide together, rather than submit to the atrocities of the Spaniards. From numerous similar, though less striking examples, it is evident that the conquest of Mexico, Florida, Central America and Peru, as well as of the West Indies, was due rather to the Indians' indifference to life than to their fear of death.

Both the Dutch and the Quakers had considerable traffic with the northern Indians and their dealings were, on the whole, of a friendly nature though distinctly shrewd. For downright brutality, one must ever turn to the "unco' guid" and, in the history of the Puritan settlers of New England, we find slight disposition to treat the Indians save as troublesome vermin, to be exterminated, not civilized nor converted. Although the retaliation of the savages was bloody and dramatic, it was fitful and numerically insignificant and New England was practically freed from its aboriginal inhabitants within a generation or two of its settlement by the English. None of the settlers of the new world were so engrossingly religious as the Puritans, none took so much pride in general education, none had been more restive under governmental restraint at home, yet none did less for the conversion and education of the Indians and none were so devoid of scientific and social interest in the contrasts of race, language, religion and economics with which they were brought into immediate contact. The absolute, cold-blooded objectiveness with which the New England settler viewed the Indian is, if possible, more horrible than the less humane but more human selfishness of the Spaniard.

Most of our historic acquaintance with the Indian character is due to the French and, especially, to the Jesuits, though the English officials, following the example of the French, cultivated the friendship of the Iroquois league.* The steadfastness

*See official correspondence of Sir Wm. Johnson, excerpts of which can be found in Marshall's "History of Buffalo," Vol. I.; Documentary History of New York.

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of the latter's allegiance even during the Revolution and after the disastrous raid of Sullivan against the Seneca villages, testifies to the wisdom of this friendly policy and to the staunchness of the Indian character. Perhaps the greatest surprise encountered by the student of Indian character is not the difference between the real and the ideal Indian but rather the difference between the Frenchmen and Englishmen of the seventeenth century and ourselves. Indeed, so far as religious and social philosophy and the artificial conveniences of life are concerned, the step from the present to the seventeenth century in Caucasian civilization, is not much shorter than from the latter to the Indian life of the stone age. Aside from purely religious topics, the point which seems most frequently and most earnestly to have engaged the criticism of the Jesuits, is the fact that the Indians did not whip their children and discipline their wives. The severest strictures are also made on certain Indian practices regarding courtship, marriage and divorce which are really entirely innocent and even admirable, bearing in mind the obvious lack of Christian ethics and European etiquette. On the other hand, it would be gross injustice to leave the impression that either the Jesuits or the French and English officials were ignorant or bigoted, according to the standards of their time. The former were certainly rigidly orthodox. They went to a strange country, endured every social and material privation, suffered from heat and cold, from lack of food, from filth and vermin, from the fatigue of long marches through forest and swamp or from paddling all day through lakes and rivers, they often endured insult from unwilling hosts and scarcely one failed to experience the martyrdom of mutilation, of fire and of stoning. If smitten on one cheek, they turned the other, thanking God for the privilege. With limbs racking in the pressure of cleft saplings, or partly stunned by the blows received in running the gauntlet, or from the midst of flames, they pleaded, not for themselves but for their enemies who knew not what they did. This sacrifice they made, not because they regarded Christianity as a desirable cult, not because they thought that in the future life the wicked or the heathen might lack in caste among his associates who had been good Christians

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on earth, but because they regarded the Holy Catholic Church as the only true exponent of the Creator and because they wished to save the Indians from a hell of literal fire and physical suffering. We can scarcely imagine and, certainly, the world has never witnessed, missionary work on such a grand scale of martyrdom, emanating from a liberal Christian sect with complaisant views as to the hereafter. However we may differ dogmatically from the Jesuits, we must regard them as heroes, modest, sincere, energetic, practical and conservative. And nearly every one is shown by his writings to have been a scholar, according to the standards of his time, a man of the world in the best sense of the term, while contemporary records explain the courage and nobility of spirit of this band of martyrs, by the heritage of the bravest and noblest blood of Europe.

In order to understand the character of the northern Indian, we must first of all realize that he was a stoic, so far as physical comforts were concerned, though by no means so in other respects.* Every Indian was a Diogenes in housing, clothing, and provender. Our own civilization is so much a matter of fashionable garments, of bath rooms, of elaborate heating and lighting devices, of methods of serving and of eating food, that it is necessary to emphasize this historic simile, in order that we may conceive of the possibility of mental, political, moral and ethical enlightenment, apart from ingenuity in devising means of maintaining creature comfort. What we profess to believe regarding the folly of taking too much thought of food, clothing and other corporeal luxuries, the Indian actually did believe and practice. He was dirty, he did not eat daintily, his clothes did not fit, his wigwam or bark house was cold and drafty at the sides and hot and smoky in the middle, but he bore these discomforts philosophically with none of the blasphemy which they would elicit from a Christian, enlightened as to the non-essentiality of material suffering, and they did not prevent him from thinking great thoughts and from doing brave and generous deeds.

*See various descriptions of amusements and jocular nature of Indians in "Jesuit Relations."

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While too indifferent to material wealth to be communists,* in the modern economic sense, most of the northern Indians lived in small communities, for protection against enemies and for assistance in hunting, fishing, etc. The successful hunter, as a matter of course, invited the entire village to share his booty and, equally as a matter of course, expected the courtesy to be reciprocated. Gifts were freely made and freely asked or articles were borrowed and sometimes without the formality of asking permission.† At funerals, religious ceremonies and social functions, all joined as one great family. The absence of true communism is shown by the occasional choice of hermit or family life and bv the existence of barter and a general recognition of property rights, at the summer gatherings of tribes or confederacies.‡ In short, the commonly accepted ideas in regard to "Indian giving."§ dishonesty, mendicancy and interested mo-

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*"To a granary built in the maizefield, at harvest time each family carries and deposits a certain quantity, according to his ability or inclination or none at all, if he so chooses. Its purpose was that of a public treasury, supplied by a few voluntary contributions and to which every citizen has the right of free and equal access when his own private stores are consumed, to serve as a supply to fly to for succor, to assist neighboring towns whose crops may have failed, accommodate strangers or travelers, afford provisions or supplies when they go forth on hostile expeditions and for all other exegencies of state." Bartram, "Travels through Florida," 1791, quoted by A. E. Jenks in *Am. Anthrop.*, Vol. 2, N. 4, p. 681. The same is true of many other tribes.

†Tribal etiquette only required that in the absence of the owner, some trifle be left at the lodge to indicate that a friend, not an enemy had supplied his wants therefrom or enjoyed its hospitality.

‡"In the Jesuit Relations, there is described a summer village on Lake Superior that was three leagues long. Similar villages are described in the same works while at the angle of Lake Erie and the Niagara River, there is archaeologic evidence of the evidence of a similar site about two miles long which certainly could not have been occupied during severe winter weather. It should be noted that the league of the early explorers seldom amounts to more than two miles by actual survey. Probably the difficulty of traversing the unexplored territory exaggerated the impression of distance.

§Generosity to those not related, even to the giving away of everything. entitled the Omaha to the same high rank as bravery in battle—for poverty is the greater foe.—Dorsey. Omaha Sociology, p. 274. 3rd Ann. Rept., Bur. Ethnol.

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tives in according hospitality, are not justified by a critical study of Indian life. Indeed, the stranger, inclined to superficial observation, would find the same conclusions apparently supported by the habits existing in circles of closely related or intimately acquainted families, among most civilized races.

There has also been hasty and unwarranted generalization regarding the character of the northern Indians, on the assumption that all tribes were alike. On the contrary, the Jesuits and other early visitors to America, have noted the most marked divergencies. Many of the Canadian tribes adopted, promptly, the gentler usages of the Europeans, while the Iroquois and especially the Mohawks were fierce and hostile to the immigration of the whites for many generations. Indeed, the very name Mohawk* is not the tribal name at all, but a corruption of the word for cannibal applied by their enemies. The Jesuits mention one tribe as inveterate thieves who considered it a reproach, not to their honor but to their skill, to be detected, while another tribe were so honest that locks were unnecessary. In one little community, it was the custom to say all sorts of slanderous things behind a man's back, not, as the missionary takes pains to explain, from a spirit of malice but merely to afford amusement. In this community, practical jokes were constantly being played, while other tribes are described as serious in their life and conversation. Some tribes were almost prudish, others shocked the Jesuits with their coarseness, but it does not appear that any equalled the average civilized Christian in lewdness. The perpetuation of prurient ideas in articles of clay and stone† was extremely rare. I have personally seen only three such relics and these are of very doubtful authenticity. What a contrast with the arts and crafts of European civ ilization, either Pagan or Christian!

The Indian woman‡ is commonly pictured as the drudge of

*See note by Dr. Beauchamp in "Jesuit Relations."

†Brinton—"The American Race," p. 214.

‡"Among the Five Nations and Susquehannocks certain grave matrons of the tribe had the right to sit in the councils, and among other privileges, had that of proposing a cessation of hostilities in time of war. A proposition from them to drop the warclub could be entertained without

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the household, while her idle brute of a husband loafed and smoked and told stories, except when he was enjoying the excitement of hunting, fishing or the nobler sport of war. Nothing could be farther from the truth. As in all social systems, unless we have to except the last generation of our own, the Indian recognized that there were certain lines of work which belonged to woman, certain others to man. Naturally enough, in their hardy, out-door life, more actual manual labor, including the cultivation of their scanty crops, fell to the lot of woman than in our own society. But this labor, at the worst, did not involve the strain upon mind and body which we view with so much complacency in our women teachers, stenographers, clerks and other business women; it did not involve as many hours daily as the tasks of the average American housewife, the work in the fields was not as arduous nor as protracted as that which is to-day performed by women in the market gardens about every large American city. On the other hand, it must be borne in mind that hunting and fishing were the serious business of the Indian man, not his recreation, that they involved in the winter, exposure to cold and fatigue, often on an empty stomach, such as we can scarcely realize, and that, allowing for some differences in customs, the division of labor among the Indians was precisely as among ourselves, bread-

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compromising the reputation of the tribe for bravery. There was an official orator and messenger whose appointed duty it was to convey such a pacific message from the matrons, and to negotiate for peace. ..... The Iroquois sent messengers to the Delawares with the following speech: 'It is not well that all nations should war. . . . . Let one nation be the Woman. We will place her in the middle, and the war nations shall be the Men and dwell around her. No one shall harm the Woman, and if one does, we will speak to him and say, "Why strikest thou the Woman?" ..... When the men around her strike one another and the strife waxes hot, the Woman shall have power to say: "Ye Men; what do ye that ye thus strike one another? Remember that your wives and children must perish, if you do not cease." Then the Men shall listen to the Woman and obey her. . . . . We hang on your arm a calabash of oil and medicine. With the oil, you shall cleanse the ears of other nations, that they listen to good and not to evil. The medicine you shall use for those nations who have been foolish, that they may return to their senses, and turn their hearts to peace.' "—Brinton: "The Lenâpé and their Legends," pp. 109-111.

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winning and protection being the function of the man, domestic duties of the woman. Perhaps the best evidence that the Indian woman was not abused is that her work was absolutely under her control, interference by the men not being tolerated, that she was free from domination by her husband, so free indeed, that she could leave him whenever she saw fit, and that she possessed an influence in public affairs which Caucasian society has, thus far, attained only in isolated instances as in some of the western United States. While we may agree with the European pioneers that the Indians were at fault in allowing their children to grow up without discipline, our own development has been away from the dictum of Solomon and toward the idea of the Indian, that the child should not be struck and that he should be coerced only in extreme cases. It is contrary to all reason to suppose that, with this marked deference to the rights of childhood, the Indian should have shown less consideration for the woman.

Curiously enough, some facts that may be taken as examples of the enlightened treatment of woman, may also be used in condemnation of the moral status of the Indian. The freedom of the Indian woman, after, as well as before marriage, was so great that divorce was, necessarily, a simple matter and Indian marriages had not that theoretic permanence characteristic of Christian communities. Thus, instances are mentioned in which women abandoned their sick husbands for other men or in which marriages were dissolved by the husband or by mutual consent without adequate cause. But, as a parallel, may be mentioned a recent Ohio case, in which a woman of means, sued for divorce for non-support from a sick husband, while the laxity of the divorce laws of some of our States is a public scandal. As a general rule, it appears that, practically, the marriages of the Indians were as stable and as happy as in more highly civilized countries.

Indian heredity was through female lines. This fact, as well as the custom among some tribes of preferring for succession to a chief, his sisters' children to his nephews by a brother or even his own sons, has often been construed as indicating a general state of immorality. We must remember, however,

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that many civilized states have hedged the succession to the throne with precautions similar in intent, if not in detail. The semi-public accouchement of the queen of Spain, still nominally in practice, may be cited. That some Indian communities were extremely licentious, is well established, but we have no more right to generalize to the detriment of the Indian character, than to condemn our own population indiscriminately because of the existence of local centres of gross immorality. Heredity through the mother is logical, both physiologically and as a matter of sentiment, and the crude deduction drawn from the more rational practice of the Indians reacts to show the foulness of some of the civilized critics. Among many tribes, especially in the south, the most rigid legal protection was afforded to virtue,* and, where this was lacking, it was only exceptionally that general immorality existed.

While the Indians were lacking in many of the niceties of European etiquette, they won the admiration of all observers for dignity of bearing, especially in council, for eloquence and rhetoric skill, and for genuine politeness. While possessing an etiquette of their own, elaborate enough to bear witness to considerable advancement in the amenities of thought and action, they were too logical to regard it with the superstitious veneration noticed by Europeans in their dealings with eastern peoples. Thus, the formalities of councils, funerals and other gatherings were modified to suit special circumstances, and the failure of the white man to observe Indian customs provoked no such intolerant wrath as has caused disastrous results in China, India and other Asiatic countries.

The religion of the Indians differed considerably in different tribes, and the legends were subject to wide local variations. While most tribes had superstitions regarding the supernatural origin of the phenomena of nature, and supported a class of religious charlatans, individual scepticism was quite frequent in regard to myths and sacerdotal healing, though atheism was rare. The conceptions of a supreme creative spirit—without

*Voyage to Panama in Drake's "Voyages," 1767.

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the carnal attributes of the majority of Pagan cults—of a spirit land where the good, at least, led a life similar to the present but on a higher and less stringent scale, the duty of sacrifice of small portions of meat, tobacco, etc., before enjoying such blessings, and the imperative duty of fulfilling literally whatever message should be sent in dreams, all these conceptions were generally held by the aborigines of the middle belt of North America. As compared with other religions, it is singular how closely this development of western wilds was in touch with the highest ethical ideals of eastern civilization.* There was respect for the dead but no worship of ancestors. The ritual was scant and so liable to modification as to prove its non-essentiality. There was none of the idea of *quid pro quo* in making sacrifices, but rather the spirit of gratitude and courtesy and the small amounts of food and tobacco employed show the purely symbolic nature of the sacrifice, which was simply a "grace before meat." The most peculiar and characteristic idea of religious duty was the belief that dreams were messages from on high and must be literally fulfilled, even at the cost of great trouble and personal danger. Different tribes differed much in the conscientiousness with which this duty was performed and, as is the case with all religions, the sternest and hardest natures were the most punctilious. A Seneca, for example, dreamed that he, and ten companions, dived into deep water through a hole chopped in the ice, emerging at some distance from under the ice. He immediately gave a feast, invited ten friends and informed them of his dream.† All consented to aid him in his religious duty, in spite of the discomfort and actual danger involved, and the dream was fulfilled, at the cost of a human life. More frequently, the sacrifice asked was of property, and we may well suspect that certain hypo-

*"Their own faiths, though lower in form, had in them the germs of a religious and moral evolution, more likely with proper regulation, to lead these people to a higher plane of thought than the Arian doctrines which were forced upon them. . . . . The heathendoms of America were very far from wanting living seeds of sound morality and healthy mental education."—Brinton—"American Hero Myths," p. 231.

†"Jesuit Relations."

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crites pretended to have dreams in order to secure gifts of coveted articles. Yet it is impossible that this religious custom could have persisted, unless by the general support of sincere conviction and good faith. Whatever view we may hold as to the rationality of such a superstition, we must admire and respect the spirit of implicit obedience to a higher power, and the willingness to make sacrifices and suffer martyrdom, not only to save one's own soul but to ward off disaster from another. "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Even cannibalism, which arouses the greatest horror in civilized minds, exists as a sort of sacrament among nearly all savages and was practised by the American aboriginies with the belief that the virtues and valor of an enemy were thus absorbed. The Jesuits had the utmost difficulty in reconciling their interdiction of cannibalism with the belief in the transsubstantiation of the elements of the Host, just as in distinguishing between the elaborate symbolism of the Church and idolatry, which was entirely foreign to the religious spirit of the Indian. Indeed, when we consider how much better adapted to the comprehension and habits of thought of the Indian, were the simpler ritual and beliefs of the Protestants, it is a remarkable testimony to the perseverance and devotion of the Catholic missionaries, that the only genuine progress made toward the Christianization of the new world during the seventeenth century was due to them.

Although able, by means of an ingenious system of ideograms,* to communicate simple and practical ideas and even to keep a fairly accurate history of events, the northern Indians were illiterate. But before assigning them a low place in linguistic development, we must consider that the average Greek of the golden age understood only oral language. Yet the latter was a cultured individual, by reason of the complexity of the Greek grammar and his high standards of rhetoric. Likewise, the American Indian spoke a language which recognized

*"Bureau of Ethnology Report," 1892-93, and 1883-84; Malloy's "Account of Pictographs of North American Indians;" page 88. same volume. Winter count on buffalo-robe verified by contemporaneous history for over 100 years.

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clearly the various parts of speech, which possessed elaborate inflections and which was peculiarly rich in vocabulary† on account of differentiations of ideas and distinctions between literal and figurative meanings, far beyond the capabilities of any Aryan tongue. The difficulties which the Jesuits experienced in learning the native dialects, were not merely those of unfamiliarity and lack of interpreters, nor were they the difficulties of ignorant men, incapable of appreciating idioms and methods of analysis not found in their mother tongue. Most of the missionaries were well versed in Latin, Greek and one or more modern languages beside their own. They were men of the highest intellectual training of their day, when language study occupied a much greater part of the curriculum than at present, and their testimony regarding the perfection of the Indian language must be considered that of experts. The fact that elaborate inflections and fine rhetoric distinctions were perpetuated among the Indians, marks a degree of erudition and of logical development, which cannot be swept away by our modern prejudice against the inability to commit speech to more or less phonetic writing. Almost every Indian could write, though not so as to reproduce words; he spoke according to well-formulated standards, a language far more complex than any used by his more civilized conquerors; in most instances he was familiar with several allied dialects and, often, with distinct native tongues. He learned the language of the Europeans more readily than the latter learned his.

While the concept of the government of the individual was conspicuous by its absence among the Indians, intertribal law was well fixed, though often on radically different lines from the international law of the Old World. The amalgamation of the United States more closely resembles the league of the Iroquois than it does any republic or confederation of Europe.

†Vocabulary of Menominee Indians, Bureau of Ethnology Reports, 1892-93. See also Wright's "Grammar and Dictionary of the Senecas," Sioux alphabet, "Bureau of Ethnology Report," 1881-82; "Essays of an Americanist," by Brinton. Recent reports of study of Patagonian dialects; manuscript grammars, dictionaries, etc., more or less complete, in custody of Rev. Arthur E. Jones, S. J., St. Mary's College, Montreal.

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One of the strongest factors in unofficial modern life is the existence of fraternities with chapters in different localities. This feature, instead of being unrecognized by or even at variance with formal executive and legislative powers, as among ourselves, was an integral part of the government of the Indians, though it became conspicuous only among the Iroquois. Running through the five sovereign states or tribes of the Iroquois confederacy, were clans,* named after natural objects, which constituted huge artificial families. So real was the fraternal spirit thus engendered that a member of one tribe was assured of hospitality among others, marriage between members of the same clan was considered incestuous and, most important of all, any threatened strife between sovereign tribes was prevented by the thought that this would necessarily involve fratricide. One of the cardinal principles of Indian polity was the absolute separation of civil and military offices.† The peace sachem took his bow and arrows and tomahawk and followed the war-chief as a humble warrior. The leader in battle took his seat in the council, merely as a member of the tribe. The inestimable loss of money and lives that our country suffered even during the brief Spanish-American war, to say nothing of previous struggles with intervening periods of political reward for military heroes, may serve to illustrate that the aborigines were not in all respects our inferiors.

The Indian has been accused of cruelty, especially in regard to the torture of prisoners of war. While the accusation is literally true according to present standards, much of the odium disappears if we compare the Indian, not with ourselves but with our European ancestors of even a few centuries ago. The international ethics of the Indian differed materially from that of most Caucasian nations. Formal declarations of war were less often made, the person of an ambassador was not considered sacred, and the torture of prisoners, though brutal and cowardly from our standpoint, was considered by the Indians

*Morgan's "League of the Iroquois."

†Morgan's "League of the Iroquois," "Jesuit Relations," and O. H. Marshall's "History of Buffalo," Vol. I.

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themselves very much as our forefathers looked upon the physical suffering of the tournament. Every warrior regarded death by torture as a possible and glorious, though doubtless scarcely desirable ending. In anticipation of death in open battle, he wore a scalp lock for the convenience of his successful enemy. In anticipation of death by torture, he nerved himself to the ordeal and, when the time came, took pride in bearing mutilations without flinching and even in inciting his captors to additional cruelties by recounting his own exploits in the field of battle and in the torture-council. Frequently it happened that, on account of some sudden fancy of his captors, or the desire of some recently bereaved family to replace a parent, son or brother, the victim was liberated and he then became a member in full standing, of the family, clan and tribe of his adoption. Sometimes the victim escaped and, if he afterward encountered his former tormentors, in time of peace, he had no inclination to take revenge upon them, regarding them simply as the victors in a fair, though, to our minds, uneven contest. When we contrast the tortures of the Indian with those prevalent among European nations in the middle ages, we find them no more brutal nor painful and, while in both cases, the victim was overwhelmed by superior forces, the Indian had previously enjoyed a fair field and no favors, while our more highly civilized Christian predecessors, tortured those who were entirely helpless. But, the salient difference is this, that the Indian torture was simply a development of a normal love of fighting, whereas the tortures of advanced, European civilization fouled the fair name of religion and law, the two powers which ought preeminently to stand for mercy and justice. At the time when the Jesuits came in contact with the Indians, the inquisition of the Church of Rome was comparatively recent history, while similar cruelties had been perpetrated by the established churches of England and Scotland, since the discovery of America. Cruelties, only a little less horrible, marked the differences of religious opinion among kinsmen in New England, the Protestant Dutch tortured English captives late in the eighteenth century, and the extortion of testimony under force of pain, prevailed at least in Italy and Rus-

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sia, into the nineteenth century. Even in the American Revolution, gross violation of the ethics of civilized warfare may be charged to both sides, and our pioneer history is full of instances in which unprovoked totrture and murder characterized our dealings with the Indians. All facts considered, it is scarcely necessary to plead for the Indian, his position in the stone age, separated from ourselves by thousands of years of the natural process of evolution.

A. L. BENEDICT.

BUFFALO.

DISCUSSIONS.

A FURTHER REPLY TO MR. J. M. ROBERTSON.

MY rejoinder to Mr. Robertson's "Reply" in the July number will be very brief. In his paragraph I. on p. 506, Mr. Robertson argues that because, borrowing for once a word I have seen used more than once in writings of his own, I spoke of a "blatant" faction, I therefore was "vituperating" a number of persons whom he names—persons for many of whom I have the greatest respect, based on a knowledge of their works and in some cases of themselves. His argument is doubly fallacious. (1) It does not follow that what may be predicated of a collective whole can be predicated of every individual who in any sense belongs to that whole. If an historian of recent events were to record that "London rejoiced in the boisterous fashion of 'Merry England' over the relief of heroic Mafeking," he would not necessarily be asserting that Mr. John M. Robertson had so rejoiced. Mr. Robertson has supplied me with a good specimen of the fallacy of Division, for which I should be duly grateful as a Professor of Logic (not of Moral Philosophy, as he says on p. 510—inaccurate in a matter which is irrelevant to the discussion, but on which verification would not have taken much trouble). (2) To refer only to responsible politicians whose views are sufficiently known—Mr. Morley and Mr. Bryce have accepted the annexation of the South African republics as now inevitable and they, with the great mass of the Liberal party, do not therefore belong to the *small* but very

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noisy faction of which I was speaking—the people who keep calling out "Stop the war"—on Mr. Kruger's terms, regardless of the interests of British subjects, and who pass resolutions against annexation and circulate petitions calling for *foreign* arbitration, as if there was a question in dispute between sovereign international states not yet at war. Perhaps it was a little unkind to the memory of the "Copperheads," whose case had a certain plausible legality, to liken them to these people.

If anyone will carefully compare what Mr. Robertson says in paragraph 2 on p. 506 with what he said on p. 286 and with what I said in the second pragraph on p. 498, he will see that Mr. Robertson has produced no scrap of evidence for his statement that I "repeatedly insinuated" a "chronological measure" of personal authority—a measure which he ridicules by an incongruous analogy. He now says that I have not ventured explicitly to say I did not do this. I did explicitly say on p. 498 (l. 9 and 3 from foot of page) that what I actually wrote about my reasons for preferring the authority of Sir Alfred (now Lord) Milner to that of his assailants had nothing whatever to do with length of residence. Mr. Robertson reiterates his original assertion (with the omission of the word "repeatedly") without being able to cite a single sentence of mine in support of his assertion, and then accuses me of "subterfuge." Mr. Robertson's criticisms of myself are, indeed, quite unimportant, except as illustrating what he apparently considers to be a fair method of controversy in matters where accuracy is easily obtained. On the more difficult problems of history and ethics further discussion with Mr. Robertson would, I think, be quite unprofitable. After reading his two papers of criticism I have re-read what I wrote in the January and in the July numbers, and I see nothing in my arguments that I should wish to alter—except that my statement of views is perhaps too condensed and that I have trusted too much to every word being read. On p. 405 the footnotes have unfortunately been transposed by the printer. To the books named in the footnote to p. 496 I should now like to add Mr. E. T. Cook's "Rights and Wrongs of the Transvaal War," which contains a valuable collection of documents.

D. G. Ritchie.

University of St. Andrews, Scotland.

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HUMAN SENTIMENT WITH REGARD TO A FUTURE LIFE.

The American Branch of the Society for Psychical Research has recently issued an interesting *questionnaire* (printed below) with a view to determining the feelings with which the possibility of a future life is actually regarded at the present day. The inquiry has arisen naturally out of the Society's work, since it must, of course, be of primary importance for it to know precisely the emotional bias which may at present distort the evidence it examines and thwart the objects it aims at.

In itself, however, the inquiry is primarily psychological in character and as such should appeal strongly to all students of human psychology. At the same time it has also a special interest for students of ethics, inasmuch as some of the questions asked seem to be well designed to throw light upon disputed ethical problems. For instance the questions as a whole will give us some definite idea of the relation between sentiment and belief, and so test the doctrine of the existence of a "will to believe" (or *disbelieve*) which moulds the beliefs actually entertained. Again the answers to Question II. should throw many side lights on the ethical questions as to the value of life.

Of course the results of the inquiry can only be representative and trustworthy if a large number of answers are collected, and I should like therefore to appeal to the readers of this journal to answer the *questionnaire* themselves and to collect answers from their friends. The work will be found extremely interesting as well as useful.

Copies of the *questionnaire* may be obtained from Dr. Hodgson or myself, and in *Europe answers should be returned to me, in America to Dr. Hodgson.*

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

There is a widespread literary tradition that men naturally desire a future life. From this assumed fact it has been variously argued that (1) such a universal desire cannot be destined to disappointment, and (2) it must vitiate convictions and engender illusory evidence in its own support.

But there is some reason to suppose, both from the ordinary conduct of men and from sporadic declarations of individuals, that this tradition is very far from accurately representing the facts, and that these are actually more various and complicated. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that in India the literary tradition seems to be exactly reversed, and it is assumed that men naturally crave for extinction or absorption in the Absolute.

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It becomes a question, therefore, what the actual sentiments of men are, and what, consequently, is the actual bias with which they are likely to receive the doctrines and the evidence that bear on the subject.

Both these questions are capable of being determined with sufficient precision by instituting a statistical inquiry over a sufficiently wide field—collecting answers until it becomes evident that the percentages of the various types of answer have become constant.

To determine the nature of men's actual sentiments and actual bias should be a matter of great interest, not only to the S. P. R. and psychologists generally, but also to every religious organization. For both the scientific labors of the former and the moral exhortations of the latter are likely to be in some degree, at least, ineffectual, so long as they are conducted in ignorance, and so in disregard, of what men really want. It is only when the facts have been ascertained that they can be argued from for the various purposes of the scientist, the philosopher and the theologian.

First of all, therefore, it is necessary to discover the nature of human sentiment; and to obtain it in its purity, it is desirable to exclude, as far as possible, all extraneous influences, whether of a religious or of a scientific kind. It is, of course, recognized that these may and often do influence sentiment, that they may engender or check it, as also that there may be a marked divergence between conviction or belief and *sentiment*. But as it is primarily the nature of the *sentiment* which has to be determined, these other considerations should be excluded as far as possible.

Hence the subjoined questions should be understood as directly referring only to the personal preferences, sentiments or desires of those who answer them, quite irrespective of their religious faith or reasoned convictions, the influence of which, where it exists, may be recorded in answer to Question III.

Please return this questionnaire when answered to Richard Hodgson, 5 Boylston Place, Boston, Mass., or F. C. S. Schiller, Corpus Christi College, Oxford.

N. B.—All names will be regarded as strictly confidential.

QUESTIONS.

I. Would you prefer (*a*) to live after "death" or (*b*) not?

II. (*a*) If I. (*a*), do you desire a future life whatever the conditions might be?

(*b*) If not, what would have to be its character to make the prospect seem tolerable? Would you, *e. g.*, be content with a life more or less like your present life?

(*c*) Can you say what elements in life (if any) are felt by you to call for its perpetuity?

III. Can you state *why* you feel in this way, as regards questions I. and II.?

IV. Do you NOW feel the question of a future life to be of urgent importance to your mental comfort?

V. Have your feelings on questions I., II. and IV. undergone change? If so, when and in what ways?

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VI. (*a*) Would you like to *know for certain* about the future life, or (*b*) would you prefer to leave it a *matter of faith?*

HINTS FOR COLLECTORS.

1. Answers should be collected by preference from educated adults.
2. Collectors should fill up their own papers first, and get the others answered *independently.*
3. Any answer, AFFIRMATIVE OR NEGATIVE, is valuable as a psychological fact.
4. Even *a refusal to answer* is a valuable indication of feeling, which it is important to record. In such case, the collector should, if possible, ask the reason of the refusal, and should then fill up a census paper with the name, etc., of the refuser, inserting the reason given for refusing under the head of *Remarks.*

The name, address, sex, age, nationality and profession of those who answer is also asked for.

BOOK REVIEWS.

ETHICAL DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS. By Professor D. G. Ritchie, G. H. Perris, J. R. MacDonald, J. A. Hobson, Professor J. H. Muirhead, Zona Vallance, F. J. Gould, Margaret McMillan, Professor Adamson, Christian Collin, and Dr. Stanton Coit. Edited for the Society of Ethical Propagandists by Stanton Coit. London: Grant Richards, 9 Henrietta street, W. C., 1900.

The subject matter of this book is described in the Editorial Preface as "the relation of democracy to the process of evolution in history, to international coöperation, to industry, to the family, to woman as a social factor, to the moral instruction and education of children, to the philosophic habit among the people, to literature and art in general, and to the inner springs of human conduct. Each of these topics forms the subject of a special essay in this volume."

There are eleven essays, each one by a different writer. Great catholicity has been shown in the choice of the essayists. Each one holds a more or less different point of view from all his fellows, in philosophy, politics, and methods of social reform. For this and some other reasons, the book is more interesting as a revelation of the modes of thought, and of the aims and ideals of

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of experience and unity of view. It is probable, however, that authority is one of the last things any of the writers concerned would desire to claim or exert, and in days like ours when we tend more and more to carry on our education in public, nothing but good can result from a published discussion by earnest and thoughtful people of topics which are of the first importance in the life of a community.

There is one common problem before all the writers, viz., how best to moralize a community; there is one common recognition that the supremest good in a community is the individual character of its members: but there is considerable difference as to means of moralization, and as to the moral effects of various methods. There is a preponderating tendency in the volume (in spite of disclaimers) to look to legislation, and to expect spiritual results from material conditions and from mechanical arrangements. There is also an absence of the recognition of any principle whereby we might be helped to know in what respects legislation can aid the development of character and in what respects it may thwart it. This seems to the present reviewer the gravest defect in the book.

One is grateful to Miss Vallance for her discriminating and vigorous emphasis upon motherhood as *das ewig-weibliche,* and for her noble insistence on the spiritual side of motherhood—that educated and educative tenderness, which, whether within the family or without it, is woman's finest gift to the community. But one's gratitude makes one's regret the more keen that Miss Vallance too looks for the conservation of her pearl without price, the development of this heart of womanhood, to the intervention of state economics, rather than to the development of mind and conscience in family life.

The most interesting essay in the book is that on Literature and Life, and this in spite of the fact that the writer does not always seem to discriminate clearly between life and literature. His judgments about the latter are apt to be too much on all fours with his judgment about the former, and *vice versa.* Nevertheless the whole essay is vigorous and fresh and full of a fine buoyancy and hope, too often absent both from the literature and the life of to-day. He says: "The association of images and emotions which the artist and his public go through, is a goal in itself, just as every victory in the struggle for life is a goal in itself, besides opening up a vista of further victories" (p. 265). "Art is useful

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in the same way as play is useful. But no imaginable play can be more useful to modern man than the art which develops a sailor-like love of moving on in a world of endless change and makes us feel at home on a coastless ocean of time" (p. 265). "Whatever the final result, whether idyllic or tragic, the struggle for life is worth living for the sake of the struggle itself. The trial of strength under high pressure sets the wonderful machinery of man going at full speed. There is a sense of vital victory in every telling effort" (p. 266). "If we do not take the playing instinct of animal and human nature into account, we get a misleading and enormously pessimistic impression of the evolution of life. Life has only in part been a struggle for existence. To a very great extent it has been a struggle for the sake of the struggle. To feel his faculties grow, and the bow of his energy bent to the utmost, is to man and beast a hire which is worth the labor" (p. 267). "In 'Romeo and Juliet' Shakespeare has shown us the spirit of love rising out of the old bloody family feud—love to the death blossoming out of war to the death, the very history of life in the shortest sum" (p. 281). "To combine that *struggle for right,* which has been the leading principle of Western civilization, with that spirit of *all-embracing love,* which is the greatest gift to mankind from Eastern culture—such a synthesis seems to be the central problem of life. If the problem is rightly put, the solution, of course, cannot lie in Tolstoi's abandonment of the active struggle for right. That is a one-sided Eastern view of the matter. Nor can it lie in Nietzsche's brutal and short-sighted application of the Darwinian law to human life. It can only lie in the closer and closer interweaving of universal sympathy with the active struggle for the liberation of the highest faculties of all—if need be, against their owners" (p. 281).

It would be impossible in the space at our disposal to give any detailed account (much less any detailed criticism) of the individual essays. One cannot avoid an uneasy feeling that the multiplication of books of this kind may dissipate time and energy of mind that could be more profitably employed in the study of some one really good thinker, or even of some one really great book. But doubtless there are many persons interested in these subjects who are deterred from grappling with the great books because of the more severe simplicity which is apt to characterize great books. Such readers will be attracted by the journalistic, up-to-date manner of most of these essays, a manner which while it makes those

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essays that are characterized by it more fit for the platform than the library may yet act as a decoy to lead to higher things.

MARY GILLILAND HUSBAND.

LONDON.

PARTEIPOLITIK UND MORAL. Von Dr. Friedrich Paulsen. Dresden: v. Zahn & Jaensch, 1900.

The question of party politics and morality is always a timely one, and it is interesting to know what a thinker like Professor Paulsen has to say on the subject. Philosophers usually find it impossible to accommodate their thoughts to the collective mind, and therefore are apt to look upon all party life as incompatible with their sense of truth and justice. Like the philosopher in Plato's "Republic," "they hold their peace and go their own way." And they are certainly not alone in this respect. Attention is frequently called to the fact that in this country the so-called "better element," men of moral refinement, take no serious part in public life, but leave the affairs of city and state to the "practical politicians," who are in the business "for revenue only." Indeed, the term *politician* has almost become synonymous with dishonesty, and there are few persons, even in public life, who would be willing to accept the title *sans phrase*.

There are, of course, legitimate reasons for this pessimistic feeling. Still, we cannot approve of the attitude of those who allow this feeling to cripple their action, and who simply repudiate all party life as immoral and unnecessary. A little thought will show the teleological necessity of parties and justify their existence, and it is highly important that their *raison d'être* be made clear. This Professor Paulsen has done in an admirable manner in a recent lecture, which is now published in pamphlet form, and which deserves to be widely read. Parties, he finds, always arise and must arise where an unorganized mass has to act as a unit. Without division into parties such unified action would be impossible. Political parties are the means of bringing out the different interests represented in a state and of thus securing the health of the whole. They are based upon the interests, let us say, upon the self-preservative, self-assertive impulses, of the different groups in a society. The views and theories of a party are of secondary importance; they are the products of party interests, which constitute the basis of a party's existence. Every group aims to pre-

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serve itself and therefore creates the ideas or theories essential to its preservation. It follows from all this that every party desires to rule; the will to power is the soul of its soul. A party that does not fight for power is useless. And it is because parties oppose each other as warring powers that we find so much in them that reminds us of war: victories and defeats, truces and treaties of peace, unions and compromises, strategy and tactics.

There are two tendencies in every party, hence two groups: the doctrinaires and the opportunists. The doctrinaires strictly adhere to the principles formulated by the party, their cardinal virtues are consistency and loyalty to principle. The opportunists care not so much for principle as for power and influence. Both these tendencies have their dangers. Unprincipled opportunism leads to dissolution, and brings a party into contempt. Rigorous adherence to a principle, regardless of conditions, makes a party lose touch with reality. Hence a party must keep the mean between these two extremes; the tact of its leaders must decide when obstinate consistency and when accommodation to conditions are necessary. Men who possess this tact are the political geniuses.

The warlike nature of parties explains the relation of party politics to morality. We frequently find them practising something of the morality common in war, indeed, they often suspend the rules of morality altogether. Hence deception is used as a means of combat, just as in war. In party eloquence the facts are manipulated, perverted, and invented in the interests of the party. The purpose of the speakers is not the discovery and spread of truth, but the triumph of the party over its opponents. The motives of opponents are impugned, those of the party men placed in the most favorable light; the consequences of proposed measures are exaggerated and distorted so as to redound to the glory of the party and to cast discredit upon adversaries. The public offices are filled with partisans, on the principle that to the victor belong the spoils. Loyalty to the party is made the test of fitness to hold office. The duty of the office-holders is to promote "the cause," that is, to keep the party in power at all hazards, particularly by influencing the elections. Even the courts of justice are regarded as proper instruments for the promotion of party interests. Everywhere the principle seems to be followed that the end (the success of the party) justifies the means.

And yet parties are necessary; without them public life would be impossible. Nations without internal and external conflicts

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stagnate. War and struggle are evils, but they are necessary evils. Hence the problem is not to do away with parties, but to humanize the conflict and make it moral. The party must fight an honest fight; the party man must be convinced of the justice of his cause and advocate its principles simply because he believes in them, not for the sake of personal gain. The party in power is in constant danger of attracting to its standard all office-seekers and spoilsmen, while the defeated party has the tendency to become the party of the honest people. Again, the battle must be fought with honest weapons. No honest man will fight with poisoned arms. But of course my attitude towards party opponents will not be the same as towards friends. We must also respect the human being in our adversary; we must remember that there are honest men in all parties. And finally we must place the welfare of the people above the party.

We may say in conclusion that though we have not reached perfection in party morality we are approximating the ideal. Party conflicts, like wars, are being humanized and made moral. Party conflicts as they occurred, say in the ancient Greek cities, are no longer possible in our day. The causes of the change are to be sought not so much in a change of human nature as in a change of the general conditions of historical life. Three causes have been of assistance here: (1) The formation of great national states, which makes impossible conspiracies with a country's enemies, and thus robs party conflicts of their former bitterness. (2) The monarchical constitution. A monarchy considers all parties, listens to all, but serves none. A government that has the absolute approval of a party is no longer a monarchy, but the slave of that party. (3) The development of the historical feeling, which enables men to justify the existence of parties other than their own.

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

DER BEGRIFF DES ABSOLUT WERTVOLLEN ALS GRUNDBEGRIFF DER MORALPHILOSOPHIE. Von Felix Krueger. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1898. Pp. 95.

The fundamental problem of ethics, says the author, is this: What has absolute worth for man? Kant has taught us that everything objective is to be referred to subjective, psychical

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functions. Now ethics cannot dispense with an objectively valid, supreme judgment of worth. This judgment must be based upon a functional uniformity of our psychical life. The method of ethics must therefore be psychological. All the defects of Kant's moral system spring from his neglect of psychology, its value consists in its psychological truth. Kant was opposed to an empirical-psychological foundation of ethics for reasons that are not valid. He did not believe that experience could give us universal and necessary judgments. Moreover, he identified eudæmonistic with psychological ethics, and repudiated the second with the first. But Kant is right in the belief that the criterion of moral worth can be found only in the personality; only a specific quality of the human will can be absolutely valuable.

Moral judgments are always judgments of value. Such judgments presuppose a certain relation between the willing and feeling of the person judging and the object of value. Hence the fundamental problem of ethics is to give a psychological analysis of the fact of evaluation. Dr. Krueger reaches the conclusion that only that is valuable for me which I desire constantly. Now what is unconditionally valuable? What is the absolutely valid judgment of value for every evaluating individual? There is only one possible object of worth, that is the psychical faculty or function of evaluating. Everything in the world would lose its value for me the moment I lost the faculty of constant desire; this is the necessary condition of all evaluation, hence it has absolute value for every individual that possesses any values whatever. We cannot evaluate without other soul-capacities, hence these have a *relative* value. The absolute or moral value of a man depends upon the measure in which the function of evaluating is realized in his psychical life. The effect of the volition is immaterial. The problem is to organize or unify a multitude of desires by the function of evaluating; be an evaluating individual, organize your desires.

The author's method and his leading idea that morality is ultimately based on human nature are, in my opinion, sound. But there are several objectionable points in his theory. In the first place, it seems to me the feeling of worth or value is not absolutely identical with desire. It may be *aroused* by the desire, but it *is not* the desire. Thus I may have two desires, a desire to eat and a desire to think. I may say the desire to think is better than the desire to eat; eating is *good,* but thinking is *better.* In order to

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place a value on a desire I must have the desire, but having a desire is one thing, putting a value on it, another. Again, every desire has relative worth, *i. e.*, even though a desire be not constant, I may feel: this thing is good, it is worth something *to me*. Moreover, there are many constant desires which have no objective worth; I may say of them, they are not valuable. It is the business of ethics to find out what has objective worth, and if possible why. According to Dr. Krueger the evaluating faculty itself has absolute worth. This ought to mean on his theory that we *constantly desire* such a faculty, which is not true. Besides, the ability to evaluate, to organize our desires, does not determine a man's value. In order to be moral a man must have the *right* values, he must organize his desires in a certain way. If he organizes them so that his so-called lower impulses control the higher, if he puts a higher value on his material me than on his spiritual me, he is not called moral. It is true that if man did not have the power to evaluate, there would be no morality. But it is also true that then there would be no immorality either. The first fact would not make the function absolutely good any more than the second would make it absolutely bad.

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

THE TEMPERANCE PROBLEM AND SOCIAL REFORM. By J. Rowntree and A. Sherwell. Popular Edition (abridged). London: 1901.

The appearance of a popular edition of Messrs. Rowntree and Sherwell's well-known book suggests the time has come when their facts, arguments and proposals should be tested and criticised with the utmost care; for the book has attained such a vogue that Cabinet Ministers do not hesitate to quote it as an authority before which we have to bow. It has achieved its preëminent position in the literature of temperance not only by comparison with the mass of the temperance literature but also by its own merit. The pages of the book abound in figures, quotations, diagrams and photographs, and in contradistinction to most of the literature on this subject, its tone is moderate and evidences a serious desire to ascertain the truth rather than to boom the cause. It is refreshing to find a case where abstinence

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from alcohol has not produced violent and intemperate language. The theme of the author is briefly this. The evils of intemperance are immense (chap. I), the Liquor Trade is a serious political menace and every effort should be made to dissociate it from politics (chap. II); State Prohibition has proved a failure, at any rate in towns (chap. III). Local Option is successful in Rural Districts (chap. IV). The Scandinavian system of philanthropic companies has succeeded in diminishing drunkenness and divorcing the Spirit Traffic from Politics (chap. VIII).

Let us pause here before we come to the authors' solution. The most important part of the book is the detailed account of the working of State Prohibition in Maine and the other Prohibition States of America. If any analogies can fairly be drawn between England and the United States it seems clear that Prohibition, if enacted in England, would fail hopelessly. Probably public sentiment would always be so strong against it that there is not the slightest chance of any prohibition law ever being passed and the use of this chapter is to show to the more extreme temperance advocates that their energies should not be devoted to agitating for prohibition. However much some people would like to forbid the sale of alcohol except in blue corrugated bottles labeled "Poison, for medicinal, chemical, mechanical or sacramental use only," they must for the present be content with much less stringent measures. Local Option was not well received in England by the electors who voted in the year 1894, and unless it is combined with proposals for giving full compensation to license holders, incurs the bitter hostility of the trade while only affording a partial and incomplete remedy. No remedy is satisfactory which does not put the liquor trade out of politics. The question of the remedy is very difficult. The authors' scheme is to provide rival attractions. The retail Liquor Trade is to be carried on by the localities either directly or through a company, and the profits resulting from it are not to go directly to the locality but be paid to the State and redistributed by the State in the form of grants for the establishment and maintenance of recreative centres; the grant will be proportioned to the population. The first difficulty in this scheme is, How is the transfer to be effected? The authors fairly point out that it is essential to the success of the scheme that the whole of the retail licenses in a town should be taken over. But this can hardly be done without compensation to license holders or a very long time notice.

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It is upon this question of compensation that most of the initial difficulties will arise. If the compensation be not full, the trade will be very hostile, and if the authors' arguments as to the power of the trade in cities are correct, it is extremely improbable that the necessary legislation will be passed. If, on the other hand, full compensation be given, the profits will only suffice to pay a fair rate of interest on the capital expended in buying up the licenses and there will not be much to spend on the counter attractions. A time notice sufficiently long to disarm the hostility of the trade would delay the reform for a generation at least.

The theory of counter attractions is plausible and has no doubt much to be said for it. But it is hardly likely that Arts and Crafts Exhibitions, lectures by Sir R. Ball, or even winter gardens, social clubs (if they are strictly temperance), gymnasia or bright temperance cafés would form a sufficient counter attraction to the craving for stimulants. No doubt these counter attractions are sadly wanted and would do great good and would tend to lessen the number of persons who frequent public houses for want of something better to do, but it is not safe to be too optimistic about the matter. Further, in so far as they were successful in diminishing the consumption of liquor the annual grant with which they are provided or kept up would diminish. Although we may think that the critical and destructive part of this book is more valuable than the constructive, nevertheless it would be an excellent thing if the authors' scheme could be tried on a large scale.

The abridged edition omits a great quantity of statistics which are contained in the eighth edition, but this is a matter of no consequence, because it is very difficult to draw trustworthy conclusions from many of the figures given, and mere masses of figures do not assist the inquirer. And the statistics which are retained could conveniently be omitted without diminishing the value of the popular edition, for they are extremely difficult to interpret. Thus do the figures for the per capita consumption of alcohol-liquors in the colonies refer to the consumption throughout the whole population or are native populations omitted? Until we know this the statement that in 1898 the consumption of spirits per head of population in the United Kingdom was 1.05 gallons, in New Zealand .66 gallon, and in Natal .60 gallon, does not tell us much. The chief defect of the book is a certain want of proportion, and the absence of a bibliography. It is greatly to

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be hoped that in future editions the authors will see their way to adding a bibliography.

C. P. SANGER.

LONDON.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A DIALOGUE IN UTOPIA. By Havelock Ellis. London: Grant Richards, 1900.

Mr. Ellis' book consists of a number of discursive criticisms, delivered in a tone of calm retrospective contempt, tempered by the conviction that all will come right in the end.

The bar, the press, our present political, educational and drainage systems come in for charges of absurdity; but in the light of the author's lantern the facts illuminated more often wear the air of familiar half-truths than surprising discoveries. Incongruities are often coupled with cleverness and success; but the author has not the incorruptible naïveté of eye of the ironist, nor within him a fierce enough fire of scorn to consume the pile of apologetics which lie round makeshift institutions.

To the young men talking in the pleasant shade of Utopia the nineteenth century appears as an age of blood and tears, of blind energy and "picturesque misery," a hard and hideous age, in which some lived in sluttish luxury; but most led stale, decrepit lives, spent in dreary oscillation between their slavish work and mean homes. The "herd instincts" still flourished; there was no individuality and therefore there were no good thinkers or good artists. Patriotism, pugnacity and other savage virtues still ruled men's relations to each other. "No truly human civilization could possibly arise on a national basis." Besides, "it was never the custom for any country to seek out diligently its wisest men and induce them to undertake the conduct of difficult affairs . . . . . any pert young scion of the aristocracy or any pushful manufacturer or idle barrister was allowed to direct the fate of a nation." . . . . "In the hands of such rulers the finer human impulses might at any moment be swept off the face of the earth, leaving scarcely a trace behind." In the scramble for land and gold the English were especially qualified to succeed, being more tenacious and suspicious than their neighbors. Mr. Ellis quotes the assertion that we conquered India not from motives of ambition or cupidity, but under the suspicion that we were the dupes of the French. Protestantism was naturally the religion of the

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progressive Northern peoples, for it encouraged truculent self-assertion. Abroad they found it a convenient catspaw and in individuals it nourished "moral force, which was merely the inherited fighting instinct turned into a social channel," and in its attempts to benefit others usually too officious and obtuse to be useful. Science had not yet come down from the stars to study the physical well-being of man.

In short the men of the nineteenth century were "children in the art of living." They came near destroying the beauty and joy of life—*propter vitam vivendi perdere causas.* "They could not see beauty because they could not see nature." "No better proof exists of the death of art than the inability to make vital buildings," and Mr. Ellis goes on to say that it would be impossible to expect a love of architecture in a people who were ashamed of the naked body. Now, the study of the human body is an excellent lesson in proportion; but is there more truth in his remark than this? It is true perhaps that the only style original to the nineteenth century is the speculating builder's cockney fantasia, the works of refinement being merely learned essays in past periods: but is not this due to comfort being a cheaper ideal than beauty, easier recognized and now easier attained, to circumstances requiring men often to move from one ready-built home to another and to the frequent compulsion of the modern architect to build under artistically impossible conditions, when, for instance, he has to pile a high house upon a show-plate window? Had not Mr. Ellis better have confined himself to the less interesting statement that architecture, as he asserts of science, had lost some of its dignity by becoming the drudge of a commercial age, instead of hinting at some mean morality as the cause? He sums up the nineteenth century by saying that "at that time the race was approaching the problem of the organization of the mechanical side of life." This statement contains for him a pardon and a promise. Men did not know how to use the new results of their ingenuity to their own happiness; but regarded them "simply as a method of enriching capitalists, crushing superfluous populations, and adding to the total ugliness of the world" (p. 148). But earlier in the conversation a glance is thrown on subsequent history. "When once the development of machinery was achieved on its main lines, so that the merely mechanical side of life became almost automatic, an immense amount of energy was released for finer ends, and the instinct of beauty, freed

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from the fetters it had worn, naturally revived with increased vigor. But for the moment its suppression was inevitable" (p. 94).

So we are to be saved by machinery after all. No reasons are given showing that invention is likely to reach such a pitch or the knowledge of what is really important to keep better pace with it in future. Perhaps Mr. Ellis does not really believe this himself; for at the end of the dialogue the reader is startled by the statement that "Life has been always perfect," and that "the sum of satisfaction can hardly be greater in one age than it has been in any other." One of the Utopians consistently adds, "There is but a hair's breadth between us and the nineteenth century." This, if it darkens the future for us might have thrown a brighter light on the past for him.

D. MACCARTHY.

LONDON.

PROBLEMS IN EDUCATION. By W. H. Winch, B. A., Inspector of Schools for the London School Board. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1900.

It is a remarkable fact and one greatly to be regretted that the greater number of books on the Theory and Practice of Education are worthless. Most writers on this subject seem to be singularly devoid either of thought or of the power of clear expression. The result of this is that persons who can discriminate have not patience to read such books, and are inclined to scoff at Theorists on Education, while those earnest students who have had little previous education have their intellects confused and their tastes vitiated by books accepted by them as authorities.

Moreover, writers on education, like writers on Sociology, seem to delight in epitomizing philosophical and scientific theories and in making hasty generalizations as to how these theories can be practically applied to current topics and questions of conduct. Nothing tends to encourage superficiality of thought and mere verbal knowledge more than this does; and these writers, who, like our present author, inveigh against cheap science, would do well to consider whether cheap philosophy is not equally pernicious. "Problems of Education" is no better than the majority of its kind.

In the preface to this book, the author, Mr. Winch, tells us that

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in it he intends to discuss "the burning questions of the day (concerning Education) approaching them from the philosophical and psychological side." Again he says, "Roughly, the dominant theories in the common school education of to-day are based upon a psychology and philosophy that are largely discredited, and my own endeavor is to bring the results of later thought and study into relation with school work. And this from a double point of view; for in no case have I given practical deductions whose success I have not verified." This being Mr. Winch's aim we should expect him to give us a complete and lucid account of the main philosophical ideas of to-day and an estimate of their influence on existing educational schemes and systems. We should expect also a summary of those recent conclusions in psychology, psychophysics and physiology which are likely to bear on education, and a discussion as to how far these conclusions are already or ought in the future to affect our educational theories. This alone, without Mr. Winch's verifications, would, if adequately treated, fill a large volume; yet all Mr. Winch offers to the public is a series of disconnected essays filling altogether less than 100 pages.

Mr. Winch's first essay, "On the Hope of Agreement in Educational Theory," is a fair sample of his book. In this, after a few preliminary remarks, he tells us that "the dominant school of thought to-day in so far as such thought effects educational practice is realistic." No explanation is given as to what is meant here by Realism—the discussion of its "educational outcome" is dismissed in a few words concluding with the remark that "a curious illustration of this supreme regard for natural science, and all the more valuable perhaps because shown incidentally, is given by a liberal thinker of to-day, who is himself an historian." This "curious illustration" is an anecdote of Benjamin Franklin given by Sir George Trevelyan in his "American Revolution," and is hardly apposite to the present question.

Mr. Winch concludes his brief remarks on Realism by these somewhat unintelligible words, "If Liberalism means a definite philosophic view, and is based upon consistent conceptions, then History at least as concerned with government and governors, is, assuming one could learn anything definitely from it, not likely to be of great use when members of a world wholly given up to economic considerations, engaged in supplying each other's material wants, where there are no interferences with the interchange

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of productions, much individual liberty, and the gradual contraction of the sphere of government." We gather from this introduction of the term Liberalism that Mr. Winch in some way connects or confounds it with "Realism."

After disposing of Realism, Mr. Winch proceeds to discuss Idealism and its effects on education. In two pages he tells us the meaning of Idealism, viz., "that in this world there is nothing great but man, and in man nothing great but mind, and that things are what they are by virtue of the relations which subsist between them and other things," and that following from these conceptions, and supporting them, comes "a group of conceptions regarding human society which are the very antithesis of individualism; the solid individual becomes dissolved in a network of relations, to his family, to his trade, to his church, to the human race, the strong unsolicited taking up the burden of the inferior races, a burden, perhaps, that is not always realized by those who carry it." "The inevitable outcome educationally of such doctrines as these," says Mr. Winch, "would not be hard to forecast *a priori*." This is, if we understand him, that education should be literary rather than scientific.

Mr. Winch then concludes this essay by stating that his purpose in writing it is to indicate the general systems of thought, which issue in and partly depend upon Theories of Education, a purpose which he has signally failed to carry out.

In the course of the above mentioned discussion Mr. Winch impresses upon us the fact that it was by no means his intention to assert or deny the truth of either Realism or Idealism or at present to condemn or approve the educational outcome of these in any entirety, or even with discrimination." He told us in short "that he disclaims for the moment any attitude of approbation or criticism." At no future moment in his book do we discover that Mr. Winch ventures to forsake this uncritical and impartial attitude. Perhaps he atones for his humility by occasional digressions from his line of argument to give us gratuitious information such as "I remember discussing with Professor Earl Barnes, whose studies in Education is to me the best-known work in Child Study along pedagogical lines, the enormous difficulty of framing the questions upon which those statistical results are based."

The style as well as the nature of Mr. Winch's book has been fairly illustrated in the above quotations, but his disregard for the simplest rules of grammar should also be noted and

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may be seen in the following sentence: "To know the best that has been said and thought in the world, poetry to sweeten and soften, literature to provide the pupil with knowledge and views of life, history to strengthen the sense of human solidarity and to give object lessons in government." Not only has this phrase no finite verb, but it has no logical or grammatical connection with its context. Again in the next page we find standing in place of a sentence the elliptical phrase, "Thus the theory of knowledge, and for the ethics, they, too, may be obtained inductively."

In conclusion, the most charitable excuse we can make for the author is that he is one of those who rightly lament the narrow utilitarianism of our elementary education and the mechanical and superficial methods of teaching still dominant, who see also danger in the cry for more technical and commercial education but who cannot perceive clearly either the cause or the remedy for the evil which they deplore.

A. D. SANGER.

LONDON.

EDUCATION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: Lectures delivered in the Education Section of the Cambridge University Extension Summer Meeting in August, 1900. Edited by R. D. Roberts, M. A., D. Sc. (London). Cambridge: University Press.

The title of this book suggests a wider field than is actually covered by the thirteen lectures of which it is composed, for twelve of them deal with education in England, and the thirteenth gives a sketch of the present organization of schools and universities in Germany. Further, "education" is tacitly confined to influences deliberately brought to bear on children and youths in schools of various types. There is no claim to completeness, nor very much of system in the topics handled, but the lectures together give a convenient summary of the chief changes which have taken place in both the external and the internal organization of schools. Awful examples are quoted to show the depths from which scholastic England has ascended in primary, secondary and university branches of scholastic work. Undoubtedly the advance has been very real and very general. Especially prominent is it, of course, in the provision of adequate material equipment for primary instruction, and in the greater attention now paid to the higher instruction of girls and women. Marked, too, have been

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the changes in curriculum and methods of teaching, and the writers of the lectures before us generally assume that all such changes are improvements. Such optimism is natural under the circumstances, but as Mr. Sadler says in his lecture—to our mind the most valuable in the volume—"Courses of study are inflicted by one generation, not on itself but on its successors, and it is only fair to wait till the victims have come to their turn to speak. They have a disagreeable way of siding with their grandparents" (p. 214). Certainly not all who are in close touch with English schools would go with Dr. Kimmins when he says that "during the past few years [rational science] teaching has been on its trial, and has come out of it splendidly" (p. 138); the generation demanded by Mr, Sadler has not yet passed; we cannot test the adult product of the science schools and that is the only test worth considering.

Several of the lectures exhibit a craving for state organization as the one panacea for the ills of secondary schools. Yet it is shown that there has been much progress during the past century without such organization. To us it seems probable that an exaggerated importance is attached to such organization. Doubtless, something of the kind is wanted to secure efficient and sufficient material conditions of secondary instruction. But beyond that, official and external regulation is likely to do as much harm as good to the cause of real education. Certainly this danger has not been avoided in State dealings with primary schools, and much of the progress of the past ten years has consisted in retracing that of the preceding thirty years. The picture Dr. Rein gives of German organization does not appeal to us as either very admirable in itself or suitable to England. Here again Mr. Sadler sounds a note of wise warning. "How is [State] authority going to touch public opinion as it exists among the boys or undergraduates themselves?" he asks. Lovers of system are always apt to regard human beings as mere items to be "systematically" dealt with; the natural result ensues that a highly "systematized" scheme of schools is frequently as uneducative in any true sense as it is externally impressive. The writers before us would not, we know, desire an organization which would weaken the true life of our schools, but we are not certain that the danger of such a result following external interference is as clearly recognized as are the material advantages of public pecuniary support.

J. Welton.

Leeds.

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AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLE. By the Rev. Wilfred Richmond, M. A. London: Edward Arnold, 1900.

This book is intended, the author tells us, "to illustrate a philosophical principle, not to establish a philosophical conclusion." By this we understand him to mean that his object is to state a point of view, rather than to demonstrate or even to discuss its truth. The point of view is certainly interesting. It is, to use the author's own phrase, "a kind of philosophical socialism," and as such is likely to appeal to a wide circle of readers, at a time when the conception of fellowship, in some form or other, is influencing and transforming every department of experience. This point of view, it is true, is hardly suggested by the word "Personality." But the tenor of the book is to show that the whole content of personality implies or presupposes a collective experience. The conceptions of the intellect, the laws of will, the objects of emotion are represented as involving from the beginning a reference to other minds. These three factors, it is conceived, interact in every phase of experience; and point, in the course of their development, to the same ultimate ideal. This ideal, in the author's view, is the love of God; God being the only object that satisfies at once the craving of volition for law, of intellect for truth and of emotion for good. And it is in this love that men find the perfect fellowship to which all their imperfect activities point.

Such appears to be the general tenor of the book, so far as it can be expressed in a few words. In detail a philosopher or a psychologist will find, we conceive, much to criticise; but apparently it is not for these that the author writes. He has in mind rather "the very large body of people who are asking themselves the philosophic question, and who find themselves repelled by the form is which it comes, and the question is offered for their acceptance." To these Mr. Richmond's view of experience is likely to appeal; and to them we heartily commend his book.

G. L. DICKINSON.

KING'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE, ENGLAND.

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PHILOSOPHY AND LIFE.

I.

We have more reason to examine the relation of philosophy to life than the relation of other sciences to life, because philosophy is specially occupied with questions which have direct reference to life, or which are on the boundary line between the life of thought and the other forms of life. Philosophical problems concern the nature, conditions and limits of knowledge, the nature and worth of evidence, and the principles which underlie our valuation of human actions and institutions. It is the task of philosophy to bring together all the facts which can throw light on these questions and to use them for the purpose of gaining a definite point of view with respect to the fundamental problems of life and reality. Philosophy is a distinctive form of mental life which reacts on the other forms of mental life. The philosophy of the Vedanta has had great influence on mental development in India; Platonism has acted powerfully on the development of the Christian Church; and in the past century the thought of Spinoza and Kant, of Hume and Comte have had a great influence even on those who cherished the belief that they were beyond the reach of philosophical influences. Philosophy has a function to perform, without which the mental life would be deprived of clearness and depth. To accomplish its task, philosophy ought to be free and unhampered. Thought is an element of life which throws

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light on the other elements, and these other elements have no right to dictate to thought on the ground that they alone constitute "life." The materials which thought requires for working out its problems must be discovered by thought itself. Only with the help of thought is it possible to distinguish between real experience and mere ideas or illusions. Philosophy is nothing but an endeavor to attain the clearest possible conception of our place in the system of things.

It is difficult, however, to reach this stage of clear consciousness. Behind our clearest consciousness there are always unconscious tendencies and dispositions, which can perhaps be recognized later on, but which for long periods of time can function as latent coefficients. Our consciousness works itself out of a dark chaos, and its sporadic elements are combined through an involuntary synthetical process. Our clearest thinking has, therefore, its heel of Achilles, namely, that point where the unconscious and involuntary forces are at work. This heel of Achilles can be discovered later on, and thought can perhaps avoid being wounded again at this point. When Thetis immersed her son in fire to make him invulnerable, she grasped him by the heel; she was not clever enough to immerse him twice and to grasp the other heel the second time. Philosophy acquires this cleverness in proportion to the degree in which she emancipates herself from dogmatism. Every philosophical work makes use of certain presuppositions, of which the philosophers cannot be completely conscious, which are effects of the dependence in which thought, despite all its energy, ever stands to the other sides of life. But subsequent thought can draw such presuppositions to the light, and in this consists the progress of philosophy. Achilles must always be made invulnerable again, because new struggles always arise, and there is always a heel of Achilles as long as life and development are going on. The philosopher cannot avoid being a child of his time and his nation. In his most independent moments he is often guided by an endeavor to find expression for peculiarities and tendencies of which he is not conscious, just because they are so intimately one with his own self. In this respect philosophy stands in a passive or receptive relation to

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the other sides of mental life. Philosophical ideas, however carefully they may have been worked out, are in this respect to be considered as symptoms or symbols. The Platonic doctrine of ideas stands above the darkness and restlessness of the world of experience, as Olympus in its eternal splendor stands above the struggles and changes of the life of mortals; and in Kant's "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," as in Goethe's "Faust," the last word is eternal striving. What myth and poetry express in the form of images, philosophy expresses in the form of ideas or concepts. It is the task of critical philosophy to define the boundary between thought and poetry.

Philosophy stands, then, in a double relation to life: in an active relation in so far as it is the conscious working out of problems; in a passive relation so far as it is an involuntary symbolizing of unconscious tendencies and dispositions. Both sides have their value, and both are always present when the work of philosophy is done on a grand scale. The last century has especially accentuated the historical and psychological dependence of the life of thought on the other forms of life. Both Romanticism and Positivism have, each in its own way, maintained this point of view. J. G. Fichte, the founder of the philosophy of Romanticism, declared that the personality of the philosopher decided the choice of the principle on which his general view of the world depends. Your philosophy depends on what sort of man you are! Hegel develops this point of view further in his obscure but profound "Phaenomenologie des Geistes," in which he attempts to prove that the nature, degree and direction of thought are determined by the stage which has been reached in the development of the mental life. Comte's doctrine of the three stages implies that the methods and results of knowledge differ according to the degree of human and social development. At the "theological" stage, other explanations of phenomena satisfy the endeavor to understand than at the "metaphysical"; and the "positive" stage, the stage of modern experimental science, puts questions and requires answers in accordance with principles which are different from those of the two earlier stages. What at one stage is a good answer, is no answer at the other stages. The dependence of

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problems, methods and results on the mental and social development, is expressed in the most general way by the philosophy of evolution; for, in the light of evolutionary principles, all knowledge is seen to be determined by the struggle for life and the necessity for adaptation.

That this relation between thought and life is so clearly recognized by philosophy indicates that a great advance has been made. But this point of view raises several new questions which I shall try to answer.

II.

The philosopher is in the first place a logician. Philosophy has even been defined as the science of knowledge. This definition is not sufficient, but it emphasizes a feature of prime importance. An investigation of the nature and origin of our concepts, judgments, and inferences, and of their connection with the nature and mode of action of our consciousness, is always of capital importance for philosophy. It is the task of the logician to tell us what it is *to understand.* What are the conditions of a complete understanding, and can we have such an understanding? The endeavor to understand leads to the development of concepts, judgments, and inferences. When we try to understand a thing, we translate it into the forms of our concepts, judgments, and inferences, and we form on the basis of experience a system of thoughts as coherent and continuous as possible. But with what right do we thus translate the contents of reality, which we have not produced, into the forms of our thought? If reality were intelligible (*i. e.* rational) through and through, all its contents could be represented as a great system of concepts, judgments, and inferences, and every event in the world could be placed in the same relation to other events as the conclusion to its premises. In every field, human thought works unweariedly to reduce the contents of reality, through observation and analysis, to such simple points of view that a pure logical continuity can be established. But the great question is: Can all the content of reality be in this manner translated into the forms of thought? The content and qualitative distinctions of reality, however, would not be com-

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pletely characterized, even if a pure logical formulation of reality as a whole were possible. We could then only say, that existence can be perceived or understood, *as if* its states and events were related one to another as the premises are related to the conclusion, or *vice versa.* The states and the event contain always more than the purely logical relations, in accordance with which they can be arranged in our understanding. Their special qualities are not explained, because we can point out their exact relations to other qualities. At any rate, the great difference between a series of thoughts and a series of states and events still remains: every element of a series of thoughts stands in relation to the next only as reason to consequent, but every element in the series of states or events stands in relation to the next, not only as reason to consequent, but also as cause to effect. The event which we call cause precedes *in time* the event which we call effect. The relation of time is here of capital importance. But in the series of logical thoughts the consequent is given, when we have the premises —though we perhaps need a long time to discover it. In pure logic the relation of time is of no import. But, in existence, something *happens.* There is here a "no more" and a "not yet." There is a contrast between memory and expectation, and the great problem is, with what right do we base our expectation on our memories, and how far can such expectations be verified by future events.

As a logician, the philosopher has only one mental want, the desire to understand. It is his task to mark out the boundary between the intelligible and the unintelligible. But there are other mental wants besides the wish to understand, and it is a part of the philosopher's task to investigate these other wants and their relation to the purely intellectual want. The philosopher ought to be a psychologist also, not merely a logician. *All* understanding is an utterance of *the personal life,* whose manifold forms and stages the psychologist ought to follow step by step, from the most elementary stage to the highest. The philosopher is here an observer and should employ an art of description, which sometimes presupposes the talent of the poet, sometimes those of the experimentalist. The manifold,

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free and often mysterious variations of mental phenomena must be studied in many different ways. And observation and description are only the first stages. Explanation, the pointing out of the causal relation of mental life, is the main task. The philosopher has here the most direct and immediate example of a content of existence which cannot be completely and exhaustively represented in purely logical forms. And yet such a representation is the ideal of the psychologist. He seeks a continuity of mental development which can make it possible to perceive mental states or events as related one to another as premises to conclusions. But his own immediate experience teaches him that the real states of mental life are not completely characterized in this way.

Both as a psychologist and as a logician the philosopher finds himself at last confronted with *the metaphysical problem,* the problem of the innermost nature and essence of reality. The manner in which this problem is treated, must essentially depend on the results to which the discussion of the problem of knowledge has led, and on the view which Psychology has formed of the nature of mental life and its relations to the other sides of existence. And if one completely eliminates the metaphysical problem, one must justify this by arguments which are furnished by Logic and Psychology. In this connection it is of special interest for us to see wherein the importance of metaphysical discussions and hypotheses consists.

A metaphysical hypothesis can give us an ideal or a principle, a leading thought, which carries us on to larger questions and problems, where an anxious restriction to single present experiences would suspend the labor of thought. It gives us a wider point of view from which special questions can be treated, and is in this way of importance for the whole scientific domain.

But its main importance depends on the account of our whole intellectual situation which it endeavors to give. In a metaphysical hypothesis we follow a line of thought to its logical conclusion and render explicit all its implications. We wish to see in what direction the scientific principles and results lead, if we consider them as complete expressions of reality.

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The history of thought exhibits a struggle between a certain number of hypotheses or systems. But these are not the same at every time. Certain metaphysical possibilities can be eliminated, for experience may show that they are not tenable or not necessary. Other possibilities can take their places, or older hypotheses can be recast in such a way that they are in harmony with the claims of new experiences. Perhaps this is an eternal war. But then it is important to be clear about the object of the war and about the manner in which the war is to be waged.

The individuality of the philosopher, his personal equation, must inevitably have a great influence in that undefined region where metaphysical hypotheses live and move, and where thought and poetry are often insensibly blended. It is important to bear this in mind in view of the human propensity to dogmatism, that is, the tendency to regard one's own presupposition as the only one possible. But the influence of the personal factor has not this effect, that the attempt to build a world of thought at the boundary of our exact knowledge is useless or impossible. This attempt has its worth, if it is carried on with critical power and with a deep apprehension of the kernel of the problem. A shortsighted scepticism has no more right on its side than a shortsighted dogmatism, and is equally hostile to clearness and depth of mental life. Neither new doubt nor old dogmas ought to prevent us from looking freely around, even when we have arrived at the boundary of exact knowledge. The world of thought, which we here build, ought to be brought into harmony with the methods and results of science. In the long run, a conflict between the consequences of science and the claims of personal life is impossible. There is one thing which is generally overlooked, when the relation between science and belief is discussed. Scientific research is no purely impersonal affair. A personal want, one of the necessities of mental life, reveals itself in the endeavor to find continuity in the life of nature and of mind. The involuntary striving of our mind to maintain its continuity under all variations and to unite all its elements as closely as possible is the ultimate explanation of that unweariedness with which the causes of events are sought at all stages of mental development. The

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more we can conceive each new experience as a continuation of earlier experiences, the better this want is satisfied. The desire to find natural causes (verae causae), that is, causes which are experienced in the same way as the effects, is, therefore, not merely thrust upon the mind from without, but has its source in the innermost nature of our mental life. There is analogy, and more than analogy, between thought and character: both demand continuity and coherence, and both are antagonistic to the sporadic, the isolated and the fragmentary. Only by this consideration can we explain the deep joy which arises, when the work of thought advances and a clear understanding is won.

III.

Philosophy is not only Logic and Psychology; it is also *Ethics*. Its task is not only to construct a series of pure thoughts and discover a series of causes, but also to test values, to make a systematic valuation of human qualities, actions and institutions. All valuation is in the end determined by a fundamental value, *an immediate value,* on which all other values depend. Man endeavors to retain what to him has immediate value, that is, what convevs an immediate satisfaction, and, if he cannot immediately retain or attain it, he will seek means to realize it. The ends which man seeks to realize are determined by that which has for him immediate value, and the ends in turn determine *the norms or standards* which he applies in his valuation of qualities, actions and institutions. The concepts of value, end and norm lie in one series. From a given fundamental value thought can progress with logical necessity, if it has at its command experience enough to discover the influence of a quality, an action or an institution on human life. The question it has to solve is whether the quality, action or institution lies in a causal series, which leads in the direction of the realization of the fundamental value.

Ethical thought is, then, only a special application of logical and psychological thought. The relation of end and means is not, properly speaking, different from the relations of reason and consequent and of cause and effect. The value of the end

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is the reason of the value of the means, and the means is the cause of the realization of the end. He who has an end in view, because something has an immediate value for him, cannot, without self-contradiction, omit to choose the means which are necessary for the realization of the end. These means must for him have a mediate value. We endeavor—often unconsciously or involuntarily—to maintain all that has value for us, and this is expressed in our estimate of the qualities, actions and institutions, which can be ways and means to the maintenance of that which possesses value. The endeavor to maintain what has value is most successful, if the very endeavor to find such means and ways—and if even these means and ways themselves—have immediate value for us. The distance between value and norm, and between ends and means is then as small as possible.

It is not superfluous to accentuate this inner connection between Ethics, Logic and Psychology, because the prejudice has not yet disappeared, that when we enter the region of ethics we must leave behind our usual methods of thought and research. The peculiarity of ethical thought is simply the introduction of the concept of fundamental value as determining the processes of reasoning. No other special laws or principles are necessary. The difficulties of ethics arise partly from the imperfection of our psychological and sociological knowledge, partly from the fact that not all men acknowledge the same fundamental value. The discussion of fundamental values carries us to the centre of the problem of ethics. Later on we shall come back to discuss the point of view which must be adopted when our argument forces to the front this question in regard to fundamental values.

IV.

As a logician, as a psychologist and as a moralist, the philosopher meets difficulties which are determined by the conditions and limits of our knowledge.

We have already seen, that reality cannot be completely expressed in a logical system, the most perfect form of understanding we have. Exact science approximates to the logical ideal, in proportion as measuring and calculation take the

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place of mere observation and description, so that the laws of events can be reduced to a series of equations. But even if such a reduction of qualitative differences to quantitative differences could be carried through in all domains, the difference between logical form and real content would still remain. The real and qualitative content must be taken as merely given and could not be deduced from the logical form, despite the fact that it can be expressed in this form. The real content is richer than the logical form. There is an irrational (in the mathematical sense of "irrational") relation between the form and the content of our knowledge. Thought is a part of reality, and we use this part as a form in which all reality is to be expressed. But this task cannot be completely accomplished, because we always seek and find new content, which we cannot deduce from the pure forms. We cannot be sure that future contents can be expressed in these forms, even if the past content could be so expressed.

It was this irrational relation between the form and the content of knowledge which Kant rather unfortunately expressed in the much disputed concept "thing-in-self." This concept, in the form which Kant gives it, cannot be legitimately retained. But as an expression of the irrational relation between the form and the content of our knowledge it cannot disappear from philosophy. However it may be concealed, it will always reappear in one corner or another in every philosophical system. It expresses the fact that we cannot prove the rationality of real existence. The imposing structure on which science prides itself was perhaps only possible because reality in a long course of time has, so to speak, only turned its rational side toward us. If it one day or other should turn one of its other sides towards us, it would be quite impossible for us to build a continuous and coherent thought-series which could be applied to it. The logical ice-period of reality would then begin.

But there is also another way in which light can be thrown on the irrational possibilities, which every thorough-going discussion of the problem of knowledge discovers. All science is a product of life; it springs from man's need of finding his bearings in the world of reality. Truth is to this extent a

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product of will; it is the rule and the norm which the will has found to be necessary, if its aim is to be reached. But can the will not emancipate itself from this its own product? Are there not higher ideals than that of the understanding? Such questions arise, because the truth we have, always depends on our stage of life and development. A new truth is necessary, when a new stage of life is reached. Even the most exact science which we now have, corresponds to a certain stage of life whose time shall one day or other pass away. This is a consequence of the fact that all knowledge is won through interpretation of our experiences.

The breach of continuity, which a new stage of life conditions, is but temporary. Thought will soon begin to seek an unbroken connection between the new stage and the earlier stages. Every new religion endeavors to consider the earlier religions as preparatory stages in relation to itself. And scientific research seeks by means of biological, psychological and historical methods to discover the steps by which a transition is made from one form of life to another. We seek to ascertain the transitional forms between the knowledge of animals and that of men, between the ideas of savages and Greek science, between Greek science and modern science. This method Hegel, Comte and Spencer applied, each in his own manner, to show the dependence of knowledge on the particular stage of life which is reached at the time. When it is no longer possible to find a continuity within science, thought makes a regress and looks for a greater continuity, within which the connection between the different systems of knowledge can be found.

This has a special application to ethical knowledge. In Ethics, the concept of value or end is fundamental. Every ethical system is based on a certain fundamental value. But *what* value shall then be chosen to determine all norms and standards? There is a possibility for as many ethical systems as there are values or ends, on which a thorough-going valuation of human qualities, actions and institutions can be founded. But no purely intellectual path leads from one fundamental value to another. This transition is effected by means

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of a psychological and historical process, which may be long and complicated, presupposing many metamorphoses and transpositions. Ethics—like the theory of knowledge—must here have recourse to Biology, Psychology and Sociology.

Some moral philosophers have thought that this consequence could be avoided and the objectivity of Ethics maintained, if we defined Ethics as the doctrine of the necessary claims which society makes on individuals. But this is an illusory expedient. The question is, whether the individual recognizes the claims of society. If he has power, sagacity and consistency of aim, he can try to make himself (or his special interests) the absolute *centrum,* the highest end. He is then not imposed on by the talk about "the necessary life-conditions of society." He can perhaps be compelled to see that prudence requires him to accommodate himself to these conditions; but he does not thereby acknowledge that the claims of society are just and good. Such acknowledgment is only possible, if the maintenance and development of society have an immediate value for him. And, it is not by pure reasoning that he discovers the value of society. We come here again to the different stages of life: what is ethically valid at one stage need not be valid at another stage. The significance of ethical thought lies in the fact, that it enables us to draw all the consequences of the values which are fundamental at a given stage of life; but it is not able to carry us directly and definitely from one stage of life to another.*

That continuity which Ethics does not give, because the fundamental values are not the same in all stages, can be gained in another form by studying the origin, development and disappearance of values with the help of Biology, Psychology and Sociology. The history of values can have continuity, though the ethical systems, which are projections from the different stages of life, are discordant in their principles.

But the difficulty appears again in a new form. Biology, Psychology and Sociology are species of knowledge, and as

Cf. my paper, "The Law of Relativity in Ethics," in the first number of this JOURNAL (October, 1890).

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such they presuppose basal scientific principles and depend consequently on a given stage of life. The science of a particular stage of life itself depends upon the stage at which it appears. This circle, however, does not imply that the point of view here maintained is fallacious. We have here only a relation of reciprocity: knowledge depends on life, and the conception of this life depends on our knowledge; if life develops to new stages, our knowledge and particularly our conception of life and of the stages of life will develop in consequence thereof. The irrationality in the relation between thought and reality does not exclude the possibility of progress; it is on the contrary this irrationality which makes the progress possible.

V.

An important problem still remains. As logicians we work with the concepts of reason and consequent, as psychologists we work with the concepts of cause and effect, and as moral philosophers we work with the concepts of end and means. But these different points of view cannot be absolutely divergent. They must all have their place in our definitive conception of reality. One or another of them has generally prevailed in metaphysical systems. Reality has been conceived as a logical system, or as a great mechanism, or as an empire of values.

Is it possible to unite all these points of view in one conception?

We stand here before the great, perhaps eternal, struggle between the world-conceptions. This struggle has philosophical interest, only if it is carried on by means of clear and precise reasoning on the facts of experience which scientific observation discloses. Science, philosophy and religion here come in contact with one another. It is the task of the *philosophy of religion* to examine the conditions and the significance of this frontier war.

The historical development of metaphysical and religious problems seems to show that the time for both religious and anti-religious dogmatism is past. No dogma, that is, no idea which directly or indirectly has its origin in religious feeling,

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can explain the world for us, either as a whole or in detail. There are gaps in our scientific knowledge, but they cannot be filled up by invoking the aid of such entities as gods or souls. Such a gap is an unsolved problem, nothing more or less. But even if the gaps were filled by the help of scientific method, the whole content of existence would not be included in any logical or causal system. It is, no doubt, an important fact, that the states and events of real existence to a great extent can be calculated and foretold by means of laws which our research can discover. In monistic systems this point is specially emphasized. All understanding presupposes unity and continuity in the real, and as reality is intelligible in a high degree, it is inferred that unity and continuity belong to its innermost essence. But as the recognition of the irrational relation between thought and reality seems, as we have seen, to be forced on us as the unavoidable result of a thoroughgoing theory of knowledge, no monism can be anything more than a speculative hypothesis. Perhaps the term "Critical Monism" expresses passably our position in this respect.

We have here only applied logical and causal categories. As a logical and causal system, reality remains unaltered, whatever the fate of the values may be. Our scientific understanding of reality is independent of the results of valuation.

But the fact remains that we in our personal and practical life work with the concepts of value and end. The fact that experience leads us to form these concepts ought to be taken into consideration, when we construct our definitive view of reality. Here, as in the case of knowledge, one part of existence gives rise to a judgment on existence as a whole. Religious judgments are determined by man's experience of the relation between value and reality. Religious belief is a firm conviction that the really valuable shall persist, though it must undergo many great metamorphoses and transformations. The differences between religious standpoints depend partly on the values which are recognized, partly on the stages of knowledge which are reached, partly on the different experiences in regard to the relation between the values and reality. Here are causes enough for conflict. And as the values, reality, and

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the relation between them, are in perpetual development, this conflict shall again and again assume new forms.

The proper task of the philosophy of religion is to examine the psychological possibility of uniting the belief in the persistence of value with the scientific understanding of reality, and with the ethical activity in discovering and producing values. Philosophy cannot produce belief. Belief is not excogitated, or constructed, but grows out of life. But though it is no product of philosophy, it is something which philosophy must deal with. Philosophy examines its psychological possibility, its ethical import and its epistemological validity. In this last respect the problem is to draw the line between thought and poetry.

The highest is perhaps only accessible to us in the form of poetry, and a poetry of life, in which the deepest experiences of personal human life are expressed, will more and more satisfy the want, which before could only be satisfied by myth and dogma. Then Goethe shall be in the right.

> Und deines Geistes höchster Feuerflug
> Hat schon am Gleichniss, hat am Bild genug!

If life conserves its health and energy during the advancing division of labor within the mental world, there ought to be a new concentration of mental forces. Otherwise the old values will perish without equivalents. The production of such new forms of concentration must be the work of great personalities, who unite in themselves the gifts of poets, thinkers and prophets in effective harmony. In comparison with this, philosophizing is a specialized and one-sided form of activity; but it can indirectly and in a circuitous way contribute to the great work of concentration, which can have as its fruit a new stage of life.

HARALD HÖFFDING.

COPENHAGEN.

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THE MORALITY OF PRIVATE AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION.

IT is often impressed upon us by philosophical writers that it is an unwarranted proceeding to apply such terms as "robbery," "theft," etc., to the conduct of nations, because the actions which are so stigmatized are the actions of *States*, and therefore do not fall under the same category as actions which are offences against private morality. The warning thus conveyed, however, is not intended as a rule to lead us to conclude that the actions of nations have nothing to do with morality; it is a caution that we are not to identify carelessly public and private spheres of action; and, leaving, as it does, a connection remaining between the individual's conduct and the conduct of the State, it suggests some interesting questions, which we propose to consider briefly.

The State's acts are public acts. Therefore, to take the most obvious point first, it may be at once admitted that they are never fully and satisfactorily criminal, and that crime is too forcible a term to be used in a loose and hap-hazard way. But, it may be suggested, are these acts not sometimes criminal, if not in the primary sense of the term, yet in their own peculiar sphere—the sphere of international relations? Probably not; at least, if we judge by results. There does not exist amongst the body of international units any machinery for systematically condemning the international wrong-doer and visiting him with punishment accordingly. Of course, to a certain extent we can see, or we imagine that we can see a rough sort of penal justice being administered in international affairs. There comes a time when a nation's power for wrong-doing must be treated severely by other surrounding States. But this, as a source of punishment, is a vague and erratic one: and there is no criminal system which warrants us in speaking with boldness of international crimes. It may be urged, indeed, that such a system ought to exist, although it is not yet in being, and that in stigmatizing such offences as crimes we are endeavoring to bring the gravity of them home

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to the popular mind. On the other hand, it may be retorted that the use of criminal terms tends towards confusion and encourages exaggeration: and this seems to be the sound conclusion.

But the larger question lies behind. It is concerned with all the various terms of moral praise and blame which the State ordinarily receives, and forces us to consider more particularly the State's external duties and the existence of international law. States, it is said, are the "persons" of international law; and it is sufficiently clear to everyone that the rules of that law are stretched over civilization, that they possess sanctions of some sort, and that they do not exist by themselves but are connected with a body of vaguer principles, of much significance, which for want of a better phrase, we may term international morality. The border-line between the two departments just mentioned, of course, cannot be accurately distinguished in practice; and the laws themselves have not all the definiteness which might be desired. At the same time, the legal characteristics of the so-called laws demand attention. They have been acted on and agreed about as if they were laws, till it becomes a question whether, if they were not strictly laws to begin with, they have not been made laws now. The doctrines of which they treat have been elaborated by a course of avowedly legal reasoning. In international controversies precedents are used in a strictly legal manner; and the authority of previous writers is invoked, just as if the whole were within the more familiar sphere. Accordingly, the rights and duties governed by this law, even if we allow them more than their due measure of imperfection, have to be very carefully considered; and no view of the State which tempts us to ignore them can be accepted as an adequate one. Again, let us turn, for a moment, to the moral duties just referred to. Such duties on the part of a State embrace some which are almost legal in their force. Chief of these is perhaps the duty of good faith; while the duty of extraditing criminals, and the duty of the State to permit commercial intercourse to be maintained with foreign countries, may have their *legal* validity more plausibly disputed. If, however, we pursue this line

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of thought, there is clearly unfolded before us a scheme of duties which makes the nation in its external aspect the subject of a rough network of moral principle somewhat similar to that of private morality. The analogy between the State and the person is thus forcibly brought home to us. In order to show how even those who are very firm in their insistence on the "merely analogical" aspect of the case may nevertheless find essential uses in the analogy, we may take such a view as the following: "The word 'morality' " it has been said, "applied to international relations refers properly to the conduct of individuals in regard to foreigners, but may be extended by analogy to the corporate conduct of the State or the government as representing it. . . . But in the relations of States there do arise obligations which are said to be imperfect as compared with others which permit their vindication by force." Accordingly, the writer proceeds to draw a line between *this* international morality and the corresponding law, as he considers the line between ordinary morality and law ought to be drawn, by considering whether the spirit of the act or forbearance, or the act or forbearance itself is of more importance.* This is given merely as an instance of how the analogy suggests its implications. One step more, and the convenience of describing national sentiment and will emerging into act in language borrowed from ordinary morality will assert itself imperiously.

Let us look, for example, at the rights and wrongs of war in relation to selfishness. A great deal of ingenuity has been expended upon attempts to explain what are the "just causes" of war; and though these attempts have not been singularly successful, it is a mistake to treat them disparagingly, as they have undoubtedly been very useful in rendering more accurate our ideas on the whole subject. The central difficulty, however, arises from the fact that although we can say with certainty that under certain circumstances a breach of the law has taken place sufficiently evident and serious to justify war, most actual disputes are too complex to be easily treated theoretic-

*Miller, "Law of Nature and Nations," pp. 62, 63.

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ally. They can be connected indeed with the fundamental principles of law in some sort of way, but divergence of opinion on principle or matters of fact in a great mass of cases renders the solutions put forward inconclusive. The sort of criticism which Dr. Sidgwick has directed against the rules of common-sense morality, in short, can in large measure be directed against rules indicating just causes of war. They either say too little, and are useless, or they say too much, and are inaccurate. But, as a primary right of nations on which the justification of war has always more or less clearly been based, we find the right of self-defence. The right thus named may branch out into others; but the theory of war has almost always treated it as fundamental. Now self-defence is a term borrowed from the sphere of private relations: and the State, thus endowed with a self, can at least without absurdity be stigmatized as selfish when necessity seems so to demand. For if it has a self, in fact or in analogy, which it can defend, it has also a self, in fact or in analogy, which it can aggrandize. The principle cuts both ways.

Again, we may take the idea of the State's "Conscience." Here, it may be said, we indulge in a daring metaphor; but can we really do without it? Certain it is that those who have studied with technical accuracy the history of European international relations, have not been amongst the reformers who were eager to reject *in toto* that humble but significant phrase. "In a community as in an individual," says Hall in the preface to the third edition of his "International Law," "passionate excess is followed by a reaction of lassitude and to some extent of conscience. On the whole the collective seems to exert itself in this way more surely than the individual conscience; and in things within the scope of international law, conscience, if it works less impulsively, can at least work more freely than in home affairs. Continuing temptation ceases with the war. At any rate it is a matter of experience that times in which international law has been seriously disregarded, have been followed by periods in which the European conscience has done penance by putting itself under straiter obligations than those which it before acknowl-

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edged." We may call this "conscience" or not as we feel inclined; but we must recognize the *thing,* however we treat the name.

A few other terms may be mentioned. National prejudices and jealousies have obviously their bearing on State action. In considering their effects on international relations we shall find it difficult to substitute for these names more accurate and equally significant ones. Dishonesty, in the sense of a want of good faith which amounts to trickery, is often found in State action, and raises sharply the question of the State's responsibility for its agents, to which we must return. Yet, in so far as the nation as a whole approves of such trickery, dishonesty has its place here. Justice generally has its legal basis, as we have seen. And, to take a favorite term of moral approbation, national charity, while it may truly and forcibly be said to be the vanishing-point of virtue, really exists in germ amongst nations to-day. We are by no means inclined to advocate an indiscriminate magnanimity in international affairs: but to admit the danger of trusting too far to the effects of kindness in given circumstances, is one thing, to refuse to see theoretically any benevolent tendencies in the international sphere, quite another.

We may perhaps expect to hear some day of a State's "arbitrativeness" employed as a term of praise. There may be some questions on which States will never arbitrate; but for trivial questions, where the principles of determination are fairly clear to both sides, arbitration is obviously the most reasonable way of ending a dispute. In it, the State has to place itself in a distinctly private position, and many terms applicable to private rights and duties have to be employed in the course of the proceedings. The national virtue thus foreshadowed, in fact, irresistibly reminds us of the "law-abiding citizen," and gives further point to the analogy which we are considering.

But if so much be admitted, and the State is so far a moral being, like, but not exactly like, the individual, what is the chief danger which arises from the use of ordinary moral terms in their international connection? One obvious danger

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is, that the State's acts when they appear to be of doubtful morality should be transferred illegitimately from the State to the individual statesman. If a nation is called a thief, we are at once put upon our guard by the nature of the phrase. But if a statesman is so maligned, the case is altered. The assertion might be true, without a shadow of metaphorical interpretation, as applied to the individual. Therefore, such a statement may derive a certain plausibility when directed against the public acts of a statesman, from altogether irrelevant considerations. This obviously is a method of attack which cannot be tolerated.

We have then, as these considerations show, to notice the main question not only *per se,* but as complicated by the actions of the authorized agents of the State. And first, where the agent's action is of such a nature that practically no one would defend it, what is the position of the nation? The State cannot be made responsible for acts done by its agents as a consequence of the worthlessness of their characters, when it was unable to ascertain beforehand what their characters were. It may be mistaken in its agents. The strain of high position may make manifest in the agent propensities never suspected before. On the other hand, the State must to a considerable extent be responsible for its agents, if they are to be its agents at all. And, in so far as it has it in its power to dismiss or retain worthless agents, it must be held responsible for a prolonged course of wrong-doing on their part. Again, the State is responsible for a reckless choice of agents. It is, in general terms, the duty of the State to choose proper agents for its work; and if it neglects that duty it is answerable. The presumption is in favor of the obligation.

Conversely there is the casuistical question whether the fact that he is an agent of the State justifies a man in certain circumstances performing an act which in his private capacity would be immoral. There is little doubt that it does, as the example of the soldier suggests; and at any rate the agent's duty is to act for the State; if he finds himself involved in a conflict of duties which he cannot solve, his proper course is to give up his public position altogether.

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There are many actions in international history which have been brought about by a calculating spirit of national advancement on the part of the leaders of the State, directed towards aims, sometimes legitimate, sometimes illegitimate, and backed by public sentiment of a much more passionate character. This public sentiment also, may be good or bad in its direction: but the most interesting cases occur when it is generous in intent, when it is charged with sympathy, for example, for the victims of religious persecution or political oppression. The result is the inauguration of a policy, mixed in motive but dominated by ends which are clearly conceived only by a few. Here, as it is very difficult to say where the true self of the nation lies, so it is very difficult to judge of its action. One point however is clear. An interfering nation which goes beyond the circle of wrongs that directly and seriously affect itself will never escape calumny, though its motives may be entirely pure. If a nation is going to interfere at all in such a way, it must make up its mind to bear the cynical comments of its rivals. And though it is no doubt healthy for the State to live in an international atmosphere of such a kind, it must be remembered that it is becoming increasingly difficult, as international relations multiply and extend, to construe the policy of non-interference on the old stereotyped lines.

Again, there is the question of active homologation of wrong. Suppose that a State, dominated for the time being by a corrupt government, adopts a policy of repudiation of its external debt. The effective motive may be, in the first instance, simply the motive of a number of individual members of the government—to benefit themselves. But the members of the State as a whole, finding that such a policy "pays," that they as units receive material benefits from it, may approve of what has been done and continue to follow in the course which has been pointed out. Technically, they have not committed theft, or abetted in the commission of theft; but it is hardly wonderful that the offence of which they have been guilty is graphically described as stealing. Moreover this line of thought leads to the more general conclusion that wherever the great bulk of the nation, acting as a crowd or aggregate,

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use State machinery in order to gratify themselves, as individuals, it depends largely on the nature of that gratification whether the nation, regarded as a whole, can escape blame or not. If the lust for "thrashing" or "getting the better of" a rival nation's members leads the mass of the people to desire war for war's sake, the mere fact that they are using State machinery in order to put their collective design into execution will not excuse them from blood-guiltiness. Not, of course, that we would put forward the conception of the nation as an aggregate, and nothing more, as an adequate or proper one. On the contrary, even at the risk of under-estimating those occasions on which it seems to act in accordance with the unorganized feeling of its individual units, we would maintain the nation's intrinsic unity. The difficulties which collective passions present when they have a highly organized force of arms at their bidding, however, must be kept always before us. To forget them would be to loose our hold on facts altogether, for the sake of theorizing.

To gather up, then, what has been said, there is a tendency in ethical thought to make the State the last great unity in social life. It is the *whole,* not the part. Dr. Bosanquet's theory of the State is especially emphatic on this point. And guarded by the necessary *caveats*—for no one would maintain that the particular State embraced in itself the whole of the life in which morality is interested—this doctrine is in some respects of vital importance. It teaches us how systematic is the interplay of interests within the State, and impresses upon us the relative difficulty of justly characterizing the external actions of a nation. But, on the other hand, it must not be allowed to obscure the necessity for estimating the nation's acts in an adequatelv ethical way. The personification of the State may be a metaphor, but it covers a great truth. How to designate the moral character of the State is no doubt a question of difficulty; and after many attempts which the student of political philosophy naturally makes to find a phrase to express his meaning, he may be forced to fall back on the somewhat hackneyed term of a "moral organism" as freer than most from misunderstandings. It holds the bal-

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ance fairly well between the tendency to identify the State with the human individual and the tendency to divorce it from human action. But at any rate, for all practical purposes, the student is fixed down to the assertion that the nation has its duties to perform in the world, and he will have to reckon with these duties at every step he takes in his investigations. This implies, of course, that the State as supreme power is itself regulated by a more or less clearly observable scheme of external conduct; a point upon which it is impossible to give in to the opposition.

It is true that in times of international stress and storm, methods somewhat similar to those of primitive self-help must be recognized by the nation as those on which it may ultimately have to fall back. Its duties may seem to be those of a man assailed in a savage and hostile country, rather than those of a man guarded by all the institutions of a civilized State. Yet that is not so entirely. The international sanctions are always at work, and their force is great. As we have seen, the period of passion on the part of nations is generally followed by a time of reaction, or even of remorse. To tide over periods of danger, to work for the reign of rational principle, to proclaim the existence of duties, and especiallly to impress upon itself that even when "violence" is necessary, measure, order and restraint must dominate its employment, are aims which the enlightened nation must steadfastly set before it.

W. A. Watt.

Glasgow, Scotland.

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THE TEMPERANCE QUESTION.

It is not intended in this article to indulge in any lamentations on the evils of intemperance. The sober and intelligent portion of the community is pretty well agreed on this matter, and it will here be taken for granted. But in spite of sufficient intelligence to see where the evils lie there is not so clear a judgment regarding the possible remedies for some of the evils deplored. It will be the task of the present discussion to propose and defend some method of dealing with the problem.

Many people at one time thought that prohibition, and others thought that high license, would solve the question for them. Nothing is more certain, however, than the fact that the fortunes of prohibition have declined in recent years, though the importance of the temperance problem has lost none of its interest and impressiveness. The failure of prohibition does not prove that the question is insoluble, but only calls for renewed effort in a direction that is not accessible to the influences affecting the policy of prohibition and offering more reasonable hopes of success. I cannot propose the measures I wish to discuss until I have indicated the nature of the situation which suggests them. They are the offspring of some general principles which condition them, but which are universally ignored in the attempts to deal with the problem. The measures to be proposed are simply corollaries to indisputable principles, though they do not seem to be thought of in the political and other efforts to meet the issue.

Two things have availed to suppress interest in the temperance problem. The first is the evident failure of prohibition to effect its end, and the other was the distractions of war and the financial issues of the last two Presidential campaigns. *It* was impossible under the last two influences that it should be otherwise. Bad as intemperance is, it must take second place in the struggle for the financial and political foundations of all social order. But the decision of the last election ought to be final in regard to financial questions, so that, even though tariff and colonial problems are still to be solved, we may bring for-

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ward the issue of temperance as one whose consideration need not be further neglected. Whether any policy can be adopted that can expect to cope with the problem successfully, at least to the extent that the optimistic mind desires, may be doubted. At any rate I am not approaching it with any patent nostrum that promises miracles. If any improvement of the present situation be possible I should be satisfied. The cynic, however, will say that it is no use to try, as the matter is hopeless, and he may be right from the point of view from which he regards it, which is the existing institutions at our disposal for treating the matter. Assuming that he is right I think we can turn his conclusion into a fatal objection to democracy as a desirable form of government. I for one should not remonstrate against this conclusion if I may use it as a club to beat into the cynic's head his optimistic apathy in politics. But whether right or wrong as to practical measures in the matter, there is one thing that can be done, and this is to discuss the general principles upon which any successful temperance policy must be conducted, simply assuming that the problem of administrative government will be adequately or approximately solved.

I have alluded to the failure of prohibition to accomplish its object, not because of any malice against it as a method of restricting personal liberty, but for the purpose of remarking a certain feature of it which dooms all efforts of the kind to miscarriage. I do not deny that there may be instances in which it may have diminished intemperance. But these are not general. The main point is that the policy does not accomplish what it sets out to do, and this is to make intemperance a negligible quantity in the community. This is what must be effected before any measure can be regarded as successful. Why is it that prohibition has not effected this result, and why is it that we cannot expect it to succeed to the necessary extent?

The simple reply to this query is that the prohibitionist attacks the problem from the false point of view. *He attacks it from the standpoint of supply instead of demand.* I adopt the economic form of stating it because it is the most convenient abbreviation of the issues involved. The matter may be examined in several relations: firstly, from the conception of

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responsibility for the evils of intemperance; secondly, from the conception of democratic institutions; and thirdly, from the question of administrative functions in government of any kind. I take up the first of these points of view.

The question of responsibility is the one fundamental problem in all "government," whether individual or social; that is, whether in the attainment of self-control or the control of others. I mean in this nothing more than the question of the causes of any given effect. The responsibility for intemperance means simply the original source of it. The one defect of prohibition is that it does not rightly locate the responsibility for intemperance. It attacks the saloon-keeper as the main cause of the evil. It ignores or minimizes the place that should be assigned the drunkard in the problem. Far be it from me to say that the majority of temperance agitators of the prohibition type would not admit that the primary cause is the drunkard, on the matter being put to them in this way. But whatever they admit or know when thus pressed, their policy is not formulated upon the basis of this admission. They attempt to regulate the whole matter by affecting supply, when it is the demand that is the crucial factor in the problem. I need not dwell on economic truisms here in order to make out my case. I shall assume them as admitted and understood. But I may emphasize that way of stating these truisms which brings out the effect of demand upon supply instead of the reverse.

There is an interesting fact in the economic world that conceals from us the real order of cause and effect in the relation between supply and demand. We often see an increase of supply in goods followed by an increase of consumption which is too readily interpreted as an increase of demand. This, however, is only apparent. The evidence for this is the fact that the increase of supply will not be followed by any increase of consumption unless there is a corresponding decrease of price, as is usually the case when demand remains the same and supply increases. It is the fall of price that increases the consumption and thus appears to increase demand. If this fall does not take place increase of supply has no causal influence on demand, so that it cannot in any case be assumed to be the real agency

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in determining the result. Moreover, the fact also is that the demand, as a psychological agency, remains the same in all conditions. The variable factor in what passes for "demand" is the availability of the means for satisfying it. When prices fall the means for gratifying desire relatively increase. The constancy of demand, therefore, as a constitutional factor in the individual and the casual inefficiency of supply by itself shows unquestionably that the casual relation between supply and demand is exactly the reverse of what it is often assumed to be, and we have indubitable grounds for accusing prohibitionists of attempting to cure evils without attacking the causes. It is the demand that creates the supply. There would be no supply whatever but for this demand. If we had the means of absolutely removing the supply the demand could not gratify itself, but all attempts to regulate supply only divert ingenuity into methods of evading the law, while the modification of demand makes the law unnecessary. This again is, of course, a truism, but it is not sufficiently regarded in the practical measures of temperance agitators.

Starting with the maxim that it is demand that determines supply I repeat the truism that the point of view to be assumed in all temperance policies must be the limitation of the individual drinker's power. He, and not the saloon-keeper, is the free and responsible party in the first course. I do not deny that the saloon-keeper has some responsibilities in the case, but he is not the primary factor in the problem. He is to some extent the victim of the person to whom he panders and whom he in the end may victimize. He only supplies what is wanted, and would be a merchant or a grocer if his customer preferred clothes or bread to whiskey. If men really wanted something better than drink we should not be troubled with saloons. But we are in the habit of shedding our tears over the drunkard and reserving all our malice and vengeance for the poor caterer, who as often as not has no temptations in regard to drink, and who can only supply demands which he does not create. If we can establish a policy which modifies the drinker's demand or limits the availability of his means for gratifying it, we may hope to accomplish something without even attempting to reg-

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ulate the action of the supplying agencies. All effective as well as rational methods of prevention in any problem of evils to be cured must strike at the primary causes. This again is a truism, and as a general principle will be admitted by many that I am here accusing of neglecting it in practice. But we have often to emphasize even truisms in order to show where there is a failure to apply them rightly, and the average temperance agitator must be accused of admitting the principle in the abstract and then wholly neglecting to apply it, as he expends all his indignation and repressive energies upon the effects instead of the causes in his problem. The same general remarks apply to the high license policy, and were it not that there are other important reasons for its adoption than the repression of intemperance it might stand condemned with prohibition. But can we propose any measures that promise more effective remedies for the evils of drink than those in vogue? I cannot answer this question until I have briefly considered the other two mentioned in connection with individual responsibility for intemperance.

What strikes the observer at first, in looking at the policy of the prohibitionist, as both important and paradoxical, is the relation between his method and his general conception of government. His decided predilections in regard to government are for Democracy, in its original and perhaps its purest form. He may not intelligently adopt this position, as it may be wholly due to the influence of tradition and habit, mingled with that pride in our institutions that is closely allied to patriotism. He simply assumes the adequacy of present institutions to meet the emergency, and is too much bent on action to stop and consider the difficulties in his path. The prohibitionist is of the Puritan type in both his moral temperament and his readiness to act. He accepts and reveres the sturdy character of our more primitive national life. He has been educated in the Puritan's ideals and possesses the Puritan's conscience He accepts, whether by tradition or theory, the intrinsic merits of our political institutions. He does not care to reform them as institutions, though he wishes to see them better administered. He in fact conceives no better form of government as possible. What he

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wants is to see the employment of all its power in the repression of intemperance, and he does not reflect that this power is derived from the very people whom he wishes reformed. The conjunction of his morals with his political theory thus becomes a curious one. He does not see that Democracy has been organized in the interest of liberty, and not of restraint. He is wholly unconscious of both the advantages and the limitations of his ideal notion of government, which was designed for the encouragement of a liberty which his own rigorous policy in drink matters seems to contradict. In spite of his earnest adhesion to democratic institutions he verges on the socialistic method in his efforts to deal with intemperance. He passionately advocates the agency of government in the attempt to cure the evils of drink and does not dream that he is enlarging the functions which he so much dreads when inveighing in the abstract against despotism. He proposes methods which, if they mean anything, design to reform a man by interfering with others whose whole conduct is determined by the character and action of the man to be reformed. It is strange thus that socialism with its enlarged government functions, though this affinity of the prohibitionist be unconscious, finds its strongest support in the men who are the most conservative of our citizens in their usual conception of politics. This is consistent enough from the standpoint of his morality. Moral earnestness and a determined inclination to be his brother's keeper have, as their most natural result, precisely this disregard of devotion to abstract political institutions, apart from the influence of mere tradition and habit. It is the improvement of the individual man that he seeks and not the formal preservation of political institutions. The latter would very quickly seem to be useless if they did not lead immediately to the welfare of their subjects. But having taken his government as a foregone conclusion and not as a question to be reopened, his supreme end is to eradicate certain moral and social evils without first reflecting upon the probable effect to change the institutions that he so much reveres. He would use any power, or set agoing any machinery at his command, for the accomplishment of his purpose. He appre-

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ciates liberty only as an exemption from restraint upon conscience, and not as immunity from consequences without qualification. In fact it is liberty of conscience for which he has always stood and not liberty of will, and he balks at nothing which appear to infringe his determination to save his neighbor. Hence he does not stop to consider any consequences except the abridgment of the rights of conscience, as he does not suppose that any conscience exists in the desire and liberty to use drink. In that he may be right, in the main at least. But the right to liberty of some kind does not depend upon the possession of conscience. It depends upon the exemption of one's conduct from the charge of being anti-social, no matter what the injury to self may be. Consequently the appeal to direct government methods only exposes legitimate liberty to extinction, unless we are guaranteed rulers that respect it.

But passing this by as of secondary interest the main thought which I wish to keep in front is the prohibitionist's neglect of the conditions that are required for the success of his method, and these are the limitation of the power of the men to be reformed and the responsibility of the administrative agents of government. To expect the intemperate to reform the administration of the government which is to carry out prohibition is like asking a man to raise himself by his bootstraps. When that class holds the balance of power, as it too often does, there is little hope that the direct government agencies upon which prohibition relies will effect anything. This perhaps is again a truism, but its assertion points a moral in the direction of some other means of solving the problem.

In attempting to suggest remedial measures here I return to the question of regulating demand. Attempts to restrain the sale of liquor do not affect this demand, and some method must be devised by which either to extinguish that demand or to limit the individual drinker's means of gratifying it. This I think is quite possible. I propose, therefore, as a more practical method than mere police administration or prohibition which is a form of police agency, a more extensive application of the principle of guardianship, such as is already applied to imbeciles, insane, and incompetents generally. Provide an

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adequately responsible person or body of persons who shall take the wages, income, or property of all addicted to such inebriety as deprives the family of its support and administer it in behalf of the parties concerned. If desirable in the interests of diminished government functions, the application of such a measure might be limited to cases where the family was affected. But I shall not define any special limits to the usefulness of such a policy. The one question which I have to meet is the practicability of the method proposed.

It must be conceded that the proposal at once suggests some of the difficulties that I have urged against prohibition and similar agencies. The appointment of guardians on so large a scale, and protecting the subjects of this guardianship by securing the proper responsibility of the men or agents acting as guardians, is a question of government fitness as much as the administration of prohibition. In removal of this objection, however, two things can be said. First it has the successful experience of guardianship in other matters in its favor. The objection suggested applies equally to the present system in operation which no one would abolish. Secondly, there is a perfectly feasible method of avoiding the undue appointment of guardians, so that the establishment of their responsibility might be easily affected. I shall indicate this resource in a moment. I have at present to remark that the system has the advantages of all selective processes that evade an appeal to the voter at frequent intervals. If guardians were to be selected by popular voting I should not advocate the method. Our present use of guardianship would not work successfully if the agents of it were the product of the franchise directly applied. What makes it useful and practical is the method of securing their appointment by the courts. This policy could easily be adopted in the case discussed and no objections would be relevant that would not also tell with equal force against all guardianship.

An easy way to meet all objections based upon administrative difficulties in our kind of government would be to see that the guardian was an institution organized somewhat after the type of the New York and Boston Provident Loan Association.

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Such a body could be made adequately responsible and would evade the objection to the multiplication of individual guardians. I grant that there would be some exposure to embezzlement in the multiplication of individual guardians and agree to the necessity of preventing this. But I think an agency like a Provident Loan Association, or if you like the comparison with a Savings Bank better, some trust association, would offer a feasible plan for solving the problem in so far as it is solvable at all. It is not necessary to work out the organization of such an institution in detail at the present time. This duty can be left to those who can accept the general plan. If it is not desirable to attempt legislative action at first, there is a way in which practical experiment can be tried before the method is employed on a larger scale. Charity societies could organize the system on the voluntary plan and test its general merits at least for all those who are willing to accept the method in their own self-defence and the protection of their families, and the state need not be invoked until its extension to inebriates who will not voluntarily accept guardianship is shown to be practicable. The utmost development of the system can be left to experience while it begins on a voluntary basis. The main point here is to invoke precedent as the guide to a possible amelioration of the evils of intemperance instead of casting about for untried methods, or those that cannot rely upon the present machinery of government for their efficiency.

I have discussed this extension of the principle of guardianship as if it were entirely new and untried. This, however, is not the fact. It is not in fact a device of my own at all. It has been tried on a small scale, as a voluntary system, and has succeeded. I do not, therefore, have to rely upon speculative arguments for its defence. It has already the favor of practical experience and requires only to be taken up by the general public and enlarged in order to make its usefulness commensurate both with its possibilities and with the extent of the evils to be remedied. In support of the whole plan therefore I quote a report on the system which I have presented for years to my classes. This report is the discussion that took place at a Charity Organization meeting and is published in

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the *Charities Review* for June, 1895. It represents the experiment of Mr. G. W. Swan, in Norwich, Connecticut. It was the application of voluntary guardianship in cases sent to jails for various derelictions involving failure to support their families. I shall permit Mr. Swan to speak for himself. His statements arose in the discussion of the subject of "married vagabonds."

"In taking up my work over eight years ago I found everything comparatively easy to dispose of except these married vagabonds, who hid behind the wife and flock of little children. I consulted the law, and found that there was plenty of law, but the application was not such as to remedy the evil. Such men are often willing to enter a jail and be well fed and kept warm, and, as a general thing, have nothing to do but read trashy literature, leaving their families to starve or be supported by towns or by benevolent people. I awoke one morning with a determination to see what I could do towards making the law a means to an end. I visited the judge of our city court and laid my plan before him. I said to him: 'I find that in your administration of justice in this court, from time to time, you suspend judgment in cases of certain men. I want these men to understand the next time they are presented to this court for non-support of their families, instead of giving them from thirty to sixty days, you will give them the full penalty of the law, and then allow me to give them an opportunity to choose between two things.'

"'Go ahead,' said the judge, 'and we will see what we can accomplish.'

"The first to come up was a Scotchman. I had seen him in the prisoner's dock time and again. He had a wife and four children, was a skilled workman, and able to earn three dollars a day. He expected to get his usual thirty days. His wife would get two dollars and a half a week, in coal, and they would try to work the Charity Organization Society for some help. The man was proved guilty, and it was then the opportunity to try my experiment. I walked over to him and said: 'Dave, you are here again, and I will engage that you will get six months this time.' He changed color, as he did not like that.

"'Now,' I said, 'wouldn't you like to turn round and be a better man, support yourself respectably and take care of your family?'

"'What can a fellow do,' he asked, "when everyone hates him?'

"'Well,' I said, 'if I will stand by and be your friend, will you do as I want you to?' He said that he would. I had had some blanks printed that read: 'Mr. ———: Please pay to G. W. Swan the money due me for wages the next six months,' or 'a year,' or 'during my employment.' I filled that out and he signed it. I presented the signed document to the judge of the court and made a plea for the suspension of judgment for sixty days. I gave a little bond for the man's appearance, and he went to work. When pay-day came I took his money; and that money did not go into the family, to be got away from the wife by threats or coaxing. I adopted the system of tickets, sending her to the grocery store, allowing a limited amount of groceries to be received—so many dollars' worth a week.

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A similar arrangement was made with the butcher and with all those from whom David's necessaries were bought. If something were wanted from the drygoods store a special order was given for that. We kept a strict book account, and at the end of each month we called the man in and rendered an account to him of what we had spent. That man to-day is the best man in the employ of C. F. Rogers & Co. His home at that time was anything but cheerful. The condition of affairs had made his wife a scold. There were no carpets on the floors, the furniture was broken, there was only an apology for a stove, and the equipment of the larder was mainly empty whiskey bottles. Go in to-day, and you will find five rooms nicely furnished, five children well cared for, well clothed, and four of them in school, and above all, you will find a happy wife. They attend church and the children go to Sunday-school, and the man has a snug little bank account.

"We have handled between four and five hundred such men in the last four years, and I have personally received over fifty thousand dollars of the earnings of these men, and have applied it to the needs of their families. It has been an interesting experience to step into the court room Saturday morning and see the men in line waiting for their cases to be called as the sixty days expired. If I ask for further suspension of judgment it is always granted. When a man sees the advantage of the better way of living, and applies himself to follow that way, keeping away from the saloon and caring for his family, he is again trusted with his own wages, and we have very few that lapse into their old way.

"What has been the result with regard to the dispensing of charities in the town? That is an important part. Take the report of our selectmen, and I will show you that in 1887 the amount of aid to the outside poor was almost twenty-three thousand dollars. You know what the past two or three years (1892-'95) have been—how severe the circumstances of the unemployed. All these things have been against us, but there has been a constant decrease in this direction, and two years ago it was only a trifle over ten thousand dollars, instead of twenty-three thousand."

The population of Norwich at that time was about twenty-six thousand. The extent of the work accomplished by this method of Mr. Swan is tolerably apparent to any one, and I see no obstacle to the organization of such a plan everywhere that organized charity attempts to solve the poverty problem. After the system had sufficiently proved its value the state might step in and make such guardianship imperative upon the inebriates that did not accept it voluntarily, and to escape the difficulties of multiplying guardians might see that the work was done by Provident Loan Associations.

I hardly need consider the advantages of the system after the above experiment, but I may call attention to the points which connect it with the fundamental principles of every suc-

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cessful social order. First, it attacks the problem from the standpoint of personal responsibility, or the primary cause of the evil to be remedied. Secondly, it protects the liberty of those who do not abuse the propensity to strong drink. Thirdly, it enables all parties interested in temperance to unite, when they will not unite in such repressive measures as prohibition. These are three very important advantages in the system, and it is strange that the moral and religious classes that constitute the backbone of the prohibition movement, do not see that their own theory of individual responsibility for sin and vice compels them to adopt some such measure as is here advocated. Their doctrine of free will and personal responsibility is incompatible with their tendency to attribute so much wrong to the saloonkeeper and to bestow their sympathy upon the primary recreants in the evil. But not to dwell upon this point it seems fair to demand upon the basis of Mr. Swan's experience the practicability of the plan proposed, and to inoculate public opinion with the desire to try it at least. To begin its application as a department of organized charity ought to appear easily possible, and that it should thus recommend itself to the benevolent ought to appear from its capacity to invest the personal service of man which is so indispensable to the most successful charity. Once started it may easily grow into the larger application that the problem requires, and yet lose none of its capacity to promote personal service. To me it is a wonder that organized charity has not already seen the importance of Mr. Swan's work and endeavored to extend it as it deserves. It is not a new principle and for that reason ought to seem feasible and worthy of trial. The extension of a policy ought not to present serious difficulties. If the weak-minded, the insane, and the decrepit can have guardians, I do not see why the weak-willed in matters of vice and intemperance should not be classed among those demanding similar treatment. If I am right in this comparison and assumption the suggestions in this article ought to bear fruit.

JAMES H. HYSLOP.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK.

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WOMEN AS MORAL BEINGS.

CIVILIZED races have evolved till they have accepted as a commonplace Kant's maxim that every human being ought to count both to himself and to others always as an end, never merely as a means. Few men may either formulate the principle or reflect deeply upon it; but it is the latent ideal which is arbiter wherever some fresh impact of forces enables a new class to enforce its will. The ideal is there. Individual actions are far from it. In every country, multitudes exist who are only means to the enjoyments and development of others. Still, between men, even thoughtful folk assume that the realization of the principle is only an affair of time and really wise energy. Except among extreme aristocrats, it is seldom maintained that apart from human will there are intrincially insurmountable obstacles against social arrangements providing equal opportunities for all individuals to work out the best they have in them. Is this so between men and women? Can our world be so re-modelled that women no less than men shall have free scope for the satisfaction of many-sided human nature and aspiration? Success or failure in performing this practical task will be the final test common sense will apply to the ideal put into words by Kant. For, if the larger half of the race must be kept permanently subordinate to the other half; if, regardless of individual peculiarities, a great field of human ability, desire, and aspiration is to remain closed as it is now in all countries against women, only because they are women; then, to match facts, there must be a masculine plus a feminine character-goal, involving, instead of one kind of moral perfection, which conciliates renunciation and self-realization, two sorts, one mainly egoistic, the other altruistic. Either a double-sexed morality-standard must be faced by the ethical theorist as it has long been by the politician, or else his whole democratic doctrine of conduct is false.

No equivocal refusal to reckon with the actual tendencies and desires of actual women, such as the politician has recourse to, will meet the case. Even if there were only some women

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who were fitted by nature and desire for useful activities from which they were to be debarred merely to suit the lower abilities and standards of others, either men or women, they would be peculiarly sinned against. Ideal right, as moderns accept it, demands that such a minority of gifted beings should not be balked and stinted of full self-development and opportunity to render their own complete meed of service to the human race. But if what is continually affirmed be true: that Nature has opposed the fullest possible development of individual women against the continuance and development of the race in such an insurmountable manner, that whether they be few or many or all who show ambition or aspiration, because they are women they must always be restrained and sacrificed for behoof of the race, then there are also insuperable obstacles in the way of practising ideal justice; then there is a permanent tragedy in the destiny of the sex. Nay I would go further. I would say then that this Nature itself, which evolves such a sort of woman and then sets at naught the fundamental principle of impartiality, the very main-spring in human conscience, is incurably evil. I would demand then, from the woman's point of view, whether humanity be worth preserving at all?

What is right for finite beings to do always depends upon what is possible; and yet the very Hall-mark of Humanity is to sit in judgment upon the possible. Shall the upshot be a moral pessimism which shall end in refusal on the part of the more intelligent and critical women to become mothers?

I am aware that what I have just said may seem so extravagant as to provoke a smile, or even, in some quarters, a sneer; but it will not excite either the one or the other from those who watch modern tendencies and also reflect upon them. In some of the countries where sentiment which is democratic has already far outstripped the political and commercial arrangements for acting in concord with it, insufficient increase in population is already attracting attention. In others as well as in these, it is noticeable that the population is recruited chiefly among the poorest, least capable classes, and that our more prudent and able women are not the ones who make the earliest marriages or rear the most children. Of course I do not sug-

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gest that this is due to the women alone or to any thought-out pessimism; nor do I imply that a diminished proportion of offspring from the more intelligent women may not have more than one sort of compensation and even profit. The work they do in elevating the position of the whole sex is I believe more valuable just now to the race than the loss of their progeny; and the children they do have may more than compensate for fewness by their quality, especially where the number is limited through really ethical considerations; but I fear the considerations themselves are frequently only some aspect of the very real conflict there is between women's own well-being and the begetting and rearing of a family under existing circumstances. Women may not cool towards marriage and maternity from mature conviction that those are right who assert that their sex forever must bear virtually the whole burden of what Mr. Spencer names the "Antagonism between Individuation and Genesis"; but the working conviction that they have to do so, as society is constituted, is growing rapidly in the most unexpected quarters. It is at bottom the underlying fact that drives the educated women to demand a marketable career.

What then are the separate rights which modern women claim? They begin in the nursery. It is said girl children are not to be considered any less than boys in regard to the sort of food and clothing which makes for health and strength, in regard to physical exercise, to play, education or equipment for earning money. In adult life, women are to be specially trained for marketable careers and to be paid equally with men for equal work, quite regardless of sex. They are freely to choose their employments according to individual tastes, abilities and financial demand. In family life, wives are to be partners secured in financial rights and not under any sort of tutelage to husbands. There are to be proper educational facilities for the efficiency of women who choose the responsibilities of married life. The personal and financial claims of motherhood are to be somehow legally recognized as grounded in service to the community; and the wife's old age is not to be left at the mercy of a husband's commercial ability or of his caprice. If there be disloyalty or other trouble between a

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married pair, the remedies and penalties, whatever they be, shall be equal for both. In state or civic affairs, women of appropriate ability are freely to direct and administer along with men; and are to be chosen by electors, who shall be women equally with men. In religious bodies, universities and professions, merit and not sex shall be the test of opportunity, office and privilege.

When we see collected together all these demands which have been made during last century, for the most part separately, we are able to realize both the vastness of the change which may be looming, the need to examine whether the items are compatible with each other and good in themselves, and the difficulty of deciding which claims should be pressed forward with most earnestness; for now that steam, electricity and printing have given peasant men, and women of all classes, the instruments for quickening moral sense into a power on their behalf, there is a portion of every nation, a portion which includes some of the ablest men, bent on solving the question what justice to women involves. The insinuating novel, the play and the news-sheet are perpetual generators of social knowledge and consideration for every sort of complaint. Gradually all classes are being stirred up to examine one claim after another. Women never can again be rendered isolated and dumb as they have been in the past. If man's soul is at bottom an ethical counterpart of woman's, sooner or later there must now come in him and in her a conscious sifting and balancing of ideals and aspirations until some programme of an accepted social order, modelled so as to give sufficient recognition to all the needs and claims I have detailed, shall emerge.

The central problem under all details is of course the reconciliation of women's functions in family life, in relation to offspring, with their aspirations as the peers of men. Some pioneer women have tried to ignore that any dilemmas arise from this, but though we may learn how to give both the married and the single woman a really ethical liberty, it will be by recognizing, not by ignoring that perfect womanhood entails power to become in due season a good wife and mother no less than to be a good public servant in industry or in politics. The

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enthusiasm with which women enter into the controversy over special legal restrictions of their paid work shows that they will soon feel their way to the real battle-ground of woman's liberty, her right to requital for her mother-work. Under the present social order every sort of opportunity, even including a vote is based upon possessions. Under this order the lot of the exceptional woman who remains voluntarily always single is inextricably bound up with and modified by the lot of her mother, or her sister who marries. The peculiar difficulty of doing real justice to any women is due to the transitions they have to make to and fro between the spheres where competition decides remuneration of labor and the one where their requital is regulated by law, modified for good or ill by affections they can excite.

The abolition of slavery cleared the world for modern Western civilization. But this was nothing at first but the granting of rights to enforce money payments for labor, coupled with liberty to forsake one master for another as a means of remuneration. Even in the case of men, industrial and other legislation has had to follow; and experience has shown that ability on the part of workers to initiate laws for their own protection is the only means by which the individual's power to own the abilities and will of another—practical slavery—will ever be abolished. But if freedom for men is impossible without political abilities, women need them a thousand times more; for not only do they share, at least potentially, all the ordinary work-capacities of men, but they are able to perform, and unhappily able to be directly or indirectly forced to perform, parental functions other than those of men, which differ from theirs in hindering them as earning laborers. Moreover, apart from promptings of affection, they are under obligation, for the community's good, not to remove from the children or the father of the children they have born. Because parental and family labors are not moveable, they are not marketable; and the stationary character of mother-service is one of the causes for the assumption of existing law and of earlier morals that women ought to be mere life-servants of the father of their offspring and have no claim on the exchange

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currency. Another view is rapidly spreading: that a mother serves her country and her race, and her husband is but her fellow-servant. If women are really moral beings in the same sense that men are, this is the only right view, and the fact that it has not hitherto been embodied in the politics of any nation is one reason why no empire and no civilization has ever yet been permanent, or successful from the point of view of equitable individual distribution of material benefits. Granting the wisdom of monogamy, it is by means of law that we must enforce the principle that wives are the fellow-servants of their husbands instead of serfs to them; for the immobility of women's family service deprives them as individuals of the ordinary market means of enforcing and regulating requital and choice of occupation. The wide social implications of ethics can have little concrete significance for the average woman until this view has been embodied, first in the laws and then in the customs, which irresistibly but silently mould her disposition from infancy to death. It is in a reformed constitution of the family that the foundations of women's freedom, and men's with it, must be laid. Greater justice there even in primitive times would have produced a happier world and a far less wasteful economic system than any the nations have really evolved. Let us therefore examine some of the defects of the family as it is now constituted and one or two of the difficulties in the way of cures.

Let me say first, however, to safeguard the suceptibilities of couples too happy to have strong fellow feeling for wedded blunderers, that I know full well there are thousands of instances, where personal wisdom and genuine love transforms the married partnership into a just and fruitful comradeship for the woman as well as for the man. Granting this however, and granting that increasing numbers of husbands and wives may elude existing tradition and law, by their own superiority, I say that the accepted constitution of the family tacitly, and just when it is least desirable, actually, involves the entire subordination of the wife to the will and purposes of the husband. It is true that in England, since 1891, when the Clitheroe case was tried, no husband may legally use brute force to detain

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his wife. Yet still, unless one or both of them are so incurably wrong-headed as to break the family right up, the husband is legally master over the wife and over the children; and is financially master, unless she owns separate property or has ability to earn in the market. Taken together, the money control and the prior right in the children enables him to enforce his will in personal matters without any such publicity and suffering as she would incur, probably without fruit, if she were to resist him.

If a woman ought to have freedom of conscience anywhere it is where she can be most easily and fatally tempted to go astray: I mean in regard to her function of motherhood. Yet it is only quite recently and in very advanced circles, that unmarried women have been told anything about the subject which would enable them to realize how grave is the personal responsibility which rests on a wife in marriage. The teaching of orthodox churches follows St. Paul. It imbues ignorant girlhood with the religious conviction that once a husband has been accepted, he must be obeyed as implicitly as Christ; and this conviction is the very breath of the holy spirit to the average religious woman. The more sincere her religion, the more solemnly she resigns any conscience in conjugal relations on her marriage day. From personal confidences of women who have lived to repent, I know how far ignorance of physical matters and this false religious teaching sometimes carries women into bodily slavery. But the moral power of sacred tradition is perhaps on the wane. The law however is in brutal harmony with it. In 1888, it was decided by the Lord Chief Justice of England and five other judges against four, that although wilful communication of venereal disease may be the cruelty count in a divorce case, it is no crime nor even an assault against a wife; and that nothing else a husband chooses to do can be counted as rape. Actually, a wife is worse protected than a prostitute. In the celebrated case (See *Westminster Review,* March, 1890, also *Justice of the Peace,* March 9, 1889), Regina *vs.* Clarence, to which I have alluded, it was also incidentally laid down as law that a wife may not refuse marital rights to her husband, even if they both know

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that her condition is such that she would suffer bodily harm. I will give an illustration from life of some fruits of this judge-made law when coupled with the wife's financial dependence and the prior right of the father to the children.

A wife had been medically warned, on the birth of her second child, that she ought not again to become a mother. The husband found this the reverse of a grievance; but he nevertheless claimed marital rights, accompanied by certain neo-malthusian practices. It was not till ten years after that the wife, suffering in health and in soul because she had come to count their life immoral, finally rebelled. The man then sought to coerce her by secretly conveying away and hiding her two boys. The woman, financially quite dependent on him, could not seek eminent advice, but a lawyer deeply convinced of the iniquity of our marriage laws gave an opinion to the effect that even if friends could have found the money, it would have been fruitless to bring such a case before the English Courts. There was no legal ground for separation, how then could a judge have favored the mother's claim to her boys. It is only optional for them to give the most innocent mother custody of her own children. The Infants Act, which Mr. Bryce and others sought to pass through Parliament, in 1884, attempted to give a joint guardianship to parents, during their marriage, but the Bill, which eventually did pass, left the father supreme unless the Courts ruled otherwise for some special reason. Both these children were boys. The youngest was as old as ten; and, according to the ruling in the Clarence case, a husband who tried to carry out Luther's shameful teachings in the most thorough-going manner would not be guilty of any offence against a wife. Perhaps, had this case actually been sifted in Court the husband might have brought evidence, or have urged motives for his actions which in the special instance might have modified our sympathy for the particular woman; and it is fair to add that while I have omitted details supplied to the lawyer which might have still further enlisted the sympathies on the woman's side, when friends intervened, the husband did support the wife financially and allow the boys to visit her at holiday times; but given the

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exact truth of this wife's preliminary statement, it is a terrible condemnation of the law that a lawyer who had specially and sympathetically studied the laws relating to women counted that she was absolutely defenceless against the man.

It is perhaps not possible to guard against all the dilemmas that may arise, both for a man and a woman, for women may be the offenders no less than men, in the married relation; but in these dilemmas nature herself has allotted to women the severer penalties, especially for breaches of hygienic conditions. It is therefore most unjust for artificial law and financial conditions to be framed so as to accentuate women's natural disadvantages. This century has seen a harvest of various new "fruits of philosophy." Law was invoked against the pamphlet of that name. Apparently it was only against the pamphlet. Whatever may be the personal views on such subjects it seems clear that even in England, where we have never been subjected to a Code Napoleon, a man may coerce his wife's conscience for years, and is enabled to use punishments quite as severe to some women as the imprisonment or beating, which were declared illegal in 1891. A woman who knows the social odium, involving outlawry from the women's labor market, which she will probably meet as a wife not even legally licensed to live apart from her husband, and who knows also that that husband will be free to keep the children and educate them after his fashion, will be certain to suppress herself rather than face the only alternatives provided for her.

Sir Francis Jeune, President of the Probate Divorce and Admiralty Division, has recently added to the complexities of the existing law by his ruling in the Synge cases, one of which was brought by the wife for divorce, on the ground of adultery and desertion, the other, subsequently, for judicial separation. He ruled that refusal of marital rights is "reasonable ground for desertion." Whatever we may think as to the "reasonableness," which other laws remain as they are, the brunt of this new decision must fall upon women. In the particular instance, the wife had suspicions of her husband's physical condition which proved groundless. The President did not think them "bona-fide." But that does not alter the fact that owing

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to the decision in this case, in future, any woman who acted upon similar suspicion which was genuine and perhaps correct would know beforehand that her husband's desertion of her as a consequence would probably be legally condoned, and that though he were an adulterer also she could not get a divorce because she had no plea either of legal desertion or legal cruelty.

The root question in regard to marriage, which we ought to face, is whether the old view is ethical that it should imply bodily slavery on the part either of man or woman. The alternative view is not "free-love." No one suggests that a wedded pair should be freed from their bonds because one of the two becomes incapacitated from conjugal relations by incurable illness. They take each other for "worse" as well as for "better." If the obstacles are ethical and spiritual should they not also take each other for "worse?" Marriage may be a sacrament, or a mere bargain in flesh and blood. Which shall we choose? Surely wedlock should necessitate the same intelligent reference to right and wrong, the same respect for individuality, the same mutuality of restraints which we expect in single men and women who would have married if they could. It ought not to be a license to wreck either the soul or the body of one person out of all the world. It is essential for the state to sanction and discipline, in the interests of all, a relationship which may lead to the introduction of new citizens into the community. But it is not in the interest of all for it to compel, ever so indirectly, either of the parties to obey each other regardless of consequences. So long ago as 1884, Mrs. Wolstenholme Elmy and others endeavored to push a Bill into Parliament, which would have freed marriage from this risk of bodily enslavement. Many members have approved the draft; but all said it was hopeless to introduce it in our men's parliament. I have only touched upon one aspect of the many problems involved, but it is enough to show clearly that greater attention to the whole subject is required; and I will now pass to the question what ability is granted to a mother to promote the well-being of her children after she has brought them into the world?

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A wife may assist her husband, directly or indirectly, in the business which supports the family. She may be thrifty and industrious in the household: she is expected to devote herself to forming a child's manners and to details of animal comfort; but, however ignorant or grasping their father may be, she has neither financial nor legal power to insist that her girls and boys shall be fairly educated or equipped for life; nor can she secure that her partner shall give them the needed enjoyments and recreations which are in accord with his material circumstances. In fact, consistently with the law which denies a woman's claim to intelligent foresight as to the number of her offspring or the physical circumstances attending their procreation, she has no determining power over their spiritual circumstances nor yet her own; and so far is this subordination carried that even after the father's death, she is compelled, with or without his instructions to that effect, to bring up her children in his religion. As to her own efficiency as mother and citizen, during his life, by keeping his wife's purse empty, a husband may, and often does, exclude her from books, from lectures, and from all associations which would help to equip her for the higher duties of parenthood, or for civic responsibility. The law now admits women to some branches of local administration, and many consider that only women can do some of the work needed in the solution of the housing, the poor law, and other social difficulties. A wife may possess the ability, the leisure, and the aspiration to serve on some local body which sorely needs her help, but through his sole control of the family purse, the husband's will and social views must always ultimately determine the wife's doings, even apart from the disqualification of the woman through poverty if he happen to be inefficient as an earner. The evil sociological results of the age-long sacrifice of the women to the psychological solidarity of the family is too big a discussion to open; but I must repeat that the best individuals among men have now and always risen above this régime by refusing to use their great powers, but that the unjust, the tyrannical and the stupid are the ones whose vices receive aid from the gaps and injustices I am emphasizing in the accepted constitution of the family.

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The moral progress of these higher natures must be registered in laws if only to avoid reaction in their sons.

Where widows are concerned it has been the same. The testamentary license husbands possess is not always used unfairly; but if the man be unjust or careless, the most virtuous and industrious wife can have no security. Either through his extravagance or by his deliberate choice, she may be left destitute after he has used up all her best years and energies to suit his individual purposes. It is often asserted that the family is an economic unit. There is little truth in this while there is a head of it who has unlimited testamentary power, and practically unlimited power over the income. The man who owns the family is now the unit, and he is the unit even when dead. This is one of the instances where the women of this country have lost old rights. Even the few privileged ones who thought they possessed inalienable rights to dower saw them all swept away in 1834, after the attack on the few political rights women had, in the Reform Bill of 1832. Many of us know of instances, quite as distressing if on a smaller scale, similar to the notorious one of the rich London draper, Peter Robinson, who, omitting to provide for his legal wife and children, left his great fortune to his illegitimate offspring.

It may seem that the proportion of women who openly resent their position within the family is very small. But in our luxurious age with its contrasting sordid poverty, this is one more evil symptom. Sometimes it indicates moral cynicism; sometimes sensuality; sometimes stupidity; rarely deliberate judgment after a varied contact with life. The truth is, people who move in educated circles in up-to-date towns are apt contentedly to estimate the women's world very falsely. Even in England it is still possible for women to suffer what amounts to enslavement of mind and body. Of course few men consciously adopt the rôle of a Mephistopheles, anywhere in life, but there are clever fiends and stupid persons among both sexes, and when they happen to be men they possess enormous legal and natural powers over wife and children. The majority may be morally in advance of the low standard embodied in the existing legalized constitution of the family, but under it, the

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greater proportion of wives suffer wrong in some one direction, more or less grave in its social consequences, while all women, married and single, and all men suffer ethically from the immoral atmosphere the knowledge of the wife's position germinates. Even among the best women, few realize what they might achieve or what they might become in character, if family arrangements and traditions were improved; for a passive habit and inability to criticize or initiate are the cherished fruits of the present order. Preachers and social reformers inveigh against the merciless greed which still taints commercial and public affairs, even as it did when states were reared on a basis of avowed slavery. The callousness is bound to be there as a reaction from family life. We have not dug deep enough. Ethical freedom must begin with women, who can never be prevented from acting as natural educators. Our present family institution carefully saps the development of any social conscience in them, increasing the characteristic defects which would logically follow from the offices imposed by nature. Woman as she now is may operate as a force towards industry and enterprise in man, but that is not everything. In proportion as she is a slave, she is also a force often against her personal will, making for a predatory disposition towards other men and families. It is right for the community to regulate the conditions under which families shall be founded. It is a crime against all women if wedded life is made impossible for them unless they consent to forego their individuality and its fair influence over the individuality of the husband and offspring. It is nothing but cant to talk about the sacredness of family responsibilities and the glory of maternity for women while the personality of the wife is only permitted to have weight at the option of the individual man. So-called "sacred" maternity only drives the best and the worst emotions in the wife who is a slave to conspire in urging her to an indiscriminate cry "give, give." Even education often finds its outlet only in craving for luxury. The one source of power and sense of responsibility for women now is possession of a considerable personal fortune. This will enable even married ones to evade most kinds of restraint, good and ill; but it cannot present

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them with the habit of mind and sense of duty towards all, which a far smaller money right would give, accompanied by political functions, and shared by other women, who would create a public opinion concerning many matters now falsely counted of no moment except to the individual.

I have tried to show how little right to a conscience the community grants to women in those very concerns which are popularly assumed to give womanhood its chief dignity. Redress of the laws relating to custody of children, to divorce, and to conjugal rights is urgently needed. Relief is even wanted for husbands, who already labor under various injustices due to the piece-meal character of attempts to remedy the wife's case. I cannot enter into details; but this is rather because I do see the difficulties of doing justice to both personalities, than because I do not. Discussion would be a long task, and I must limit myself to a part of the economic question. I turn to that in preference, because I am convinced that just among the particular couples, who most need better laws in regard to personal matters, reform would be a make-believe for the women unless the economic constitution of the family were also remodelled. I have however another motive for emphasizing this problem. I wish to point out that the reform of the economic constitution of the family, which has already been begun in England must be carried further if there ever is to be any single standard of fair pay for men and women within the remunerative labor market.

The Dower Act of 1833, which robbed widows of their ancient security of dower at the husbands' death, may be counted as the death-blow in England of the old view of the relation between husband and wife, which belonged to the period of domestic industries. The Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1874 began a modern reconstruction of the economic constitution of the family to suit the migration of women's industries into factories. The Act which followed in 1882 is generally regarded as a perfect charter of liberty. It marked an ethical epoch. It was an incalculable boon to thousands of women to be at last permitted to regard themselves as responsible persons in money affairs. Indirectly it added to

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the self-respect even of women who gained no money profit from it. But there are countless women whom it does not benefit. It helps the very fortunate and the very unfortunate. It does little for the average mass. It protects, as the old dower law did, women of rank and property. It protects women endowed with possessions apart from any matrimonial connection, fortunate souls who have some special marketable gift which can be utilized consistently with the duties of wife and mother. It also allows many poor victims of misfortune to rescue themselves by market labor when their husbands cannot or will not earn sufficient or give them enough for family needs.

But the majority of women have virtually no property to protect from a husband, either before or after marriage. Few can ply a business without failing in home duty; and even if they have earned before marriage, the keener their affections and sense of home duty the more they become absorbed during the whole middle culminating period of life in home work for husband and children. From the point of view of a high ideal of family life and motherhood, and also of civic duties for women, a law which stops short of protecting women's property acquired by outside labor or by gifts is only a law for exceptional women and for privileged ones. If it be a fact that mothers and wives are needed to perform higher service than factory labor for families, and if it be a fact that the best communities are composed of well-knit happy families, with mothers in them, who do not seek the risks of the coal-mine or the white-lead factory, and who do not weaken themselves by working longer hours in home or outside home for less wages than men, we must have adequate financial recognition of the married woman's social services: and it must be regardless of the possible idiosyncracies of her husband. She must come to play the part of his comrade and adviser, not of his whipping-boy.

I admit that real financial and legal equality between the sexes is no easy condition to achieve; but a great deal more might be done beneficially in this direction. Human necessities include the continuance of the race as well as provision of food

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and luxuries. The maternal and the home services of women are in the last resort energy expended for the nation just as certainly as are defence of the country, road-making, or spinning yarn in factories, or trading. No matter what the industrial system of any nation, out of its capital and income regarded as a whole, a portion has actually to be used up every year, in reproducing and increasing its population, and in rearing the young up to working citizenship through a period of sixteen or seventeen years, which must elapse before they can labor profitably. Let us call this a fund for reproductive, as distinguished from productive services. The claims of teachers and domestic servants to their share of this fund achieved a market standard when domestic slavery was vanquished, and can be legally bargained for and enforced because they are transferable. In the case of mothers and wives, I have already pointed out how the welfare of the community combines with natural affection, to forbid such a transfer; but why should lack of mobility in their services be a ground for denying their individual legal claim to a recognized portion of this reproduction fund? It really is a reason why they specially need, on moral and psychological grounds, the liberty independent possessions give. Our present plan of requiting only the interchangeable services of women in the market and leaving mothers only claims to maintenance at the hands of individual men, who may be good, bad or indifferent, both as husbands and as earners, leaves the most important of all public servants in a position of permanent precarious inferiority.

And I now wish to emphasize my second point. It unjustly complicates the whole system of remuneration for productive labor. Until the labor of mothers has separate recognition it will be impossible even approximately to pay justly for labor in the market. For if the mother's portion of the reproduction fund is not set apart from industrial capital and income, the other workers are really getting it divided among them at haphazard.

There is at present no sort of security that a woman's husband should receive and even be able to pass on to her what the nation really owes her for her life-work, whether estimated in

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terms of her need or of the nation's need. Yet these needs have played a part in economics. It has been a popular superstition that the custom of markets has been to pay according to an impartial law of demand and supply; but as a matter of fact, the community has always excused itself for paying men higher rates than women on the score of the needs of the married man. Also however, it has paid the single man at the same rates as the father of a family without compelling him to save for matrimonial necessities, or to marry: in fact without interfering at all with his license to keep for mere bachelor uses the surplus he has been given on the family pretext. At the same time paying industries and professions have been artificially protected against the women, even when unmarried and without security of support from men. This has been done by laws in some cases, and also by refusal to lay out money in equipping daughters for marketable work, and by their early specialization to domestic labor, which was unpaid and which reacted by lowering the market value of paid female servants. But in the period of home industries the unpaid wives and daughters could help themselves straightway to many of the products of their own fingers, and the disparity between money earners and direct owners of industrial product was also lessened, because traveling and intellectual pursuits and recreations which are now easily purchaseable for money scarcely existed except for the very rich. The migration of home industries, and modern facilities for intercommunication, have sent many women into the market; but they are paid at rates which deny all power to save for sickness, for motherhood (as men can save for fatherhood), or for old age, and which are insufficient for complete personal maintenance while in the market. Even when indirect, the competition of the low life-standard which had to content women both as mistresses and servants in the patriarchal home has proved an economic danger to the middle and lower class men, who are still expected to find money for wife and children; and now we have the great cry for equalization of the earning capacity of women with that of men. I cannot now deal with the ethical aspects of industrial specialization among women; but what I wish to point out is that this equal-

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ization of opportunity would enable single women like single men to share promiscuously in the family fund, or what I just now christened the fund for reproductive services. But what would it do for fathers? What would it do for mothers whose consuming needs become greater with wedded life than when they were free to earn outside home? Married women produce little consumers, who for many years can be regarded only as so much labor-capital invested speculatively for the community; but you do not offer them any means to meet the increasing cost of female help under the proposed régime; and they must fall into a far worse position than when they were single and able to earn. Justice to them and justice to their husbands demands monetary recognition of women's family services both during the actual period within which it is advisable that they should segregate themselves from hard outside work, and also on account of the depreciation of their individual earning ability through long absence from the competitive market and the physical wear of child-bearing. At bottom the market competition is a conflict of wills; but the home-keeping wife of the poor man, though a consumer and morally an earner, has no means whatever of rendering her will an effective force. She is non-existent for the husband's employer; she has no vote or legislative power, by which she might insist on her own labor being paid through taxation; and the unceasing wear and tear of her precarious existence, as a rule, prevents her even formulating the thoughts which should wring in the public ear and shame it into recognizing her enslavement. If her husband be a good man he divides his own earnings with her, and fully shares her burden; if not, so much the worse for her. But under existing economics there is no guarantee whatever that in his earnings hers shall be included for him to hand on. As to her old age, it is an unconsidered trifle.

Now I am aware that while we may easily expose the sores in the present social chaos, it is as easy to picture new ones which would arise from the various remedies recommended by social doctors, individualist or collectivist. I have omitted to deal at all with some recent individualist prescriptions, and I have not space to offer my own tentative suggestions; but the

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truth is, the doctor to whom I look most confidently is not any single theorizer, but the practical doings of the women's party which I discern, slowly beginning to cohere and to organize in every land for the attainment of knowledge and political power. I will not prophesy as to the uses women will make of such power, if they remain true to themselves; but it must be remembered that the power itself can never be achieved at all without a high moral discipline being gradually imposed upon women by women, from the point of view of collective welfare. Full political power for women means that they themselves will bring the social conscience to bear upon many details of conduct now counted optional. Those who consider that any collective solution of the wife's financial problem would necessitate official interference with married life omit to reckon up the evolution of women into self-regarding, public-spirited beings which is bound to accompany their attainment of ability to enforce the claims of independence upon the stronger sex. I see no need for police supervision of the family because the woman who is rightfully one of its heads, obtained her own remuneration from taxation; and I must say that the proposal seems unconsciously hypocritical, when we once realize that hitherto individual men have controlled without interference just so much as they could grab, of the wife's portion and the children's portions of the common fund essential for the continuance of the race, which has always been earned by women's labor no less than by men's; whilst they have fashioned laws which left wives and mothers in the hands of individuals helpless as to all conjugal matters, including the regulation of their own maternity. If such license in the sex which suffers least inconvenience from parenthood has been counted compatible with their individual ownership of the material means of family existence, and even inheritance of large fortunes, why interfere because the wife obtained secure money rights and control of her own person? There has been no interference even with the idlest parasitical men, beyond the reach of any public opinion, who daily beget legitimate or illegitimate children afterwards supported by the state.

Some persons who favor other reforms which defend man

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from Nature's cruelties argue against security for motherhood on the score that it would interfere with natural selection. The defence of existing family economics on this ground is utterly fallacious. It is based upon a double confusion. Financial competition is itself an interference with the totally different sort of complex selection Darwin described between animals and species of animals. That will continue to operate somehow, independently of money and man's artificial contrivances and laws. But the unwisdom of his arrangements may make it operate harmfully. The disparity between the happiness and strength of women and men, throughout the earth, compared with that between females and males among animals, does not say much for the beneficence of the one-sexed individualism which has prevailed. The contrast between our armies of prostitutes, our miserable slums for toilers, and the male and female lives which are one riot of unscrupulous and effeminating luxury says just as little. It is impossible to prove from facts that the men who succeed best in financial competition under existing conditions are necessarily those best fitted individually to control the destinies of wife and children; and the comparative physical feebleness of the female sex at least suggests that the men who had almost all the power to select the women who should become mothers have selected very badly. But again it is a pure assumption that the efficient men who are fittest for general affairs are the ones who do most to re-populate a country under modern conditions. It is more probable that they are the ones who have to marry late; and even if present arrangements secure survival of the fittest for the existing social and economic environment that is not what any idealist can want. Our task is to secure survival of the fittest for improving that environment. Extreme wealth may make women physically and morally unfit or selfishly unwilling for the demands of motherhood, but the sanest and most dutiful parenthood is now found in the classes where, through inheritances or family history, marriage and parenthood are little dependent upon market capacity either in men or women. But unhappily these morally fittest men and women are but a small proportion of those who undertake family responsibilities. The highest rec-

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ord* of woman-wasting, infantile mortality, and at the same time the largest and unhealthiest families, are produced among the poverty-stricken masses. They are produced by just the persons who (especially the mothers) had the least chance, previously to marriage and in marriage, of ever fulfilling family obligations thoroughly. This is largely because, through the indifference of the community, women among the poor are permitted to lack any sort of individual standard of life, either mental or physical. Wise selection itself requires that women possess an individualized standard, especially after marriage. As it is, at the bottom of the social scale, we meet the full fruit of the prevalent doctrine that a wife is a mere instrument. If she is to feel the obligations of selection she must possess the material means to become a moralizing influence over men, and to rear only healthy happy children. A woman must experience tangibly that work in and for her family deserves remuneration in the opinion of the community as much as labor in the jute or cotton factory, or as her husband's in the carpenter shop. She must be a factor in the economics and politics of the nation in right of motherhood as well as on other human grounds. No blind trust in magic is more superstitious than the vague setting up of the struggle for existence against justice. This struggle is a universal condition alike for the down-going and the up-going person or race. No phase of collectivism will destroy nature's selecting work, certainly not honest paying for services we want from women. But fair requital of women may be just the one thing which will make man permanently winner instead of loser in the struggle with nature. Let us not forget, firstly that every providential arrangements of men is an interference with natural selection; secondly that the problem is to ensure the right sort of a selection: what ought to be instead of what now is.

Probably neither the sociological science nor the morality of this generation are ripe enough for working out a scheme to perfect our family economics. I have not mentioned, but I do not ignore, the logic which usually connects collective maintenance of children with that of mothers. Logic, however, is of

*See some figures in *Westminster Review*, May, 1901.

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no use unless it takes count of every factor before giving judgment. I have had to omit all real discussion of the psychological effect upon men of the wife's financial independence, and of the advisability on that account of blending individualism with collectivism in the family financial arrangements. Without entering on these points I will merely point out the distinction that the average woman has, in addition to the consumer's claim, which the child possesses, an earner's unsatisfied claim. It may be impossible to estimate how much the community owes a mother or housewife in terms of merit; and difficult to decide justly on any standard of needs; but both sorts of estimate are just as hard in relation to all other sorts of social service. My point is that at least it is possible to recognize that on both grounds, of merit and of need, she has some claim which she ought to be able to enforce. However it is done, this will probably be the first point in the reform of family economics which women will attack, once they realize the pernicious effects of expecting a domestic worker to be also a market earner as fully as they already discern the tyranny of limiting all women to family occupations. However sincerely they might wish it, I do not think it is within the power of men to remodel a community so as to give real liberty to women in the mass, until a mental aristocracy among women, of diverse gifts, ambitions, and social grades, have, among themselves, become somewhat clear as to existing causes of their own worst grievances and as to the more important remedies. But as a matter of fact, the proper adjustment of society so as to permit all women full development and use of their powers in the common service must finally involve a gradual reconstruction from the apex to the base. I believe the process would be at least as beneficial to men as to women, and that as soon as the foremost women are ripe, men will assist. But if it is impossible, if women as a whole can never secure equal control with men over their own bodies and souls, without introducing greater evils than their subjection, then our current conceptions of ethics are all wrong; then let moral philosophers and women imitate the sincerity of the men of the market-place and the law-court in all the empires which have gone to ruin, and face the fact

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that evolution has crowned earth with a species, one-half of which is essentially and permanently inferior and subservient to the other, not entitled to equal liberty and enjoyment, but only to so much self-development and consideration as would facilitate their own obedience and the further development of the superior half.

ZONA VALLANCE.

LONDON.

THE DARK AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE.

NOT long ago, in speaking of the life work of Ruskin, I said that he, and his teachers and followers, did a work in England not other than that done by Goethe's generation in Germany. And I described this work as being to bring back God into the world.

We are to consider for a few moments the historical meaning and justification of such a judgment.

The paradox is here. The world—the Protestant world at least—believes, or believed when some of us were young, that European society had passed through its re-birth and reformation four hundred years ago, and had, on the whole, been steadily pursuing a course of moral, political and intellectual progress since that day. Some time before the prosperous re-birth lay the period known as the Dark Ages; and by assuming that this lay, as it were, behind the dawn of day, and was inaccessible to the light of reason, we were saved a good deal of very troublesome research. As Mr. Wicksteed points out in his most profound and delightful address—the Religion of Time and of Eternity—in our inquiries into the history of intelligence we* practically omitted the Middle Age, and probably too we localized it, so to speak, as something foreign, elsewhere than in England. The precise relation between the Dark Ages† and the Middle Age is something which one never could find out.

*Not Hegel, as he half suggests.

†I wish I knew the history of the phrase.

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All one's life one has been searching for the exact location of the Dark Ages. But of course there was a reason at first sight for our attitude. We had heard about Galileo, and about the new departure in science which Francis Bacon so eloquently preached; of John Locke, and of Sir Isaac Newton and of Milton. And, of course, our English literature, what we practically dealt with and cared about, ran back pretty much to the Elizabethan period and stopped there. It seemed, in short, that a steady growth in all good things set in from about the defeat of the Armada, and continued down to the nineteenth century. Then what had we to gain from a movement which should carry our interest back to the centuries far behind 1500? And how could any such movement be spoken of as supplying a grave defect in our intellectual and religious life? Had we been, since the Reformation, on a wrong track? Had we ever since been banishing God from the world? That was not what Luther set out to do, nor what the English of Cromwell's time supposed themselves to be doing.

But looking closer, we can see that something must have been wrong. The sort of dullness, of which the French Revolution cleared the air, showed an exhausted line of life and thought. "You and your supreme being begin to bore me," said Mirabeau to Robespierre; and it is, in essence, this idea of the Supreme Being—the God outside of the world—against which Goethe's generation and Ruskin's were in revolt. The fact is, that the one impulse of the Renaissance (in its ordinary sense) the impulse of literary criticism, fine art and science, had been more than a match for the other (religion ostensibly founded on a book), and had eaten away the apparent props of Protestant faith, and taken all life out of its supposed miraculous and supernatural manifestations. Voltaire and Gibbon are fair examples of what the spirit of the re-birth had brought itself to, —the banishment of the revelation of the divinity from the history of man.

But here we meet a wonderful thing. What was it that pointed the way out of this Slough of Despond; out of Deism and victorious analysis? In general, no doubt, the needs and spirit of man, which would and did rebel against the emptiness

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of life, and would bring back faith, and aspiration, and the idea of right. But intelligence must move by particular paths; a mere general need can furnish no ideas; there must be experiences and suggestions, in short, a logical track.

Now what furnished the logical track by which the intellectual revolution perfected itself in Germany and in England? Simply the impulse of the Renaissance in its ordinary sense; the sympathetic study of humanity, and the intelligent study of nature. Classical study began, and it could not do otherwise, at the nearest points; with the later art of Greece and Rome, with the surface meaning of their writers, and with very slight knowledge of their social and political life. Scientific study took chiefly the mathematical form, the only form for which material was ready and the age was ripe. But in, and at the end of, the eighteenth century the Renaissance impulse had as it were tracked out its own roots. Real Greek life and art were beginning to be known; the Elgin marbles were about to be brought to England; even Rousseau had an extraordinary insight into the Greek political spirit. Homer was interpreted as the voice of a people; law was correlated with national character. Biology had succeeded to mathematics, and was progressing by leaps and bounds; and connoisseurship in Italian art was slowly traveling back from the post-Raphaelite to the pre-Raphaelite schools. Historical study was deepening. We spoke just now of the idle neglect in which the Middle Age was buried before Ruskin's generation. What an extraordinary thing that the great pioneers in its recovery should be no other than Gibbon, the pupil of Voltaire, and Goethe, the devotee of Hellenism.

Thus the surface renaissance inevitably led on to the new and deeper re-birth. The intellectual revolution of Goethe's day in Germany was closely connected with the finding of Greek art and Greek life, the result of the work of the humanists: it was this that suggested the great idea of unity in nature and history, the fusion of reason and sense, the inherence of the divine mind in the world and in man. Most remarkable that Goethe, the modern Greek, was the first to herald the new interest in Gothic art, as he reminds us in the famous passage of his

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biography, where he preaches on the text, "What one desires in youth, he possesses abundantly in age," and applies it to the interest in mediæval art. The activity of the biological sciences coöperated; the notion of life, of a purpose within the growing plants and creatures, corroborated the conception of a Nature which was not outcast and dead, but spiritual and alive. In England the change came more variously; Carlyle, no doubt, was a link with the German and French Revolution; Wordsworth almost by a miracle recovered the Greek idea of Nature as the divine productive principle of life; and Ruskin's work in connection with Turner and the pre-Raphaelites gave reality to the double sense of God in the world around us and God in art and history, which the great German idealists had proclaimed in a different phraseology. The original connection of W. Morris' great undertaking in the reform of decorative art with the Tractarian movement, the mere fact that the first intention of the famous firm was largely to undertake church decoration, is most significant of the logic underlying the whole new aspiration. The effect of this movement was that the very word "renaissance" became ambiguous. In its older sense—that of the surface renaissance as I have called it—it became a term of disparagement applied to "the pedants of the Renaissance"; in a deeper sense, as the true or real renascence, it acquired a wholly new application. We will note some traces of this change, in pursuit of our search for the dark ages and their significance.

But first, to return in a word or two, to the inner spirit of the Protestant reformation. What, it may naturally be asked, had the biological discussion and archæological revelations of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to do with the cry of the soul for a present God, or the cry of the people for a better life? If the Protestant reformation had succeeded in bringing home God to the human soul, how could art and science, literature and philosophy, add anything essential to its work? And if it had failed, how could they repair its defect? The answer may be given in the words of a student of the English Commonwealth:* "Any spiritual impulse, not accompanied by clear

*T. H. Green, Works, III., 332.

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and comprehensive thought, is enslaved by its own realization." It has been shown in the history of the English revolution how the mere aspiration after a spiritual world, unconstructed, unorganized, and unreasoned, either comes to nothing in an approach to insanity, or itself turns into secular interests as worldly and as selfish as those which it set out to quell.

Thus we have the answer to our question: How the humanist impulse of the Renaissance could be of aid to the Protestant aspiration. And the answer is, by destroying its first crude embodiments, and gradually raising a spiritual form capable of containing the spiritual essence. A saying of the late Mr. Mark Pattison, though touched with academic superiority, shows the way to a profound historical truth. "What," he asked, "would have been the effect upon the history of the English Church if J. H. Newman had been able to read German?" In other words, what wanderings might have been spared the English mind, if the watchwords of Reason and Freedom and the Invisible Church had been current, when the Tractarians set out upon their quest for an objective symbol of the spiritual growth of humanity?

We wish then to trace the fresh significance attained by the idea of the new birth at the time when the humanist impulse of the later Renaissance, traveling backwards and inwards in the study of art and letters and life, came to a full intelligence of the greater works and experiences out of a general faith in which its own movement had arisen.

It was, we may suppose, a natural consequence of the increasing knowledge of Italian art in the course of the eighteenth century, together with the general deepening of culture towards its close, that the English mind awakened at a time almost within living memory, to the greatness of the Florentine primitives, whose names are now catchwords in every girls' school. We know them all by heart in our Browning:

> "We have loved the season
> Of art's spring birth so dim and dewy;
> Our sculptor is Niccolo the Pisan,
> Our painter who but Cimabue."

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Giotto and Botticelli, whose worship is now in danger of becoming a cant, you will hardly find mentioned in the Academy lectures between 1790 and 1810, and I should suppose that Lord Lindsay's great work on Italian painters, which drew a quarterly Review from Ruskin in 1842, marks about the turning point of the general interest from after to before the vear 1500 A. D.

Now the revival of Greek letters, which indicated the Renaissance in the older sense, is commonly dated by the fall of Constantinople in 1453. You find the popular theory of this, concerning the influx of Greeks into Italy with manuscripts and antiquities for sale, in George Eliot's "Romola." So when we have taken back our interest through Botticelli to Giotto and Dante, round the year 1300, we have already taken back the new birth to a point at which it can no longer mean simply the revival of Greek letters and general culture, in the common sense of the term renaissance. The revival of Greek letters became a consequence rather than a cause. Our interest has attached itself to the new birth of Europe within the frontiers of the Middle Age, belonging to a stream which comes down from far back in the centuries.

And so once more we find the phrase renaissance applied by Mr. Pater to the spirit of certain beautiful French stories, written as we have them early in the thirteenth century, but older no doubt in their origin. These are the tales of Amis and Amile, and of Aucassin and Nicolette, which are the subject of Mr. Pater's delightful essays, "Two Early French Stories." The sensitive romanticism united with a strident note of anti-dogmatic rebellion shows us something of the strange complexity and audacity of that mediæval spirit, which we have been accustomed to think so hopelesslv fettered by superstition. "In Paradise what have I to do?" says Aucassin. "I do not seek to enter there; but only to have Nicolette, my sweet love, whom I love so.—But to hell I will go; for to hell go the fair scholar, and the fair knight who dies in tournays and noble wars; with them I will go, only I must have with me my sweet love Nicolette." Something is here of the spirit which comes to light in the story of Paolo and Francesca.

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Here then we are tracing the Renaissance spirit, the spirit of love and life, in artistic expression, nearly to the year 1200.

And now we may think for a moment of some significant passages with which we are all familiar in the writings of William Morris. Here we are invited to take in our minds a gigantic stride, and to throw back the earlier frontier of the true Renascence to the beginning of the great building age of the world, a period of a thousand years, inaugurated with St. Sophia at Constantinople, and closing before we have come down to the Church of St. Peter at Rome. There is no such touchstone of the change of attitude towards the later Renaissance as the feeling which artists display towards St. Peter's. Even Browning seems to glorify it, in "Christmas Eve" and "Easter Day," and in earlier writings it is held as the acknowledged crown of the Renaissance, and, as it were, the culmination of Christian art. But Goethe, as early as 1773, sounded a note of disparagement in his famous paper on Gothic architecture, written at the age of 24, though it was reserved perhaps for the bluntness of William Morris to call St. Peter's Church the ugliest building built before the nineteenth century.

To anyone brought up in earlier ideas, and searching, as I have said, for those Dark Ages of which he had heard, the impression produced by these passages was electrical. For here it would seem that in one whole branch of expression of the human spirit, and that perhaps the most central and universal concern of civilized life, a critic second to none could at least venture the opinion that the earlier Middle Age was not merely the equal of our civilized and progressive days, but stood on a pinnacle of achievement compared to which our works are trivial and mean. And the difficulty of finding the Dark Ages was immensely increased by this. For we knew that the Schools of Athens were not closed before the reign of Justinian, the builder of St. Sophia. And therefore, in a way, the ground seemed to be covered; and no space appeared to be left to which the unspeakable degradation of the human mind, which we had imagined, could very well be ascribed.

And then one great cause of our difficulty began to dawn upon us. Our notion of the human mind was too narrow. It

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had really not occurred to us and to our teachers that the human intelligence could be otherwise embodied than in progressive science, and intellectual literature, and the battles of modern politics. Even religion, which in a Protestant country was genuinely given the highest place, was hardly understood to be a central utterance or grasp or faith of the human mind at its best; it seemed in practice to have become, what the Autocrat says of the power of numerical calculation, a detached movement that could be put into a mighty poor watch. So we were in sheer bewilderment, when we saw the Cathedral and Baptistery at Florence, and read of the constructive work of St. Francis, and then were told about the magnificence of Chartres and Poitiers, and the buildings running back in time to St. Sophia in the sixth century A. D. Were these things then not works of the human mind? And if they were, and if it was true that our age could create nothing to compare with them, could such a fact be void of significance for our whole conception of the order of the world and the relative importance of its various stages? Such considerations necessarily pursued us during the study not only of such passages in William Morris, but as we made acquaintance with the world disclosed by the work of Mr. Ruskin.

One further extension of the idea of the Renaissance remains to be mentioned. It came to me through Pater's "Marius." "As if in anticipation of the sixteenth century, the Church was becoming humanistic, in a best and earliest Renaissance." This saying refers to the second century of our era—the minor "peace of the Church" under the Antonines. At this time, it is suggested, "before those conflicts of body and soul which preceded or characterized the later 'peace of the Church' under Constantine, she was truer than perhaps she ever would be again to that element of profound serenity in the soul of her founder which reflected the eternal goodwill of God to man; in whom, according to the oldest version of the angelic message, 'he is well pleased.'"

Thus we have traced back the idea of the Renascence, that is, the stream of life and love and expressive power, which first attracted our attention among mingled phenomena in the six-

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teenth century, through a course of fourteen centuries, or practically to the Christian era. It may be added, that without excessive paradox, the track might be followed further. In building and in formative art renaissance characteristics are revealing themselves in the pre-Christian productions of Greek Asia Minor; and it may come to be held one day that the seeds of the new birth were sown by classical Greece, and began to germinate in what we have been taught to call its decadence.

At any rate, what concerns us to-day is to note the wholly new meaning which has thus stolen unawares upon our conception of the Renaissance. It signifies no longer the invention of printing and the re-birth of classical culture, that modern restoration of arts and letters and sciences, against the value of which Rousseau wrote a paradoxical prize essay containing a great deal of truth; but the re-birth of the human mind, and its re-incarnation in the vesture of more deeply expressive symbols and a more human and more passionate creed than that of classical Greece and Rome.

And thus the modern Renaissance has carried us beyond itself, perhaps to the very revelation of which we stand in need. I would point you once more to the recent address of a living friend and teacher—I may name him—Mr. Wicksteed, to show you in greater depth and detail the meaning and value of this revelation for the present day. A motto which I have heard that the Comtist school have adopted, and which probably expresses the inmost hearts of many of us who live energetically the life of our century, runs in the words, "The End is Progress"—surely a strange contradiction for any generation of mankind to set as the foundation of its life. The teacher of whom I have spoken will call your attention on the contrary to the mediæval conception of eternity and fruition. If our life has in it nothing worth possessing, we shall not be advantaged by gaining more of the same. No problem is solved by a mere appeal to the future. If we cannot in some measure, however humble, know what it is to lay hold on eternal life, to enter into the consciousness of something that is rooted beyond time, we seem to be in a fair way to gain the whole world and lose our own soul. I am not speaking of a

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life in the future, but of something like what Spinoza meant by seeing things under the form of the eternal, or what the ancient Greek more simply indicated by the conception of Leisure. Leisure—the word from which our word "school" is derived—was for him the expression of the highest moments of the mind. It was not labor; far less was it recreation. It was that employment of the mind in which by great thoughts, by art and poetry which lift us above ourselves, by the highest exertion of the intelligence, as we should add, by religion, we obtain occasionally a sense of something that cannot be taken from us, a real oneness and centre in the universe; and which makes us feel that whatever happens to the present form of our little ephemeral personality, life is yet worth living because it has a real and sensible contact with something of eternal value.

B. Bosanquet.

Oxshott, Surrey.

THE MODERN WORKMAN AND CORPORATE CONTROL.

The economic world in which we live, like the world of nature, is a world of change. The changes in the economic forces and conditions to which human effort must adjust itself, especially in a dynamic epoch like that of the last century in the western world, appear almost meteoric in their rapidity and dazzling confusion. So large a section of human conduct must be measurably adjusted to these economic forces and conditions that it is no wonder that the principles of ethical and just conduct in our social relations now demand the most strenuous thought.

We are accustomed to having our attention called to the changes that have taken place in the position of the modern workman. Usually these changes are measured solely by their outward and visible results. The advance in wages, both relatively and absolutely; the material comforts and conveniences which the workman enjoys in his home; the mechanical

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devices that have made the shop and factory not only less repulsive but ofttimes really attractive places in which to exercise one's activities; the shorter hours of work; the mechanical improvements in tools and machinery that have removed something of the drudgery of mere manual toil; the educational advantages in schools, libraries, public lectures and amusements, accessible to men with small incomes, and, in general, the higher plane of living to which the workman of the western world has attained, these are mentioned as the most significant factors in the labor problem and in what is called the "social problem." Is it not true, however, that these things, even when fully realized, and typical of average conditions, really throw very little light upon the problem of life as it presents itself to the workman? Do they measure his contentment, his development in character, his intellectual and spiritual outlook,—upon which his permanent welfare and his contribution to civilization depend,—or must we look back of these things and attempt rather to get at his own interpretation of the soul-struggle in which all this plays a relative part? Is it not then incumbent upon us to examine some of the significant recent changes in the industrial world in their bearing upon the personal relations and duties of intelligent workmen to themselves, to their families and to society?

Not much over a century ago the western world was ripe for rapid industrial expansion. The introduction of steam power and the mechanical inventions of the last quarter of the eighteenth century paved the way for the establishment of the large industry in the place of home production, and were to soon make possible a division of labor in the activities of the home, as productive of good results as the division of labor and greater specialization had been within the confines of industry itself. The change from house-production to factory-production made possible the removal from the home of many of the degrading influences incidental to the drudgery of daily toil, in which both women and children freely participated so long as it was centred in the house. This change also made possible, later on, a considerable elimination of women and young children from the ranks of industrial labor. The one thing

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that restricted this process, rapid as it was, by which the large industry was evolved, was the lack of adequate capital. We see, therefore, especially in the writings of the classical English economists, the reasons for the emphasis laid upon capital as an instrument of production. Not only did these economists justify every protection thrown around the interests of capital in order to stimulate the growth of a large fund of national capital, but in their moralizing with respect to the standards of individual conduct, they put an equal emphasis upon the duty and rewards of saving. The young man was taught that his upward progress depended largely upon the amount of income he was able to put aside, not merely to provide against a "rainy day" or the uncertainty of the future, but in order that he might thus contribute in the most direct and positive way to the industrial prosperity of the community. This thought runs down through the greater part of the nineteenth century in England and America. It is the key to the interpretation of our educational as well as of our moral and ethical training. The results are manifest in the enormous supply of corporate capital in both countries at the close of the nineteenth century. Now we begin to hear notes of warning. A book recently appeared with the title "The Fallacy of Saving." The workman is told that his share in production and his continued prosperity in the opportunities of employment are furthered rather by his spending, in wise ways, his income upon himself and upon his family so as to raise his plane of living; to educate his children more highly, and to secure a better contact with his environment. Capital is so abundant that the opportunities for the profitable investment of small savings are very restricted. So many agencies exist to equalize, or perhaps I would better say to socialize, the risks of the future that there is no longer so strong an inducement to guard and hoard small savings. The great fund of capital, now almost unlimited in amount, is consolidated under the wisest direction and ever seeks new ventures that promise profits. The great Corporation and the Trust are the inevitable consequences of such a development. From the point of view of industry and from the point of view of production

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they are no evil. They have simply enlarged the area of industrial territory already conquered, and have made competition sharper by reason of the skill and intellectual strength of the participants. They have made possible the better control of production; they have introduced important economies; they have reduced the stock of goods; they have brought about a more highly economic adaptation of supply to demand; they have made it possible to run factories full time and keep labor fully employed; but they have greatly changed the position of the workingman in relation to his employment.

The distance between the responsible head of a manufacturing concern and the men employed to make the product which it markets, is immeasurably greater than it was a few years ago. The duties of the president of a great corporation have become such that he must needs be protected from direct contact with the details of his business, and yet he must make and assume the responsibility for all important decisions relating to, it may be, an army of men in his employ. These decisions are greatly influenced by market considerations affecting the business in its relation to other industries, rather than by individual aspects of problems that affect merely his own plant. This means first, then, a loss of freedom of direct access to the employer on the part of the workman. It also means that the corporation must secure a higher type of workman susceptible of direction at long range, or by other subordinate officials with limited authority. It is these intermediate stages of direction that the trusts find most difficult to supply. The recent report of the Industrial Commission in its investigation of trusts, which constitutes one of its most important departments of inquiry, states that among the disadvantages of the large combinations in industry the most notable pointed out has been the difficulty of securing managers and superintendents who will take the same interest in the business that a private owner or manufacturer does. To accomplish this many of the larger concerns have already introduced a system by which not merely the higher officials, but also employés of all grades down to the ordinary day laborer, are paid for their services in part by an interest in

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stock or other form of property-right in the business. Such practices only tend to emphasize the loss of freedom to the individual workman in the employ of great corporations. He may be better off in the amount of return he can get for his effort by taking part pay in an interest in the business, but he has become more closely identified with the business and is less free than formerly to shift to another employer or to another occupation.

The growth of corporations has inevitably led to the growth in the number of workmen under the direction of one employer. The consolidation of railroads, for instance, showed, two years ago, one corporation employing over 100,000 men, and seven employing between twenty and thirty thousand each, and these figures would be greatly increased at the present time. The large industrial consolidations show even more remarkable figures of the number of men aggregated under single corporate control. Of the great corporations perhaps the railways furnish the best illustration of the legal responsibility for accidents of employment, partly because legislation has more directly affected them and partly because of the excessive risks of employment incident to railroad work. Formerly the law held employers responsible only for injuries in which there was no contributory negligence on the part of the employé and for which a fellow employé was not responsible. The time has come when the change in the nature of employment necessitates a change in this rule. The law as it formerly stood may be best illustrated by a few leading cases. A standard case in the English courts is the decision of Lord Chief-Justice Abinger in 1837, in a case known as Priestly *vs.* Fowler. An employé of a butcher sued his employer for injuries received because he was directed to ride on a van which was overloaded and not in a proper state of repair. The van broke down; the plaintiff fell and was injured. The Court held that he could not recover damages on the ground that the employé must have known as well as his employer, and probably better, whether the van was sufficient; whether it was overloaded, and whether it was likely to carry him safely. Another case was that of a fireman employed by the South

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Carolina Railroad Company, decided in 1838, which followed the principle laid down in the English case just referred to. The fireman was injured through the negligence of the engineer of the same train and the Court decided that the company was not liable for such injury, because the plaintiff knew and had equal opportunity with the company to inform himself concerning the ability of the engineer to perform the service required of him, and could have refused to work with an incompetent engineer. Most of the cases limiting the liability of employers on which the courts rely as precedents in determining these principles of law have been cases where the relations of employer, employé, and fellow-employés were intimate, personal relations such as those in domestic and household service. How does the case stand, however, if an engineer of a railroad train is injured or killed because of the negligence of a drunken switchman whom the company employed without due care to secure competent service in this department? Can an engineer be expected to inform himself concerning the ability of every switchman or of every one of perhaps a thousand men, upon whose faithfulness the safety with which he can run a train depends, or under such circumstances is he not entitled to the same consideration by the court, in holding his employer responsible, as a passenger on the train would be? The average railroad employé feels that he is and the public will probably justify this conclusion. If he is entitled to hold the company responsible for efficient service in other departments of what has hitherto been called "common employment" a change in our laws is necessary and has been rendered so by reason of changes in employment bringing large aggregations of employés together under a single corporate control. The English law has already recognized this principle more fully than we have in America, and in the Workingmen's Compensation Acts, covering a large number of employments, the English employer is now made practically the insurer of his workman against loss caused by injuries which may happen to them while engaged in his work quite apart from the question of the responsibility for such injuries, with the single exception that the workman himself

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must not be guilty of contributory negligence. This legislation was first passed in 1880 and extended in 1897, and now covers even agricultural laborers and applies to eight out of fifteen general groups of industrial laborers. In England, alongside of the Workingmen's Compensation Acts, the old Employers' Liability Act of 1880 still remains in force and an injured workman often has a choice of remedies. He may proceed under the Employers' Liability Act, which more nearly resembles the Common Law, or he may appeal to the system of arbitration providing a remedy under the Compensation Acts. The principle of the Compensation Acts is an entirely new and startling one. The employer is made liable to compensate his workman for injury quite irrespective of whether or not he or any one for whose acts he is in law liable has committed any breach of duty to which the injury is attributable. It constitutes a sort of insurance fund maintained at the expense of the employer by which the risks of employment are to a limited amount carried for the workman. The general tendency in this country has been rather in the other direction. The old Common Law liability was direct and did give workmen a remedy for injuries for which they or their fellow-employés were not responsible. This remedy was perhaps adequate when men were employed in small groups. Where men are employed by tens of thousands and the courts are inclined to enforce the fellow-servant rule, as it is called, by which an employer is not responsible for an injury caused to one of his employés by a fellow employé, every addition to the number of men brought together under one corporate employer restricts the workman's freedom in another respect. He is more liable to sustain injuries due to the negligence of fellow employees. His risks have increased and he alone must bear the burden.

The new conditions which have arisen out of the growth of corporations have, however, made it necessary for the corporations to secure a relatively permanent and stable labor force. This change is again more clearly seen in connection with the railroads because of the quasi-public nature of the service which such corporations render. A railroad must

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move its trains if possible. It cannot shut down its plant because of some trifling dispute with its employés. It must be able, therefore, to obtain and to hold an adequate labor force to carry on its business. To do this and to acquire a better hold over its men, as well as to make them more contented in their employ, many railroad companies have volunteered to carry some of the risks of employment by instituting railway relief departments. For a time some of the roads made membership in these railway relief departments compulsory, but since June 1, 1898, Federal legislation has made such practice illegal, and all that the companies can do now is to urge their men to join the relief departments, and in cases where there is a lack of disposition to do so, they can gradually dismiss employés who are not members of the relief departments and decline to employ those who do not at the time of their application for employment indicate their willingness to join the relief department. In the relief departments the employé pays a certain sum, which is deducted from his monthly wages and is proportionate to the amount of his wages, and to the amount of relief guaranteed. In return for this he receives a sick benefit of so much per week, depending upon the class of membership he selects, for a prescribed period, usually fifty-two weeks. In case of death or permanent disability a prescribed death benefit is paid to his legal representatives. The railroad company usually provides for the administration of this fund free of cost to the fund itself and pays interest on the balances held in the treasury. It also guarantees the obligations of the fund and frequently has to make up large deficits because the rates charged are not on the basis of ordinary insurance and do not usually provide for the accumulation of a reserve fund; hence the losses through sickness and accident in any given year may very considerably exceed the receipts. In a few of the larger railroad corporations the relief departments have, however, been able to accumulate a substantial surplus, which has been used for further projects in the interest of their members. Within the past few years several railroad corporations have, in addition to the railway relief departments, provided for pension and superannuation funds at

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the entire cost of the corporation. At the same time they have reduced the age at which men are admitted to the service, and at the present time on almost all the roads of the United States it is impossible for a man to start in railway employment who is over 35 years of age. The pension features usually provide for the voluntary retirement of an employé at the age of 65 and compulsory retirement at the age of 70, upon a pension based upon a certain percentage of his average earnings during the last ten years of active employment; this percentage being multiplied by the number of years he has been in service. For instance, one large corporation, which has set aside $300,000 a year, out of which these pensions are to be paid, gives each employé one per cent. of the average annual earnings of the last ten years of his active employment for each year he has been in the service of the corporation, so that a man 70 years of age, who had been in the employ of the corporation fifty years, would, upon his retirement, receive practically half-pay for the balance of his life. If the amount he was receiving at the date of his retirement was slightly in excess of the average for the last ten years, his pension would be somewhat less than half of his salary at the time of retirement. In neither the relief departments nor pension provisions is there any paid up or withdrawal value. In a relief department a man may have paid his monthly dues for a number of years, but if he leaves the service of the corporation he feels that he has lost that much income which he might have enjoyed, although, of course, he has had the protection which the fund gave him during the period of employment. He is less likely, however, to want to change his employment and thus be compelled to enter the relief department of another corporation at perhaps a higher rate of dues. Here again his freedom has been restricted. In this case his freedom of choice of employment is involved. Naturally the corporations have desired to secure this result as a return for their outlay in providing such funds.

A still further restriction of the rights of the employé is found in the provision in connection with membership in the railway relief departments, by which a workman accepting

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the relief afforded by the department fund waives all claims to legal damages under the general terms of employers' liability. The courts have decided that he may choose between the two remedies open to him,—acceptance of the benefit of the relief fund, or a suit for legal damages,—but that he is not entitled to both.

The system of pensions, now adopted by several of the leading railways, is rapidly spreading in the industrial world. The large corporations are planning to do the same thing in employments where the risks are not so great. The tendency everywhere is the same, and the results also will be practically the same. We are rapidly approaching a condition of affairs in which the employés of large corporations will be compelled to choose their employment for life at a comparatively early age. They will find themselves tied up to the interests of the corporation in whose services they choose to work for the whole period of their industrial activity in life, and will find their freedom in certain respects curtailed. They will not, at least, enjoy that measure of freedom which the older economists who extolled the glories of free competition were accustomed to point out as efficient safeguards of the interests of the workman of that day. They will have lost something of a direct, personal relationship to their employers. They will have increased the risks of employment which they must carry; they may have lost the power of substitution of one employment for another, so essential under the conditions of unrestricted competition. If the workman's choices are wisely made he will have gained a great deal in efficiency; in the productiveness of his labor; in the skill with which his work is directed and utilized, which, of course, will have an effect upon his wages, and perhaps also in the extent to which certain of his risks are carried collectively, or entirely by other agencies. As stated, however, at the outset, no amount of improvement in his general condition will compensate for these losses if he feels the restraints of the new situation sufficiently to curb his energies and dampen his enthusiasms and hopes.

Are we not too prone to discuss the labor problem almost entirely from the side of the mechanical results of industrial

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evolution, and is it not time that we turned our attention to the personality of the workman and asked ourselves whether there are compensations for the losses he has sustained which may be encouraged and strengthened? Probably the compensations are more than sufficient to make up for the losses, provided the average workman can be educated to take advantage of them.

The growth of corporations, the concentration of industry, with its reduced costs and its larger rewards, have created new labor problems; new conditions governing the output of effort for both employer and employé alike. They demand a new type of man and our system of education must be modified so as to produce him. A former economic epoch gave every advantage to the land-owner. From the peasant proprietor to the lord of the manor, the land-owner, in proportion to his holdings, had the best claim upon the social surplus and upon the results of collective advance in social life. In another economic epoch nearer to our own time this same advantage was enjoyed by the capitalist; the saver, the man who had his little pile stored away, whether in the spirit of the miser, of the money-lender or of the world-conqueror. It was the man with money to invest, or with his pile at interest, who reaped the rewards of industrial progress. We are entering an economic era, if indeed we are not already launched in it, when the type of man who is at an economic advantage is the man with foresight, good judgment, quick decision, and executive capacity. These qualities, in small degree or large, give one under present conditions the economic advantage. In so far as they are possessed by workmen the newer opportunities for their exercise by even the humblest manual toiler very largely compensate for the loss in individual freedom. The ethical imperative resting upon the corporations consists in the duty to keep open the doors of opportunity, and for every restriction of individual choice; for every specialization of individual effort; for every band of social cohesion which ties the workman to the interests of the corporation, to see that some new opportunity opens before him that will make of him more of a man, and put a premium upon the exercise of his higher faculties in

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order that he be not reduced to a mere machine of flesh and blood. Many of the economic changes here indicated are necessary in the interests of industrial prosperity, but industrial prosperity itself will be of short duration unless the humanity, the intelligence and the character of the individual workman is appealed to by all the conditions under which he works. The interests of the corporation as well as the interests of the workman demand that this shall be done, and only in the doing of it is the reward sure and the future safe. The new outlook comprising the new problems which confront the individual workman, and on the solution of which his duties to himself, to his family and to society depend, is not a hopeless nor a discouraging one. Corporate greed and shortsightedness is less likely in the long run to prevail than the individual greed and shortsightedness of the individual capitalists who preceded the billion-dollar trusts. The trusts will have more collective wisdom and will therefore be more susceptible to the control of public opinion and of the economic conditions which determine their welfare. The shortsightedness is more likely to be on the side of the workman due to defective education. There is, therefore, the greater need that the ethical and moral forces of the community exert themselves in the training and preparation of the modern workman for his new opportunities as well as for his new responsibilities under the corporate control of industry.

SAMUEL MCCUNE LINDSAY.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

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THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ROSSETTI'S POETRY.

"Shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends"
and
"If it would but apprehend some joy
It comprehends some bringer of that joy."

ROSSETTI appears to rouse in a good many people a strong feeling of antagonism, even of disgust, and in perhaps a still larger number a touch of contempt. He is called morbid and sensuous, both in the plain meaning of the word, and in its underlying more objectionable sense. Perhaps his two-fold artistic production gives an idea that his poetry was too much of an auxiliary in the expression of his inner life to have real value. There is a dim resentment against him as towards one who attempts to strain one art into an imitation of another. The detractors under this head attack the short narrative poems or ballads as mere pictures, and sometimes not even clear pictures.

But others go further; they consider that he not only deals too much with the mere external view of things, but that while he gives a minute and sometimes morbid analysis of emotions of all kinds, he deals little with the more intellectual interests of the spirit. The soul for him exists only in its passion, not in its striving active creation. He has little or no speculation on the problems of life and death, very little moral speculation as we understand it. He appears to utterly neglect the leading factors in our spiritual experience, and by so doing, it may be thought, loses the link of experience which joins us to the poetic land of promise.

With regard to the first point, it may be remarked that Rossetti himself considered that he had mastered the power of expression more completely in poetry than in painting, and that it seems probable that if any objectionable confounding of the arts really took place, it was the painting into which the alien element was imported. A short examination of the picture of

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the Annunciation and of one or two poems may illustrate this.

Rossetti's method of conceiving his subject is peculiar. He is not troubled by the question of what actually occurred, does not attempt to win our credence for, or interest in, the event. The angel, like the books and the lilies, is scarcely more than a symbol, a hieroglyphic showing the particular bearing of Mary's thought; that is, his subject is not the Annunciation at all, but Mary's character. The idea of the spiritual splendor of the event is NOT allowed to absorb or transfigure the material facts. You are given the physical reality of her appearance. Her body is drawn up harmoniously with the nervous strain of thought, not with the subject of that thought. She sees the events conditioned at every point by her human nature. But the meaning of the whole picture lies in the expression of her face—or rather, of her eyes—(the mouth is sad, submissive, not deflected, probably, from its usual expression)—of which it is an explanation or projection. Her intense abstraction results physically in an inability to see any but broad facts of coloring, and her intense simplicity of mind is portrayed by a certain stiffness of figuring, as if she were occupied with the unfleshed ideas of things.

The poetic counterpart to the Annunciation is the "Blessed Damozel." The type of woman portrayed too is very much the same—very simple and not apt to correlate appearances, destroying their personality by seeing them as the manifestation of a single force. Hence the simplicity of coloring in the picture is balanced by the sweet clearness of the surface-thought in the poem, which gives it a sort of singing quality. It has little of the slow richness of Rossetti's other work. As he thought of her the appropriate world spread around her, depending on her like variations in music or as a chord on a single note. But at the same time her heaven is not merely a setting for her, nor yet is it quite a personification of ideas in her mind. It is simply an articulation, without distinction of planes of existence (as is common to Rossetti) of her whole inner world. This world such a woman believes to be entirely the reflection of an outer one, never dreaming that it can be in any way due to her own consciousness, so mere an instinct is

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faith. Hence to gain her point of view these ideas must be painted in as background. (At the same time all ideas which color our minds, did really to Rossetti gain a certain being which remains.) He probably, indeed, did not intend to indicate that they had anything like the same clearness of outline to her at the given moment. When "the light thrilled towards her filled with angels in strong level flight," one suspects that he is describing the manner in which she was affected by the beating of the waves of light, as she might have explained it had she been perfectly conscious. But in reality there is a sort of pause in thought before her emotions have taken definite expression —a pause in which she feels that there lives within her another world that finds words to reach our comprehension in the thick-coming, thrilling beat of wings—the close succession of their rounded tops being suggested to her mind by the light.

In the same way, in the more senuous poems, the acute realization and description of the experiences of sense is at once the articulation and the justification to the intellect of the singularly elusive movements in the spiritual organism. There is an example in the "Last Confession." The description of the woman laughing in the tavern with its loathsome confounding of human, animal and vegetable life, ("The vine crawl'd in her back") so that as we think of it, emotion and even perception seems a horrible disease, is but a concrete presentment of the subtle elements of coarseness detected by the man later in the girl's manner. Almost all his painting in words seems to have this object, and connected with his ethical views, which will be examined later on, it is a perfectly admissible explanation of his sometimes touching on what appear too merely earthly aspects of things.

The other side of this intensely developed consciousness, comes out most clearly in "Sister Helen." In it you have the poetry of the relations of the different persons gathered into concrete facts, which by the omission chiefly of certain coloring matter of detail, gives an impression of strangeness. We are in the habit of saying that our state of mind colors the appearance of things. But there is more than that here. Rose Mary's grief was "not hers, but the whole world's pain." In the first

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sharp moment of realization there appeared to be a power of communication between her and external things, so close that she could not tell the originating consciousness. So in "Sister Helen," the riding of the horsemen and the agonized voices on the wind are real, but the purely picturesque quality is made so prominent that these real things appear the presentment of a distempered mind, and the departure from external realism is accentuated by the refrain which reveals the naked forces in contention, and gives us the ideal conception of the story.

Now it may, I think, be shown from these specimens that Rossetti is a true theological poet, and in this connection he has a certain affinity withBrowning. We have the same striving after intellectual cognizance of partially physical sensations in the latter. He is always testing the question—at what point the purely sensuous passes into the intellectual. But the ends at which the poets aim are different. Browning's real subject of examination is always the nature of the Divine Being, who is to be made non-anthropomorphic by supposing him to admit into his being, elements which no man would nakedly confess; the whole vague figure being somehow whitewashed into infinity by Browning's peculiar version of "now we see through a glass darkly." He is thus led to this analysis by the attempt to build up his conception of "other modes of being,"—Rossetti, by his intense interest in the emotions themselves.

It thus appears that the poet's two styles, that dealing apparently with the physical nature of things, and that with a sort of fantastic distilled emotion, are due to the same source; and that to justify him we must find some sufficient ground for this absorbing interest in phases of subjective life, interest, that is, rather in individuality, unlimited by objective circumstance, than apparently in the relation of the mind to the general order of things.

The tradition of our poetry has led the modern reader to expect—almost to require—an underlying reference to the historical aspect of theology. It is as the Source of things that the poet as poet has considered the Divine Being. But it is not necessary to approach the problem of the reality of life by this road. Nor does the fact that the ordinary person does so ap-

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proach it, make it the poet's only path. It is true that from one point of view all art is an attempt to systematize the intellectual intuitions derived from the totality of experience—not merely to educe the laws of progress and of essential life from great events and intellectual movements, unveiling more and more the hidden birth of thought, but also to draw out the soul which gives beauty and purity to the experiences of sense, raising the human nearer heaven. In this aspect of his character, the poet must be the centre of a vast system of emotional forces, having their sources in all these springs. But this is only one side of his work; he must be something more than a mere recorder, more even than a mere interpreter. For an artist is not only a prophet catching the whispers of the Divine Central thought, but, as it were, a defeated Creator-God, who showing us the fragments of his design of life in actual facts, makes us imperfectly see the scheme of a world which never was, but had been perhaps rejected in that divine thought, as being too near its own essence, too little transfused with sense. It is necessary that all the materials of this other world should be found in life as it is, but it is not necessary,—it is perhaps impossible—that it should comprehend all the spiritual aspirations and intutions derived from the present system. These are due to sympathy of the unit with the informing thought, and the latter being changed, the former would, in fact, disappear, and must, therefore, be neglected in a poetic reconstruction. Nor would the apparent partiality of this view necessarily detract from its truthfulness because we cannot at once conclude that the Divine Being's essence is to be found in life, but merely his thought. There are in fact three possible relationships between what we will call the Supreme Being and this system of things. The first is that of an historic Creator, an absolutely unchangeable connection; the second is that of body to soul, unchangeable too, but of infinite complexity; the third is that of subject and object, so to speak, the thinker and the thought. This last admits of endless variety—all true for their time but not true for any other. It is, therefore, possible that the absence of this particular type of question in the poet may be due not to his limitations, but to the fact that the real emotions of his con-

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temporaries are not stirred by these things; the strings along which his music should quiver are not taut, because the God-thought has changed. Hence if we can prove that Rossetti really has vindicated our spiritual existence in some way, wherever he plants the ladder up which he climbs to Heaven, surely the reproach of preoccupation with secondary objects would vanish.

Now what strikes one as the important thing to realize about Rossetti's poetry is, that he deals not with the subjects of thought but with the processes of mind. He is not interested in questions of what we call historical facts; his whole energy is bent towards the accurate analysis of the perceptive powers which register these facts and of their reflex action. To him emotion was the most divine thing within our cognizance, and he finds in it a promise of immortality—"A rainbow on the storm of death," "The breath of God in man that warranteth the inmost, utmost things of faith." He cannot believe in the merely natural essence of any passion or pleasure—"My soul I know not from my body nor thee from myself, neither our love from God." His emotions he feels do not at any time begin and end in himself; there is always something else which interacts. This something may be original, independent and active, or it may have been at first merely projected by the necessities of our minds, and by development incorporated. The important point is not its origin but its existence, (the latter theory does not preclude the belief in a Supreme Being as the author of things, but merely the belief in his imparting of his own nature to the world.) If in the highest trances of thought we have a belief in an external, all-pervading objective thought, and if for the greatest expansion of our spirits an honest belief in its objectivity is necessary, then this requirement seems to form a proof of the existence of another "mode of Being." Not of a creative spirit exactly in the sense of one which was a finite source of things, but a sustaining spirit, creative in so far as it imparts life through all time. To it there truly is no to-morrow, no yesterday. It exists in the present.

Thought, that is deductive or crystalizing thought, he felt,

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is apt to be destructive. The grav pictures of memory "of that which had life's form and love's" do not give the satisfaction to the mind of the vibrations of the present emotion. But there is a kind of consciousness which does not reflect on the sensations, but is, as it were, twin born with them; so that, for instance, a mere physical impression of light is accompanied by a feeling of an intense acuteness and clearness of thought, as if barriers had been suddenly broken down. The natural world lives always in the moment, is immature, or at least does not age towards death. It is the fountain of pure emotion, and the perfect realization of the sensuous delights of life is the real absorption into the infinite. Consciousness must not turn into thought or the spell is broken, and the moral element bursts in. "The secret of the wells of life" we can never know, but sometimes in the hot sunshine when we seem consciously to be drinking in the essence of physical life, the spirit of everlasting existence brushes our lips and brings cessation of care. It is then that the poet hushes us with the words "say nothing now unto her, lest she weep."

Not that the secret of life is a material one, but it is through an abnormally developed keenness of sense that Rossetti reached the spiritual. It is at the noon-hour that he hears the footsteps in another world, in an atmosphere of blazing heat and golden light. The "Song-God is the Sun-God." Myriads of creatures are made to stir by the sunshine, whose individual existence we had scarcely realized; and partly the tendency to multiply the process, partly the great physical quickening of our own senses, make us believe that impersonal forces—the sunshine or the wind—have power to come and touch us. The air appears full of thinking presences, of "a folding sense like prayer, which is, as God is, everywhere."

It was Rossetti's great merit that he saw the poetic value of this state of mind and body, and knew how to use it both to transfuse the lower element with spiritual worth, and to make the supernatural seem an experienced fact. Wordsworth had done something of the same kind of thing, but he had not perhaps quite sufficient faith in the voiceless revelations of his trances. He stills us till the beatings of our own hearts fill the silence with a supernatural language, but he neither tells us

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what he has heard in these "seasons of calm weather" nor has he any clear recollection of the different phases of the emotion. Nor does Rossetti,to say truth, tell us much of what he has heard, but he admits of a vast variety in the coloring, so to speak, of the intellectual intuitions which are sacred as carrying a direct warrant of their eternal origin. It is the polytheism of his mental and moral world which underlies the great beauty of his personifications and allegories. Like the Greeks and Blake he felt an individuality in an emotion before he could define that emotion itself—his feelings pass through the stage of personification before they reach clear expression to the intellect. It is not that he thinks in metaphor, but that the poetic idea of a thing seemed in his case to be the link between sensation in the widest sense, and perception, instead of being the result of both. It becomes in fact a sort of intermediate personality. In Blake's case it accounts for his visions, and he comes quite near Rossetti's usual use of it in such a poem as the "Tiger," where the terror and the beauty of the animal seem to him to be such living things, that they are in some sense more directly God-created; the pulsation of the thought that makes them appeals to our minds more directly than in other things.

Now this importance of emotion is greatest in that of love. Firstly because, in Rossetti's view, the mind is more frequently and more completely exalted to that state of emotion which feels the outside force, and secondly because it forms the nearest parallel to the relationship between phenomenal thought and our thought, and is therefore a revelation of the meaning and working of life. His idea of love appears to be a perfect sympathy, resulting not from original unity, but from diversity that grows by reciprocal impression into a new entity. Hence his agony when there is a change of feeling in the other person, because when "this sun bewitched" burns away the shadow of her passion in his mind, both God and his soul go too. For it is the eternity of emotion that necessitates God. Not only does the obliteration of the emotion suggest by analogy that there may have been no interaction, and hence no outside thinking force, but if we believe that an emotion can be blotted out, then there is no soul. We speak theologically as if ex-

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perienced emotions and thoughts grouped themselves, after being detached from our minds, and lived on; but in reality emotions have no continuity of individuality at all. Now if they pass utterly away, consciousness may have an enormous length of life, but can scarcely be immortal, because it exists only in experiencing; and therefore the experiences are actual parts of its subsistence, not merely different forms of a pervading spirit. The soul would therefore merely be a fictional aggregate of these outside ideas which would each have an existence in themselves, and be then annihilated. Hence the importance of the permanent preservation of emotions. It is significant from this point of view that his chief work should be a sonnet sequence. In the "House of Life" the separate poems are monuments to the "deathless hours" of his past. "No alien spell" must meet him in the land past death. "A well-known door" must be "even yet my life-porch in eternity, even with one presence filled, as once of yore, or mocking winds whirl round a chaff-strewn floor . . . . my words and me."

It is in connection with this idea that he says, "Would that I knew there was a God to thank, when thanks rise in me." He desires not so much a responsive consciousness, as a witness to the reality of his gratitude—another consciousness which should give his emotions truth by garnering up into a permanent idea the experiences of the high-flood moments of his consciousness. This shadowy aggregate of ideas following behind, partially dependent on the Divine mind, corresponds to the orthodox soul.

We therefore, come back to this, that Rossetti deals almost exclusively with the processes of mind, and that he is successful in suggesting a certain divinity in them, a supernatural element. He seems to feel that all thought (and under that term is comprehended all original life of the mind, realization of sensation, sincere emotion) is divine, and we need search no further, but be transfused in it. His work might then have gone on to show how thought becomes an active force, how the emotions force this frame of things into their law, and hence the supreme importance of the individual life which, however insignificant a citizen, is yet a law-giver in this commonwealth.

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The work of Rossetti has not been completed. The life of the spirit is indeed all in all to Maeterlinck. With him the sort of ghost of our emotions enters into an external sensible occurrence, so that an impression is produced that all events are in a state of flux and dependent on our consciousness not only for perception but for their birth into the region where they appear to impress other minds. Gradually as his plots develop, the spiritual causes of all things become more and more apparent—the unspiritualized pass utterly away, and then the other spiritual forces behind the veil come out and meet, and the purgation or translation of the soul is complete. The external world and the human mind are two vessels which are filled simultaneously with the same informing thought by some flood of ideas beyond this world. Though the individual's emotions are the only truth, yet somehow he himself is powerless. Perfect morality and wisdom would enable the individual to conform by sympathy to the creative thought so that the wheels of the progress of the universe should run in straight paths, but they would not enable him in any way to affect this progress. The solution towards which Rossetti was groping seems to me to have been a greater one. He found individuality everywhere, objective personality of infinite diversity, and he feels that this is somehow the guiding force in the universe. But he has not taught us how it becomes active. His personifications remain such in spite of a glimmer of real divinity in them—the extraordinarily concrete individuality with which he could endow the most subtle strand of feeling. With him the emotion seems to remain just off the ground of our world, apparently greater than our consciousness can contain, and yet hardly incorporated into another. The feeling beginning in the mind seems to pass out and take shape visibly before us, so that you find "Your own foot-steps meeting you." He will probably never be properly appreciated until his work has received its coping-stone and we see the substance of what he has given us "a shaken shadow, intolerable, of ultimate things unuttered, the frail screen."

J. Spens.

Glasgow.

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DISCUSSION.

A FURTHER REJOINDER TO PROFESSOR RITCHIE.

[NOTE.—The following abbreviated communication from Mr. John M. Robertson closes the discussion that has been going on between him and Professor Ritchie since the latter's article on "War and Peace" in the January number, 1901.—MANAGING EDITOR.]

In his "Further Reply" to me in the October number, Professor Ritchie asserts that I reiterated a certain charge against his dialectic method "without being able to cite a single sentence" of his in support of my statement. . . . My original statement was to the effect that he had repeatedly adopted a chronological measure of personal authority in regard to the very question under discussion. I now give the proofs. In a letter by Mr. Ritchie in the *Ethical World* of February 17, 1900, page 110, occurs this sentence: "From people who have lived longer than three months in Africa, I have heard very different evidence from that collected by Mr. Hobson." . . In a subsequent letter to the *Ethical World* (March 3, 1900, page 142), Mr. Ritchie has this sentence: "I am not prepared implicitly to accept all the testimony either of missionaries who have spent their lives among the natives, or of journalists who have been three months in the country." . . . . He repeats gratuitously his insinuation that Mr. Hobson's views on South Africa were properly to be discredited because he has been only three months there. All the while Prof. Ritchie did not claim to have been there at all. It may seem as if, that being so, he cannot have meant what he seemed to say, since it would imply that his judgment on the subject was worth nothing. . . . . Mr. Hobson never professed to stake his argument on his own first hand testimony, any more than Mr. Ritchie did.

Mr. Ritchie has convicted me of one inaccuracy, and I offer my apologies. . . . . I desire to avow my regret that I caused him to explain that he is a professor not of moral philosophy (as I erroneously stated) but solely of logic, in the same page with his pretence that I committed a fallacy of Division in citing the names of some of the best known members of what he called "a small but very blatant faction." . . . . Another illustration may serve better than any analysis to illustrate his mental process.

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When he reviewed Mr. Hobson's book he spoke of it as Mr. Hobson's "case against his country." Thus when Mr. Hobson impeaches the policy of Mr. Ritchie's party, Mr. Ritchie, a Professor of Logic, holds himself free to call the book an impeachment of the nation. But when I cite the names of a number of the leading men in what Mr. Ritchie calls a "small but very blatant faction," I am guilty of the fallacy of division!

If Mr. Ritchie had been candid enough to admit that he ought not to have used the expression he did, instead of taking the course under notice . . . . . he would have made, I think, a better finish to our discussion. I shall not imitate him by pleading tnat the chair of Moral Philosophy used often to be joined with that of Logic in Scotch Universities, and that I thought it was so at St. Andrews'.

JOHN M. ROBERTSON.

LONDON, ENGLAND.

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE PROBLEM OF CONDUCT: A STUDY IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF ETHICS. By A. E. Taylor, Assistant Lecturer in Greek and Philosophy at the Owens College, Manchester; Late Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. viii., 501.

The author was well advised in publishing this Essay, which was awarded the Green Moral Philosophy Prize in 1899; and is to be congratulated on having produced a very readable and a well written volume. One may perhaps reasonably object to the length of the book, when one discovers that the argument is needlessly repeated and amplified; but no one will be able to regard even the digressions as dull reading. The author modestly but (excepting as regards the chapter on the "Roots of Ethics") honestly disclaims any credit for originality in the principles from which his argument proceeds. All that he has to say will, he tells us, be found to be contained in or derived from Mr. Bradley's discussions in the "Ethical Studies" and "Appearance and Reality." And indeed any one acquainted with these books will be surprised to find how familiar Mr. Taylor's statements sound. But in spite of this debt to Mr. Bradley, one feels that Mr. Taylor's arguments do not come from a mere echo, but from the in-

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dividual voice of one who has faced the question for himself and holds convictions on the subject,—however closely the result may agree with the views of the author to whom he owes so much.

The argument of the volume is ostensibly polemical. Its aim, the author tells us, is to establish the position, which he admits to be unpopular, that "it is a complete mistake to found a system of ethics upon the results of a previous study of metaphysics." He divides his argument into three parts: (1) he states generally how a science founded on metaphysics should differ from a positive or experiential science; (2) he seeks to meet some of the arguments by which the metaphysical moralists have sought to show that a metaphysical foundation is essential to a theory of conduct; (3) he gives a detailed examination of some of the principal facts with which ethics deals, and some "incidental criticisms" of the assumptions of his opponents, in order to show that ethics cannot be based on a pre-existing metaphysic. The introductory chapter is devoted to the first part; Chap. II. to the second part; and the remainder of the volume, chaps. III.-VIII., to the last division of the argument.

What the author seeks to give us, then, is thus not a system of ethics, nor an exhaustive discussion of ethical principles, but an analysis of certain ethical facts with a view to discovering the *method* of a science of ethics, and a criticism of those who consider that method to be metaphysical. The result arrived at is to show that there can only be one method, viz: the empirical; ethics is to be proved to be a "positive" or "natural" science. This being the plan, it is clear that everything turns on (1) the author's views of metaphysics, (2) his method of proof. It is however difficult to fit into this view of the author's argument, the chapter on the "Roots of Ethics" (chap. III.), one of the most interesting chapters in the book, and the one which seems least indebted to Mr. Bradley. This chapter is not an analysis of the "principal facts" of ethics, nor a discussion of metaphysical arguments. It is a psychological theory of the origin of the moral judgment, or, as the author prefers to say, the "moral sentiments." The author does not make much use of the views he there advocates in the subsequent discussion, certainly not enough to justify the place this chapter has in the volume. One would not willingly spare it from the volume; yet it hardly seems congruous with the plan of it.

The author's view of metaphysic is stated expressly in chap. I.,

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and again in the last chapter on "Beyond Good and Bad," but it runs through the whole volume. He admits (p. 6) that his conception of it will not agree with what we find in any of the great philosophical systems, yet it will, he thinks, cover in a general way all that we mean by metaphysical investigations. His statement of his view cannot be made consistent, if we take his various expressions very strictly, but it is easy to determine the position he really means to defend. Metaphysics is a science which seeks to describe the general (formal) characteristics of the whole of experience as experience. Its ideal is that of complete or "pure" experience, as Avenarius calls it, *i. e.*, "an experience free from all admixture of anything which is not itself experience." The science falls into two parts, constructive and critical. The former has simply to determine the most general (formal) conditions of experience as such, its first principle being that what is real is experience, and what is real not self-contradictory (p. 30); the latter examines all other sciences from this ideal of pure experience, tests their claims to be identical with the complete world of experience, or sees how far they agree with the conception of a pure experience. Any science which on examination is found not to satisfy this ideal at which metaphysic aims cannot be held to be itself metaphysic, nor based upon metaphysics. Such then, is the author's starting point.

Before leaving it we may say that the inconsistencies to which we referred are not simply verbal. In one place (p. 18) "pure" experience, the ideal of explanation, contains and combines both "what agrees with the formal conditions of experience, and what agrees with the material conditions of the experience of the terms themselves." But on p. 29 we learn that metaphysics cannot attain the whole truth; it can only at best, hope to discover the *formal* conditions of experience in general; it is powerless to ascertain the material conditions of any particular set of experiences. That is, metaphysics not only does not conform to the ideal of pure experience, but it is hopeless for it to use it as an ideal, since an element in that ideal is beyond its cognizance altogether. In other words, strictly speaking, metaphysics does not guide itself by the conception of pure experience at all. In the same strain and almost more emphatic are the statements on pp. 455-6, where the writer is discussing in a specific case the relation of thought or reason to concrete experience. "Reason and Theory," he says, "always toil *langa intervallo* after direct and

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immediate apprehension of relief," yet it is by reason that we get metaphysics.

Again a "fact of experience," we are told (p. 12), means "the contents of a true (*i. e.*, consistent) description of our experience." But (p. 14), science is "the full and coherent description of facts of experience"; *i. e.*, science must be the description of a consistent description of experience? And on the same page the author speaks of "*experienced* matters of fact as data" for science; but this is clearly untenable with the above view of "fact." So too, when he makes "matters of fact" and "experience" *alternatives* (p. 21). And when (pp. 26-7) the writer says that by "facts" he means "facts" as they appear to "the experience which has arrived at an all-embracing and coherent view of the whole system to which they belong," and that "in the last resort no science can be said to give a thoroughly truthful representation of . . . . 'facts' except one, if there be such a one, which includes all the material of experience, and that with thoroughly consistent insight into the structure of that material," it is impossible to know what the author means to hold at all, since in this last view the implication is that "facts" are neither known nor found at the beginning or at the end of "science." Lastly (p.25), the scientific ideal is a perfect or completed or pure experience; such an all-embracing and finally consistent experience would in every case see things "as they really are;" "*theory for it would be one with direct experience.*" Theory we presume is the work and expression of thought or reason. But on p. 455 Note, we read, "But it is not 'thought' but 'experience' that is the ultimate metaphysical reality." If so, how can theory ever have even as its ideal, still less as an actual attainment, to be "one with direct experience?" So when the author states on p. 38 ff., that "thought," "thinking," "reasoning," "rationality" is a "labor-saving contrivance," a "systematic device for saving labor" that reason in conduct is an "organization of the organic reactions in accord with the principle of securing the beneficial course of behavior with the least expenditure of energy," we cannot but ask how it is possible for such a mere "contrivance" by any ingenuity to either re-produce experience, or give us a result which will be "one with direct experience"? Either reason is constitutive of experience or it is not. If it is, then it is not a mere contrivance; if it is not, then experience can never even be represented by it. And indeed, it is astonishing that with such a view of reason the

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author should have ventured to criticise and condemn such forms of experience as morality, because they are inconsistent, self-contradictory: for contradiction is after all only a principle of reason, of this mere device for simply saving time which man possesses.

Taking then the conception of metaphysic above given as his point of view, the author maintains that any science which will not, when tested by examination of its parts and principles, conform to this conception of metaphysics cannot be regarded as metaphysical, or as metaphysics. His argument therefore is to apply this conception to the case of ethics. We may remark here on an ambiguity which the author nowhere clears up, and which remains with the reader to the end. It is impossible to say whether he means to prove that ethics cannot be metaphysics, or that ethics cannot form a part of a metaphysical interpretation of the world. If he means the former, one can only ask whether any one ever really supposed that ethics *could* be absolutely the same as metaphysics? If he means the latter, as he probably does, then this merely shows that ethics as it stands is not ultimate, it does not prove that ethics cannot be treated metaphysically; and this the author in so many words admits when he says, *e. g.* (p. 494 ff), that there is always room for a metaphysic of ethics. But indeed this concession is needless, for the investigation by which the author establishes his result, is *itself a metaphysical* enquiry. And we may say in general that any metaphysic which does not take account of ethics is self-condemned. For it ignores an essential aspect of human experience.

Such being the negative result which the author seeks to establish, the positive conclusion at which he arrives is that the science of ethics should limit itself to the facts of the moral life derivable from "psychology, sociology and other sciences which have to do with empirical human nature" (p. 496), *i. e.,* should be an empirical science, in the narrower sense of that term, should be "phenomenology" not metaphysic. After we have got these facts together properly, then we may proceed to metaphysic, but not before.

But this positive conclusion is also ambiguous. For if it means that we must get the facts of the moral life before we can construct a metaphysic of ethics, this is so obvious, that one can hardly believe there was ever any other method of procedure. But if it means that there is no other fruitful way of treating ethics, and

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that for the completion of such a science of ethics metaphysics must wait, then we can only remark (1) that the author has merely shown the necessity for studying the empirical facts of the moral life, but has not proved that there is no other way of treating the content the moral life; (2) that if metaphysic has absolutely to wait on such a science, then the author's own metaphysical discussion of ethics is premature, for the science of ethics in his sense has not yet arrived. If he replies that it is only the constructive metaphysic of ethics which must wait on the science of ethics, we may point out that his own analysis of morality has condemned that as futile by anticipation. For the moral life is not ultimate, is self-contradictory, and therefore cannot become part of a constructive metaphysic at all.

Coming to the argument itself, it proceeds, shortly stated, as follows. Chap. II. discusses some arguments for the metaphysical treatment of ethics. Those considered are mainly two (1) the assumption that "ought" and "is" are ultimate distinctions; (2) Green's view of the Eternal Self. The former Mr. Taylor denies, on the general ground that to know what "ought" to be we must know what things are; while he seeks to show that the Eternal Self is non-existent, and even if it exists it is useless for ethics. The arguments here do not seem sufficient, but the importance of this chapter is indirect.

In chap. III. the author, as we said, analyzes the "Roots of Ethics" from the purely psychological point of view. The fundamental fact, he holds, from which we start, is the "sentiment of approbation." This is at first not personal, (p. 122). "Approbation" simply means (p. 122) that the "ideal representation of certain events in the way of sensation, perception, or idea is attended with the feeling of pleasure" (or pain, in the case of disapproval). From this every other ethical fact of imsome fullness. This psychological analysis says our author is the proper basis for ethics, which is a purely empirical science (p. 102).

It is impossible to discuss in detail Mr. Taylor's argument in this interesting chapter. We may point out (1) that the identification of moral "sentiments" with moral judgments, which the author makes, is loose and halting. On p. 92 the proper basis of ethics is to be a psychological analysis of the "ethical sentiments" of civilized mankind, sentiments meaning more specifically "emotions of a certain kind." On p. 102 we learn that the ultimate

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fact from which analysis of morality must begin is the "moral judgment." These do not seem the same; for on p. 101 our author speaks of the direct object of ethical study being the judgments upon acts "*and* the emotions with which we look back on them." While again (p. 103) ethics may be described as "*either* the theory or moral sentiments *or* the theory of moral judgments." Surely much depends on which of these we take; and if the matter is so doubtful and ambiguous the psychological treatment of ethics is in rather a perilous state. (2) Mr. Taylor's view of the term "ethics" in this chapter and also elsewhere is quite misleading and ambiguous. One cannot determine whether he is dealing with ethical *theory* or the ethical *judgments* of mankind. The latter he describes as "a sort of natural or pre-scientific theory about the quality of a certain class of actions" (p 101); or again as "unconscious" or "natural" *hypothesis* (ibid). This seems mere confusion. The ordinary moral judgment whatever it contains, is certainly not a theory in any sense. It seems transparent that reflection about morality is not the same, and has not the same characteristics as actual morality. A moral judgment is a principle of action; a theoretical judgment is solely contemplative. If the moral life is a "theory," a "hypothesis," where, one might ask, is the "Theory of Ethics" to begin? And what becomes of the "facts" which science is simply to "find" and not "make" (p. 26)? (3) The "approbation" which is taken to be fundamental in ethics is not distinguished from other kinds of approbation, *e. g.*, artistic. It is no doubt moral approbation which the author means in chap. III, for it is only moral ideas (responsibility, etc.), which he derives from the original sentiment of approbation. But the introduction of a more precise definition of the "approbation" he speaks of here, might imperil his theory. When this difficulty does in a way occur to the author (p. 467), he merely remarks that "morality" in the wide sense includes all forms of endeavor towards an ideal, whether in science or in art, and that in this wide sense he has been using the term throughout the Essay; though the reader feels very astonished to learn so late in the Essay that this is the author's meaning, since there has been no indication of this in the course of the argument, and the author expressly says (p. 167) that he is concerned simply with the development of *ethical* concepts and sentiments as such, and that he proposes to show later, (namely in chap. VIII.) "how morality

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comes . . . *to fuse with art and science* in a higher form of *religion.*" A similar distinction is hinted at on p. 352.

Having stated the psychological foundation of ethical theory the author goes on in chap. IV to consider contrasted "Types of Virtue." The types he deals with are primarily those of "self-culture" and "social justice," which he adopts in place of "self-assertion" and "self-sacrifice," as used by Mr. Bradley. His aim is to show that no particular virtue can be allowed to belong exclusively to one of these types. If it is confined to either, it falls into contradictions in practice. But if it is allowed to belong to both, it falls equally into contradiction, for the chief types are in principle irreconcilable. The analysis here, though very familiar, is forcibly and clearly stated. The connection between these types and the source from which they come (the developed sentiments of approbation) is not at all easy to follow. Nor again is the reader able to find out whether these two contrasted types are to be taken as theoretical ideals derived by reflection from conduct, or practical ideals at work in everyday life. This and the following chap. V., on "Moral Ideals and Moral Progress," make very good reading, whatever we may think of the argument. The latter chapter simply extends still further the criticism and the result arrived at in the preceding. Taking as an essential characteristic of the moral ideal consistency or thoroughness, he asks whether thorough devotion to the ideal of self-culture realizes the satisfaction at which it aims; or is this attained when the ideal is social justice; or, lastly, does a compromise between them realize both? After examining each of these in turn, in the course of which the author gives vent to the bitterness of his disappointment with a moral life as such, he winds up with the conclusion that there is a hidden root of insincerity and hypocrisy beneath all morality. The essence of the moral life he says is a mere compromise between opposing principles; "my station and its duties" gives the best that morality can attain to. This position, which is the view of morality which Mr. Taylor considers most tenable, can be described, he says, as Universalistic Ethical Hedonism. Yet as he ironically remarks, only those who do not think about problems of conduct can derive lasting satisfaction from "my station and its duties." We shall find ourselves perpetually in difficulties and when these arise neither illogical practice nor logical theory can help us to remove the hopeless unsatisfactoriness of a moral life. Progress turns out equally futile theoretically, however valuable

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practically. For if we are asked, "Has the growth of our civilization really been a progress? we can only answer, Yes, and No" (p. 293). The result then leads the author to declare that morality on all hands is bankrupt, if we ask it to pay man with happiness for the labor of perfect obedience. But the conclusion at least warrants the opinion, according to Mr. Taylor, that the only way of treating ethics must be purely empirical (p. 309). Though how such a conclusion regarding ethical theory can follow from a consideration of difficulties in moral practice may somewhat puzzle the inquiring reader.

The next chapter, on "Pleasure, Duty and the Good" is a digression of a critical nature on the theories of the end which take Pleasure or Duty to be the Good. Both are shown, much in the usual manner as regards principle, though with considerable freshness of argument, to be unable to do full justice to morality.

We are naturally anxious, after hearing so much of the worthlessness of morality, and despair for the moral life, to find out whether and how man can overcome his deficiencies as a moral being and attain to something better or worse. The reader therefore is somewhat wearied with chap. VII on the "Goal of Ethics," which adds little to the argument of chaps. IV and V, and reiterates the same conclusion as was there arrived at; a perfect good, whether for the individual or in an ideal commonwealth, being treated as a necessary but unthinkable illusion. We look forward to something which will satisfy, and hope for this with even painful expectancy, after the long argument we have followed, till we come to the promising chapter with which the book concludes—that entitled "Beyond Good and Bad." If an experience of what is "beyond good and bad" exists, it will carry us at least over those sorrows which come from the possession of a conscience. Such a form of experience is that of "Religion." Here, says our author, following Mr. Bradley, we are "beyond mere morality:" for religion "transcends morality," to use Mr. Bradley's expression, which our author, as it seems to me, has construed in quite a different sense from that intended by Mr. Bradley. To be a religious man is to feel oneself a member of a Perfect System; *i. e.* we are perfect as members of a Perfect Whole. Into this experience morality is forced to come, to get rid of its inconsistencies. This seems then the satisfactory goal of moral life, to overcome moral defect by entire completeness. But no; Religion turns out to be itself unsatisfactory and riddled with contradictions. Nay

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more, so far from religion "satisfying" morality, the moral ideas ("obligation," etc.), are so transformed in religion as to be emptied of all significance, and to be truly religious you must be something more or less than moral (p. 427). The author, to establish this result, gives first a short analysis of religious experience, then discusses some points of agreement between the religious and narrowly ethical view of life, and lastly shows the chief deficiencies and inconsistencies within the religious experience itself. The aim of the inquiry into religion will therefore be to show that religion, no less than morality, cannot be accepted as a theoretically "satisfactory account of the world of experienced reality."

Here we may once more protest against this, as it seems to us, confusion of life with scientific inquiry. Religion is not and does not profess to be an account of the world. It is, as Mr. Taylor himself asserts, a *practical* attitude of the individual towards the world. To condemn religion for not doing consistently what it cannot possibly do at all is therefore quite beside the mark.

But to come to the argument itself. The analysis of religion goes to show that its essence consists objectively in the experience of being perfect in a perfect universe or system, and subjectively in a thoroughness of practical attitude, of single-mindedness of spirit, whether our activity be science, art or any pursuit. This view is illustrated from religious literature of various kinds, particularly of evangelical Christianity. Our author also considers the question of the "proof" of the existence of God, and the relation of "faith" and "reason," by way of establishing the validity of the religious experience.

One could wish that this section of his argument had been further elaborated. It is sympathetically and suggestively written. The view, taken directly from Mr. Bradley, that any kind of object in which the individual feels himself perfected makes the experience religious, is open to grave question, not merely from the fact that it disagrees with ordinary opinion in matters of religion, but because it cannot be made consistent. There is only one system in which the individual can feel perfected in the religious sense. When again the author says that "the religious experience is . . . simply a development from the workmanlike or the scholarly love of thoroughness and whole-hearted absorption in your pursuit, whatever the pursuit may be" (p. 482) it is hardly possible to follow him at all. On this view fox-hunting or golf

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might get a man his title to a place in the kingdom of heaven just as much as a pure conscience or the service of humanity.

In the second part of his argument he draws the distinction already mentioned between morality in the wider sense and morality in the narrow sense, and first compares Religion and Morality in the wider sense, and then proceeds to compare Religion and Goodness. In the case of the first, both religion and morality belong to the practical side of life, and both imply an ideal by which present existence is judged and conduct regulated (p. 469). If so, one asks how does religion transcend morality, if it also implies a practical use of an ideal? In a sense, if the term morality in its wider meaning "applies to all practical life where the presence of an ideal can be detected" (p. 467), religion is *itself* a form of morality. Mr. Taylor does not consider this obvious difficulty to the "transcendence" of morality by religion, which can in this way be regarded as a form of morality. He merely points out that while morality classifies men into "good" and "bad," "responsible," "free" and so on, religion denies that these distinctions have any value. For in religion everything is of "grace," and everything is part of the already perfect system and is necessary to it. The difference between a good and a bad will, still more the opposition between them, is "illusive." On this view, all approbation becomes illusory, yet the ground of this lies in our making "the perfect Absolute the sole object of approbation" (p. 473). Where, we might ask, does the "illusion" really lie? If the distinction between a good and a bad man is a practical makeshift which is at bottom an illusion, the distinction between a religious and an irreligious man will no doubt be equally illusory, which seems to mean that nothing really matters provided you can believe strongly that everything is much the same as everything else.

As to Religion and Goodness, the author insists that religion is not necessarily dependent on "goodness," at this point parting company, (as we think, unwisely), with Mr. Bradley. All that is wanted is simply singleness and sincerity of aim, and utter devotion to it. Nay more, it is held that devotion to what, from the moral point of view, is utterly evil may be styled a form of religion! This may be the logical outcome of Mr. Taylor's position, but it contains also the complete refutation of it. If religion means devotion to everything, religion is strictly devotion to nothing at all. For if all distinctions are illusory for religion, there is

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nothing in particular to which religion can be devoted—unless an illusion. And when our author says that "there may be also, so far at least as I can see, a peace of the devil which passeth all understanding" (p. 486), we can only remark that religion so interpreted does not carry us so much "beyond good and bad" as beyond wisdom and folly.

We are not surprised then to learn that religion also rests upon an element of "make-believe" (p. 489) which can never be eradicated but which does not render it the less practically necessary. If we are therefore to get rid of its contradictions, we must take refuge in a sphere of experience which is both super-ethical and super-religious, which is beyond both religion and morality. This, as we learn with some surprise, is metaphysics, which likewise however works by an ideal and also fails to attain its end (p. 29)!

Such a result is very unsatisfactory, and it is with a feeling of disappointment that one lays down the book. It would, however, take us far beyond the limits of a short review to give our reasons in detail for believing that Mr. Taylor's argument has not proved his case. What we have said regarding his argument may seem very imperfect and incomplete, in view of the length and excellent qualities of our author's volume. Certainly we may admit that if, as our author says (p. 201, Note), "Ethics consists merely in finding bad reasons for being what you cannot help being," the reviewer ought at least to find good reasons for believing that they might have been better. But though we fear we have already exceeded our limit, we may remark in conclusion that Mr. Taylor's condemnation of morality as illusion is not, in our view, a correct expansion of Mr. Bradley's meaning at all. Mr. Taylor has taken "transcendence" in its purely negative sense. But in Mr. Bradley's view morality is not annihilated by religion but has its categories re-expressed in terms of a deeper form of experience, a re-interpretation which does them full justice, and cannot possibly destroy their essential meaning or turn them into "illusion." Hence it is that Mr. Bradley holds that the Absolute *is* in some way "good," and that a man cannot be religious and at the same time immoral—both of which positions Mr. Taylor denies. An Absolute which ignores morality has really no value for man at all.

J. B. Baillie.

St. Andrews University.

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THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by John Burnet, M. A., Professor of Greek in the United College of St. Salvator and St. Leonard, St. Andrews. Methuen and Co., London, 1900. Pp. lii, 502.

This work is an essay in illustration of a single point of view: it is a study of the "dialectical method" as applied by Aristotle to the treatment of ethical problems. It is not designed to take the place of exegetical commentaries of a larger scope, and it must therefore not be condemned for omissions which in an ordinary edition would be serious defects. There is no critical apparatus; alterations of the text are in some cases introduced without comment; and in the notes some important difficulties of interpretation are ignored. Professor Burnet stands or falls according to the measure of his success in establishing his primary thesis.

This thesis is touched upon in the preface. Mr. Burnet modestly explains that the announcement of Professor Bywater's text and Mr. Stewart's "Notes" had caused him to lay his own work aside. His motive for now publishing it appears in the following extract:

". . . . I was conscious that my method of interpretation was a somewhat novel one, and might possess a certain interest for students of Aristotle. I had come to the conclusion that most of the difficulties that have been raised about the Ethics were due to the fact that, though the dialectical character of many passages had long been admitted, commentators had never thoroughly recognized that the treatise was dialectical throughout. They had tried to find in it the scientific and metaphysical basis of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the foundations of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character, taken as they are at one time from the opinions of ordinary people, at another from popular Platonism, they have been ready to accuse Aristotle of inconsistency or to doubt the authenticity of the treatise in its present form."

The Introduction states in stronger terms the point of view (p. xvi). After alluding to the theory of "duplicate passages," Mr. Burnet remarks:

"It is the case that, in certain parts of the work, Aristotle appears to discuss the same subject several times over and that these discussions are *frequently inconsistent* and apparently quite independent of each other. But I have tried to show that this fact

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admits of another explanation. The Ethics is, and from the nature of the case must be, a dialectical and not a demonstrative work, and it is, as we shall see, entirely in accordance with Aristotle's own view of the method which is appropriate in such a case *to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophic validity of those solutions.* If it can be shown that these apparent duplicates are really successive applications of the different dialectical τόποι appropriate to the subject, the critical problem does not arise. *Aristotle is not committed to all or any of the solutions he gives any more than Plato is committed to the successive definitions of knowledge given in the Theaitetos.* Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to *base* the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system." (Italics mine.)

The view thus expressed is offered as an alternative to the theory of duplicate passages. The Ethics is a dialectical work. The inconsistencies we find in the doctrine are not a problem for criticism: for the doctrine is not based on the metaphysical system of its author. On the contrary, Aristotle is giving as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without regard to their "real philosophical validity," and without committing himself to all or any of them.

On this view the alleged discrepancies between the doubtful books and the remainder of the Nicomachean treatise present no difficulty. Accordingly, "the assumption made in this edition is that the disputed books are really Aristotle's" (p. xiii). The expression "frequently inconsistent" (in the second extract above quoted) needs to be read in connection with Mr. Burnet's remark on p. xiii: "Of course it would be a different matter if, as some critics hold, any *real inconsistency* could be detected between the teaching of the doubtful books and the remainder of either treatise. I have tried to interpret them on the assumption that there is none." Would it be captious to suggest that if Aristotle's intention is "to give as many solutions of the difficulties which arise as can be given, without any regard to the real philosophical validity of those solutions," and without "committing himself to all or any" of them, a commentator ought not to *assume* that there are no "real inconsistencies" between the doubtful books and the rest?

It is to be regretted that Professor Burnet has prejudiced his

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case by an unguarded statement of it. The impression is conveyed that "dialectical" implies disregard of the "real philosophical validity" of the conclusions obtained; so that we cannot be certain that Aristotle any more believed in all or any of them than Plato believed in definitions of knowledge which he wrote a whole dialogue to refute. There is, moreover, some obscurity in the last two sentences quoted: "Nor can we even assume that the true solution is necessarily given at all. It often is given; but it was contrary to Aristotle's own principles to base the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system." The language suggests that in some cases Aristotle withheld the solution which he believed to be true, from some pedantic scruple about the method to be observed. And how does Professor Burnet know that the true solution is often given? By what criterion does he decide that any solution whatever is "true"?

There is one more objection to be made to this statement of the editor's contention. Some confusion arises, here and in several other places, from the use of an ambiguous metaphor. "It was contrary to Aristotle's principles to *base* the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system" (p. xvii). Commentators "had tried to find in" the Ethics "the scientific and metaphysical *basis* of Aristotle's Moral Philosophy, and when they discovered instead that the *foundations* of the doctrine here set forth were of the most shifting character . . ." etc. (p. v). "It is not necessary to *base* πολιτική on φυσική" (note, p. 59). "The work we are about to study may fairly be called ἠθικά because it is, as we shall see, a piece of dialetic *based* on ἠθικαὶ πρυτάσεις, that is to say, premisses derived from an examination of human character" (p. xxvi).

On the other side, we read elsewhere: "The fact is that we must go to the 'Physics' for Aristotle's moral philosophy" (p. 69). "It is characteristic of him to keep the metaphysical *groundwork* of his practical science in the background as much as possible" (p. 108). (Italics mine.)

If there is a metaphysical and physical groundwork, however far it may be "in the background," there is reason to complain of expressions which may be taken to imply that the Ethics might have been written by a man who was not an Aristotelian. In the former set of extracts "basis" and "foundation" mean starting-point or first principle, or else the "premisses" (in this case ἔνδοξα) from which, by a sifting process of critical comparison, the first

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principle is reached. But the editor leaves us in doubt whether a formal independence of metaphysic, as a matter of method, or a real and doctrinal independence, is intended. The difference is of vital import to his hypothesis.

That dialectic, the method codified in the Topics, was to have a place in every scientific inquiry, has always been recognized, and is indeed expressly affirmed by Aristotle: "being," he says, "a method of testing truth, it may be applied to the first principles of all studies" (Top. A. 2). Professor Burnet's point is that it enters more largely into the Ethics than his predecessors have been aware that it does. The treatise is "dialectical throughout" (p. v). The meaning of this statement is best illustrated by a crucial example—the two "inconsistent" accounts of pleasure in books H and K. The note on H. xii. § 3, runs thus: "The third and decisive ἔνστασις. We must substitute ἐνέργεια for κίνησις. We need not discuss whether this is or is not 'inconsistent' with Book x, where the ἡδονή is distinguished from the ἐνέργεια which it accompanies. Aristotle is dealing here with the argument of Speusippos, and he only modifies his statement so far as is necessary for his immediate purpose" (p. 333). On H. xiii. § 2 the note ends thus: ". . . . We shall find Aristotle's own teaching about this in Book x. At present we are only getting rid of the idea which the account given of ἀκρασία might suggest, that all pleasure is bad" (p. 336). On K. v. § 7 Professor Burnet remarks: "It is said that this is inconsistent with Book vii where pleasure is defined as ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια. But that is purely dialectical. The γένεσις αἰσθητή of Speusippos is there developed dialectically into ἀνεμπόδιστος ἐνέργεια and it is not necessary to go further for the purpose of the argument there. Here we have a further step but no inconsistency" (p. 457).

Professor Burnet, as I have already remarked, has not explained what criterion enables him to pronounce that the teaching of Book x is "Aristotle's own," while that of Book vii is "purely dialectical." Apparently the treatise is, at any rate in part, dogmatic. In the dogmatic passages we must suppose that Aristotle has some regard for the "real philosophical validity" of his conclusions, and is in some sense "committed to" his statements. But the dogmatic can be discriminated from the dialectical only by bringing the metaphysical and physical groundwork out of "the background" and criticising the ethical doctrine on the as-

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sumption of a fundamental agreement. And so "there's the old idol on his base again."

Professor Burnet gives a clear account of the dialectical process which consists in the critical comparison of current beliefs, and leads to the first principle of the science, namely (in this case) the definition of the Good for Man (Introd. § 25). He then proceeds:

"Once we have got our definition, however, the procedure becomes quite different. Our analysis of it, though it is deliberative and not demonstrative, will proceed through middle terms and can only be expressed adequately in the form of a series of practical syllogisms. . . " We must not expect mathematical accuracy. ". . . . The starting point of Politics cannot be anything more than a general truth; we cannot hope to find a universal and necessary axiom such as those from which the geometer starts. And it will be absolutely impossible to lay down universal rules of action. Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule. As in medicine and navigation, we must always take into account the particular circumstances of the case, and these cannot be formulated or predicted" (Introd. § 26).

The definition of the Human Good is reached in Book A, chap. vi. Are we to understand that the remainder of the treatise consists of an "analysis" of this definition "expressed in the form of a series of practical syllogisms"? If Professor Burnet had attempted to explain the meaning of this description he might have discovered that it is absolutely inconsistent with the statement that the Ethics is dialectical throughout. At this point, in fact, the editor throws up his brief. In a work whose avowed purpose is to solve the problems of interpretation by proceeding on the assumption that the Aristotelian method is of a particular kind, two totally different and inconsistent conceptions of that method are presented as if they were identical. (1) The first conception is of a purely "dialectical" method, which gives as many solutions of the difficulties as can be given, without regard to their real philosophical validity. The conclusion in any one case may not (for all we know) express Aristotle's own view at all. The "Ethics" is a string of discussions "frequently inconsistent" and "apparently quite independent of each other," because it is contrary to Aristotle's principles to base the exposition of Politics on his metaphysical system. (2) The second conception is of a

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method which by a preliminary criticism of popular beliefs collects a definition of the Human Good. That this definition states Aristotle's own view we may ascertain by comparing it with his physical and metaphysical doctrines expressed elsewhere. Only, to avoid the appearance of dogmatizing, he prefers to lead up to it by showing that, when the current views are confronted, they may be made by mutual concessions to tally more or less with his own preconceived opinion. This opinion has a metaphysical and physical groundwork, kept in the background. The definition so reached serves as "starting-point," and the rest of the treatise consists of an analysis of it, expressed in the form of a series of practical syllogisms.

It is clear that these two descriptions contradict one another at every point, and I believe I am not misrepresenting Professor Burnet's work when I say that at every point either description can be supported by quotation from his Introduction and Notes. His capacity for self-contradiction may be further illustrated from the extract just given. Compare the following statements: (1) "Every act is a particular act and for that reason cannot be brought under a universal rule" (Introd. § 26); (2) "Ignorance shown in the deliberate preference of bad acts to good, and ignorance of the *universal rules of conduct,* come to the same thing, ignorance of the major premiss of the practical syllogism" (p. 117); (3) "Practical wisdom . . . must be capable not only of apprehending . . . the 'right rule' . . . to apply in each department of life; it must also enable us to see that the particular act under consideration is in the circumstances *a case of that general rule*" (p. 248). (Italics mine.)

These quotations are enough to show that some of Professor Burnet's own statements stand in need of a dialectical treatment, which ought not to be left to the reader. There is in the book not a little vague and confused writing about subjects which need the utmost precision of terms. Unfortunately this negligence is particularly noticeable in the editor's treatment of the fundamental distinction of theoretical from "practical" science. The original fallacies of the Aristotelian view are reproduced, with a fidelity almost perverse, in the following words:

"Each of these kinds of science has its own good or end, something that makes it worth knowing; but this will be different in each case. . . . The end or good of" theoretical "science lies in

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conformity to reality, and this conformity is truth. When we have reached this we have reached the completion (τέλος) of the science, and there is nothing beyond it for us to attain.

"If, however, the *object* of a science is something which has not its source of motion in itself, our relation to it at once becomes different. If the efficient cause is in ourselves, it becomes possible for us to *realize the object* of our science, and this realization becomes the 'end' or completion of the science. The object of it is no longer 'what is (τὸ ὄν), but the γένεσις of 'what is to be' (τὸ ἐσόμενον); we are no longer spectators but actors" (Introd. § 12). (Italics mine.)

The cardinal word, *object,* changes its meaning in the course of the paragraph. In the first sentence it means *the thing known.* In the second sentence we hear that when (as in the case of practical science) it is possible for us to realize the object, this *realization* is the *end* of the science. In the third sentence the *object* of the science is said to be "the γένεσις of what is to be" *i. e.* the process by which the human good comes into existence. Here "object" has the same *meaning* as "end" in the second sentence.

This appalling confusion is alas! only too Aristotelian, and poisons the Ethics at their source. But as Professor Burnet appears to be unconscious of any ambiguity, it may be worth while to point out a few of the fallacies involved.

The *object* of Ethical Science is the Human Good. That is the thing known. The science, in so far as it is *science,* is concerned with *knowing* this object—with ascertaining what the Human Good *is.* This is a question about "what is," and truth is so far the only important thing. There perhaps we ought to stop; but Aristotle will not let us. He will have it that Ethics is a "practical" science and has a further *end,* which is sometimes the process by which the Good comes into existence, at other times the Good which comes into existence by this process, or preferably both at once—as in Professor Burnet's exposition. Thus by the use of "object" to mean (1) something known, (2) the process of bringing something into existence, (3) something so brought into existence, "knowing" and "doing" are comfortably identified; "we are no longer spectators, but actors;" theory is altogether excluded from Ethics; and we reach the idea of a science which is so uncompromisingly practical that it has no regard for truth. Never mind whether the Human Good *is* a virtuous

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activity of the soul, or pleasure, or anything else: our business is to realize it!*

It is of course true that, as Professor Burnet has usefully pointed out, the question, How is the Good to be realized? and the training of the legislator are all along kept in view. But to call even these problems "practical" still encourages ambiguity. It is misleading to say that Aristotle "is no idle speculator, but a man in all earnestness making practical proposals which he has hopes of getting adopted" (p. xxix). As a quite general statement it would be truer to say that the whole treatise is occupied with a question of "what is"—namely, What is the Human Good? —a theoretical question. When the answer has been finally stated in the tenth book, Aristotle begins the last chapter with the remark that his design is not yet fully carried out, for "as it is said, in practical matters, to see and know the various duties is not the end, but to practise them." This last chapter discusses the value of different expedients for realizing the Good by the formation of virtue. Even here we still inquire "what is," when we ask What is the best way to realize the Good?

That Aristotle is less confused on this point than the editor appears from Pol. iii. 8. 1279 b 11: "We must define at somewhat greater length the nature of each of these polities. For the subject is not free from difficulties; and, when we are treating any subject philosophically and not merely with an eye to practice, it is incumbent on us not to neglect or omit anything, but to exhibit the truth on every kind of question" (see Zeller, "Aristotle," Eng. trans. ii. p. 136, who comments on this passage, "While therefore practical philosophy *quâ* practical has to do with action, *quâ* philosophy it has the scientific interest of pure knowledge"). We may, then, look for a certain amount even of "idle speculation" in the Ethics.

Two pages of the Introduction are devoted to the Final Cause, which deserves fuller treatment. The statement is vague, and there is no attempt to clear up the ambiguities of the word "end."

* Compare p. 248: "The conclusion of a practical syllogism is always an action;" p. 6, on τέχνη . . . μέθοδος . . . πρᾶξις . . . προαίρεσις: "The study of πολιτικὴ is all four . . . That πολιτικὴ is also a πρᾶξις follows from the fact that it is a practical science." Here the *study* of the science, the *science* itself, and the *practice* are treated as the same thing. A more instructive commentary on the dangers of the phrase "practical science" could not be devised.

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"Completion," "limit," and "something which we desire for its own sake" are treated as synonymous phrases. The muddle may be in some degree Aristotelian, but to reproduce it is not helpful. The introduction concludes abruptly with a discussion of Book A. chap. vi.

Professor Burnet has not thrown much light on the dark places: sometimes he fairly "radiates obscurity." The commentary is chiefly valuable where it discusses the origin of the ἔνδοξα and on this kind of question it may be consulted with profit. Professor Burnet's views would have been more accesible if they had been put forward in an essay rather than in an edition which, from the nature of its design, is so incomplete as to be by itself of small use for the ordinary student. The advanced reader will welcome the quotation at the foot of the text of parallel passages from the work of Eudemus. A full and useful index completes the volume.

F M. CORNFORD.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

THE ETHICS OF JUDAISM. By M. Lazarus, translated from the German by Henrietta Szold. In four parts. Parts I and II. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1900-1901.

The first volume of this work was published in 1898. It contained the parts here offered in an English translation. The second volume has not yet appeared. Professor Lazarus is well known as an ethno-psychologist, and a student of Hebrew literature. It is therefore natural that this study by the aged philosopher of the inner life of his own people should be looked upon by the Publication Society as "nis crowning service to the cause of Judaism." It will no doubt render a valuable service both by making more intelligible to the general public that form of Judaism which found its chief expression in the Talmuds and by leading to a more adequate appreciation of Israel's moral development through obedience to the law. Not merely the language, but the thought, of the Talmudic teachers must be translated. It is not sufficient to understand a multitude of technical terms and abbreviations, and to have the requisite patience for following a discourse ever ready to fly off on a tangent at the sound of a word or the touch of an idea. One must be able to read

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these discussions in the light of historic circumstance and social condition, and with that sympathy without which there can be no fruitful study of the literature of any people and no deep insight into its real character.

The familiarity with post-biblical Jewish literature on the part of Christian scholars to-day compares rather unfavorably with that of the Christian Hebraists of the seventeenth century. But even more deplorable than the lack of erudition is the want of objective, impartial, appreciative judgment. In this respect there has been astonishingly small progress in the last two centuries. It is not unnatural that even to independent investigators, in whom the progressive instinct is stronger than the conservative, the pre-exilic prophets should appeal more strongly than the legislators of the Pentateuch, and that the radical Christian movement should be more attractive than the development of the law through the rabbis. Yet it is to be regretted that admiration and regard for the great progressive factors in Israel's life should be accompanied by a palpable and by no means harmless undervaluation of the great conservative forces. Only a more highly developed historical sense, a wider acquaintance with different systems of religious thought, and a less sectarian spirit will remedy this. It would seem impossible that any Christian could read this work without being impressed with the ethical value of that life under the law which is so frequently caricatured rather than impartially described and interpreted.

Professor Lazarus has produced so good a book that one regrets that it could not in some respects have been better. In order to avoid polemics and apologetics of which he would have none, he has "with open eyes" resisted the temptation to institute comparisons between Judaism and other systems of morality, such as would naturally be expected of an ethno-psychologist. Laudable as this appears at first blush, it is in reality a serious mistake. It is impossible rightly to estimate any system of thought without comparison. The intellectual capacity and moral calibre of a student are never so evident as in such comparative work. Special pleading is indeed out of place in a historic inquiry. But no apology is needed for adopting one view rather than another, if good reasons are given. No one will find fault with the spirit in which Professor Lazarus defends his opinion against Hartmann, though some may find his arguments insufficient. Far worse than manly polemics and honest apologetics is the unsupported asser-

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tion, too frequently made by the author, that certain moral ideas or certain excellencies characterize the Jews "more than all other nations." Such sweeping generalizations are questionable.

Already the first chapter in which the sources are discussed reveals another weakness, the author's lack of historic sense. He jumbles together proof-texts after the fashion of the catechism without regard to date, authorship and context. There is neither order nor comprehensiveness in his description of the sources. Such a thing as a Pentateuchal question does not seem to exist for him. The vast difference between the moral attitude of the earlier prophets and that of the later legislators is not observed. For the peculiar development of ethical thought in the wisdom-literature he appears to have no eye. The greatest poem of the race, the Book of Job, is not mentioned. The mighty movement of thought of which Philo is only the chief exponent is ruled out; and the peculiar ethical development seen in the apocalyptic literature receives no attention. The currents of thought that ran parallel with the great stream of halachic teaching and issued in the pantheistic philosophy of the *kabbala* is passed unnoticed. Even within the Talmud the often far-reaching differences are overlooked because of the penchant for seeing everywhere the scattered expressions of one system. The great mediæval philosophers are wholly neglected. Maimonides is regarded as simply a reflection of Aristotle. Professor Lazarus is as deeply soaked in Kantian philosophy; yet he does not question his own right to speak for Judaism.

It is not the ethics of Judaism that Professor Lazarus is expounding. It is a system constructed by himself, his own Judaism, illustrated with material drawn well nigh exclusively from Talmudic lore. His correct feeling that the ideas of the Talmud must be interpreted as well as its language broke the bolts and opened the door to let in Spinoza, Herder, and especially Kant who reigns supreme in this modernized Judaism. One is reminded of Vatke's Old Testament Religion or Baur's Church History with their Hegelian constructions, only that Hegel taught his pupils to observe the principle of historic development. To illustrate the author's method some examples may be chosen. In the Mishnaic tract *Pirqe Aboth* ii: 13; Rabban Jochanan asks his disciples what is the best way for man to follow. Simon ben Nathaniel answers that he chooses the best way who looks to the future, and later adds that the worst principle of conduct is to

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borrow and not to pay, whether it be of God or man. In this the author finds the same thought expressed as in Spinoza's statement that it is the height of wisdom to know the causes of things, *rerum cognoscere causas,* p. II., 204 *f.* It is difficult to see why Philo and Maimonides could not as easily be made to "express at bottom the same thought" as the rabbis of Tiberias or Pumbaditha.

Hartmann's objection to a morality that depends upon a command imposed from without on the ground that "moral validity begins with self-determination laying down its own law" is met by the astounding assertion that the divine legislation in reality means this, that "independently of every external force or alien influence, that is, with complete autonomy, the human mind lays down moral laws," the moral law being "autonomous, because it originates in the nature of the human mind alone," I. 137 *f.* What would Jochanan ben Zakkai have thought of this, if it could have been translated into the language and thought of his own age and social milieu?

In the thoughtful and generally discriminating chapter entitled "Sanctification is Moralization," the author maintains that there is a great difference between Israel's idea of holiness and that prevalent among other nations, since "ethical holiness among the heathen ranks far lower than ritual holiness," while "in Israel alone it reached, not only the same, but a more exalted place"; that ritual sanctification was a symbol of ethical sanctification, teaching man that though he himself was merely "a link in the chain of events governed by natural laws," there existed "beyond this congeries of realities with their laws of excitation and motion something different, something higher"; and that "the expression 'I am sanctified' in Ezekiel xx: 41, conveys the sublimest notion conceived by the mind of man—it is the noblest word framed by human tongue," II. 15. Such distinctions between moral holiness and ritual holiness were no more prevalent in Israel than in other nations of antiquity; neither did men as a rule reflect upon a world governed by natural laws (radicals like Ecclesiastes were rare exceptions). To find Ezekiel's assertion that Yahwe will be pleased to smell the sacrifices when he shall have shown the Gentiles what a great divinity he is by bringing back the exiles to Palestine, "the noblest word framed by human tongue," is possible only when the modern interpreter has read

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into the phrase what he feels to be the noblest thought of his own mind.

But in spite of these limitations the book brings out the heart and essence of Talmudic teaching more truly and helpfully than any other work known to the present writer. Above everything else, it sets forth the convictions of a modern Jew upon important ethical questions. These convictions are so noble in their lofty universalism, so fused with the warmth of a genuine religious sentiment, so eminently worthy of careful consideration, that they cannot help to serve not only the cause of Judaism, but, what is more, the cause of humanity. The translation is in the main good. But it would have been safer to let Ovid's *nitimur in vetitum* alone than to render it "we strive against the forbidden."

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALITY AND THE DEPARTMENTS OF THE MORAL LIFE. By Wilhelm Wundt, Professor of Philosophy in the University of Leipsig. Translated by Margaret Floy Washburn, Ph. D., Warden of Sage College in Cornell University.

This volume contains a translation of the third and fourth parts of Wundt's "Ethik," from the revised German edition of 1892; and it concludes the work. The two volumes containing translations of the first two parts, were reviewed in this JOURNAL, Vol. VIII, No. 3, (April, 1898), pp. 382-390. There is no need to repeat what was then said concerning the success of the translation.

The historical review of ethical theories in Part II (Vol. II of the translation) led to a distinct formulation of the main problem: ethics postulates a relation between the individual and the social will, in which each maintains its independent significance. This relation must be explained "in such a manner as to satisfy our modern scientific requirements" (Vol. II, p. 189); and the author intimates that an examination of this question forms the subject of the constructive portions of his work, contained in the volume before us.

The third part of the original treatise, which begins the present volume, is entitled "The Principles of Morality." It opens with

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an analysis of the place of Will in mental life. A brief but vigorous attack on the notion of Will as a special "faculty," is followed by a defence of the "autogenetic theory," which considers that the Will has been developed, but "in this development, the complex result has proceeded from simple elements of a like nature with the result itself" (13). Wundt's conception of consciousness here seems essentially the same as that of Professor James Ward; and the analysis of voluntary action corresponds to this point of view. The irreducible active element is called "Apperception." One would like to know what is the relation of this doctrine to that of the last edition of the "Physiologische Psychologie."

We then come to a section (the most important in the book) on the Individual and the Social Will. Historically, the Individual is the later product (27). We find Individuality where "the whole inner life of man appears as his own creation; where for good or evil he regards himself as the originator of his own thoughts and emotions, and of all the outward consequences that may flow from them" (21). But though the material is *his own* possession, it is not his *peculiar* possession. The Individual is social because all may have ideas, feelings, volitions that are identical in content (23; 33). And thus there comes to be a real General Will, which (although the Individual Will is real) is more fundamental, and determines the Individual Will more than it is determined by it. On the other hand, the Social Will lacks the power of self-conscious concentration on a definite end; and "the individual will that appropriates the ideas and tendencies which govern the whole, and brings them to self-conscious operation in its own activity, does more than merely fulfill the social will; it gains the power to stamp society with its own characteristic and individual features" (34). The two elements are "forever separated in the phenomenal world" (37), but may be conceived as united in the Ideal which is the Absolute. This invites comparison with Mr. Bradley's doctrine of the relation between "Self-sacrifice and Self-realization;" and it suggests the same question: unless they can be *shown* to be united *in some degree* in the phenomenal world, can they be "conceived" as united in any other world? Wundt says that the history of opinion on this matter shows that "the conclusions of Ethics cannot be formed without a metaphysical conception of man's psychical life as a whole" (31). There is implicit in his treatment a fundamental metaphysical

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principle of this kind (see below), which ought to have been placed in the forefront of the discussion.

The section on the Freedom of the Will includes a discussion of "Psychical and Mechanical Causality," which may possibly leave the reader more than ever in doubt as to what Wundt's view on this matter really is (ch. i., p. 44). On the general question of Freedom, his view approximates to that of T. H. Green, that the essential elements of moral freedom are, Causality by Character (where character means simply the self as moral), and the capacity for rational deliberation. The "indeterminist doctrine" originated with "scholastic nominalists and theological Utilitarians" (53). The usual "short way with the indeterminists" is to ascribe their doctrine to philosophic incapacity; Wundt goes further, and insinuates that it implies a certain moral and spiritual *dullness*, if nothing worse! Not much profit can come of this sort of thing. Men like Martineau and Lotze maintained the "indeterminist" doctrine because by no other interpretation could they justify certain *ethical facts* which perhaps may be summed up by the term "moral responsibility." And they attempted to justify these facts by a metaphysical theory: not (as Wundt and many others suppose) by "denying causality," but by making the will into an Absolute Cause, absolute, but acting only through the phenomenal contents of mind. In Hegel's words (in his Dialectic) it is an attempt to affirm "causality" without "reciprocity." The phenomenal motives, etc., are essentially related to the Will (which on this theory is the same as the Self); but the Self, as Will, is capable of absolute causal action; and therefore of absolute responsibility. There seems no ethical objection to such a view; but its scientific and metaphysical difficulties are sufficiently great. There are some who think that, in spite of Green's brilliant discussion, it is not possible (in the present state of our knowledge) to combine the ethical advantages of Libertarianism and the scientific advantages of Determinism, as Green and Wundt attempt to do.

The unsatisfactory discussion of Freedom is followed by an instructive and luminous analysis of that sand-heap of a term, "Conscience" (pp. 59 ff). Full justice is done to the fact, which English writers of the experiential or evolutionary school seem constitutionally incapable of recognizing,—that the gradual formation of moral laws as conscious motives, implies throughout the

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conception of something that *ought to be;* and no mere history can account for this.

In ch. ii. we come to the question, How may ethical theory ascertain and establish the "moral ends" which it is to formulate? The method is similar to that of Socrates and Aristotle (76). "The first problem is to answer the question, What ends are universally recognized by our judgment as moral? . . . . There is little variation, even during long periods of time, in men's judgments as to what shall be called moral; and within a given stage of moral development, these judgments are hardly less constant than those which deal with logical relations" (77). The results to which this leads are as follows. The object of the moral will cannot be my own self, or any peculiarly individual end; and if not my own, then (with equal reason) not any other in distinction from my own. Utilitarianism is only extended egoism (79). Altruism has ethical value (1) as a sign of character, (2) as a means to further ends, which are given by the Social Will. These originate in the common rational life of humanity; they react to elevate the individual "by producing new objective values or richer content through the creative force of the individual psychical life" (83). But moral life is not exhausted in social life; the ends of humanity transcend those of organized society (86). In fact, Wundt's fundamental principle is a metaphysical one,—the most fundamental dynamic source of social and moral evolution consists in the constant striving of consciousness after a fuller realization of its life. Hence he speaks of "the inexhaustibility of the creative power of mind"; "its essential nature consists in its creative functions" (85). As soon as the significance of this principle is grasped, the attitude taken by Wundt on most problems of ethical theory is seen to result from it. I cannot doubt that the principle is sound and of great importance. In neglecting it, English writers have neglected what is most fundamental in the moral life. It appears, in a peculiar metaphysical setting, in the Ethics of Green and his followers.

Passing by ch. iii. ("Moral Motives"), which includes an elaborate discussion of the theory of punishment, we come in ch. iv. to a critical classification of moral "norms." This is an ambiguous and unnecessary term, and the use of it facilitates a certain blurring of the distinction between moral laws (to be obeyed) and moral ideals (to be realized). With Wundt, "norms" are

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practically equivalent to what English writers call moral laws (as distinct from the laws of the State), being based directly on the fundamental moral ends (150). The last part of the chapter is occupied with a discussion of Law in the political sense. Law is "the sum total of all those various subjective rights and duties which the moral will of society, the creator of law, ensures as rights to itself and its subordinate individual wills, in order to the fulfilment of certain purposes; and imposes as duties, in order to the protection of the rights in question" (178). The purposes here referred to go far beyond what is required for the mere maintenance of conditions necessary to the life of society. But Wundt has not the least intention of giving a "collectivist" turn to the conception, and seeking to identify the State, the creator of law, with the nation by a complete democracy. His ideal seems to be that of "paternal government" as exhibited at present on a great scale in the German Empire. And when in Part IV., ch. iii., he comes to deal with the State as "Financial and Economic Community," as "Legal Community," as "Social Unit," as "Association for the Advancement of Culture," it is hard to see what place is left for the Individual Will; while the Social Will has disappeared behind the machinery of government. Wundt's ideas on these subjects can hardly find a congenial home in the Anglo-Saxon mind.

In his concluding chapter, the author works out in a very interesting way the conception of International Law, "which, extending its influence far beyond its origin, is beginning to unite all civilized states into a higher form of legal community" (288). The essential difference between the international and the single community is that international law cannot get beyond the stage of international *custom*. It is impossible to conceive any social will of the international community controlling the individual will (289, 291, etc.). Hence it is the height of irrationality to take moral ideas, whose meaning lies entirely in their relation to the social will of an organized community, and use them as ready-made tests to settle complex questions of international action. There can be little doubt that Wundt is right in looking to the development of what he calls the international commonwealth to put an end to war. Meanwhile, the fluctuating evolution of the commonwealth of nations is a source of grave perplexities and dangers.

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The translators deserve the gratitude of all students and teachers of Ethics for making this valuable and suggestive work more accessible to English readers.

S. H. MELLONE.

BELFAST, IRELAND.

AUFGABEN UND ZIELE DES MENSCHENLEBENS. Nach Vorträgen gehalten in Volkshochschulverein zu München von Dr. J. Unold. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1899.

Several years ago Dr. Unold published a work, "Grundlegung für eine Moderne Praktisch-Ethische Lebensanschaung (Nationale und Ideale Sittenlehre)," in which he attempted to answer the question, Is ethical conduct, and particularly, is an ethical education of the future citizens of a great commonwealth possible on the basis of a purely scientific conception of the world and of life? The book did not receive the attention and recognition which it deserved. In the present volume the author makes another appeal to a larger public, and takes up the same problem in a series of seven lectures and an appendix, discussing the following topics: Past and Present; The Age of Science, Life-Ideals; The Health and Efficiency of the Nation; The Highest Ends of Human Life; Eudæmonism; Objections to Eudæmonism; The Utilitarian Conception of Life; Outlines of a Future National Education.

The thoughts which Dr. Unold expresses and the manner in which he expresses them, stamp him as a man of high ideals, practical common-sense, and literary taste. Both books are valuable contributions to the solution of a highly important problem, and ought to find a wide circle of readers, particularly the last one, which is presented in such popular and interesting form as to make it intelligible to every sensible individual. The writer's thought is somewhat as follows:

The modern civilized nations are about to pass from the period of naïve, instinctive activity, under the guidance of custom and authority, to a period in which they must govern their lives in accordance with reason and freedom, and realize their destiny with consciousness. In order to be able to do this, they must know the purposes or ends to be realized, and choose the proper means of realizing them. Supernatural revelation cannot acquaint the modern man and the modern nations with these ends

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and their means; scientific knowledge alone can do that. Natural science has discovered to us two fundamental laws of life, which are applicable to man as well as to other living beings: (1) preservation of the species or the whole, by preservation, adaptation, and propagation of individuals; (2) development of the whole into the greatest possible variety and efficiency by means of purposeful selection and heredity. History shows that this law of development also operates in the human world, that it produces a series of advancing civilized races and peoples, and, within these, progressive classes and callings, and, finally, a constantly increasing number of self-conscious, efficient personalities. This process of development we call perfection, and we find it taking five different directions: it is scientific-intellectual; economic-technical; political-social; literary-artistic; and religious-ethical. The ethical process of development we call the process of ennobling (*Veredelung*), and this has manifested itself in three ways: (1) as a process of humanization: the members of the civilized nations aim and ought to become complete, "whole" men; (2) as a process of individualization: these men aim and ought to become rational and noble, self-conscious and unique personalities; (3) as a process of socialization: these personalities aim and ought consciously and freely to combine into larger and smaller wholes, for the performance of their nearest and highest tasks.

Religion virtually has the same end in view, the preservation and ennobling of humanity, but there are essential differences between the Church and scientific ethics. The Church (the writer means Catholicism) has no understanding for the past and future development of civilized humanity; she still adheres to the false belief that men are and will forever remain children. The Church has not sufficient knowledge of and confidence in human intelligence, and therefore prefers to use external means (sumptuous service, ceremonies, prayers, Mary-worship, saint-worship) in order to realize the end to keep the individuals in her power. Moreover, ecclesiastical morality has a prepossession for the Oriental-ascetic conception of life and is therefore in constant danger of missing, nay, of opposing the ideal of humanity, the preservation and ennobling of the whole. The highest virtues of real Christian morality: poverty, continence, and obedience, would if universally followed, retard, nay, make impossible the preservation and progress of mankind.

What we need in our day of universal suffrage and popular

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representation, is a national ethical education on a scientific basis. We must arouse in all the sons and daughters of our people the knowledge and feeling that the progress and welfare of the whole depend essentially upon *their* thought and action. It must be made clear to them that unless they obey the laws and conditions of a proper individual and social life, they will degenerate, they will lose the power to carry on the process of civilization, and fail to realize the highest destiny of humanity. It was a mistake of liberalism to leave the moral education of the young entirely in the hands of the Church. The result of this is that our citizens (in Germany) are not prepared for the free institutions which their fathers have won for them; they are ignorant of the duties and rights of the citizens, and of the problems of a great national state. It is no wonder, then, that our parliament is controlled by the masses, and that these are dominated by ecclesiastical and secular demagogues.

There should be moral instruction in the schools to supplement religious teaching. Of course, we should not merely content ourselves, as do the French in their *instruction morale et civique,* as established in 1882, with praising the existing institutions and inculcating a little popular morality in dull catechism form.*

The first thing to do would be to present, in simple, intelligible form, a short survey of the development of civilization (*e. g.,* in connection with Schiller's "Das eleusische Fest" and "Der Spaziergang"; description of the four stages: hunting and fishing; herding; agriculture; industry; and of their characteristics by means of objects, customs, and institutions; history of civilization of the last few centuries in general outline). It would not be hard to show in this way the progress of humanity and the end which is realized. The instructor would then, by a study of concrete examples in the organic world call attention to the two great laws of life, which we have already mentioned; he would show that they hold for human beings, and draw their necessary consequences. All these exercises would have to be adapted to the

*The author quotes a passage from one of these books, written for girls: Mme. H. Massy, "Notions de morale et d' education civique:" "Ought one to love one's enemies?" "Yes." "Ought we to love the Prussians also?" "First, let them give back Alsace-Lorraine, and then we will see whether we can forgive them."

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intelligence of the pupils of our middle schools. Afterwards the instruction would assume the following form:

(*a*) Practice or instruction in the Proper and Efficient, Individual and Social Life. (1) Private Hygiene: aims to make the individual healthy in body and mind, strong and skillful, temperate and efficient. (2) Private Economics: aims to make him capable in his calling, moderate and rational in the acquisition and consumption of commodities. (3) Public or National Hygiene: points out the conditions of a healthy and efficient national life, *e. g.*, family life, military efficiency, action, contentment, unity, etc. (4) National Economics: considers historically and ethically that form of production and distribution which is normal, just, and most conducive to the efficiency and welfare of the nation, in agriculture, trade, and commerce.

(*b*) Ethics, or the Instruction in the Noble and Beautiful, Just and Rational Individual and Social Life. (5) Instruction in Good Manners: aims at decency and dignity in personal bearing, mutual respect and considerateness, first, by means of external rules, then, by producing the corresponding inner disposition. (6) Ethics (in the higher and true sense) has as its aim: self-respect, self-control, and self-perfection; consciousness and veracity, honesty and justice, benevolence and humanity, *i. e.*, the development of free and noble personalities. (7) Instruction in National Law: aims not only to inculcate the existing law and its practical-ethical foundation, but also seeks to arouse in the pupils the sense of justice and the feeling of duty. (8) National Politics: considers the problems and duties of the civilized state towards its citizens, as well as of the free citizen towards the state, to the end of producing just and moral institutions. (9) Instruction in Humanity: aims to develop the notion of "humanity" in a twofold sense. It strives to develop in the individual the specifically human qualities (reason, moral feeling, noble and strong character); and deals with the duties and problems of individuals and peoples with respect to the preservation and progress of humanity as a whole.

Few persons will find fault in these days with the ideal of conduct which Dr. Unold sets up. Objections will, however, be urged by some, first, against his general proposition to teach ethics in the schools in separate courses, and then to the plan which he presents for practical application. There are many who, though deeply appreciating the need of moral training, do not believe

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that the ideal can be realized except by the church, or at any rate on the basis of religion. It is hard, however, to discover any good reasons in support of their position. The fact that we have not yet developed a satisfactory system of moral instruction —if that is a fact—is no proof that none can be developed. The only way to solve the problem is to make an attempt to solve it, and to learn by experiment. The object is, of course, not to do away with religious instruction, but to leave this to the church and family, and to supplement it in the public schools by moral instruction. Perhaps we can learn something in this regard from the Ethical Culture Sunday-schools, which instead of denying the possibility of non-religious moral instruction on *a priori* grounds, are making an honest effort to solve the problem, and are, in my humble opinion, meeting with a fair measure of success.

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

POLITICS AND THE MORAL LAW. By Gustav Ruemelin, Late Chancellor of the University of Tübingen. Translated from the German by Rudolf Tombo, Jr. Edited with an Introduction and Notes by Frederick W. Holls. The Macmillan Company, New York, 1901.

The editor is unquestionably right in regarding Professor Ruemelin's address, delivered at Tübingen seventeen years ago, as "a notable and important contribution" to one branch of the science of ethics. Possibly its chief importance lies in the fact that it is a defence of the view that politics, *i. e.*, the conduct of public affairs, is not subject to the laws of morality recognized in private life, by a man whose moral earnestness is as manifest as his capacity for lucid statement is rare. He stigmatizes the teachings of Macchiavelli as infamous, and condemns the so-called Jesuit maxim that the end justifies the means. He rejoices in noticing "in public affairs an increasing tendency toward nobler ends." It is always, in his judgment, "a most deplorable instance of conflicting duties, when the law of political necessity thrusts aside the recognized and ordinary standard of right." And he maintains that the politician should act under the very highest sense of moral obligation, even when his duty to the state necessitates

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breach of good faith, cruelty, deceit and falsehood in dealing with other nations.

But he is convinced that neither the law of love nor the law of justice is applicable to the state. "The state has no parents to honor, it takes no marriage vow which it might violate." It must punish murder by killing and is compelled for self-preservation to raise millions for the purpose of procuring the most effective instruments of death. It must "covet houses and fields." "The state must endeavor to anticipate even a threatened blow with an energetic counter-stroke." The citizens of one state "may rejoice over the weakening of a neighboring state and may be impelled to derive a selfish advantage therefrom, nay, even to strike an aggressive blow." "Altruism is the gospel of the citizen, self-preservation that of the state." The state is neither subject to the golden rule nor to the law of justice as applicable to private morality. It is "unending and sufficient to itself," having an independent principle for the guidance of its action. Consequently there should be no misplaced moral sensitiveness. "Where it is allowable to take life, it cannot be improper merely to deceive." It would be folly not to make use of spies, bribery and corruption.

In a note, Mr. Holls cites as an instance of "the provocation of war which is regarded as inevitable" the notorious conduct of Bismarck in precipitating the Franco-Prussian war, and suggests that impartial history in recording the means to which he resorted will not fail to take into account his real object, the unification of Germany. In another note, he refers to England's repeated promises to evacuate Egypt which were not made to be kept and to Bismarck's disregard for the Treaty of Prague in the case of Schleswig, as showing how the expediency of a state may necessitate a breach of good faith. For the justification of warfare in general from the religious point of view, Mr. Holls thinks that Luther's pamphlet, "Can Soldiers be Christians?" is unsurpassed to this day. From Mr. Spencer Wilkinson's "War and Policy," he quotes a sentence that friends of peace as well as apologists of war have good reason to ponder: "Even when armies and fleets are not employed, their existence and the possibility of their use constantly influence the action of governments."

The reviewer cannot share Mr. Holls' confidence that this book will help to put pending controversies upon a correct theoretical basis. Professor Ruemelin's arguments rest upon as-

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sumptions that he does not attempt to prove and that are yet far from being self-evident. Is it true that each state is a law unto itself, exists for its own sake, is unending? History records the death of many a state, and unmistakably points to disregard for the legitimate interests of other nations as a frequent cause of decay and dissolution. Is it true that the relations between corporate bodies are so different from those obtaining between individuals as to place the former beyond the pale of moral obligations recognized as applying to the latter? That a state cannot marry another state is a mere quibble. The question is whether nations may sustain to one another relations that render it possible for them to show truthfulness, fidelity, equity and kindness, as well as the opposite of these qualities. That a nation *must* covet territory, kill criminals and send forth armies, are all gratuitous assertions. It is difficult to see any "coveting" in self-imposed taxation; if a people steals its neighbor's land, greed is likely to be the motive, but there is no necessity for it; society is not obliged to slay its perverts, it may protect itself in other ways; whether war is a necessary and legitimate occupation of a civilized people may, in spite of Luther, be gravely doubted. Is it, finally, a correct social theory that makes altruism the gospel of the individual, and self-preservation the only principle to be recognized by a political organization? In the case of the individual, the legitimate desire for self-preservation is not thwarted but aided by an intelligent regard for the welfare of others. Neither do egoism and altruism appear to be mutually exclusive and hostile principles in the management of public affairs.

One asks with some concern what must be the ultimate effect upon private morality of this view which differs from that ascribed to the Jesuits chiefly in substituting the state for the church, and from that of Macchiavelli in nothing that is essential. It must be reassuring to many a corporation whose gospel is that of self-preservation to reflect that since it cannot honor father and mother nor take unto itself a wife, it need not bother about moral obligations. If good and thoughtful men by this sophistry are led to look upon cruel and unfair, dishonest and deceitful practices as proper and necessary in the conduct of the people's business, are not weak and thoughtless men, with such examples before them, likely to resort to the same methods to preserve their own little lives? More than apologetics of this kind do we need practical suggestions as to how those principles of morality, at least,

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that have found recognition in society may be applied to international relations. John Stuart Mill's advice that treaties be made for a definite period only and so as not to bind unborn generations seems more timely and worthy of acceptation than Professor Ruemelin's thesis that political necessity may thrust aside the recognized standard of right. Man does not exist for the sake of the state, but the state, like every other institution, for the sake of man, and it admits of little doubt that that state best serves the interests of humanity, whose intellectual and moral excellence reveals itself not only in the lives of its members but in all its corporate activities as well.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

SCHOOL MANAGEMENT AND METHODS OF INSTRUCTION. By G. Collar, B. A., B. Sc., and C. W. Crook, B. A., B. Sc. Pp. viii, 336. 3s. 6d. Macmillan.

This handy little volume has received the *imprimatur* of the Cambridge experts—Mr. Oscar Browning and Dr. Fletcher—and its inclusion in Macmillan's series of Manuals for Teachers is in itself a sufficient guarantee that there is no jerry-building in its construction. To pursue the metaphor, it is "replete with every modern convenience." It speaks in duly respectful terms of the latest developments in psychology, and has made a successful effort to conceal from view the distasteful technicalities of that subject, while applying without fear or prejudice its broad and important principles. The treatment of school organization is deliberately limited to that of elementary schools, and the authors express the hope that teachers in every grade of school will find the volume useful to them in their labors. I think that this pious aspiration is fulfilled. The secondary school-master may pass over with a sniff the chapters that deal with matter typified by "the fat cat sat on the mat." He may scoff at schedules, stock books, at registers and fee books, and the multitudinous apparatus of school record required by a despotic Board of Education. But with all due deference to his indifference, I do not think any assistant master will be the worse for carefully looking into these details; for, although he may never have occasion to deal at first hand with these devices for filling up the spare time of the teacher, there is much in them from which he may

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learn something. They may be looked upon as highly specialized appliances for saving labor, and whilst the human temperament is what it is, he may be naturally expected to avail himself without stint of every opportunity of reducing his clerical work to a minimum. In addition, they represent the educational ideals of the last twenty years, which are even beginning to influence not only a Department of State, but the teachers themselves. But after all, are our ideals any the better or even the newer because a Board of Education has adopted them? To take as a single instance, the question of discipline. "The best reward for a child should be his teacher's praise, his frown the worst punishment." Just so; but how far is this counsel of perfection removed from the Micio's opinions in the "Adelphi" of Terence:

"Pudore et liberalitate liberos
retinere satius esse credo, quam metu"?

And again: "The lesson should afford pleasurable excitement combined with mental effort;" good questions require "a sympathetic and stimulating manner." Is this much more than a free translation of the remark of Socrates: "*ψυχῇ δὲ βίαιον οὐδὲν ἔμμονον μάθημα.*" Of course we must admit, and rejoice to admit, that we tend more and more to regard education as a means to an end; we see at last with Herodotus, that: *Σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντός χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῇ ἀποβήσεται.* But there! there is little under the sun that is new.

Nascique vocatur
Incipere esse aliud quam quod fuit ante,

and then Ovid crystallizes our intellectual conservatism in a sentence—

morique
Desinere illud idem.

Yes! we must welcome with sincerity every effort to bring those who train our youth into touch with the best that has received articulate expression on the subject of education. And from a first and cursory perusal of this book we can see that the real enthusiasm of men like Quick still lives among us. Behind the sober, sane, and stimulating suggestions in these pages must lie a real devotion to ideals, the outward and visible sign of a veritable renaissance.

The chapters, forming the bulk of the book, which deal

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seriatim with the various items of the school curriculum, contain little that is novel or lending itself to criticism. The authors are "safe" in their methods. But the general handling of the subjects is hardly as broad and as forceful as would be the case if each subject had been handed over to an expert. I am, of course, blaming the book for not being what it is not—on the lines, say, of Spencer's "Aims and Practice of Teaching." To illustrate what I mean, let us take the "inexpertness" which heads a section Euclid *v.* non-Euclidean Geometry. Here the authors have clearly no conception that with the phrase "non-Euclidean" is connoted geometries such as the hyperbolic of Lobachevsky, the single elliptic of Clifford and Klein, and double elliptic (or spherical) of Riemann. All the authors apparently mean by non-Euclidean systems is such presentations of the subject as do not follow Euclid's order. They suggest that the use of logarithms should be taught in the arithmetic course, and not practically confined to trigonometry. A sensible suggestion; but surely, in the secondary schools at any rate, logarithmic tables are used in the physical and chemical laboratory, which would seem to imply that the use of tables is known at an early stage of the mathematical course. And how futile is such a statement as the following: "In the higher forms of secondary schools this branch (conics) should be included, the chief properties of the curves being taught either through geometrical conics or analytical geometry." How else would the authors propose to teach it? And why not by both? "It is also advisable to give the senior pupils of such schools an introduction to the calculus." Surely this advice is supererogatory. It cannot interest the teacher in the primary school, and it is useless to the mathematical master in a secondary school.

The remarks of the authors on physical exercises are wise. They condemn military drill as an incomplete system of physical training. As for the advantage of music as an adjunct to drill, while I admit that it is helpful in the production of that exact rhythm of movement which makes drill "so attractive to the spectator," I am doubtful whether the pupil gets the best of the bargain. I find that it has a soothing effect which gradually disposes the boy to the minimum of exertion, or, to put it another way, the movements become too automatic; the boy is able to think of something else, and naturally avails himself, perhaps unconsciously, of his opportunity. That is my own experience, and although music is valuable in teaching new exercises, and as a change and

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a treat to the boys, I do not advocate its use as part and parcel of the daily exercises. There is nothing more difficult to detect than slackness in drill, for it can be carried to a fine art. The Appendix to the chapter on Physical Training contains a series of breathing exercises, of the value of which it is difficult to speak too emphatically. If it were possible to secure the regular performances of such exercises as the child gets out of bed in the morning and in front of the open window, we should hear less of the adenoid growths which seem to be becoming more and more common. Before having recourse to the surgeon, I should advise every parent to see that these exercises are gone through by the patient for a few months. It is worth a trial, it can do no harm, and may save the knife. I have not noticed that the authors say anything about defective sight. Just as the adenoids with their concomitants of deafness and dullness are responsible for many an imposition and many despairing tears, so the teacher is often led to put down to inattention or naughtiness what is really caused by defective sight. The evil has assumed considerable dimensions in Germany, where it is realized that great dissipation of mental energy accompanies prolonged strain in the effort to coördinate the ocular muscles. From 40 to 50 per cent. of the children in American high schools are said to have abnormal vision. And if we pass from the defective 10 per cent. of the lower schools to the 88 per cent. in the German universities—well, we can only think of the doctrine of the inheritance of acquired characteristics with a shudder. The matter must receive consideration from those who care for the well-being of the race. More attention must be paid by the publishers of text-books and atlases to the thickness, shape and height of the letters, the approach, "leading" or interlineage, and length of the lines. Dr. Cohn, an expert who has paid great attention to the subject, suggests that all books not conforming to the measurements given herewith shall be placed on an *Index expurgatorius*. Minimum height of letters, .06 inch; minimum thickness, .01 in.; least space between lines, .1 in.; letters not less than .03 in. apart; no line to contain more than 60 letters or to be over 4 inches in length. It may be that in years to come, these details will be of more importance than reams of suggestions as to how the child is to be brought to the stage at which he recognizes that "the fat cat sat on the mat."

But manuals such as that under notice, if in the hands of the elementary teachers of this country, will certainly attune the minds

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of their readers to further study and investigation of the principles and laws that govern their professional methods. I confess to not finding a dull page in the book. I have but one harsh word to say of it and its authors. They should be sentenced to make indexes for the rest of their natural lives.

W. J. GREENSTREET.

MARLING SCHOOL, STROUD.

ATONEMENT AND PERSONALITY. By R. C. Moberly, D. D. London: John Murray, 1901. Pp. xxviii. 418.

Dr. Moberly endeavors in this work to re-state the doctrine of the Atonement in such a way as to bring it more into harmony with the ethical spirit which is permeating recent theology. For this purpose he investigates in a very admirable way the ethical conceptions or elements involved in the notion of atonement, conceptions such as punishment, penitence, forgiveness, vicarious suffering. His re-statement of the doctrine is based, however, on an unquestioning acceptance of the traditional doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and makes the ethical process, in which atonement essentially consists, depend for its possibility upon the truth of the ontological mysteries set forth in these doctrines. In spite of Dr. Moberly's very evident earnestness, candor, and patient reflection, this unhappy combination of ethics and metaphysics in theology seems only to illustrate once more the result of putting new wine into old wine-skins. The strain put upon the traditional doctrines is more than they can bear.

It would be impossible in a brief space to do justice to Dr. Moberly's argument as a whole. For it is only fair to say that, within the limits of his presuppositions, Dr. Moberly has gone to work in no narrow spirit, but has striven to attain a large and coherent conception of the doctrine of the Atonement both in itself and in its various relations. But while there is much that calls for detailed examination, it must suffice here to illustrate what has just been said to be the radical defect of the work, by stating briefly the central part of the argument. In analyzing the conception of penitence Dr. Moberly argues that a true penitence for sin is possible only in so far as the sinner rises above his sin. Perfect penitence, then, would seem to be possible only for one who is also sinless (an inference, by the way, which is open to obvious criticism, and which Dr. Moberly can hardly be said to

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defend with success). For sinners, on the other hand, only an approximation to it is possible, unless they can somehow participate in a perfection not their own; since for man as man sinless perfection is not possible. It is only in Christ, the incarnate Son of God, that sinless perfection, and therefore a perfect penitence, is possible originally and directly. Now atonement for sin is realized in and through perfect penitence for sin. Thus the possibility and reality of a full and perfect atonement is grounded on the fact of Christ's Incarnation. More particularly, it is grounded on the dual nature of Christ, for it is through his humanity that he can take upon himself the burden of human sin, and through his divinity that he is capable of a sinless and perfect penitence.

Summary as this statement of the main argument is, it may serve to indicate the bearing of the following criticism. The traditional doctrine of Christ's nature makes it impossible for Dr. Moberly to entertain the thought that Christ was in any real sense capable of sin. On the other hand, the very existence of that perfect penitence, upon which the whole argument turns, depends upon this, that Christ really entered into the meaning of human temptation, was in fact himself really tempted. Hence the argument is involved in a hopeless dilemma between real temptation to sin, on the one hand, and essential inability to sin, on the other. Dr. Moberly's own language sufficiently shows the extremity to which the argument is reduced. For he tries every turn of phrase to describe "this strange, dim, vision or idea [in Christ's mind] of a possibility" [of sin], which was "not really possible," yet whose rejection required "a stupendous act or energy of victorious moral goodness" (p. 106). There could hardly be a more convincing evidence of the unhappy influence exercised upon theology by the metaphysics of the creeds than is afforded by a single passage such as this, with its urgent appeal for our reverence and awe on behalf of a manifest unreality.

Although in the main scheme of his argument Dr. Moberly is fatally hampered by his unquestioning acceptance of the dogmas of ecclesiastical metaphysics, his work in almost every other respect calls for high praise. The scheme of the argument within its limits is carefully and systematically developed, the exposition is clear, the criticism of opposing or defective views is scrupulously fair and always ready to recognize the measure of truth they may possess. As already said, the analysis of the ethical elements in the religious doctrine is an admirable feature of the work.

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Against these merits, however, it is necessary to put one rather conspicuous defect, viz., the total absence of reference to, and presumably of acquaintance with, modern theology outside this country. The defect, no doubt, is only too common in Anglican theology, but it is not easily excused in a work of this order. The reader receives not one hint, for instance, that the greatest work in dogmatics since Schleiermacher has this very doctrine of the Atonement for its theme. Our author's apparent lack of acquaintance with the work of Ritschl and his school is the more to be regretted, because their work exhibits a far more thorough and consistent development of what is best in Dr. Moberly's book; that is to say, their work shows what an ethical theology can be when it is freed from its bondage to an alien metaphysics.

HENRY BARKER.

EDINBURGH UNIVERSITY.

A HISTORY OF POLITICS. By Edward Jenks, M. A., Reader in Law to the University of Oxford, etc. London: J. M. Dent, 1900. Pp. vi., 164.

This is one of the Temple Primers published at Aldine House. It is a history of political action and not of political speculation. Mr. Jenks has done similar work before in his "Law and Politics in the Middle Ages." But this Primer is more popular in form, and the subject is not elaborated in detail. Beginning with an introductory chapter on Types of Society, the author proceeds to trace the origin and development of the institutions of government from the savage state through the patriarchal stage to the modern form. The matter of the book is prevented in an attractive way and is well arranged. Mr. Jenks displays a wide knowledge; though at times he is inclined to make too sweeping assertions. For example he asserts that "Morality is the result, not the cause of social amelioration" (p. 27). It would be truer to say that they are mutually cause and effect of each other. Morality tends to social amelioration, and the latter prepares the way for a higher morality. The Primer is however an excellent one, and there is appended to it a useful list of authorities. It ought to be read along with Sir Frederick Pollock's "Introduction to the History of the Science of Politics."

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

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THE LAWS OF LAW. By T. Baty, B. C. L. (Oxon), of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. London: Effingham Wilson, 1900. Pp. 40.

The author's object in this Essay is threefold:—(1) to demonstrate the difference in meaning of the term "law" as it is used in the physical and moral sciences respectively; (2) to indicate the scope of a science of law which shall not be a mere classification of the relations with which law deals; (3) to ascertain the main features of this science. The writer contends as against the "analytic school" of jurists that it is futile to start with a definition of law. He seems on right ground here. Such a definition ought to come at the end rather than at the beginning of the science of jurisprudence. The main part of the Essay is devoted to a classification and arrangement of the subject matter of law. Mr. Baty holds that duties and not rights are the objects of law, and adopts as his classification the principal courses of conduct affected by law, *e. g.*, religion, organizations, etc. The treatment is however too brief and of too technical a nature to call for notice here. It may be mentioned that Mr. Baty writes clearly and concisely.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

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INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

APRIL, 1902.

THE ETHICAL VALUE OF HELLENISM.

If we are to judge by certain estimates current in the popular literature of the present day the ethical value of Hellenism is either zero or a minus quantity. The ancient Greeks were Pagans in the sense that they were neither Jews nor Christians; and the word Paganism is commonly used to connote the complete absence of moral restraint, more especially of those which are imposed on the sexual relations. An epigrammatic novelist describes a group of young people, among whom marriage seems to have been replaced by connections of a more transitory character, as living in a world of Christian names and Pagan morals. Mr. Shorthouse, speaking through the mouthpiece of John Inglesant, refers to "the old world of pleasure and art—a world that took the pleasures of life boldly, and had no conscience to prevent its cultivating and enjoying them to the full." (Apparently John Inglesant had not read the Epistle to the Romans.) Another writer of fiction, Mr. Benjamin Kidd, seems to think that altruism was unknown before the Christian era. Mr. W. D. Howells implies in one of his novels that monogamy only dates from the same period. And a far higher authority, Matthew Arnold, has made the antithesis between Hellenism and Hebraism common form in literature—Hellenism standing for science and art, Hebraism for conduct, that is to say for three-fourths of life.

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Before inquiring into the justice of this summary and wholesale condemnation, I would call attention to the singular circumstance that a directly opposite estimate of Pagan virtue prevailed all through the Middle Ages. It might have been supposed that during the centuries when Catholicism reigned without a rival over the western conscience, and when the traditions of the régime which it had displaced were fresher than among ourselves, observers, especially ecclesiastical observers, would have been still more deeply impressed by the moral regeneration assumed to have been wrought by the church. Such however is not the case. Among mediæval authorities there seems to be but one opinion as regards the moral superiority of classical antiquity over their own contemporaries. "The Gentiles," says Abélard, "who had no scriptural law and heard no sermons put us to shame by the example of their virtue, bv the excellence of their precepts, and by the consistency of their lives with their teachings. Their philosophers boldly rebuked wickedness and suffered for truth's sake. Nor was it their philosophers only who shone so brightly in comparison with us. There is abundant evidence going to prove that the same virtues were practised by the worldly and the unlearned, and by women as well as by men."* It may be urged, and indeed it has been urged, that Abélard was a freethinking rationalist who sought to undermine Christianity. A much scandalized apologist refers us to John of Salisbury for a very different view of the matter.† We turn to the pages of that excellent prelate, and find to our surprise that he confirms rather than contradicts his master's statements. Examples of every virtue are to be found among the characters of antiquity. The perfect model of what a sovereign ought to be is furnished by no Christian prince, but by the heathen Trajan. The Socratic teaching is a well of morals undefiled. If people find the Christian religion too severe let them go to the Greek philosophers for lessons in chastity. And, indeed, if John is to be believed, they were in sore need of such lessons, for nothing so bad has been written

*"Opera," ed. Cousin, II., p. 409.

†Reuter "Religiöse Aufklärung," I., p. 317.

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about imperial Rome as his descriptions of court-society in the Europe of the twelfth century. Doubtless the anarchy that prevailed under Stephen is largely responsible for the corruption laid bare in the "Polycraticus."* But no such extenuating circumstances can be pleaded for the ages of faith and chivalry when, a century later, we find Roger Bacon repeating in more definite and explicit terms Abélard's exaltation of Pagan over Christian morals. If, says the great Franciscan, we cannot emulate or even understand the wisdom of the ancient philosophers, it is because we do not possess their virtue. Wisdom is inconsistent with sin and demands perfect virtue in its professors. And of all sins the most fatal to learning is unchastity, from which none but a very few, and those by special grace, are exempt in their youth. Nor is this a mere general statement. He proceeds to relate how a number of professors and students of theology had the year before been expelled from Paris for the practice of unnatural vices. Such was the state of morals shortly before the death of St. Louis, at the very climax and flowering-time of mediæval Catholicism.†

I am not aware that any such clear and emphatic testimony to the superiority of Pagan morals is given by Dante; but it is at least suggestive of the same leaning that he should ascribe what little good Florence possessed to the descent of some few of her citizens from the ancient Romans. And we know from a brilliant chapter in the "Convitto" how highly he rated the virtues of the Romans, referring them even to divine inspiration. Whether he had an equally high opinion of the Greeks cannot be positively affirmed; but there is a significant passage in the "Inferno," pointing in that direction. The motive to which Ulysses appeals when urging his companions to sail beyond the Pillars of Hercules is the remembrance that they were not born to live like brutes but to pursue virtue and knowledge. And to this appeal the Greek sailors, according to Dante, readily respond.‡

*"Polycraticus," bid. III. passim.

†"Compendium Theologiæ," ed. Brewer, pp. 398 *seq.*

‡"Inferno," Canto xxvi., 118 *seq.*

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It may be objected that Dante was a poet and a scholar, more in sympathy with the old than with the new spirit, Roger Bacon a man of science sheltering himself under the Franciscan habit, both perhaps Christians only under compulsion. There is however one more authority to which no exception can be permitted—no less an authority than the Angelic Doctor himself. Aquinas, while confessing a preference for the republican form of government, admits that it is "only fitted for men living in the primitive state of sinlessness, or so wise and virtuous as the ancient Romans were"*—clearly not for a society so corrupt as the crusading chivalry of France. .

To what cause shall we ascribe this extraordinary revolution in Christian opinion as to the moral value of classic civilization? A sufficiently easy solution suggests itself at once. The mediæval scholars romanced about Pagan virtue because they did not know what Paganism was. The Greeks and Romans were to them what the Chinese were to the philosophers of the eighteenth century; and they used them just like those philosophers as a stick to beat their contemporaries with. The far more complete knowledge of Pagan life and literature that we owe to the Renaissance and to modern research has led to very different conclusions, and it is on these that the estimates quoted at the beginning of this paper are based.

But the suggested explanation seems insufficient. If the schoolmen knew less than we know of Pagan literature, the fact remains that for all practical purposes they knew enough. If they had not read Aristophanes and Plato they had read Aristotle's "Politics," Terence, Horace, Ovid, Juvenal, Suetonius; above all they had read the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans; nor does there seem the smallest reason to believe that a wider and deeper study of the Greek authors would have altered their estimate of the Greeks, except perhaps to raise it still higher by making them more familiar with the whole range of Greek virtue. The truth is that their reading of classical antiquity was not biased as ours is by an apologetic

*"De Regimine Principum," II., 9.

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interest. They accepted Christianity because it is true, not because it strengthens the hands of the social reformer, the magistrate, and the policeman. Hence there was no particular motive for exaggerating its services in that direction. Religion no doubt was useful; but its utility consisted not so much in making people better members of society as in saving them from eternal damnation. Baptism gave a chance, absolution *in articulo mortis* a certainty of escaping from that dreadful fate; and the possession of so precious a privilege was the great advantage that the Christian possessed over the Pagan. Otherwise, as we have seen, he had nothing to boast of, rather the contrary. Whatever vices the church condemned had been condemned by Greek philosophy. Whatever vices had been practised among Pagans were repeated with aggravating circumstances in the most famous seats of Christian learning: and those whose experience had familiarized them with the cesspools of Paris and Bologna listened with more blunted sensibility to the unsavory records of Thebes and Athens.

It might indeed be imagined that the appalling penalties inflicted on such offences in this world and imagined for them in the next, bore witness to an entirely new sense of their flagitiousness in the mediæval conscience. But no mistake would be greater than to use the criminal jurisprudence of the Middle Ages as a gauge of their moral susceptibility. Difficulty of detection for one thing, and the supposed slight cast on the honor of an earthly or heavenly sovereign for another, counted for incomparably more in the assessment of punishment than the actual wickedness of an offence as measured by the animosity that it excited in the public opinion of the times. Now of that public opinion no austerer representative can be quoted than Dante: and what Dante really thought about the vice that is always brought up as the special opprobrium of Greece, is sufficiently indicated by his extreme cordiality towards the lost soul of Brunetto Latini, and by the fact that he subjects all sins of unchastity to an equal intensity of torment in the cleansing fires of purgatory. Evidently the great Catholic poet was no more of a rigorist than the Platonic Socrates whose half-tolerant attitude so much shocked Professor Huxley.

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We must then look elsewhere than to a mere increase of knowledge for an adequate explanation of that great revolution in the historical conscience which has led many of our contemporaries to reverse the mediæval point so completely that in the popular imagination Paganism, or, more precisely, the Græco-Roman spirit, has become identified with impurity, while Christianity has come to be viewed even more as the chief instrument of moral reform than as the God-given means of salvation.

So far as I know the change began with Luther. If in one way the Reformation was the last fruit of the Renaissance, in another way it was a reaction against the Renaissance. In returning to the standpoint of primitive Christianity Luther and his successors could not fail to become imbued with the hostility felt by the first Christians, and above all by St. Paul, towards the Pagan world; and all the more so as the worst vices of Paganism were being resuscitated under their eyes in papal Rome. Moreover the dogmas that Luther attacked had been bound up in a peculiar way with the philosophy of Aristotle, and therefore the Aristotelian ethics became a special object of his animosity. The doctrine of moral habits seemed radically inconsistent with the doctrine of instantaneous regeneration. Men do not become just by performing just actions; they perform just actions because they have been made just. Speaking generally, Rome had apostasized from the purity of the gospel by incorporating with it much that was Pagan in doctrine and ritual; therefore with Paganism in all its forms war must be waged.

Rome naturally enough refused to accept this account of her parentage; but it made her all the more anxious to disclaim so compromising a connection. Hence both great divisions of western Christendom have united in vilifying the civilization to which mediæval scholars looked back with fond regret as an unattainable standard of excellence. And before long their joint hostility was still further aggravated by a new provocation. Undeterred by the double tide of reaction the Renaissance continued to pursue its victorious career. Taking up human progress at the point where it had been let fall by Greek

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culture, the modern mind set itself to replace feudal Catholicism by a new art and a new science, a new morality and a new state. Concurrently with this great enterprise it carried on an unceasing criticism on the existing régime, its institutions and its beliefs. Both processes, the constructive and destructive, were powerfully aided by principles and examples derived from classical antiquity. All these efforts culminated in the French Revolution, whose leaders avowedly looked for their models to Greece and Rome. And as the Hellenic spirit had shared in their momentary triumph, so also it shared in the ruin and disgrace that speedily overtook their cause. For the first time since they came into existence the products of the Greek genius were systematically neglected and defamed by educated men; and recourse was had to mediæval art, literature, and politics for new ideals to put in their place. The Romanticists consciously ranged themselves behind the forces of reaction in church and state; and it was not without reason that Byron, the glorious standard-bearer of European progress, directed against them his fiercest attacks. So too the cause of Greek independence for which Byron gave his life became the battle-cry of resurgent liberalism, and helped to win back Canning, the future liberal leader, to the liberal principles that had been his first love. Conversely the Holy Alliance thwarted Greek aspirations to the utmost of its ability; and its literary agents carried the war into historical literature. Writing in 1834, J. S. Mill observes that "the most elaborate Grecian history which we possess (Mitford's) is impregnated with the anti-Jacobin spirit in every line; and the *Quarterly Review* labored as diligently for many years to vilify the Athenian republic as the American."* Even greater bitterness was displayed by reactionary theologians. The Abbé Gaume in France and Dr. W. G. Ward in England joined in making the grotesque proposal that the Greek and Latin classics should no longer be taught in school, their place being supplied by patristic literature.†

*"Dissertations and Discussions," Vol. I., p. 113.

†"W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival," pp. 114, 118, 194 and 454.

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The leaders of the reactionary movement against the French Revolution and the philosophy of the eighteenth century were in truth anything but conservatives. They caught the spirit of innovation from their opponents, and even sympathized to a certain extent with their aims. Agreeing with them that the world needed to be reformed, and agreeing also that its reformation should be effected by social reconstruction, by education, by popular literature, by journalism, in short by all the machinery that the schools of enlightenment had set in motion, they differed from them chiefly in holding that all these instruments should be animated by religious ideas, used for religious purposes, and wielded by the ministers of religion or by laymen to whom their confidence had been given. This is not the place to expatiate on that vast movement, nor indeed has the time come for its history to be written. The important thing for us to observe is that it led to a new interpretation of Christianity, of the church, and of the Bible. In rivalry with the ideals bequeathed or inspired by Hellenism, these also were represented as embodying a scheme of social reform, an ideal polity, a new reading of life. Thus it came about that Pagan and Christian morals, ancient and mediæval civilization, were ranged in an unreal opposition and unhistorically contrasted as darkness and light. And so strong was the prejudice generated by the unscrupulous assertions of the reactionary party, so skilful were the arrangements by which facts were disguised or set in a false light, that a generation taught to discard supernaturalist metaphysics has continued to accept a supernaturalist version of history, according to which the highest elements of human nature, intelligence and conscience, may exist and be developed in complete isolation from one another.

So much has seemed necessary in the way of preamble in order to clear the ground for a candid consideration of the thesis I am prepared to support, which is no less than this—that the ethical value of Hellenism fully equals its intellectual and artistic value; that the Greeks were as great in what belongs to the conduct of life as they confessedly were in the creation of beauty or in the search for truth. They were, what

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Huxley called them, the real chosen people, and that in a more absolute sense than he would have dared to maintain.

To avoid all possible misconstructions I wish to state at the outset that I accept the current English and American estimate of morality. I have no desire to be classed with the neo-Pagans—if the persons calling themselves by that name still exist as a class; I detest their theories; and I believe that in most ancient Greek communities they would have been summarily lynched had they tried to put those theories into practice.

It must further be understood that when I speak of Hellenism and of the Greeks I speak of what was highest and best in the race and in its bequest to posterity. This amounts to no more than is assumed in estimating the claims on our gratitude of any other extinct race or civilization, or of any religion whether extinct or not. We really know little more than this, nor does it concern us to know more. The good lives on, the evil dies. The point needs emphasizing because it has been particularly neglected in discussing the subject on which we are engaged. Instead of comparing Greek practice with the practice of other communities, Greek ideals with other ideals, we ignore the ideals and compare the practice with our own highest theoretical standards. I do not propose that the question of practice should be left out of account: I wish on the contrary that it should figure largely in the estimate. An ideal to deserve the name must sooner or later, and sooner rather than later, influence conduct: failing that it becomes worse than nothing, mere lying cant and hypocrisy. At the same time in default of other evidence it ought to count for something that a particular ideal should have been entertained in a particular society; it must, we may argue, have been suggested to our authority—poet, orator, or the like—by some happy experience of his own or by the tradition of a better age. And this is more especially true when we are dealing with a frank and sincere people, as the Greeks, or at least the Ionian race, will presently appear to have been.

Another point also should be borne in mind. In placing the ethical value of Hellenism on a level with its intellectual and

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æsthetic value I am claiming for it no chimerical perfection. The art of Hellas was not perfect, nor was its philosophy; still less its science. In all these the Greeks have been surpassed by the successors who profiting by their lessons and their example, have taken up their tradition and carried it to a higher pitch of excellence. And what is more to the point, other races, working simultaneously with them, or at a later period in complete independence of their influence, have in some ways shown a more delicate æsthetic perception, a truer sense of objective reality, a more penetrating depth of reflection, a more successful ingenuity in devising methods of calculation. So also with morals. The virtue of chastity may have been better taught and more generally practised among the Jews, self-devotion among the Romans, personal loyalty among the Germans, sympathy with all living things on the banks of the Ganges. But just as no alien philosophy and no alien art, taken altogether, could compete with the philosophy and the art of Hellas, so neither was the moral life of any other people so rich, so well-balanced, so identified with its inmost nature, yet so capable of a world-wide diffusion or of expansion and adaptation to altered circumstances in after ages.

That the Greeks were so great in art and science furnishes a certain presumption that they attained, to say the least of it, some eminence in morality. To part off the æsthetic life and the intellectual life from the life of conduct, as Matthew Arnold does, is a mere conventional abstraction. It would be little to say that there is no hard and fast line of demarcation; there is in fact no line at all. Conduct is co-extensive with activity, and falls under different laws of obligation as its subject-matter varies, but never escapes from obligation altogether. As regards fine art this truth is now widely recognized and finds expression in such common terms as "good work," "conscience," and "sincerity" in connection with the production and the criticism of æsthetic objects. And as regards scientific investigation it is almost too obvious to need emphasizing. Of course the artist and, although more rarely, the philosopher may be faithful to the duties of his special

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calling and faithless to the ordinary duties of a citizen, like Benvenuto Cellini or Francis Bacon. But the same possibility of a high moral development in one direction combined with grave deficiencies in another runs through the whole circle of human activity. There seems to be no solidarity among the virtues. Sovereigns exemplary in their domestic relations and ready to undergo martyrdom for their religion have been false to their word like Charles I., or false to their country like Louis XVI. And conversely the highest public loyalty may co-exist with gross private vices as in the case of William III. A keen sense of beauty may have its temptations in the direction of sexual immorality; and the impersonation of Aprodite Anadyomene by Phryne, so picturesquely described by Matthew Arnold, may indicate a weak point of this kind in Hellenism. But Puritanism too has its temptations in the direction among others of savage cruelty towards women, abundantly illustrated in the history of our own civil wars.

Intellectualism too may have its moral dangers, among which want of common honesty will probably occur to most readers as the chief. But as this deficiency seems also to accompany every degree of stupidity and ignorance the connection may after all be accidental. However this may be, love of knowledge, as represented by the Greeks, has one great and characteristic virtue, the love of truth. The claim may excite some surprise. From Cyrus to Hobart Pasha the enemies of that people have habitually spoken of them as liars. I cannot say that my own small experience of the modern Greeks has given me that impression. On the contrary they struck me rather as a frank and straightforward race, very inaccurate certainly, but without any intention to deceive. Our business, however, is not now with the average Greek, ancient or modern, but with the élite of the Pagan period; and of these it may be said, I think, that they have set an example of truthfulness unequalled except by those moderns who have been trained in their school. "Hateful to me as the gates of Hades is he who hides one thing in his breast and tells another," says the Homeric Achilles; and Plato with a still more exacting standard of veracity censures Achilles for uttering

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threats that he does not mean to carry out.* Sophocles in what is, ethically at least, the noblest of all his tragedies, makes Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles and the guardian of his tradition, quite incapable of carrying out the scheme of deceit into which he has been reluctantly drawn. "Tell no lies," was a maxim of Solon. Thucydides, himself a historian of admirable sincerity, seems to cast a slight shade of censure on the heroic Brasidas for making a statement that was untrue although useful from the diplomatic point of view.† Epaminondas was famous for his strict adherence to truth; and Marcus Aurelius, known as Verissimus, ascribes his hatred of falsehood to the teaching of a Stoic tutor.‡

A Roman satirist has charged the Greek historians with mendacity on a point where their accuracy has been signally confirmed by modern research. He might with more justice have extended the accusation to his own countrymen. Early Roman history has been in many instances deliberately falsified by national or family vanity; nor are the later portions altogether trustworthy. We are told of Dr. Arnold that "the falsity and corruption of the Latin historians was for ever suggesting to him the contrast of their Grecian rivals." And if Arnold had directed his studies more systematically to what is called "Sacred History" the same contrast might have suggested itself in a more unpleasant form. If we are to credit the Higher Criticism—which is the only honest criticism—whole masses of ancient Hebrew literature are deliberate forgeries, in the sense in which we speak of the forged Decretals of Isidore; and the incidents related in them are to a great extent fictitious. Theologians tell us that the fabrication of documents purporting to contain a divine revelation did not at that period and among Orientals imply the same guilt that a like proceeding argued in the Middle Ages and would argue now. If so it seems rather audacious to refer us to such a quarter for elementary moral instruction. However that may be, we have to congratulate ourselves on the fact that in Attica,

*"Hippias Minor," 370 A.
†IV., 108.
‡I., 15.

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at any rate, public opinion had early risen to a stage at which truth and falsehood are more accurately discriminated. Herodotus has preserved an anecdote that well illustrates the contrast offered by Hellenism and Hebraism in this respect. During the sixth century B. C. a great religious revival, now known as Orphicism, sprang up in the Greek world and had Attica for its principal seat. One of the leaders of the movement, a certain Onomacritus, stood high in the favor of the Peisistratid Hipparchus, and seems to have been employed by him in editing the prophecies of Musaeus, a somewhat mythical authority of the school. Having however been detected in the act of interpolating a prediction of his own in the collection, the unlucky forger was summarily expelled from the country by his indignant patron, one of whose maxims, engraved where every passer-by could read it, was, "Do not deceive thy friend."

Hipparchus was not in other respects a model of virtue; but it is fortunate that in this matter of pious forgeries we have been brought up on his principles rather than on Hilkiah's. But our excellent training has its occasional inconveniences. It makes some honorable persons too reluctant to admit that forgery and fabrication on a great scale were actually practised by holy men among the Jews. Moving in a world of Hellenic sincerity, and not without the simplicity that a wise Hellene has called the principal element in a noble nature, they have failed to realize the possibilities of Hebraic duplicity. A typical example of this uncompromising attitude is furnished by the manner in which that great and high-minded theologian F. D. Maurice was impressed by the speculations of Colenso. "I asked him," writes Maurice, "if he did not think Samuel must have been a horrid scoundrel if he forged a story about the I AM, speaking of Moses, and to my unspeakable surprise and terror he said 'No. Many good men have done such things. He might not mean more than Milton meant.'" Most educated theologians have come to agree with Colenso, except that they would place the composition of the Elohistic narrative considerably later than the time of Samuel. But their whole tone as regards the limits of truthfulness in religious

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teaching is such as to inspire plain men with something of the "surprise and terror" felt by Maurice.

It may be objected that Plato, a typical Greek and the greatest of Greek moralists, took similar liberties with the truth, to the extent even of leaving it doubtful whether he really believed in any God or in any future life. The fact is so, and his warmest admirers must always regret that it should be so. Such prevarications show the mischief that comes of trying to combine mythology with philosophy. But at any rate Plato knew what he was doing. Unlike our modern theologians he avoided what he called the "lie in the soul," not deceiving himself, however much he may have wished to deceive the people. Even here we can see how admirably well Ruskin has said of the Greeks, "they have not lifted up their souls unto vanity."

From the consideration of veracity as practised in Greece we pass to that part of conduct which is more directly concerned with the mutual relations of human beings, to the great interests of justice and beneficence.

It is a familiar fact that the people of whom we are speaking divided all mankind into Greeks and Barbarians. By the latter they originally meant only those whose language they could not understand. But in time Barbarian came to mean much more than this. With the Greeks as with ourselves it stood for the opposite of civilized. But the civilization with which they identified Hellenism was no mere material good. The Barbarians might have better roads, more accumulated capital, a more highly developed industrial system, larger and even better disciplined armies than theirs. In the eyes of a Greek these things were desirable, but they were not the one thing needful. That one thing without which there could be no real civilization was the reign of law in opposition to the rule of a despot on the one hand, and on the other to that anarchical state of society where wrongs are redressed, or rather perpetuated, by private vengeance. It is a blessing, says the Jason of Euripides, to live in a country that is governed not by brute force but by law. And the same poet makes Tyndareus tell his son-in-law Menelaus, who has been excusing the

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matricide of Orestes, that he has become barbarized by living out of Greece so long. Otherwise he would see that the right course for Orestes was to bring his mother before a court of justice on the charge of murdering her husband. For when one homicide is requited by another the blood-feud goes on for ever, to the total destruction of orderly and peaceful relations. Let those who expatiate on the moral superiority of Hebraism to Hellenism remember that this barbarous principle of blood-vengeance is sanctioned by the priestly code promulgated by Ezra in the middle of the fifth century B. C., and that it was in full force at the very time when the noble verses of Euripides were being recited before the assembled people of Athens.

And this suggests another contrast. Thanks to the eloquence of Renan and the still more fervid declamations of James Darmesteter, himself a Jew, much attention was drawn ten years ago to the passionate preaching of justice by the Hebrew prophets. It was well that should be done, and done so well. It was well that devout readers of scripture should be made realize the fact that the prophets of Israel had something else to do than to mystify their hearers by discussing the affairs of modern Europe between two and three thousand years in advance. And it was well also to remind pious guinea-pigs and company-promoters that subscriptions to missionary societies would not have purchased absolution for wholesale robbery from Amos and Isaiah. All honor to the preachers who whether at Samaria and Jerusalem or in London and Paris identify religion with justice and mercy rather than with dogma and ritual! But let not our recognition of their services blind us to the still greater services of those who, unaided by supernatural promises or terrors, actually accomplished that for which the prophets vainly strove, the legislators, magistrates, and orators who established and carried on the righteous governments of Greece under which the poor working-man could not be plundered with impunity as he was plundered in the Holy Land.

Certain historical errors die hard; and one has just occurred to me against which it would be well to enter a caution. I can imagine some readers exclaiming: "There were no

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paid working-men in Greece; the free Greek citizens were an oligarchy living in idleness on the produce of slave-labor." Such indeed seems to have been at one time the prevalent belief; and it may still survive in certain circles. To assert that the Greek democracies were not democracies at all in our sense of the word, but aristocracies of a particularly oppressive kind, was part of the reactionary and anti-Hellenic propaganda carried on after the French Revolution, to which reference has been already made. The assertion is however untrue; and anyone may easily convince himself by consulting the Greek literature of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. that the bulk of the Athenian voters consisted of petty shop-keepers, peasants, and day-laborers. Slaves no doubt there were, and a good many of them, although their number has been enormously exaggerated, as Prof. Beloch shows in his brilliant work on the population of the ancient world. But slavery existed everywhere in antiquity, in Judea as well as in Greece. White slavery indeed lasted far down into the Middle Ages, with the full approval of the church, and was finally extinguished by purely economical causes; while black slavery, after being actively promoted by professing Christians and attaining portentous dimensions without a protest from the Christian conscience, owed its final destruction to a movement set on foot by freethinking philosophers and then taken up by that most rationalistic of Christian sects, the Society of Friends. But the original impulse to abolitionism came, as will presently be shown, from Greek thought.

Returning to the contrast between the Greeks and other nations, it has to be observed that the Barbarians too had their laws, a fact of which we cannot suppose Euripides to have been ignorant, as it was already familiar to Herodotus. The really important distinction was that while the Greek laws gave a far more effectual protection against the arbitrary will of the rulers and against the passions of private individuals, they did not become, as with the Asiatics, an instrument of irremediable bondage. Where men's habits of thinking took their whole shape and color from the traditions of despotism the law itself could not be conceived but as a despot armed

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with divine authority and raised above criticism or emendation. There may have been something of the same feeling in Greece also. But at a comparatively early period it was met and overcome by the idea of law as an expression of the collective will, and therefore as something that might be altered with the altered needs of the community, or with the increase of general enlightenment. Her teachers expressed this principle in various ways, one by declaring that man was the measure of all things; another by contending that the measure was rather supplied by nature, by the rules of conduct that experience showed to be observed at all times and in all places.

Either of these methods would serve to accomplish the step that first makes morality what it is, the transition from the letter to the spirit of legal obligation. We owe to Rome the word equity by which that essential element of law is ordinarily expressed; but the notion is purely Greek. It is that ἐπιείκεια—rather oddly translated "sweet reasonableness" by Matthew Arnold—which Aristotle has defined in a manner that leaves nothing to be desired. He tells us that the equitable man fulfills the intention of the legislator in cases for which the legislator, being tied to general terms, could not provide. In cases of disputed right he will not grasp all that the letter of the law gives him but will take somewhat less than his strict right. And as the laws must be interpreted in the light of their original intention, so also the merit of the obedience paid to them, or the demerit of disobedience, must be measured by the agent's intention. Involuntary transgressions, according to Aristotle, are not deserving of punishment but of pardon, and sometimes of pity. That anyone can justly be made to suffer punishment for a wrong committed through no fault of his would, from this point of view, have been absolutely unintelligible. So also would be the theory that crimes can be expiated by the sufferings of the innocent. And at the present day such beliefs are explicable only as survivals or recrudescences of Hebraic barbarism, quite impossible in a completely Hellenized society.

A spiritualized morality relieves the individual from all responsibility for actions not committed intentionally by him or

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through any negligence on his part. But within the sphere of individual life it extends responsibility from overt acts to thoughts and desires. A Spartan who consulted the Delphic oracle on the desirability of appropriating a deposit that he had sworn to return received for answer that his very question amounted to a crime and would be punished as such. When the poet Sophocles dwelt somewhat too rapturously on the charms of a beautiful stranger Pericles reminded him that the eyes of a general should be as pure as his hands. And in what is believed to be a portrait of Aristeides, Æschylus describes him as wishing not to seem but to be the best.

An intention or wish may be made the subject of human, or at least of divine penalties, as we saw in the case of the fraudulent Spartan, and may be repressed solely through the fear of such. Therefore to complete the spiritualization of morality it must become wholly disinterested, or dependent on none but internal sanctions. Greek philosophy rose to this height. It pronounced the distinguished mark of a sage to be that he would act as before if the laws ceased to exist. And Plato pushed the principle to an extreme when he maintained that even if the just man should live in obloquy and die in torment he would have chosen wisely in preferring righteousness to prosperous iniquity.

The sanction of disinterested virtue lies in the pain given by a wounded conscience to those who violate its dictates. Both the notion and the name of conscience are Greek creations, and first received wide currency from the Stoic philosophy whence they passed to St. Paul and became so thoroughly incorporated with Christian theology that in the opinion of many the existence of such an inward monitor was unknown to Paganism. But we find it distinctly recognized by Isocrates* a century before Zeno taught at Athens; nor can we suppose that a popular rhetorician was the first to formulate so profound a thought. Indeed the thing itself goes back to Homer, in the character of whose Helen it is a distinguishing trait: Alike in the supreme triumph of her beauty on the walls

*"Demonicus," *.

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of Troy and in the dignity of her rehabilitated matronhood at Sparta the sense of forfeited female honor is ever present to her thoughts, and that without the least admixture of supernatural terror, for the goddess Aprodite is offended by her scruples, or of shrinking from public opinion, for no voice is raised against her but her own.

"In justice," says Phocylides, "is summed up the whole of virtue." "Justice," says an unknown Greek author, "is more beautiful than the morning or evening star." But what, after all, did they mean by it? Aristotle, who quotes these lyrical expressions, gives no very helpful definition; nor does Plato, although his "Republic" was written to develop the idea of justice. Here again we may profitably consult Isocrates. That excellent teacher tells us not to do to others what would make us angry if it were done to us*—the first and far the more important part of the golden rule. The principle is not enunciated as if it were particularly new; but Isocrates applies it elsewhere in a way that was new to his contemporaries, that had not occurred to anyone outside Greece, and that even now is not universally recognized. He tells husbands that they have no right to exact from their wives what they do not give, and that the fidelity which they demand is equally obligatory on themselves.† Monogamy had been a law with the Greeks so far back as we can trace their history, and they regarded polygamy with abhorrence as a custom of the Barbarian,‡—a fact which those should remember who set the Hebrews, a polygamous people, on a higher moral plane. And we see by this passage in Isocrates that some at least among the Greeks were prepared to draw the logical consequences of monogamy. Nor was the principle here enunciated ever quite forgotten. Plato also in his last period enjoins the same constancy on husbands, though rather on grounds of social utility than of justice;§ and although the first Stoics, like some moderns, advocated free love for both sexes alike, Epictetus, writing four

*"Nicocles," *.
†Ibid. 40.
‡Euripides, "Andromache," 177, 243, 464.
§"Laws," 839-40. "Manual," xxxiii., 8.

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centuries later, returns to the same standard of conjugal fidelity, with the recommendation, which is also Platonic, of antenuptial chastity for men as well as for women.

According to the Greeks the obligations of equality and reciprocity rested on natural law. The invariable return of physical phenomena at equal intervals of time, the co-existence and mutual limitation of the everlasting elements that make up the universe, were so many object-lessons in justice, so many silent protests against the abuse of superior strength or the violation of sworn pledges among men. And unmeasured indulgence in sensual gratifications was similarlv interpreted as a derogation from the rationality by which Nature had expressly distinguished men from brutes. Thus the maxim, Follow Nature, came to be accepted as the great constitutive principle of morals. And it was not merely used as a general sanction for the accepted code of conduct, but still more as a potent engine of reform, as a protest against inveterate abuses, or as an index to new ideals of perfection. We have not now to discuss the logical value of the physiocratic method. It may be used at all times and it was more than once used at Athens as an apology for anti-social egoism on the part of individuals or of states. Civilization itself has been condemned as a departure from Nature; and conversely Nature might be denounced as the great enemy of civilization, with the further deduction that no artificial refinement on our original pleasures should be tabooed merely on the ground that it is unnatural. But good causes are often supported by bad reasons; and whether logical or not, the Greek appeal to Nature seems on the whole to have made for righteousness. Certain detestable vices were once for all stigmatized as unnatural, and a constant warfare kept up against them by the philosophers from Prodicus to Plotinus until the attack was taken over by Christianity to be prosecuted with more drastic methods, although, if we are to believe Roger Bacon and Dante, for a long time with no greater success.

Another application of the same principle led to the denunciation of slavery as contrary to nature. The cry was apparently first raised to justify the revolt of the Messenian

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Helots against their Spartan masters, but it soon received a far wider application. Certain philosophers struck at the root of what was not then a "peculiar institution" by declaring that all men were born free. This assumption has been mercilessly criticized by Bentham, and more recently on the same lines by Huxley. As a question of logic their triumph is complete; but the crudeness of the naturalistic formula should not blind us to the truth that it contains. To enslave a human being is to treat him like a brute, or in the still more degrading phrase of Aristotle, like a living tool; and no reasonable being will in the long run submit to such treatment, or regard it as anything but an outrage. Reasonings of a more elaborate and far-reaching character show that the exploitation of one class by another leads to the ruin of the whole community; but nothing so surely rouses the oppressed to revolt, or the brave and disinterested to the championship of their cause as an appeal to this wounded sentiment; and it is part of our ethical debt to the Greeks that the appeal was first made by them.

To assert one's own rights and to respect the rights of others is much, but it is not all; and human nature being what it is a well-organized community cannot rest on the single virtue of justice. After law, and the spirit of law which is equity, we must bring in the third and completing element of morality, which is love. I am not sure what is the current estimate of the Greeks in this respect. Perhaps the same popular writers and preachers who deny them morality and conscience think of them also—*ad majorem Dei gloriam*—as a heartless and selfish people, wrapped up in a sense of their own superiority to the rest of the world. Mr. Stillman, who stood up for the modern Greeks, called their Pagan ancestors (or predecessors) a cruel and bloodthirsty *canaille*. Burckhardt, with more scholarship than Stillman, seems to have arrived at pretty much the same conclusion. In fact they suffer from being so very modern. We judge them not by comparison with the Jews or the Romans or even with mediæval Christendom, but by our own ethical standards.

Here again the antithesis between Hellenes and Barbarians may prove helpful. In English and other modern languages

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"barbarous," as we know, has the secondary meaning of inhuman and cruel. But this association has come down to us from the Latin, and was adopted by the Latins from the Greeks. In Greek literature the instances where "barbarous" is used in the sense of cruel are certainly late and few; but they are sufficient to show that cruelty was regarded as essentially alien to the Greek character. Nor was the belief unfounded. History and literature testify to its validity, to the relative humanity of the Greeks, and more especially of those among them in whom the Hellenic type most perfectly realized itself. The Achilles of Homer was a merciful victor until the death of Patroclus almost extinguished pity in his breast, and even then it could be reawakened by the tears of Priam. Euripides tells us that to slay prisoners of war was against the laws of Athens. The Spartan Gylippus pleaded, though in vain, for the lives of the captive Athenian generals at Syracuse; and another great Spartan, Callicratidas, declared that no Greek should be sold into slavery with his consent. With the spread of philosophy this feeling received a wider extension. Agesilaus impressed on his troops the duty of treating their Persian prisoners with humanity. Epameinondas refused to participate in a political assassination. Dion, the pupil of Plato, declared that he had learned in the Academy not merely to be loyal to his friends but to forgive injuries and to be gentle to transgressors; and we know from Plato's "Laws" that this was really what the master taught. Philip and Alexander too, though ruling over a semi-barbarous people, and not without a deep taint of barbarism in their personal habits, showed in their hour of triumph a clemency hitherto unknown to the possessors of irresponsible power.

These, it may be admitted, are no more than individual instances of a merciful disposition. But language may fairly be quoted in evidence of its wide diffusion. The very word humanity is of Greek origin, being a translation (through the Latin) of φιλανθρωπία, which conveys the same meaning with a somewhat warmer tone. And there is the more direct evidence of Plato, who tells us that one expects the inhabitants of a Greek city to be good and gentle. Gentleness and human-

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ity, says Isocrates, are of all qualities the most highly esteemed among men; and the Athenians at least liked to be complimented on their possession. But the best proof of their prevalence is afforded by a passage where it is quite incidentally and unintentionally disclosed. In what is meant to be a very satirical picture of democratic society, obviously drawn from his own native city, Plato mentions that the last extreme of popular liberty is where "the slave is just as free as his purchaser." Even allowing for exaggeration, where so much as this could be said slaves must have been very kindly treated. And it is a fresh tribute to Athenian humanity when Plato adds that "horses and asses have a way of marching along [in the streets of a democratic city] with all the rights and dignities of freemen." He also mentions, what to many will sound the most surprising thing of all, that under an extreme democracy, *i. e.* at Athens, there was complete equality between the sexes.

To appreciate fully the humanity of the Greeks we must compare them with the other leading nations of antiquity. Little need be said of the great Oriental monarchies. Of these Egypt seems to have been the least barbarous; yet Egyptian sculptors loved to represent their most famous kings in the act of butchering a crowd of defenceless captives, and their laborers as fainting under the taskmaster's stick. The Phœnicians with their crucifixions and human holocausts may also be summarily dismissed. If the early annals of the Israelites as recorded in the Hexateuch were authentic we could no more ascribe any feeling of humanity to such a sanguinary and fanatical horde than to the Huns or to Abdul Hamid. Happily, and to the no small satisfaction of enlightened modern Jews, the wholesale atrocities recounted with so much complacency by the priestly historian are demonstrably fictitious. But the fiction has a historical value. It shows what were the ideals of the Jewish nation in the fifth century B. C., and presumably of their descendants for many centuries afterwards; and the impression thus created is deepened by the testimony of the equally fabulous book of Esther.

The only people of antiquity who can dispute the moral

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supremacy of Greece are the Romans. They had no doubt their advantages, but of these humanity was not one. In reference to the political struggles of the early Roman republic Macaulay has indeed credited them with a tenderness for the lives of their fellow-citizens unknown to Greek factions. But Dr. Arnold has conclusively vindicated the Greeks from this aspersion. He points out that the bloodless struggles between the Patricians and the Plebeians are more properly paralleled by the equally bloodless contest of the "party of the coast" at Athens with the Eupatridæ; and the more sanguinary faction-fights of later Greek history with the proscriptions of Marius and Sulla or of the Triumvirs.*

Apart from such episodical outbreaks of passion we have indubitable proofs of the inhumanity of the Romans in the barbarous character of their punishments—especially their custom of flogging before executing, even in the case of prisoners of war—and still more of their amusements. It must indeed be admitted that through the contagion of Roman example the gladiatorial games spread at last over the whole Hellenic world. But Greek philosophy kept up a steady protest against this barbarity; and when it was proposed to introduce the games into Athens, Demonicus the Cynic called on the people to begin by pulling down the altar of pity. According to the modern writer who has studied the civilization of the Empire most profoundly this amusement was never popular with any but the dregs of the people in Greece;† and it was finally abolished in the west through the heroic self-sacrifice of a Greek. Everyone has heard how the monk Telemachus made his way from the heart of the eastern Empire to protest against the cruel exhibitions still kept up at Rome; how he descended into the arena of the Coliseum, threw himself between the combatants, perished by their swords, and produced such an effect by his death that public opinion insisted on the abolition of the gladiatorial games. But how few think of this pathetic story except as redounding to the glory of Christianity! Assuredly the death of Telemachus does honor to

*Arnold's "Thucydides," I., p. 519.

†Friedlander, "Sittengeschichte Roms," II., p. 384, 5th ed.

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his religion. But it also does honor to his race and to that philosophical training which had been preparing it through long ages to accept with enthusiasm the new faith that was to give Greek philanthropy a mystical consecration and a world-wide diffusion.

Before the advent of Christianity the diffusion if not the consecration had already begun. Renan, if I remember rightly, has said that the Greeks despised the Barbarians too much to embrace them in a single fraternity. But here as elsewhere the great French critic betrays the ineradicable prejudices of a seminarist. No ancient race was so generous to its neighbors or so beloved by them as the Greeks. Already in Homer the note of generous sympathy with a foeman is struck, and it never ceases to vibrate through the hearts of his successors. Cyrus and Anacharsis were Greek ideals; even Xerxes obtained a meed of admiration; and Rome owes much of her glory to the rapturous eulogies of Greek historians. It was seen that the superiority claimed and justly claimed over the Barbarians did not belong to the Hellenic race as such, for in earlier ages there had been no marked difference, and the primitive barbarism still survived in some Hellenic tribes, but was, as we should say, an evolution due to favorable circumstances. Hellenism in fact meant culture; and culture could be communicated to all who desired it. In the language of Hippias the distinctions of birth were conventional; by nature all like-minded persons are kinsmen, friends and fellow-citizens. In the language of Isocrates the partakers of Athenian culture should sooner be called Hellenes than those who were merely of the same race. And in the same spirit a doctrine of human collectivism was subsequently preached by the Cynic, and with more elaboration by the Stoic school. Finally Eratosthenes followed by Plutarch proposed to abolish the distinction between Greeks and Barbarians, and to replace it by a classification based entirely on the contrast between virtue and vice.

Had more of the earlier Stoic literature been preserved we should doubtless have more such generous sayings on record. As it is the philosophic writers of the Empire—some of them

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Romans—must remain our principal authorities for the idea of a common humanity with its implicit obligations of mutual service and love. But even if Seneca and Marcus Aurelius did not directly copy from the older masters, the spirit of their teaching remains purely Hellenic, and is derived by an unbroken tradition from the schools of Athens.

Moral reform is the verification of ethics. If the lectures delivered at Athens exercised no regenerating influence on their hearers, then they were, what the enemies of philosophy called them, mere chatter, sophistry, waste of time; at best an abstract expression for what had been felt and done in the uncorrupted prime of Hellas. And this is what we are still, or were until lately, taught to regard as the net result of speculative Paganism by theologians who fail to see that as good a case might be made out against Christianity if its enemies employed the same logic. But the facts are beginning to be more impartially studied and better understood. A brilliant historian to whom I have already referred, Professor Beloch, points out how much more humanely war was conducted by Greek generals in the fourth century B. C. than in the fifth, and what better ideas as to the position of women were beginning to make their way in the society of the same period. And he has no hesitation in ascribing this improved tone to the new standards introduced by philosophy. Nor can it be truly said that this advance was paid for by a proportionate decline in the manlier virtues. Courage and patriotism continued to be displayed when circumstances called them forth. The defence of Athens against Demetrius, against Antigonus, and, much later, against Sulla was not inferior to the deeds of the Persian and Peloponesian wars, and numerous examples of a like heroism are to be found in the later history of other Greek states.*

Still more striking is the evidence offered by the history of the third century A. D. Alone among the inhabitants of the Empire the Greeks of that period spontaneously took up arms against the Gothic invaders and largely contributed to their

*Beloch, "Griechische Geschichte," II., p. 441.

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destruction. This successful resistance is significant in more than one way. It bears witness not only to a revival of the old heroism but also to the existence of an abundant and vigorous population. It would seem then that there had been a cessation or decrease of those immoral practices which in the classic age of Greek civilization made war on family life. The improvement has been ascribed to the spread of Christianity, but there seem to be no grounds for such an assumption. It does not appear from independent evidence that the new religion had made the advances that would have been necessary to account for so great a change; nor were its doctrines favorable either to family life or to the military spirit. And—what seems decisive—the most vigorous resistance to the invaders was offered at Athens, the last city in the Empire to be converted to Christianity. But even were the contention true it would detract little if at all from the ethical value of Hellenism. Christianity could only convert the Greeks into heroic patriots by acting on the latent possibilities of the Greek genius itself.

If indeed the question of obligation be once raised we shall have to ask not so much what the Greeks owe to Christianity as what it owes to them. The answer has been already given by modern criticism. Catholicism in its original and only true sense is but the theological expression for universal Hellenic humanitv. The much decried Tübingen school has made good at least one point—that the Church was first converted from a Jewish sect into a world-wide society by the Hellenist St. Paul, who in his turn owed his conversion to the martyr-death of the Hellenist Stephen. And, quite apart from the question of admission to church-membership, the root-ideas of Pauline theology are only intelligible when interpreted in the light of Plato's metaphysics. In other words where Christianity differs most widely from Judaism it approaches most nearly to Greek thought. And this applies not only to faith but to morals. The antithesis between Hebraism and Hellenism still remains valid, though in a sense different from that assumed by Matthew Arnold. We do not exactly go for lessons in veracity or in justice, in gentleness or in breadth of

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sympathy, to the Jewish scriptures: if we want them we shall find them given with incomparable charm in the literature of the Ionian race. And so long as moral training shall be imparted through Christian agencies it is vitally necessary that those agencies should be kept in touch with the sources whence the early Church derived its most human inspiration. For present purposes then the ethical value of Hellenism may be defined as its influence in fixing attention on the purely moral side of the popular religion, and in preparing men's minds for the eventual reception of a morality independent of religious sanctions.

ALFRED W. BENN.

FLORENCE, ITALY.

RELIGION AND ETHICS.

THIS paper does not deal with the origins of religion and ethics but with their meaning and implications. It does not enter the domain of the positive sciences. "Modern physical science aims at a mechanical interpretation of all the phenomena of the universe,"* an unattainable ideal, but even if attained, were every effect explicable mechanically, yet would our inquiry remain untouched and our problem unsolved. So too, could we show fully the sociological and biological significance of religion and ethical functioning, we should thereby have led up merely to the beginning of our study. To show the mechanical sequences involved and the biological and sociological significance of these acts is to show that man in his religious and ethical nature is not a miracle, not an intruder, but a part of the one great system of the world. Accepting this, none the less the meaning of ethics and religion can be determined only by reflection based upon a study of their phenomena, and this is just as true even though we conclude that the full meaning is exhausted in the description of the method of their production. To make mechanism all, or most important, is to reach a conclusion which is metaphysical no less than

*Stallo—"Modern Physics," p. 15.

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its opposite. My only desire in this introduction is to disown the wish to exclude any part of the subject from the scope of the investigation of the positive sciences while insisting upon the equal importance of metaphysical reflection.

Evidently, we cannot assume a supernatural origin. Such an assumption would take us out of the range of science and its investigation would be as far from our purpose as a discussion of the mechanical theory. The question between evolutionist and special creationalist, if it be still a question, for us simply does not arise. We start with man as he is, as we know him to-day.

As he is to-day so he has been throughout the whole range of history with comparatively small modifications. And if appeal is made from this statement to the fact that man could make himself known to remote generations only when he had attained, substantially, the status he now occupies, we agree that the propositions are identical but point out that this man, as we know him, is our undoubted fact. To start with man at some hypothetical earlier stage as essential to our explanation, and then to reduce man's meaning to the significance of that relatively undeveloped stage, is to substitute theory for fact, and to give us in the name of the scientific imagination a new series of myths. In other words, it is an attempt to explain the known by the unknown, and, valuable and legitimate as the process may be, scientifically it cannot be permitted to throw discredit upon the facts we directly know.

Historically man is distinguished by the two features we are discussing, he is ethical and he is religious. Almost no other generalization rests upon a wider or more certain induction. It will, I suppose, be unchallenged, but needs of course definition. Let us begin with religion.

Religion is the recognition of super-sensible realities as superior and worshipful.

(*a*) Religion has to do with the invisible and the intangible. The merest peasant who worships the rock out of which a tree grows does not worship it as rock. Nor when he restrains the sacrilegious globe-trotter from throwing a can down the crater of a volcano with the exclamation, "It is God!" has he

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any notion that the mountain *quâ* mountain is divine. It is not the stone, nor the tree, nor the image, nor the cave, nor the mountain, nor the sun, nor the river; but all these are sacred because they are not merely rock, river or tree. Let the peasant be convinced to the contrary, viz.: let him believe them to be so much brute matter and *ipso facto* he ceases to worship them. In the visible, which he does not worship, he is conscious of something more which he does worship.

And this same consciousness continues in all stages of religious development. The peasant conceives it under semi-materialistic forms, for so only can he think, while the idealistic philosopher calls it the transcendental and attempts to free it from all phenomenal elements; but in both alike is the feeling of a somewhat other than this visible and tangible world with which our senses have normally to do. In this, religious feeling differs from the æsthetic, for could the universe be shown to be, all in all, only a great machine, religion would vanish, but æsthetics I take it would continue in part at least as before.

(*b*) This supersensible somewhat is recognized as real; indeed, while in religious mood, as the highest reality. To the peasant its presence is mediated by things of sense, but it is more real than they and gives them their value. The conception varies, of course, with education until a Matthew Arnold thinks of "a stream of tendency," and different as his thought is from the semi-materialistic fancy of the fetish worshiper, yet he too conceives this "stream" not as mere ideal but as real.

(*c*) It is worshipful. The peasant bows before it, mutters his prayer, and feels in its presence awe, wonder, maybe fear, and worships. The philosopher may use no outward form, utter no word, and yet, putting this as highest, worship in spirit and in truth.

(*d*) It is good, that is, it meets the desires of the worshiper. The pacification of bad gods is a perversion of the religious sentiment, though the misconception from which it arises is natural enough. Even a religion avowedly pessimistic like Buddhism holds goodness fundamental. For the evils of existence may be escaped and the teaching of Buddha is a joyful

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message of salvation. But the belief that man may be saved is faith in ultimate goodness, else the last word would be,—"Which way I fly is hell: Myself am hell;" and from despair comes no religion.

(*e*) And finally, this supersensible presence is believed to "respond" to the worshiper. Religion is not conceived as one-sided, beginning and ending in ourselves, but is communion with the transcendent and the divine. The "response" also is of course conceived variously, including the vague feeling stirred in the heart of the peasant, dreams and visions, the multiform phenomena of possession, the ecstacy of extreme emotionalism variously stimulated, deliverance through miraculous interference, communion with a personal God in Theistic religions, and the beatific vision of the philosopher who feels his individual self swallowed up in the Infinite and finds the peace which passeth all understanding as he perceives God to be all and in all.

These five elements then are constituent of religion, the unseen, the transcendent, recognized as real, as worshipful, the good and as "responding" to us. In all religions from lowest to highest they are found and together form an inclusive definition.

It follows that religion does not spring from fear (observe how dear to his heart is the religion of the devotee), though fear doubtless often stimulates and quickens the religious sense. Nor does it arise from the sense of dependence, though this is often closely related to it. But man worships, sometimes, that on which he does not recognize himself as dependent. It is not merely with prayers for help that the worshiper goes to his god, but fully as much with adoration and praise. The religious man, so to speak, instinctively worships, without needing further reason. Nor is religion the offspring of ignorance, though it is true the ignorant man ignorantly worships many things he afterwards recognizes as unworthy of being symbols of the Divine being. But this successive purification and correction no more prove that religion is essentially the offspring of ignorance than does the progressive rejection of

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hypotheses and insufficient generalizations prove that science is the offspring of ignorance. Religion is not negative but positive, and to the religious man increase of knowledge means increase of worship, so that he shall worship most who knows most. Neither is religion the offspring of animism, nor of fetichism, nor of ancestor worship, nor of totemism. As well might one suppose it the offspring of Methodism, or of Presbyterianism. These are various expressions of the religious consciousness which is deeper than them all and source of them all. Nor is religion one with theologies, in any form. It does not come from our instinct of causality, or of personality. Theologies are philosophies or cosmologies, crude or profound, explanations of the phenomena, varying with each grade of man's evolution. Theology none the less, as matter of course, influences religion and this at every stage. For our separation of the religious feeling from the theological concept is more or less artificial, since consciousness always contains feeling, thought and will. Let us discuss this a little more fully.

Could philosophy demonstrate the unreality of the being worshiped, not by this worshiper or that, but in general so that material elements would represent the all, religion as we have seen would cease. Could theology establish an absentee God, who had at some time revealed his will but had now withdrawn himself, again religion would disappear. There might be the obligation to believe certain statements touching such a God, but none to worship, and by hypothesis no communion with him. At best there would be a belief in such communion in some future world. But, apart from such extreme views, theology must modify the content of the religious consciousness at every point. Our theology varies with every variation in our general view of the world and therefore it is vain to look for agreement in the developed contents, but only in the vague and primary feelings as above interpreted. For example, if we begin with our open-mouthed peasant in Japan going on a pilgrimage, we shall get from him no answer which is articulate. The wonderful to him is God, mediated to him by the unusual in nature and in man and in art. When more educated

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he will speak of *rei,* meaning some mysterious personage, and of *ki,* a mysterious power. Trained by a priest he will speak of the *hotoke* (Buddhas), and of gods many and diverse. With these differing conceptions, theologies, he will narrate a differing experience. That is, he interprets his religious experience in terms of his theology and by means of his theology brings new experiences under the head of religion, rejecting old expressions and experiences as no longer adequate. At the lowest he will worship the wonderful, at the highest, trained now in Chinese philosophy, he will give up native gods and shrines, will reject Buddhist images and temples and will say, "Fear the will of Heaven. When man leaves all else and is humane and true he accords with Heaven; it surely cherishes and embraces him." At the starting point is a feeling vague and almost indescribable, and a theology equally vague and inarticulate, with a worship unorganized and of simplest form. But as the conceptions grow in clearness so does the experience. In well-defined polytheism are direct communications from the gods, direct answers to prayers, a priesthood, sacrifices, temples and an experience, mediated by all these, itself elaborate and complex. So through all forms, henotheistic, monotheistic, pantheistic, the religious element remains but varies, is impoverished or enriched, ennobled or debased according to man's stage of culture and his general view of the world. Even in the highest abstraction, in the pantheistic view which seeks oneness and not communion there is still language which can be interpreted only in the tones of all religious experience, and man may be God-intoxicated while denying God. Like the peasant, though from the other extreme, he too can find no words to express that which he feels and knows.

We separate then the two elements, the religious instinct present in all forms, and the developed religious consciousness dependent upon our general view of the world and modified directly by our theology. From this the inference is obvious, viz.:—that we can make few statements as to religion in general, but must discuss religions in particular, if we would go beyond these vague and general points all have in common.

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For example, we ask—Is religion beneficial? But we can only answer—What religion? From its emotional nature religion lends itself readily to immorality, and to superstition. To immorality because the religious feelings are akin to other feelings and unless carefully discriminated are associated with sensuality, fear, anger, cruelty and the like. Religion then gives its sanction to these passions and forms a combination of terrible strength and evil. The religious feeling like all others longs for gratification, is of great strength, and may readily be misled into supposing itself gratified through the stimulation of other passions. It lends itself with equal readiness to superstition, for it precedes a reasoned view of the world, lays hold uncritically of objects and teachings which seem to offer it a basis, renders its objects sacred, objects to their criticism, and thus remains in the past while the science of the present moves on to other view-points. Thus results the never-ending conflict not only of science and theology, but of science and religion in so far as the religious experience clings to and finds expression through the conceptions of the past held sacred in theology. No religious feeling is "pure" but each is in part offspring of concepts which are joined with these feelings from the beginning, and therefore at no stage has this conflict been escaped excepting when for uncertain periods man's view of the world has remained unchanged and in harmony with the cosmological teachings of the prevalent religious faith.

As thus religion is not essentially a philosophy, or a cosmology, though it is in all stages associated with these; so, too, religion is to be distinguished from ethics. Even when somewhat developed it may have no ethical code. It is said that *Shinto* has as its teaching only this,—Fear the gods and obey the Emperor! But in its earliest book there is not even this teaching, nothing which implies either as an ethical maxim. The later writers explain this unusual feature by saying that the Japanese, being holy by nature, needed no moral code, which was invented by immoral folk like the Hindus and the Chinese. But even the mythology of the *Kojiki* offers ethical material of a sort, that is, it indicates the ethics of its own time and shows the current conceptions of right and wrong, though

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not yet as moral precepts binding upon others, or on anyone. It reflects the ethical, as it reflects the political and social condition of the people, but is not itself ethical more than political. Nor in its development is religion necessarily ethical. Indeed an argument to the effect that it is a drag on ethical progress might well be made, since its mythology renders sacred a moral state which has been transcended, and deeds are ascribed to the gods which are abhorrent to men. Sanctions too are sought in their words and conduct for acts condemned by prevalent standards. Then antinomies result and religion is denied in the name of ethics.

But the phenomena are by means so uniform that one may deduce a consistent philosophy of this relationship. Doubtless ethical teaching in a somewhat pure and high state of development, in advance even of the development of the masses of the people, has been associated with religion, and a sanction for right conduct in religious teaching of a future judgment has been a powerful impetus to a relatively right conduct. Huxley thinks that men without moral sense can only be compelled by fear and religion has supplied this fear. But in certain instances religion has gone beyond this.

The best division of religion is into natural and ethical, or natural and personal, which comes to the same thing. Of course, no division is satisfactory, but this for the moment will answer our purpose. Here we come, in the second class, to the great religions which go back to an historical founder—Buddhism, Confucianism, Zoroastrianism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. All of these religions unite ethics with religion in a fashion which is comparatively unknown in the religions which cannot thus be traced back to great teachers. The most striking illustration of all is found in the prophets of Israel who transformed a tribal worship into ethical monotheism with, as result, a conception of God of the highest significance. To these men righteousness is the fundamental fact and God is worshipful because he is holy. The one appeal is to conscience—and religion finds its consummation in ethics.

In turning to this second subject we follow the same order of discussion. We are not concerned with the topics, that is

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to say, which take up the largest place in such discussions usually, but in that which has a relatively small place. We are not then to ask the origin of our ethical instinct, whether created or evolved; nor as to our ethical judgments, whether gained by experience or through intuition; nor with special types of ethical doctrine; nor with the distinctions of ethical maxims. Clifford says that the "maxims of ethics are hypothetical maxims, derived from experience and based on the assumption of the uniformity of nature." And again, "By morals I mean the doctrine of a special kind of pleasure or displeasure which is felt by the human mind in contemplating certain courses of conduct, whereby they are felt to be right or wrong." We might fear a murderer "but every one knows that these feelings are quite distinct, different from the feelings which condemn murder as a wrong thing ..... it is as distinct and recognizable as the feeling of pleasure in a sweet taste." "The particular things commanded or forbidden .... depend upon the character of the individual in whose mind they arise."* In the same essay Clifford derives man's moral sense from his tribal relations, though he thus clearly enough recognizes the instinct as something deeper than this derivation would indicate. Huxley also, in his Romanes lecture on Evolution and Ethics, professes to show the origin of ethics in the wolves which can hunt in packs on the tacit agreement that they will not hurt each other. But he says elsewhere† that the origin of the moral sense is undiscoverable, "they who have it need no other motive, while the rules of conduct can be discovered in the same way as others by observation and experiment." Now we, as in the earlier part of this discussion, are concerned with this moral sense, but not with its origin. It does not concern us to decide whether its origin be undiscoverable or whether it can be sought out—or if the latter be true, which one of a dozen theories is correct. Suppose we take Clifford's phrase and think of the maxims as hypothetical; this being right, do it; and correcting our tradi-

*"Lectures and Essays," ii., pp. 106-126.

†"Life and Letters," ii., 324.

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tional and inherited conscience by our reason, using the term in its narrower sense, let us determine the right as we will. Being thus finally determined the moral sense responds: Do it. This moral sense is the *prius* of all ethical systems, of all ethical maxims, and is not explicable by those maxims. It belongs with the deepest sensibilities, as Huxley puts it. Our question then has to do with this moral sense or instinct, and not with any empirical contents. We ask, why should we give heed to this sense, and respond affirmatively to the "ought"? We may indeed dismiss the sense of obligation as illusion, though thus doing we shall find it difficult to escape *maya* anywhere in the whole universe. Or we may say we do not respond to it, being right supplies no motive for my conduct; but then though we frankly separate ourselves from the moral world, we still discuss it as the man with no sense for music discusses it as phenomenon in others. But our problem is not even as to the existence of the feeling of oughtness, neither its origin, nor its universality, nor its character, nor its contents; but only this, the right being discovered, why should I do it?

The first thing which strikes the attention is this: moral science differs from the positive sciences in that its special and primary object is "to determine what ought to be, and not to ascertain what merely is."* Mr. Sidgwick continues—"Ethical Science might, according to usage, denote studies that deal with the actually existent, viz., either the department of Psychology that deals with pleasures and pains, desires and volitions, moral sentiments and judgments, as actual phenomena of individual human minds; or the department of Sociology dealing with similar phenomena, as exhibited by the larger organizations of which individual human beings are elements. We observe, however, that comparatively few persons pursue these studies from pure curiosity, in order merely to ascertain what actually exists, has existed, or will exist in time. Most men wish not only to understand human action, but also to regulate it; they apply the ideas 'good' and 'bad,' 'right' and 'wrong,' to the conduct or institutions which they describe; and thus

*"Methods of Ethics," p. 1.

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pass, as I should say, from the point of view of Psychology and of Sociology to the point of view of Ethics. It is true the mutual implication of the two kinds of study is, on any theory, very close and complete." And yet the distinction is clear and to be made, and thus distinguishing, let me repeat, ethics deals not merely with that which is but with that which should be.

The man of good form conforms to the multitude. It is the sufficient plea that everyone does it. In ethics this plea is inadmissible. To go with the multitude to do evil is to be condemned. That everyone does it is not accepted by this tribunal. It rejects the rule which says, whatever is, is right. To justify feathering one's own nest because peculation is in fashion, to teach sophistry because sophists abound and are popular, to applaud aggression and support it in our government because the world is being divided among the great powers, to cling to possessions or even to life in preference to principle, is to repudiate ethics.

Not only does the ethical sense appeal from that which is to that which should be, it imperatively commands obedience. When once determined no dispute is possible. We may indeed disobey, but, disobeying, we forsake moral ground and to the moral man disobedience is impossible. For example, Mr. Huxley recognized nature as non-moral and terrible. He also knew it to be the fashion to cover up the facts, preaching peace when there is no peace; but for himself "he would rather have a millstone tied to his neck and be cast into the sea than to be with those who cover up these awful realities."* John Stuart Mill we remember elected Hell rather than declare that to be just in God which is unjust in man, and plain men in every land and age have suffered the loss of all things and even of life itself in obedience to this imperative ought, witnesses to that which is not but should be. Prudence dictates a careful following of the way of the world. The moral sense often demands that we forsake it at all hazards. Our question is, how can this be rational?

Another instance illustrates the same fact from a different

*"Life and Letters, ii., 323.

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point of view. Nothing is more impressive than the development of the scientific conscience. By its rigorous method it separates natural knowledge from "the human prejudice and hasty ingenuity and delusive rhetoric or poetry which might have adulterated it." No seeming good, no apparent gain is to turn the man of science from devotion to his facts. And yet it is not devotion to facts precisely—not to the world as known. "Science is an ordered systematic pursuit of knowledge."* The fact we now have is only a starting place for adventure in search of facts not yet known. Romanes† with his usual convincing clearness sets forth the method of science. It is from facts to hypothesis and from hypothesis to facts again, and so to more facts and new hypotheses in constantly widening circles. Haeckel‡ insists upon the same truth and points out the provisional nature of all hypotheses. Each theory is held as a working hypothesis, the best basket, it has been said, in which to get our eggs to market, but when it has served its turn, to be cast aside for a new basket holding in safety our larger supply of eggs. This strict relativity of scientific knowledge is one of its most striking characteristics. It is an unending search for truth, and every truth attained is accepted only as an instalment to be supplemented and corrected by greater truths to come.

Let me dwell for an instance upon this phase of scientific faith. It involves certain remarkable beliefs. It believes that truth can be found in the very act of confessing that it has not been found. Given evil in the world and we find it hard to believe in fundamental goodness, but, given error and we have no difficulty in its despite in believing that truth exists and can be found. Of course there are sceptics here also, but the true sceptic must abjure science and he to whom the scientific conscience is a fact is not disturbed though some men think him a fool for his pains.

From the world which is known science then fares forth to the world which is not known, and the scientific conscience,

*"Groundwork of Science," p. 3.
†"Darwin and after Darwin," pp. 1-8.
‡"The Riddle of the Universe," pp. 299*f*.

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in its command to be true to facts, rests in the belief that this unknown world can be known, and being known will prove worth the knowing; indeed, better worth the knowing than the world we know. That is the motive for the adventure and it is believed in spite of all seeming evidence to the contrary. Let me quote an extreme instance—

"So far as I am individually concerned the result of this analysis has been to show that, whether I regard the problem of Theism on the lower plane of strictly relative probability, or on the higher plane of purely formal considerations, it equally becomes my obvious duty to stifle all belief of the kind which I conceive to be the noblest, and to discipline my intellect in regard to this matter into an attitude of the purest scepticism. And . . . . I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God, the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept of 'work while it is day' will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words 'that the night cometh when no man can work,' yet when at times I think . . . . of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as I now find it—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age—or whether it is due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton—Philosophy having become a meditation, not merely of death, but of annihilation, the precept *Know thyself* has been transformed into the terrible oracle of Aedipus—'Mayst thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art.' "*

This then is the climax, the awful vision of that which is compared with that which was supposed to be. But it does not represent at all the depths of Romanes's faith, for he tells us just above—

"It is therefore with the utmost sorrow that I feel myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out. . . . Just as I am confident that truth must in the end be most profitable for the race—so I am persuaded that every individual effort to attain it . . . . ought to be the common property of all men, no matter in what direction the results of its promulgation may appear to tend."†

What then does this mean? That though the universe lose

*"A Candid Examination of Theism," by Physicus (George John Romanes), p. 114.

†Ibid, p. 113.

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its soul of loveliness, yet the only way to well-being is in casting aside all garments of make-believe and accepting truth. On other terms, truth is better than make-believe, however lovely the latter and alluring. Let me again insist, in view of this confession of faith, the scientific conscience demands loyalty to truth at all cost; not to truth as known merely but to truth as yet unknown, in the belief that this truth exists, can be found and is better than our present body of knowledge and better than all the rainbow colors of our most artistic imaginations.

One illustration more. Herbert Spencer in the "Data of Ethics" sets forth a doctrine which shows the ethical man to be the relatively more developed man. The prophet, so to speak, is in advance of his time and shows what is to be. The criminal lags behind and shows the state which is vanishing away. So we, if we be ethical, feel the stirrings of the new time which as yet is not, and we go unhesitatingly as martyrs to prison and stake in obedience to our sense of right. This protest against the present, this appeal to the future is of the nature of the truly ethical man. Here again, as in the two preceding cases, we find the same fact and the same implication. Why should the prophet be true to that which is to be at the cost of renouncing all which is?

In all our ethical study we find the same phenomena, and must—if it be the study not of that which is but of that which ought to be. In its name Huxley will have a millstone tied around his neck, and Stuart Mill will sink deeper than the depths of Huxley's sea, and Romanes will let the universe lose its soul of loveliness, and the plain man will come to want and suffer all this present world can know of loss and woe. Our question is, what is the reason for this, in Huxley, Mill, Romanes, and the unrhetorical plain man?

If I understand him aright, Huxley says merely I do not know. That is complete agnosticism. Why should you do right? I do not know. If I have the moral sense, I'll obey it; if I have it not, I'll disobey it, and that is the end of it. But this is to make the irrational supreme and final, and to act not as a man but from an instinct which is blind. And

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Huxley is in still deeper difficulty, for evolution is evil and this is the devil's world, as he repeats over and over again, and in the Calvinistic theology he sees merely an anthropomorphic statement of these scientific facts. "Of moral purpose I see no trace in nature. That is an article of exclusively human manufacture and very much to our credit."* In his Romanes lecture (p. 6), he describes the ethical man as kicking down the ladder by which he climbed to his present stage, and in another place holds that the criminal is a product of evolution as truly as the saint, and from this point of view no more blameable. He will therefore have no ethics of evolution at all. But if this be the cosmic process and the whole of it, by what rational process can man be asked to separate himself and set up a rule of conduct of his own exclusive manufacture, the reason for which he himself cannot state? He has it, himself has made it, he would have a millstone tied around his neck and be cast into the sea rather than disobey it, but he has no rational explanation for it. Why, in a world in which the struggle for existence is the law and the strongest survive, man should give himself a golden rule and condemn himself for violating it is not apparent. It is an appeal to a blind faith.

Spencer faces the question and gives his answer. † "If for the divine will, supposed to be supernaturally revealed, we substitute the naturally revealed end towards which the Power manifested throughout evolution works: then since evolution has been, and is still, working towards the highest life, it follows that conforming to these principles by which the highest life is achieved is furthering that end. The doctrine that perfection or excellence of nature should be the object of pursuit, is in one sense true; for it tacitly recognizes that ideal form of being which is the highest." This answer suggests our final discussion.

Men, I take it, do not chase rainbows. They do not surrender that which is for that which is not, the real for a mere

*"Life and Letters," p. ii., p. 285.
†"Data of Ethics," pp. 171*f*.

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ideal, the present for an impossible future. Let it be made apparent that evolution as Huxley describes it, *i. e.*, without moral elements, mistakenly as I think, is all: Let it appear that the universe is the vision of horror from which Romanes turned; let it be supposed that that which is, in the empirical sense, is all, and ethics cease or become strictly irrational. There is no answer to the question, why should I do right? and no reason for my choosing or seeking right. But equally there is no reason why science should seek truth.

It is not that which is known empirically which can answer the question. But in all the range, in the plain man who will not sin, in Mill and Huxley in their refusal to go with the multitude to speak evil, in Romanes representative of the scientific man who will be true to the truth, no matter what specters affright, and in Spencer, representative of the prophet who prefers to suffer now as incarnation of the virtue which is to be, the appeal is to the deeper truth, the deeper fact, the reality which transcends that which now is and that which now is known. In the theological language but in the strictest sense the appeal is from the things which are seen to the things which are unseen. In Lotze's thought, the things which *should be*—in deepest sense *are*.

To sum up: Ethics can be rendered rational only on the assumption that there is a reality deeper than the phenomenal world of sense, truer than the world we know and better. Religion is the intuition, the recognition of this reality. It becomes corrupt through its identification with other feelings and passions. Its explanation—theology—becomes superstition through a too ready and uncritical identification of this reality with the symbols and concepts belonging to the varying stages of man's development, determined as theology is by our general view of the world.

Religion becomes worthy only as it is ethical—being thus delivered from false alliances with other feelings and passions; and this unity of ethics and religion has its basis on the facts pointed out above—religion being the feeling of the reality which the ethical sense implicates. The great founders of ethical religion—especially the Hebrew prophets—by insight

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or inspiration—attained the unity maintained in this paper—a unity we thus justify by reflection.

But ethical systems like theological, identify too readily empirical teachings, hypothetical maxims, with ultimate truth. They equally with theology can be set free from superstition only by the method and the results of scientific inquiry. Nor is this something lugged in *ab extra,* for science in its devotion to truth is ethical in the truest sense, and by its search for a higher and better truth postulates the reality which religion trusts.

GEORGE WM. KNOX.

UNION THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY, NEW YORK.

THE CONCEPTION OF NATURE IN THE POEMS OF MEREDITH.

SINCE the beginning of philosophy, the word "Nature" has been the centre of ambiguities, many of them, no doubt, due to mere confusion, but some, it may well be, pointing to conceptions of real value. The whole subject has never been more pressing than now, and it seems worth while to examine in this connection the work of George Meredith, the last of our poets who has sung of a faith in Nature and a lesson from Nature with high and persistent confidence.

At the outset it will be well to restate the chief of the meanings current. On this hand, "nature" is used in what one might call an external sense, either to denote the world as it appears apart from man—the world of the earth and the wild animals, of the sky and the stars—or to include with this all that happens to man as to other creatures except what is due to his own action. On the other hand, it may refer to the inner world in the heart of man himself, and here it may mean all impulses whatsoever, or only those that tend towards fulness of physical life in the individual. Further, and still more important to note, "natural" is used in the sense of "good," good according to the standard set by man, and this both for

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the inner and the outer world. The pure affections of the heart, the grace of a tree, the shapeliness of a horse, are called "natural" in a sense not strictly applicable to what is cruel or ill-proportioned or unseemly. Misapplications, however, are and have always been incessant. A glance at contemporary thought shows what extravagances can follow. Everything in existence must be accepted just as it is; it "comes from nature," and therefore needs no change. Every impulse is "natural," and therefore all are admirable, and ethical chaos has come again. "Self-preservation is the first law of nature," therefore let us glorify brute force and selfishness. It is not, however, my purpose now to dwell on these fallacies, but to ask what are the roots of their persistency. Why in the first instance, was the name of "nature" used for both the inner and the outer world? Why, above all, was "natural" ever chosen as a synonym for "good"?

Now it is obvious that the reverence which the plain man feels for life-promoting impulses ceases at once if they conflict with his ideal of conduct. If he feels an invincible distrust of the suicide, he feels an ineradicable contempt for the soldier who follows the "natural instinct" to run away. Thus, if there is to be any harmony between such judgments, it seems we need a further conception, a belief that somehow these natural impulses are essentially subservient to the moral. Again, the lovers of Nature need not necessarily uphold all her works in themselves as beautiful or beneficent. Even if they misunderstand their own experiences so much as to say, in defiance of clumsiness and dirt, that they find nothing ugly in Nature, they would have to admit that there are degrees in her beauty which need not correspond to degrees in their adoration. It is not only her loveliness that can startle them into recognition. The "meanest flower" can touch as deep springs as the fairest. The pig grunting in the mud can suggest as much as the crossing deerherds "up a clearing's leafy rise."* Nor, unless they shut their eyes to facts, can they deny that Nature is "Nature red in tooth and claw."

* "The Woods of Westermain," G. Meredith.

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Yet they may grant all this and still in spite of hurricane and avalanche they may hear a voice in the mountains and the sea. The root of their love, it would seem, is not satisfaction in this or that natural process as it stands, but a sense of a power in and behind each manifestation that must be something more than the mere outward appearance. Any scene that brings such lovers into this presence can do for them what they need, however much it may repel them in other ways. This is the reason of their passion for desolate scenery, where Nature cannot be obscured, as in a well-kept park, by what has sprung from her, of their irritation with those who will only give her the patronage of their approval when she satisfies their æsthetic demand, of their contempt for those who will only notice her "improving examples," as though the snake and the tiger did not share with the bee and the lamb in the same great fount of life. Yet it cannot be mere naked power that they worship, for their whole attitude is essentially one of love, a love which far from making them forget their own ideal seems to brace them for the struggle towards it. Nature's manifestations may not be beautiful or good, yet they seem to be stamped with something that prompts to goodness and beauty. None need be taken as a model for our action, but the touch of the life in them all somehow stimulate us to our own work. If Nature is not moral in herself, she is yet on the side of morality.

Meredith's doctrine is the completion of all such obscure convictions. The external world, apart from the wills of men, he holds to be the manifestation of one Power, "Nature," a power distinct from Man and yet akin to him, akin to the best he has it in him to be. And the urge in each of us towards physical life and enjoyment springs from the same source, and shows in a similar way a real connection with the Best.

Nature in us is, primarily, the force that makes for individual life, and these impulses are therefore "natural" in the prime sense of the word. But they make for something more and therefore they are to be called "good" also, not good,

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that is, just because they are natural, but because the natural holds in it the seed of good. But the seed is, so to speak, dormant, and can only be developed by our own struggle, a struggle that is not ignorant of pain and failure. Meredith does not attempt to define with philosophical accuracy the precise relation between these impulses and what we may call their fulfillment. And here lies a great danger for those who try to expound him, the danger of putting their own blundering attempts at system-making in the place of his vital essence. To imagine two separate forces at work in man, Nature and Spirit, and two others that thwart them in the cravings of Disease and Sin, seems to make a ridiculous breach in the unity of the individual. To say that the life-promoting impulse is the same force, only at a lower power, as the hunger and thirst after righteousness seems more reasonable, but does not help towards an explanation of the conflict. Leaving all this aside, however, the essential point to hold is that, somehow or other, these impulses do prompt to something beyond themselves, something that our reason could recognize as absolutely good. If we could reach that, we should find ourselves in no less sympathy than before with physical vitality, but the sympathy would have become intelligent: we should have understood its meaning. One "gate of life" at least may be opened by the joys of the flesh. There may be other paths to the goal, but this at any rate is one. Of "bodily exaltations" Meredith writes deliberately in a passage of singular beauty:

"One who has had them (when they do not bind him), may reach the Isles of Bliss sooner than another. Sensual faith in the upper glories is something. 'Let us remember,' says *The Pilgrim's Scrip*, 'that Nature, though heathenish, reaches at her best to the footstool of the Highest. She is not all dust but a living portion of the spheres. In aspiration it is an error to despise her, forgetting that through Nature only can we *ascend*. Cherished, trained and purified, she is then partly worthy the divine mate who is to make her wholly so. St. Simeon saw the Hog in Nature, and took Nature for the Hog.'" *

It is in such a spirit as this that Whitman can celebrate

*"The Ordeal of Richard Feveral," c. 23.

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"the life of my senses and flesh, transcending my senses and flesh," and that Wordsworth can sing of

> "Spontaneous wisdom breathed by health,
> Truth breathed by cheerfulness."*

Half understood, often misunderstood, again and again this belief in Nature and health comes back upon man. The Bacchanal madness may have meant little else. Such a wild guess at truth is Meredith's theme in the daring impressive grotesque he calls "Jump-to-Glory-Jane." To Jane, the peasant founder of a Shaker Sect, jumping has become the very way of life. She has been visited with sensations of bodily health and vigor that open spiritual vistas, sensations that "are to her as the being of angels in her frame," and through all the whimsical absurdity Meredith never lets us forget that

> "It is a lily-light she bears
> For England up the ladder-stairs."

It is not that the indulgence of the senses is a kind of pleasurable sauce to be supped now and then in a holiday mood: the senses are rather the raw material of the satisfying life: they are even more, for they are no alien matter on which a form has to be imposed from without: of themselves they demand for their own peace a higher use: the body, as Meredith puts it, is the bride calling for the spirit who is to be the bridegroom; it is "by her own live warmth" alone that Nature can "be lifted out of slime."† Reason is the child of the great mother, the child who is to interpret her inarticulate cries. There is no ultimate discord in the elements of which we are made. Here on this earth we can come in sight of what Browning calls

> "the ultimate angel's law,
> There where life, law, joy, impulse, are one thing."

The voices of the three singers to young blood,‡ the voice of unreflecting delight in the flesh and its force, the voice of prudence, the voice of personal passion; each by it-

*"The Tables Turned."
†"One of Our Conquerors," c. 35.
‡"The Three Singers to Young Blood."

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self incomplete and jarring, childish or harsh or ravenous, could all be brought into the same melody at last:

> "Hark to the three. Chimed they in one,
> Life were music of the sun;
> Liquid first, and then the caw,
> Then the cry that knows not law."

But to reach this harmony toil is needed, and that is the work of man.

Left to herself Nature at best is dumb and lost, at worst, an engine of destruction. Meredith is not the writer to forget

> " . . . . how the devil spends
> A fire God gave for other ends."*

> "How the God of old time will act Satan of new,
> If we keep him not straight at the higher God aimed."†

And the business of life when life is "thoroughly lived" is just this interpretation of Nature, this "reading of Earth." This is what it means to "keep faith with Nature"—we are not "wise of her prompting," we have not understood the rose of her in our blood, if it gives no birth to the "rose in brain," if the human Good does not blossom out of the natural. Nor does Meredith leave that Good a mere abstraction, though it is not his task to give an inventory of its content. Sympathy and courage are for him true flowers of that immortal garland whose roots are "in good gross earth." Our problems must all be solved in "the soul of brotherhood." "Not until we are driven back upon an unviolated Nature, do we call to the intellect to think radically: and then we begin to think of our fellows."‡ Thus it is idle to dream of mere self-indulgence. The man who has been deceiving himself under the pretext that he is "made of flesh and blood" finds no answer to soothe him after he is startled into a searching doubt of his "clamorous appeals to Nature." "Are we, in fact, harmonious with the great Mother when we yield to the pressure of our natures for indulgence? Is she, when translated into us, solely the imperious appetite?"¶

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*R. Browning, "Time's Revenges." †"The Empty Purse."

‡"One of Our Conquerors," c. 25. ¶ Ibid, c. 40.

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The woman who has a right to "Nature's logic, Nature's voice, for self-defence," knows that the price of her keeping it is loyalty of heart and justice of purpose. "The Nature upholding her fled at a vision of a stranger entangled." She knows that "we may be rebels against our time and its laws: if we are really for Nature, we are not lawless."* No marriage is "natural" except that which is founded on the heart's love that can give a life †. Thus it is self in the narrow sense of the word, the petty self always dragging us back from union with our fellows or from the struggle after what we yet admit to be best for our own souls, it is this "old dragon" that is the arch enemy and enslaver alike of Nature and of Man. Meredith cannot be accused of minimizing the conflict: indeed his sense of the perilous strife makes him often utter hard words, at first sight puzzling, against the goddess of his worship. "Untamable old Nature," he can call her, "that wanton old thing, the empress of disorderliness, § "the power that is always pressing to break the dam and be through, uproarious in her primitive licentiousness." ¶

A weighty passage in "Beauchamp's Career" at once expresses this apparent contradiction and gives the solution of it. "The world and nature," it runs, "which are opposed in relation to our vital interests, each agrees to demand of us a perfect victory, on pain otherwise of proving it a stage performance, and the victory over the world, as over nature, is the victory over self: and this victory lies in yielding perpetual service to the world and none to nature: for the world has to be wrought out, nature to be subdued."|| To get the full reality out of our natural instincts and out of the web of relations woven by society, to make them both, that is, the best they have it in them to be, we have unceasingly to refuse the demands of our narrow self in the name of the wider. Such a conflict is accepted by Meredith with confident joy. It is through this struggle alone that character is realized: to count

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* Ibid, c. 11; † Ibid, c. 25; § Ibid, c. 18; ¶ Ibid, c. 36; || "Beauchamp's Career" c. 42.

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ourselves to have attained would be to court a death-in-life:

> "Wisdom is won of its fight,
> The combat incessant: it dries
> To mummy-wrap perching a height."*

In this spirit he meets life not merely patiently, but as a conqueror. The fact that character can be and is developed by the clash with circumstance is to him warrant for infinite hope. So does Browning see the lost face of God grow again in the outlines of a universe that can mould men. †

This faith of Meredith's is supported and enriched by his conception of a link between Man and the Nature without, a Power real in its own right, no mere phantom of his construction, independent, yet bound to him by a mysterious sympathy.

> "For every elemental power
> Is kindred to our hearts, and once
> Acknowledged, wedded, once embraced,
> Once taken to the unfettered sense,
> Once claspt into the naked life,
> The union is eternal."§

This union in its most simple and primitive form, the union, as it were, in the mere joy of physical life, Meredith has celebrated with splendid richness of fancy in the "Appeasement of Demeter," an old myth recast with new significance. The primal mother ceases to care for life, and all the wheels of advance are stopped; not till she returns to the laughter of living can the starved people get "flesh on skeleton." Mere pain and pleasure, elementary hope and fear, are our first "links to a Mother of grace."¶

But just as the urge to life within us holds, wrapped up in it, much more than mere living, so the union with Nature means much more than this. To be in contact with natural things is to touch a source of righteousness as well as of strength. All poets, perhaps, have felt something of this faith, but Meredith makes it a corner-stone of his thinking. Wordsworth and Whitman offer the nearest parallels to his work in this as in

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* "A Faith on Trial."

† "Epilogue," fin.;

§ "South-West Wind in the Woodlands"—(out of print).

¶ "A Faith on Trial."

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many other points. Whitman will create his poems in the open air and test them "by trees, stars, rivers";* he knows that systems "may prove well in lecture-rooms, yet not prove at all under the spacious clouds and along the landscape and flowing currents."† True religion is taught to Wordsworth's "wanderer" as much by "his habitual wanderings out of door" as by his "goodness and kind works."§ Meredith makes a Diana who has lost her way feel that "one morning on the Salvatore heights, would wash her clear of the webs defacing and entangling her.¶ In one of his most striking poems|| a "lone-laid wife," tempted to weakness and inconstancy, lies awake all night after a season of drought "to hear the rain descend," and the mere sound and smell of the rain, the breathings from Earth's "heaved breast of sacred common mould" of themselves bring to her the strengthening that she needs. So special and marked indeed, is the virtue that goes out of Nature that these three poets are agreed in placing it, in a sense, above what can be got from Man. Why is this? Is it just because Nature is the expression of something *other,* though akin, of an aspect of the whole that could not be resolved into human consciousness? The poets do not answer, but they hold unmistakably that there is something to be got from Nature which cannot be supplied elsewhere. It is doing Wordsworth wrong to explain away his outburst:

> "One impulse from a vernal wood
> May teach you more of man,
> Of moral evil and of good
> Than all the sages can."**

Meredith's "South-West Wind in the Woodlands" echoes the thought, almost the very words:

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* "By Blue Ontario's Shore"—14.
† "Song of the Open Road"—6.
§ "The Excursion," Bk. I.
¶ "Diana of Crossways," c. 23 fin.
|| "Earth and a Wedded Woman."
**"The Tables Turned." *Cf.*

> "One moment now may give us more
> Than fifty years of reason:
> Our minds shall drink at every pore
> The spirit of the season."—"To my Sister."

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"The voice of Nature is abroad
This night; it fills the air with balm;
Her mystery is o'er the land;
And he who hears her now, and yields
His being to her yearning tones,
And seats his soul upon her wings,
And broadens o'er this wind-swept world
With her, will gather in the flight
More knowledge of her secret, more
Delight in her beneficence,
Than hours of musing, or the lore
That lives with men could ever give!"

In this same spirit Whitman speaks of the impression from the starlit sky as beyond anything from art, books, sermons, or from science old or new.* Lucifer in Meredith's sonnet could tower over the earth and its sleeping sinners, but

"at the stars,
Which are the brain of heaven, he looked and sank.
Around the ancient track marched, rank on rank
The army of unalterable law."†

Such a sense of a glory proclaimed by the silent heavens recalls the old Hebrew fire of adoration that, where all else failed, could give a Job strength enough to bear the still unsolved problem of evil.

On the other hand Meredith holds that we cannot hear this voice of Nature any more than we can understand our own "natural impulses," except through incessant striving after the complete human ideal. To reach the fires at the heart of Earth we have to experience the fire of Life. The tortured wife in "Earth and a Wedded Woman" would not go back to the untroubled playtime of her girl-companions:

"They have not known; they are not in the stream;
Light as the flying seed-ball is their play,
The silly maids! and happy souls they seem;
Yet Grief would not change fates with such as they.
They have not struck the roots which meet the fires
Beneath, and bind us fast with Earth, to know
The strength of her desires,
The sternness of her woe."§

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* "Specimen Days."—"Hours for the Soul."
† "Lucifer in Starlight."
§ "Earth and a Wedded Woman," III.

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The man in "A Faith on Trial," set face to face, as it were, with his whole life, finds in the worst hour of his ordeal that the supreme crisis, valiantly met, has become for him the supreme revealer of Nature's secret:

> "But this in myself did I know. . . . .
> That natures at interflow
> With all of their past and the now,
> Are chords to the Nature without,
> Orbs to the greater whole;
> First then, nor utterly then
> Till our lord of sensations at war,
> The rebel, the heart, yields place
> To brain, each prompting the soul."

The everyday woods are all enchanted "Woods of Westermain," horrible to cowardice and selfishness, holding a meaning of joy for the valiant, brimful of suggestions for the right life, frank and modest, free and pure, the life that could sing the true song of the mind, where blood and brain and spirit sang together, the life that could rejoice in the change through which the Dragon of Self is tamed and stamped for service, the life that could lead to a glimpse of that fundamental Power, the weaver of the natural world, girt with terrors and thunders and silences, yet felt to be the mother of man, the prompter to reason, and the inspirer of hope.*

Nor can this battle be thoroughly fought out except among men:

> "Not solitarily in fields we find
> Earth's secret open, though one page is there, . . .
> Not where the troubled passions toss the mind,
> In turbid cities, can the key be bare.
> It hangs for those who hither thither fare
> Close inter-threading nature with our kind."†

Like Whitman, Meredith will go at one time "through the mighty woods," and at another "through the mightier cities."‡ The "full-grown poet," for him as for Whitman, stands between Nature and Man," "as blender, uniter, tightly holding hands."§ The lore of the Forest is not read till he appears:

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*"The Woods of Westermain."
†"Earth's Secret."
‡"Rise O Days from your Fathomless Deeps."
§"When the Full-Grown Poet Came."

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"Came then the one, all ear, all eye, all heart;
Devourer and insensibly devoured;
In whom the city over forest flowered,
The forest wreathed the city's drama-mart."

It is he who can show amid the woods—

"What charm the human concourse works,
Amid the press of men, what virtue lurks
Where bubble sacred wells of wildness lone."*

Melampus, learned in roots and herbs, who walked among Earth's creatures "as a scholar who reads a book," loving them all with a fearless love,, a love that had insight in it,

"Melampus dwelt among men: Physician and sage,
He served them, loving them, healing them";

understanding that to use his knowledge thus was to draw from the deepest wellspring of Earth.† So Wordsworth learnt to pass from a mere rapture in the loveliness of Nature, from

"a feeling and a love,
That had no need of a remoter charm
By thought supplied, or any interest
Unborrowed from the eye,"

led on by "the still sad music of humanity" unto the culminating

"sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,"‡

something that moved in Nature and Man alike, something that Euripides sought for in his questioning cry, "Thou, whoever thou art, hard to guess at, hard to know, *the law of Nature or the mind of Man,*"§ something that was at last realized to be both. Thus Meredith comes to claim that it is only in the faces of heroic men and women that we see the true outpouring, reflection, definite expression of Nature:

"That is the welling of her, there
The mirror: with one step beyond,
For likewise is it voice."**

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*"Forest-History," published in *Literature,* July 9, 1898.
†"Melampus."
‡"Lines composed a few miles above Tintern Abbey."
§Euripides. Troades. ll. 885, 886.
**"Hard Weather."

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At the same time it will not do to overlook the fact that something more is required for the communion with Nature than the heroic temper. Meredith frankly calls it "faith" and is not afraid of the word. He speaks of it as a "leap of the spirit," admitting that it is not based on logic or laws of evidence, but claiming that it is really a higher manifestation of the Reason that is the base for them:

> "'Tis Reason herself, tiptoe
> At the ultimate bound of her wit,
> On the verges of Night and Day."*

And like the love for a person, it is the divination of something which is the source of qualities, and a belief in that, not a mere admission of undeniable events and appearances. Her true lover, Earth says, must be awake

> "To love more than things of my lap,
> Love me."†

To such come revelations in the light of which

> "Half strange seems Earth and sweeter than her flowers."‡

As with Wordsworth, so with Meredith, this sense of something in Nature that is more than phenomena and their relations is so intense that he is ready to sympathize with Pagan anthropomorphism rather than to think of her as utterly lifeless. The wildest mythological fancies were closer to her than that:

> "Banished is the white Foam-born
> Not from here,"

he says of "the mystical woods,"

> "nor under ban
> Phoebus lyrist, Phoebe's horn,
> Pipings of the reedy Pan,
> Loved of earth of old they were,
> Loving did interpret her;
> And the sterner worship bars
> None whom Song has made her stars." ||

And further, this embrace of Nature as the wise mother of

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*"A Faith on Trial."
† Ibid.
‡"Meditation under Stars."
|| "The Woods of Westermain."

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heroic children, brings with it, for Meredith, something more than the impulse to heroism: it brings an all-embracing hope. Nature, he believes, not only sends us after a good which is our good, but she whispers that we can reach it. It is no chimera we pursue. If we follow her bidding all will be well with us. Thus she is the spring of comfort as well as of courage. Here again Whitman and Wordsworth offer the most striking parallels. Whitman's words in "Specimen Days," ("Death of Thomas Carlyle"), sum up his whole attitude: "with me, too, when depressed by some teasing problem, I wait till I go out under the stars for the last voiceless satisfaction." Wordsworth tells how the mere look of grass and weeds in the rain could bring peace to a heart filled with a tale of hopeless sorrow:

> "I well remember that those very pleasures,
> Those weeds, and the high speargrass on the wall,
> By mist and silent rain-drops silvered o'er,
> As once I passed, did to my heart convey,
>
> "So still an image of tranquility,
> So calm and still, and looked so beautiful
> Amid the uneasy thoughts which filled my mind
> That what we feel of sorrow and despair
> From ruin and from change, and all the grief
> The passing shows of being leave behind,
> Appeared an idle dream that could not live
> Where meditation was. I turned away
> And walked along my road in happiness." *

This belief of Meredith's in an assurance from Nature that nothing in the world or out of it can bring anything but good to the good man leads him to speak of her as pointing to

> "The great Over-Reason we name
> Beneficence," †

as bidding the mind of man seek "the Master Mind," in the confidence that he can reach it, it, that is, "the great Unseen, nowise the dark Unknown."§

Such passages hint at a conception of the kind suggested above, namely, that Nature is another partial expression of

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* "The Excursion," Bk. I. fin. † "A Faith on Trial," fin.
§ "A Reading of Life."

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the same ultimate Power working for good that stirs in us, a Power which is greater than either of its manifestations, and which in the end is ruler of all. But Meredith is reticent on the matter, and it is hard to be sure of his precise view. Whatever it is, however, there can be no doubt of his hope. We shall gain, if we are valiant, what will content the valiant. Nothing can stand in the way of that, not death itself. The impulse, fortified by communion with Nature, to face everything that can befall us whether from within or from without, in the faith that it can be stamped with heroism, is a sign that the soul of man can conquer in the battle: in the words of his Diana, it is "a little boat to sail us past despondency of life and the fear of extinction. . . . . *There is nothing the body suffers that the soul may not profit by.* . . . With that I sail into the dark; it is my promise of the immortal: teaches me to *see* immortality for us."* The real worth of life lies in the effort to attain the ideal, and the sense of the reality of that ideal, coupled with recognition that the force at the back of Nature is in harmony with it, can show us life beyond the death that ends this life of sense:

> "Nought else are we when sailing brave
> Save husks to raise and bid it burn,
> Glimpse of its livingness will wave
> A light the senses can discern
> Across the river of the death,
> Their close." †

But here arises a question of great importance and difficulty. In what precise sense does Meredith mean that life outlasts death? Does he mean to imply personal immortality, or is he only thinking of the effect on other lives springing from the work done and the life lived by the worker who himself passes utterly away? Passages might be quoted to support either view, but on the whole it seems impossible to explain the triumphant confidence in Nature with which he faces Death on the supposition that it is the end for the individual life:

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* "Diana on the Crossways," c. 43.

† "The Thrush in February."

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"And O, green bounteous earth!
Bacchante Mother! stern to those
Who live not in thy heart of mirth;
Death shall I shrink from, loving thee?
Into the breast that gives the rose
Shall I with shuddering fall?"*

Making all allowance for a poet's metaphors, how can the Earth be to him such a Mother if she is after all only "the place of graves?" And in the wonderful poem called "Earth and Man," he recognizes expressly that the desire for permanence and joy, the shrinking from dust as the end, springs from the heart of Nature as much as the impulse to heroic effort:

"Those are her rules which bid him wash foul sins;
Those her revulsions from the skull that grins
To ape his end."

"And her desires are those,
For happiness, for lastingness, for light.
'Tis she who kindles in his haunting night
The hoped dawn-rose."

"Fair fountains of the dark
Daily she waves him, that his inner dream
May clasp amid the glooms a springing beam,
A quivering lark."†

But no doubt Meredith holds that the veil is not fully lifted. He sees "the dawn glow through,"‡ but that is all. The faith that he is really concerned to hold to is that it is worth while to go on: that there is "a heart of eternal goodness to receive" the dead, "whatever the nature of the eternal secret may be."§ How much is involved in that "eternal goodness" he does not care to inquire. What the heroic man has a right to claim for his satisfaction will be granted to him, but he is not yet told what that will be. To refuse to continue the struggle unless a detailed answer can be found, means, Meredith thinks, a lack of spiritual vigor. The great Mother teaches a patient trust:

"And 'If thou hast good faith, it can repose,'
She tells her son."¶

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*"Ode to the Spirit of Earth in Autumn," (out of print).
†"Earth and Man," stanzas 30-32. ‡"Hymn to Colour."
§"Lord Ormont and his Aminta." ¶"Earth and Man."

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We have simply to do our work,

> "Leaving her the future task
> Loving her too well to ask.*

It is not the proof of immortality that can make us feel that life is worth living: it is the sense of its worth that assures us of immortality. Nature whispers to the valiant heart that nothing of real value can perish:

> "Near is he to great Nature in the thought
> Each changing season intimately saith,
> That nought save apparition knows the death;
> To the God-lighted mind of man 'tis nought.
> Close on the heart of Earth his bosom beats,
> When he the mandate lodged in it obeys,
> Content to breast a future clothed in haze,
> Strike camp and onward, like the wind's cloud-fleets."†

Such an attitude explains the sternness with which Meredith speaks of "the questions." If they could all be answered, which they cannot be, what ultimate good should we gain? Scientific proof, if it was to be had, of life after death could not give us the inner significance of life itself:

> "Shall man into the mystery of breath,
> From his quick-beating pulse a pathway spy?
> Or learn the secret of the shrouded death,
> By lifting up the lid of a white eye?
> Cleave thou thy way with fathering desire
> Of fire to reach to fire."‡

However interesting the intellectual search, it is neither the hunger and thirst after righteousness, nor the leap of the spirit to union with Nature and Life. "They scarce have the thirst," Earth is made to say of the questioners,

> "Except to unriddle a rune,
> And I spin none; only show,
> Would humanity soar from its worst,
> Winged above darkness and dole,
> How flesh unto spirit must grow.
> Spirit raves not for a goal."§

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*"The Woods of Westermain."

†"A Reading of Life," printed in the *Monthly Review*, March, 1901, Meredith's last published utterance.

‡"Hymn to Colour."

§"A Faith on Trial."

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Yet the belief in a goal of some kind is the very foundation of Meredith's philosophy, and it may seem strange to many that he should so persistently refuse to define it any further. His own summing-up of the matter does inevitably suggest questions that cannot ultimately be put aside:

"Then let our trust be firm in Good,
Though we be of the fasting;
Our questions are a mortal brood,
Our work is everlasting.
We children of Beneficence
Are in its being sharers;
And Whither vainer sounds than Whence,
For word with such wayfarers."*

How can our work be everlasting if it is only done for a perishing race? How can we talk of Beneficence, if all the mutilated lives only "subserve another's end?" Are we not driven to a further inference? Is not Whitman's attitude with its unmistakable demands, more logical and complete?

"Pleasantly and well-suited I walk, ...
Do you think I could walk pleasantly and well-suited toward annihilation?"†

But to say that Meredith stops short where it would be more natural to go on is not to deny that his way of approach is the right one. And his hard words are well deserved by that "foolish and adulterous" stretching at evidence which fancies it can take the place of the "mortal moral strife" that for Meredith, as for Clough, alone forges the key to the "fast-shut door." That is the "cry of unfaith," "crying aloud for an opiate boon,"¶

"Unfaith clamouring to be coined
To faith by proof;" ||

that is the spirit that proffers

"vows of living faith.
For little signs." **

It springs from the senses that must "touch and feel" in order

*"The Question Whither."
†"To Think of Time."
¶"A Faith on Trial."
||"Earth and Man." **Ibid.

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to be sure; it is nursed by the temper that shrinks from tragedies;* it leads on to a denial of any value in the life of earth, even to an acquiescence in that base heaven of the elect from which a man's fellows are shut out:

> "From dust, of him abhorred,
> He would be snatched by Grace discovering worth.
> 'Sever me from the hollowness of Earth?
> Me take dear Lord!' "†

The fullest expression of Meredith's whole view of the matter is to be found in "A Faith on Trial," a poem evidently autobiographical. Under the burden of his wife's death the poet finds no other answer from Nature to his questions and his cravings, but the simple bidding to go on with his work, with his aspirations, with his

> "dreaming of good
> Illimitable to come,

in union with his brothers, and in the confidence that everything he meets comes from the "sacred Reality" which is stern only to the selfish self. This gives him "a reading of Earth" through which

> "a concord deeper than cries
> Of the Whither whose echo is Whence,"

springs up

> "as a fountain-jet in the wind
> Bowed dark o'er the falling and strewn."

As pledge and earnest of the ultimate triumph he grasps "the very sap of the vital" in the one recognition

> "That from flesh unto spirit man grows
> Even here on the sod under sun."

That is all, but it is enough:

> "and have we wept,
> And have we quailed with fears,
> Or shrunk with horrors, sure reward
> Who see through mould the rose unfold,
> We have whom knowledge crowns;
> The soul through blood and tears." §

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

* "A Faith on Trial." † "Earth and Man." § "Outer and Inner."

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THE ETHICS OF SPECULATION.

TAKEN in its narrowest sense, the word speculation describes transactions that are made for the sole purpose of getting a profit from changes in price. This is the sense in which it will be used in this paper. Furthermore, the discussion will be confined to operations on the stock and produce exchanges. The speculator, then, buys and sells property because he expects to realize a gain from changes in its price, not because he expects to be a sharer in its earnings. The reason that he does not intend to profit by the earnings of the property that he ostensibly buys and sells, is to be found in the fact that his control of the property will be either too brief to secure the actual earnings, or too indefinite to create earnings. The former is the usual case of speculation in stock, the latter, of speculation in produce.

Some examples will make clearer this distinction between the speculator and the ordinary investor or trader. The man who buys railway stocks merely to sell them in a few days at an expected advance, is a speculator; the man who buys them to hold permanently for the sake of the dividends that they will yield, is not a speculator. The former looks to price changes for his gains, the latter to property earnings. Again, two men buy wheat on the board of trade: the first is a miller who wants wheat to grind; the second is a speculator who has no particular use for wheat. He does not intend to change its form in any way or bring it nearer to the consumer; his interest in it is confined solely to its fluctuations in price. From these he expects to make his profit. The miller, on the other hand, will add utility to the wheat by converting it into flour. His profit will be in the nature of a payment for this productive and social service. In like manner, the dividends received by the genuine investor in railway stocks will be a return for the use of his capital in a productive business. Both he and the miller are producers of utility, while the speculative buyer of stocks, and the speculative buyer of wheat, add

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nothing to the utility of any property—make no contribution to production.

Pure speculation on the exchanges differs, therefore, from ordinary trade and investment, in its effect upon the production of utility, and in the source of its gains. These are in reality two aspects of the same economic fact. It is also unique in the manner in which its contracts are completed, or "settled." I have spoken of the speculator as, *ostensibly* buying and selling. In purely speculative purchases and sales, there is no genuine *transfer* of goods. The stocks bought are not, in any adequate sense, brought into the possession and control of the purchaser, but are usually "carried" by his broker until they are sold. The exceptions to this rule are not of great importance, and need not concern us here. The produce bought—wheat, cotton, petroleum, etc.—is not moved an inch in any direction. When the buyer completes one of these transactions he merely receives or pays out a sum based on the extent to which the price of the goods in question has risen or fallen. The mechanism of these settlements falls outside the scope of this paper. It suffices to point out that speculative contracts are settled by a payment of price differences, instead of by a genuine delivery of goods. In effect and intention they are substantially wagers on the course of prices.

Indiscriminate apologists for speculation and the exchanges are fond of insisting on the productive services of so-called speculators who gather and store up goods during a period of plenty, and dispose of them during a period of scarcity, or who carry goods from a place where they are abundant to a place where they are in greater demand. Hence they conclude that speculation, *i. e.*, all speculation, is useful. Such reasoning betrays confusion of thought. With speculators in the sense just mentioned we have nothing to do in this place. Besides, their social worth is obvious. Nor are we concerned with the exchanges, as such. Their original function was a very necessary one, namely, to serve as meeting places for those who wished to buy and sell real goods. They still retain that function in so far as they constitute a market place for permanent investors, and for manufacturers and productive traders.

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These productive transactions, however, have become subordinated to purely speculative operations, so that, according to conservative estimates, fully ninety per cent. of the business done on the exchanges is of the latter character.

Now this kind of speculation, as already pointed out is non-productive. It creates no utility, either of time, place, or form; that is to say, it neither distributes goods over intervals of time, or space, nor puts them through any process of manufacture. Does it perform a social service of any kind? If it does there will arise a presumption that it is morally good.

Prof. Henry C. Emery, in what is without doubt the most thorough work on speculation written in English,* strongly maintains that organized speculation, of the kind that we are discussing, is of great service to legitimate trade. Since the market for great staples, like grain and cotton, so runs his argument, has become a world-market, the large dealers in these goods must not only buy, store, and move them, but also take extraordinary risks of changing prices. These risks are extraordinary because they extend over a long period of time, and are subject to world-wide trade conditions. What the dealers need, then, is "a distinct body of men to relieve them of the speculative element of their business." The professional operators on the produce exchanges constitute just such a class. The wheat merchant buys a quantity of wheat in the northwest for shipment to Liverpool, where he intends to sell it some time later. But the price of wheat may fall before that time arrives. Here arises the element of risk. To avoid it, he immediately sells to a speculator, for future delivery, an equal quantity of "paper" wheat. The delivery of this "paper" wheat, or rather, the settlement of this speculative contract, is to take place about the same time that his cargo of actual wheat is to be delivered and sold in Liverpool. If in the meantime the price of wheat falls he will lose on his actual wheat, but he will gain on his "paper" wheat. For when a man sells any commodity in the speculative market for future delivery, his interest is to have the price of that commodity fall. Thus

*"Speculation on the Stock and Produce Exchanges of the United States." (Macmillan.)

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he gains the difference between the price of the article when he sold it and its price at the time of delivery, or settlement. Hence, by means of this "hedge" sale the wheat merchant is secured against loss on his cargo of actual wheat. Sales of this kind are a sort of insurance that lessen both the possibilities of great profit and the risks of great loss. It is said that nine-tenths of the wheat stored in the elevators of the northwest is "sold against" in this way.*

So much for speculation in produce: speculation in stocks, it is maintained, enables the small investor to have within reach a class of men "ready to assume all the risk of buying and selling his security, and a market that fixes prices by which he can intelligently invest." The army of professional speculators stand prepared at any time to buy or sell any kind of stocks that are at all marketable, while their incessant buying and selling keeps the market active, and the quotations of the different securities at their proper level. The whole function of organized speculation is summed up to be: taking the great risks of fluctuating values, reducing these fluctuations to a minimum, and providing an active market for produce and securities.

The obvious answer to the above argument is that traders in produce should take the risks of fluctuating prices themselves. At present, indeed, they seem unwilling to do so, because the speculators stand ready to do it for them. But it is difficult to see how the public would suffer if traders, importers, and manufactures were compelled to take all the risks incident to their business, instead of handing them over to a special class. Under such an arrangement many of them would doubtless go to the wall, but the community would be the gainer through the elimination of the unfit. Besides, there is reason to believe that the superior knowledge of market conditions possessed by the professional speculators, and their work in reducing the range of price fluctuations is very much overestimated. At any rate, there seems to be no good reason

*"Proceedings of Twelfth Annual Meeting of American Economic Association," p. 110.

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why the capable dealer or manufacturer could not acquire a sufficient amount of this same knowledge and foresight. To set apart a body of men for the sole purpose of *dealing in risks* seems to be carrying the principle of division of labor unnecessarily far, especially when these men manage to charge the high price for their services that is obtained by the professional speculators of our produce exchanges.

As to stock speculators, it may be reasonably admitted that they know the true value of the various securities more accurately than the small investors, and that they are able to fix more correct prices than would be possible without their activity. Yet if there were no dealing in stocks, except for permanent investment, there would still be a stock market. That is to say, if there were no speculators, and if stocks were bought solely for the sake of their dividends, it would still be possible for an investor to buy them at quotations sufficiently correct and stable. This fact is exemplified to-day in the case of numerous securities that are not dealt in by speculators nor listed on the exchanges. It is worthy of note that two prominent German economists who maintain that the produce exchange is a necessary institution, declare that the stock exchange is "an unnecessary and injurious one."

The institution of organized speculation is not only of doubtful benefit to the community, but produces serious public evils. Only those who have expert knowledge of market conditions can, in the long run, make money on the exchanges. These are the prominent professional speculators, the "big operators," as they are often called. The great majority of all the others who speculate, namely, the outside public, either know nothing of the intricacies of the market, or rely on "inside information" that is worse than useless because misleading. Out of the losses of this class comes the greater part of the gains of the big operators. One proof of this is seen in the fact that when the general public and the small operators desert the exchanges after being fleeced, speculative activity is checked until such time as the "small fry" begin operations anew. And yet the general public continues to patronize the centers of speculation in ever increasing numbers, notwith-

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standing the lessons of the past. Thus the chief losses of speculation are borne by those who can least afford to bear them.

Speculation absorbs a considerable amount of the community's capital and directive energy. It diverts money from productive enterprises, and engages the activity of men who, if removed from the unhealthy atmosphere of the exchanges, would be of great service to the world of industry. By holding out to its votaries the hope of getting rich quickly, it discourages industry and thrift, and makes men worshipers of the goddess of chance. It imbues thousands with the persuasion that acquiring wealth is a colossal game in which they are to be fortune's favorites. The career of the "Franklin Syndicate" in Brooklyn, in 1899, is a typical instance of the way in which those who have caught the speculative fever disregard the laws of probability and the laws of wealth. The promoters of this company agreed to pay ten per cent. per week on all deposits, pretending that they were enabled to do so through their "inside information" of the stock market. Within a few weeks they took in nearly one million dollars, showing how large is the number of people who regard the stock exchange as an institution that creates wealth without labor.

To the question that was asked above,—does speculation perform any social service? the correct answer, then, would seem to be in the negative. At any rate, its good features, which are problematical, are more than offset by its bad features, which are grave and unmistakable. Hence there is no reason to regard organized speculation as morally good because of any economic or social function that it exercises.

If the *institution* of speculation is at best of doubtful moral and social worth, what are we to say concerning the moral character of the *individual act* of speculating in stocks or produce? According to Funck-Brentano, speculation on the exchanges, although not highway robbery, is "robbery according to the rules of an art so refined that the keenest lawyer can not exactly determine the point where fraud begins and legality ceases." This condemnation, however, seems too sweep-

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ing; for many of the transactions on the exchanges are made by men who have no intention of acting dishonestly. At the worst, they are actuated merely by the spirit of the gambler. But it is true that moral and immoral operations are often inextricably mingled, so that it is extremely difficult, no less for the moralist than the lawyer, to separate the good from the bad. For our purpose it will be best perhaps to point out the dishonesty of some of the more notorious practices and the extent to which they are followed, and then discuss the morality of speculative transactions that are entered into with the most upright intentions.

Under the régime of competition the natural and just value of goods of all kinds is determined ultimately by demands for consumption and for permanent investment. We may find fault with this anarchic determination of prices; we may complain that the movement of supply and demand often compels men to sell their property at a loss; yet so long as our economic structure is based on this system, so long as we live under the competitive régime, the natural movement of supply and demand (apart from the question of a living wage) must, generally speaking, be accepted as the only just regulator of values. Hence speculators morally are bound to take the exchange values of property as they find them. Any attempt to raise these values artificially, is an attempt to make purchasers pay more for property than it is worth; and any attempt to depress these values is an attempt to deprive owners of property of a just profit. Purchases and sales made for the sole purpose of influencing the level of prices will, so far as they are successful, create an unnatural and unjust price. They are substantially attempts at an immoral monopoly.

A favorite method of manipulating values is to disseminate false reports concerning property or market conditions. A description of the various ways in which this scheme is practised is not possible nor necessary here, but a typical instance may be given. In the spring of 1900 a prominent manufacturing company having its headquarters in New York, sent out a report that a dividend was to be immediately declared on its stock. This caused the stock to rise several points, and the

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directors and their friends then "sold for a fall." Next the report concerning the dividend was denounced as false, and official announcement was made that the company's condition did not warrant the payment of a dividend. Immediately values began to fall, and those who had sold "short" bought in at a profit, while the small holders of stock became panic stricken and sold their holdings to the larger ones. This last phase of manipulation, which consists in depressing values for the purpose of getting possession of the stock of the small holders, is expressively termed "shaking out."

The industrious circulation of false reports is an essential part of the process known as "supporting." The owners of some stock that is worth little send out glowing accounts of its desirability as an investment, and of the earning capacity of the property that it represents. At the same time they begin to make purely speculative purchases on a large scale. The intention is to deceive the public into the belief that the owners have confidence in the future of their own property. The result is that the price of the stock rises. When it has reached what the conspirators regard as its maximum, they sell both their cash stock and their purely speculative purchases to a confiding public. Then the stock rapidly sinks to its proper level.

Another way of manipulating is by "wash sales." One or more operators scheme to depress the quotations of a particular stock by making a show of enormous sales. The natural effect of such wholesale selling when reported on the stock market is to cause a fall, but the peculiarity of these transactions is that they are not sales at all, for the same person is both buyer and seller. He employs two brokers, one of whom sells to the other. Thus the supposed sales are all counterfeit, since the supposed buyers have no existence. The same principle can be carried out in attempts to *inflate* values, and in the case of produce, as well as stock.

A simpler form of manipulation is the attempt to raise or depress the value of a stock by extensive genuine buying or selling. Where several operators act together the operation is called a "pool." An extreme instance of continued buying

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for a rise is the "corner." If it is successful the result is that one or a few men get control of sufficient of the available supply of a certain produce or stock to create what is practically a monopoly, and thus force up prices almost at will. The corner, however, is rarely successful.

The schemes above described are some of the more common forms of manipulation. Clearly they are all immoral, and the gains accruing from them dishonest. Closely allied to false rumors as a source of unjust profit, is the special and secret information that is so often turned to account on the exchanges. When this special information concerns a movement of prices that will come about naturally, not artificially, and when the information is acquired by the expenditure of some labor, either intellectual or physical, or when the information is not entirely certain,—there would seem to be nothing wrong in making use of it for profit. But it is difficult to see how the profit will be honest if any of these conditions be wanting. Suppose that a certain stock is about to be manipulated upward. Now if an "outsider" is apprised of this fact, and buys some of the stock to sell at the advance, he is simply realizing unique possibilities of stealing. He defrauds the other party to the contract; for artificially produced gains for one man mean, in the long run, artificially produced losses for another. But suppose that an advance in the price of a certain property is due to the natural laws and conditions of trade. In that case a man who foresees the advance by reason of exceptional skill and diligence in studying the conditions of the market, may rightfully invest in the property, and reap a profit that will be in some sense the reward of ability. Again, if a man without exercising labor or skill obtains special information that is not entirely trustworthy, his gains from a speculation made on this basis might be regarded as the reward of risk-taking. But if the information is practically certain, and got without any personal expenditure of any kind, the morality of gains coming even from a natural movement in prices will usually be very questionable. Obtained as they are from differences in price, their source will in most cases be the pocket of some one who is not possessed of this special knowledge. The

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transaction is substantially a wager in which one party takes the other at a disadvantage. These are the principles: in practice it would seem that most of the profits arising from secret information on the exchanges are unlawful.

To what extent do manipulation and the various other forms of immoral speculation prevail? A precise and definite answer to this question is, of course, not obtainable, but it is safe to say that on the more prominent exchanges of the country questionable methods are in very common use. "Schaeffle, who is not only an eminent political economist, but has been minister of commerce to one of the great political powers of Europe, says that when he became acquainted with the bourse he gave up believing any longer in the economic harmonies, and declared theft to be the principle of modern European commerce."* A member of the New York Stock Exchange declared a few months ago that fifty per cent. of the operations in that institution were attempts to manipulate prices. The manœuvers of the great operators have often been compared to a game in which the successful players use loaded dice or marked cards. Indeed, many close observers of the speculative market assert that in the long run money is made only by those who resort to questionable devices. This is probably an exaggeration, but we can readily see that when men having great power, the big operators, are engaged in operations whose success depends solely on the movement of prices, they will be strongly tempted to use their power in order to influence this movement. It is impossible to watch their tactics for any length of time without concluding that they regard manipulation in some form as an essential feature of speculative operations. The stock market columns of almost any morning newspaper will show that on the preceding day there was "an assault by the bears" on this or that stock, and that under "constant hammering" the stock fell one or more points. Or, we are informed that "after a rally by the bulls," such a stock "went skyward."

So far, at least, as the big operators are concerned, the ex-

*John Rae, "Contemporary Socialism," p. 326.

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change is a battlefield on which two opposing armies, the bulls and the bears, are constantly engaged at close range. "All is fair in war," and it is not surprising that in the speculators' warfare nice ethical discriminations as to methods should be overlooked. Manipulation is regarded as lawful, since it is merely fighting the enemy with his own weapons. The intellectual atmosphere of the bourse is so befogged that the moral vision of its habitues becomes easily dulled. The mental qualities that are most frequently called into play among professional speculators are those that characterize the activities of the professional gambler. "A man's nerve is put to the highest tension; his mind is always on the stretch; not guiding the policy of a great commercial venture, but bearing up under, and watching over, the fluctuations of some stock which, in the opinion of the majority, and by virtue of what has been paid for it at the outset, is worth only so much, and which he has estimated at a different value. The trade is not a noble one, and there are few noble men engaged in it."*

So much for practices of speculation that are certainly dishonest: what about the acts of a speculator who has no desire to take advantage of any unlawful practice? Is it wrong to make a purchase or sale on the exchange solely for the purpose of realizing a profit out of a change in prices? The purchaser or seller, we will suppose, seeks no dishonest advantage, but is willing to take all the risks of an unfavorable turn in prices. We cannot say that such a transaction is, in itself, wrong. At the worst it is merely a wager on prices, and wagers are not immoral, provided: (1) that those who take part in them have the right to dispose of the property that they hazard; (2) that neither fraud nor violence be used; (3) that the chances for winning be approximately equal, so far as the knowledge of the participants is concerned; (4) that the parties risk no more than they can afford consistently with the duties of their condition and calling; and (5) that the transaction in question is not forbidden by the positive law. All of these conditions may easily be present in a speculative

*Frazer's Magazine, vol. 94, p. 84.

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deal; consequently there may be nothing in it contrary to the moral law. This statement applies to an act of speculation in the abstract, not in the actual conditions of to-day.

For we have seen that from the side of economic welfare the whole institution of non-productive speculation is in all probability useless; that from the side of social welfare it is productive of grave evils; and that from the side of morality its transactions are to an alarming extent carried on by dishonest methods. In the light of these facts, we may safely conclude that, so far as the principal exchanges of the country are concerned, it is morally impossible for a man who spends all or the greater part of his time speculating, to avoid all the dishonest practices of speculation. Secondly, we would seem to be justified in asserting that men who, even without any intention to be dishonest, participate to *any* extent in speculative transactions on these exchanges, are engaging in actions that are, at least, *morally questionable.* As we said above, the isolated act of speculation may in itself be without censure—may be no worse than the placing of a wager—but because of its connection with a questionable institution, and because of its grave danger to the individual himself, it can never be pronounced licit in the sense that the transactions of ordinary trade are licit. The shadow of immorality is over it always. Every speculative deal is a participation, remote and insignificant, perhaps, in what can without exaggeration be regarded as a social and moral evil, namely, the institution of organized speculation.* Every anticipated profit, almost, is in danger of being promoted by illicit manipulation; for the well meaning outsider can seldom be certain, even if he tries, that movements of price by which he is the gainer, have not been artificially produced. Every man who yields to the seductive temptation to speculate feeds the passion of avarice, strengthens the ignoble desire to profit by the losses of his fellows, cultivates a dislike for honest, productive labor, and exposes himself to financial ruin. Hence, no man who is fully acquainted with

*For a strong confirmation of this view, see A. Crump's well-known work, "The Theory of Stock Speculation," recently reprinted in the "Wall Street Library" series.

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the character and effects of speculation, and who is possessed of a fine moral nature, will ever participate in the purely speculative operations of either the stock or the produce exchanges of our largest cities.

The question, "Is speculation wrong?" cannot, therefore, be answered categorically. The phenomena with which it deals are too complex. But with the help of the distinctions above drawn an answer may be obtained that is fairly definite. To resume, then: speculation as an institution is *economically* of doubtful utility; *socially*, it is productive of great and widespread evils; and *morally*, it is vitiated by a very considerable amount of dishonest "deals" and practices. As an individual action, speculation, at its best, is morally questionable.

JOHN A. RYAN.

CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA.

THE PLACE OF ETHICS IN THE TABLE OF THE SCIENCES.

A Swiss professor recently compared the philosopher to an Alpine traveler who with infinite pains had at length succeeded in reaching the summit of some very high mountain. On looking around him he found he could no longer distinctly see some of the smaller objects which had formerly occupied the largest share of his attention. The cottage in the valley which he had left, the wife from whom he had parted on the previous day had faded into a thin mist; but instead of them he was able to discern the larger contours of hill and valley and lake in a manner which he had never previously been able to do. The illustration is a very appropriate one to bring before our minds the work of the investigator who is interested in the larger relations of his special department to the general theory of knowledge. In these days we must either be content to keep to the valleys and remain imprisoned in the roomy cell of our own special subject or else we must be prepared now and then to risk an expedition to the mountain tops so that we may become more familiar with the relations of our special subject

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to the great world as a whole. In the latter case we must expect to find that some of the investigations which formerly delighted us are not so important as we deemed them; but although we may lose something in this way we gain a great deal more in width and comprehensiveness of view.

Every seeker after truth, in fact, ought to know something of the place of his science in the general scheme of the sciences, and, if this be granted, it can surely not be without interest for the student of ethics to consider the Table of Sciences which a Belgian professor gives in a recent interesting book—one of the latest attempts to continue the work of Comte and Spencer. Here is the order—beginning with the simpler and more general and ending with the more complex—in which he places the sciences:

1. Mathématiques.
2. Astronomie rationelle ou abstracte.
3. Physique.
4. Chemie.
5. Physiologie.
6. Psychologie et Logique.
8. Génétique.
9. Esthétique.
10. Croyances (*a*) religieuses, (*b*) métaphysiques, (*c*) positives.
11. Ethique.
12. Droit. A. (*a*) procedure, droit pénal, (*b*) droit civil économique, (*c*) droit personnel et familial, (*d*) droit artistique, moral et philosophique, (*e*) droit administratif—interne et international.
    B. Droit public, (*a*) interne, (*b*) international.
13. Politique, (*a*) représentation, (*b*) déliberation, (*c*) exécution—internes et internationales.*

One or two thoughts will at once suggest themselves to the reader as he casts his eye over this formidable list of sciences. In the first place it generally follows Comte as against Spencer. In the second place Logic is looked on as mainly Induct-

*De Greef, "Les lois Sociologiques," p. 82.

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ive, and is bracketed along with Psychology. In the third place more than half of the table is taken up with the particular sciences included under the general science of Sociology.

All the above considerations suggest possible lines of comment on the table of M. de Greef, but what will interest students of Ethics most of all is the lowly place assigned to their own particular science. It is not without emotion that one sees the master sciences of ethics lost amid a crowd of sociological sciences which jostle it on every side. Even Herbert Spencer does better for it than this. Though he does not enlage much on it in his Table of the Sciences, he tells us in his "Data of Ethics," that this was the particular part of his philosophy to which he looked forward all the time. Ethics is at the very least, we had fondly hoped, the science which gives a finishing touch to all the sciences. Its end is the end to which all the cosmic laws have unceasingly pointed and whether, with Huxley, we oppose the "cosmic order" to the "ethical order" or whether we look on the "ethical order" as interpreting the "cosmic order," we find the same tendency of thought to exalt the functions and claims of ethics.

But the Belgian Table of Sciences which has been inserted above opposes itself at once to this tendency of thought. Instead of placing ethics at the end of the whole Table, it places it, as we have seen, in the middle of the sociological sciences. It comes to guide us when metaphysical and religious beliefs have shown their insufficiency; but superior to it and more comprehensive in their view of the world are the "Science of Right" and politics, national and international, as interpreted from a scientific point of view. Every inferior science is taken up by the superior science, and so there is an ethical element in politics; but apart from this, the sociologist views his ideal state as a society composed of *Ueber Menchen*—men who have transcended all merely ethical rules and postulates.

The whole subject suggests a close inquiry into the object and sphere of ethics and its relation to sociology in particular. What is involved in a "Science of Ethics" in the broadest and most general use of the term, and what is the place of such a science in the general Table of the Sciences?

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The very name "Ethics" suggests at the outset a customary tendency of the human mind. Not only do we look on objects or actions as they are in themselves, but we make a certain estimate of them *i. e.*, we judge them with reference to some purpose or other. Often this purpose or end is not explicitly set before our mind and then we are more or less unable reasonably to justify our judgments. But with a perversity which points to some independent source of knowledge, we often cling to these judgments despite all the doubt which reason can suggest. Thus Socrates, at the dawn of ethical speculation, found that the men around him used certain terms which seemed to indicate principles of ethical judgment, and the whole aim of his "spiritual midwifery" was to bring to the birth those principles which were tacitly assumed.

In this wide sense of the word "Ethics," then, anything which is held to subserve a purpose and which is looked on with reference to this purpose, is the object of an ethical judgment. A carpenter's tool, if it is well made, and enables him to make the shavings fly with ease, can thus be said to yield a certain ethical satisfaction. An important question, however, is, can we apply this standard of purpose to all the judgments of an ordinary life or are there some that we need not include in the sphere of any possible ethics? An effort, for instance, has been made by Mr. Spencer* to show that a large part of conduct is ethically indifferent. "Shall I walk to the waterfall to-day? or shall I ramble along the seashore?" Here the *ends* are ethically indifferent." But this way of putting the matter is rather misleading. In the first place, if I make either the walk to the waterfall or the walk along the seashore, the object of an ethical judgment, I do not thereby look on either of them as an end in itself, but as comprehended for the time in some larger end. However often, therefore, I may be contented in ordinary life to let things take their course, there is no doubt that with reference to the larger scheme of my life, one of these choices at the particular time and in my particular mental state, would be more ethically fitting than the other.

*Spencer, "Data of Ethics," p. 6.

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The waterfall might be another "cataract at Lodore," which would suggest thoughts "too deep for tears," or the sea might be fitted to interpret to me many pages of "Leaves of Grass," which hitherto have remained sealed to me. In this sense, with reference to the larger purpose of my life, it cannot be said that such a choice could be ethically indifferent. But, in the second place, even Mr. Spencer admits that certain additional circumstances may make, even in the above case, an ethical judgment imperative. "If a friend who is with me has explored the seashore but has not seen the waterfall, the choice of one or the other end (?) is no longer ethically indifferent." This goes far to admit the essential part of our contention. All life is the possible content of a series of ethical judgments. We are not entitled, so far as our argument has gone, to isolate a part of it and say that this part is beyond the pale of ethics. Of course, we may not, on any special occasion, explicitly set forth our ethical opinions, and certain people may be content to go through the world without any conscious ethics at all, but "in a calm hour" we must acknowledge that there were principles assumed all the time and that we live in the all-pervading atmosphere of ethics.

So far we have dealt with the judgments of our ordinary life, but the experience which we have gained here will help us when we come to deal with the more systematic and ordered judgments of science. What place does our subject occupy in the scale of the sciences? Can we, in the light of our previous analysis, hide it among the sciences dealing with sociology? Is ethics, in short, limited to the sociological sphere at all, or may we not equally look at all other sciences from an ethical standpoint?*

Now it is not to be denied that the prevailing view is the counterpart of that of Mr. Spencer on the ordinary judgments of life and makes ethics a science among the sciences—limited to judgments of a certain kind and a certain degree of complexity. Mr. Fiske, for example, whose recent books are so

*On this point, see Mackenzie, "Introduction to Social Philosophy," p. 22.

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interesting in their drift from the old moorings, is a good representative of this order of thought. He refuses to look on ethics as a mere by-product of the cosmic order; he traverses the views of Huxley in which the latter seems to look on it as a reversal of the "cosmic order;" but at the same time he holds that only at the human stage—the stage when the *Homo Alalus* has ceased simply to "peep and mutter"—do ethical judgments at all become possible.* Man has a prolonged infancy in contrast with the other animals, and during this period of helplessness the experiences arise which are the root of all subsequent honor and self-sacrifice. Ethical judgments, then, inevitably arise as a result of cosmic progress, but it is only possible to make them at a certain stage of cosmic progress.

Our previous arguments, however, have made us exceedingly chary of accepting any limitation of the sphere of ethics. Of course, if we insist on reading into an ethical judgment, the conscious subordination of means to an end, then it is only possible to make such a judgment at a very late stage of the process of evolution. Without straying into any metaphysical discussion, it must be affirmed that, at any rate, nature is *unconscious* reason, and if we apply the adjective "ethical" to the judgments of the earlier sciences, we must postulate, besides the special science, a conscious intelligence which is able to discuss and declare its latent purpose. But there does not seem to be any particular reason why this postulate should not be granted and a consequent widening of the sphere of ethics effected. If we are going to limit ethics to conscious adjustments of means to end, we must begin a great deal further forward than even Mr. Fiske. It is impossible for man at the earlier stages even, of his distinctively sociological progress, to have a very clear idea of the goal set before him. Indeed it is very doubtful if many men have such a clear idea even now. It is advisable, then, to set aside for the time any idea of limiting ethics to the sphere of sociology and to see how far ethical judgments, in the wider sense of the word, can be said to be made in the earlier sciences.

*Fiske, "Through Nature to God," p. 101.

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Possibly there is no science in which any teleological conception can be said to apply with less force than in mathematics. Its main conceptions of space and time furnish us with those ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute with which very many philosophers have so ably contrived to puzzle our minds. A thought that goes off flying into the infinite ether of pure space is a thought which you cannot very well put in a cage and confine within the four walls of a definite purpose. But even in mathematics there is a trace of that interpretation of means in the light of an end which we have seen to be the essential characteristic of an ethical judgment. Many people, nowadays, have heard of space of constant and inconstant curvature or of Riemann's space of n dimensions. But it cannot seriously be maintained that n-fold space is the space that is made use of in the mathematical part of statics and dynamics. So far as an experience is concerned, it may, indeed, be held that space of constant curvatures is a possible conception, but certainly in the space of an experience not n but only three coördinates at the most are needed to specify a point. If, then, we make the constructive results of statics and dynamics the end to which in the world as we find it, the earlier mathematical conceptions point, we must, at the same time, hold that space of n dimensions is a possible deviation from the straight path of rectitude in which experience guides us.* It is a line of development which, when judged in the light of the proximate end of the process, cannot be held to be successful. Perhaps in other circumstances and with other conditions, space of n dimensions will form an element in a world more wonderful than our own, but so far as our experience is concerned we must hold that, granted a conscious intelligence, it is possible to make a judgment which answers to our earlier definition of an ethical judgment.

That the materials for such an ethical judgment are latent

*If in this and the following paragraphs there is an extension of the meaning of "wrong-doing," which is thought fanciful, it must be remembered that even the theological words for sin suggest such an origin. The Pauline παράπτωμα means "a slip or fall sideways," "a false step," while ἁμάρτημα means "missing a mark."

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in all development, is even more plainly seen in biological science. If we endeavor to make a systematic table of all plant and animal life, we shall find that we cannot arrange it in a linear series. Sometimes a certain series of forms can be traced up to a certain point and then the development is suddenly arrested. Sometimes, even, we have traces of actual degeneration in the history of a particular form. Nature often makes "false starts" and frequently she seems to go backward instead of forward. But what right have we to use the words "backward" or "forward" at all, or to speak of bacteria, for example, as degenerate forms of plant life? Simply that we have discovered a certain typical organism which stands at the end of the most successful line of development in the series, that by means of it, it has been possible for biology to pass into higher and more complex fields of science. Every reader of Prof. Huxley's "Lay Sermons" must remember the great use which he makes of the term "homologous organs." This meant that the barriers which separated organism from organism were being broken down and that it was becoming possible to express one in terms of another to which, outwardly, it presented no features of resemblance. If, then, the biologist came to a form which he regarded as the culminating form of the whole process, he was able subsequently to retrace his steps and to judge the rest of the development as a means to what he considers the proximate end. Here, then, again, we have the possibility of ethical judgments.

In Psychology this possibility is, of course, more evident still. The fact that in the Table of Sciences given above, Logic is bracketed with it, shows that here we have reached the epoch of reflection. The end is no longer one which is unconsciously reached to be afterwards used by a conscious intelligence as a principle of judgment. The end is now consciously sought after: it becomes an object of endeavor on the part of the means. Many ethical teachers would, of course, limit the word "ethics" to the conscious pursuit of ends by the means. If we do good unconsciously, they say, we have done nothing that can be rightly called moral at all. And it must be confessed that there is here a distinction which cannot be simply

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ignored. The word "ethical" receives an immensely higher denotation in psychology. Its meaning is deepened and refined. We don't really begin to understand the "ethical" till we come to psychology, but though a cause is only truly made evident in its effect,* it does not follow, from this, that we need refuse to acknowledge the causes or make our word "ethical" too narrow to include them.

Of course, it is not necessary to say much about the ethical in psychology because it is in the psychological domain that most of the great ethical battles of the past have been fought. The Hedonistic controversy, for example, is obviously a question incident to the progress of a self-conscious but developing organism. The term "Pleasure" may be analyzed in two very different ways. It may be taken as a certain *intensive* aspect which may be detected in an object, varying from zero to infinity in a continuous scale. Or it may simply be taken in the sense of Spinoza as a progress from a lower to a higher perfection. In the first sense, we find ourselves involved in a great many psychological difficulties when we attempt to make a consistent Hedonistic calculus. In the second sense, it simply reduces itself to the coördinate of a certain stage in the development of a faculty. A constant oscillation between these two points of view may be seen in Mr. Spencer's "Data of Ethics." When he has shown conclusively that pleasures are relative, and that thus the first sense of the term is a very difficult one for ethical comparison, he suddenly changes his tack and drifts easily and almost imperceptibly to the second sense of the term. In this case the interpretation of the developed faculty by means of its coördinate expression, Pleasure, is very easy indeed, for they are simply convertible terms. But it is not my intention here to enter into a complete examination of Mr. Spencer's Hedonism. What I want to insist on is the fact that ethics is applied to psychology in the same way in which, with varying material, it is applied to sciences lower down in the scale. In the course of psychological development, we reach the idea of a life extended in length and breadth by complex re-representa-

Cf. Pringle—Pattison, "Man's Place in the Cosmos," p. 15.

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tive ideas or of the coördinate expression for such a life and then, going back on our material we judge the means according as they do or do not tend to this end. That in Psychology the end is consciously sought after, is, of course, important, but it does not justify us in limiting the word "ethics" to the domain of psychology.

If Psyschology has been the scene of most ethical controversies in the past, it seems no less clear that in Sociology many fierce ethical battles will be fought in the near future. No one who has tried to keep abreast of the books on this new science which have lately poured forth from France, Germany, America, Italy, and even Spain, can fail to see that the social end or the "Sociale Frage," is giving us a new standard of ethical judgment. Hedonism, for example, ceases to be a burining question when Sociology in this way alters the court of appeal. A certain degree of intensity may be the coördinate of a development of individual faculty, but it can hardly be the coördinate of a state of society. At the same time, however, ethical questions which Psychology had seemed to settle, rear their head in newer and more menacing forms. Egoistic Hedonism had become universalistic Hedonism and thus the head of Individualism in psychological Ethics had been scotched. But Egoism in Sociology is not so easy to dispose of. If with Kidd, we make the "Struggle for the Tropics" the most important movement in Western civilization at the present time, then we must recognize that there is a struggle going on between Individualism and Universalism in social life. A nation may use the Tropics as territory to be exploited for its own ends, or it may feel that even black nations have their rights. The great influence of Nietszche is exerted mainly on behalf of Individualism in social conduct. People who would scorn the idea of Egoism in its narrower sense are yet ready to make "might" the ideal of the nation and the "will for might" as the best means to attain this desirable result.* At the opposite pole of thought, of course, stands the system of Tolstoy, with

*In a recent book it is roundly stated that this "will for might" is the dominating influence in English politics at the present time. See Steffen, "England als Weltmacht und Kulturstaat," p. 64.

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its incessant depreciation of Patriotism as simply belonging to a past stage of the world's progress.*

What Ethics has to do in its relation to the social problem is to construct an ideal with reference to history and the laws of scientific Sociology. History is the laboratory of the social investigator. There he sees ideas tested and tried on a large scale, weighed sometimes and found wanting by the impartial judgment of the world's progress. It is difficult, sometimes, to get at the "naked truth" among the confusion of contending shibboleths. The danger is that we should hastily rush to conclusions and assume that some historical development is perfectly relevant to the case. History has to deal with such complex conditions. The thing that has been never occurs in exactly the same way again. In both Tolstoy and Nietszche there is a certain impatience of history. They often substitute broad generalizations for well-founded laws and self-assertive dogmatism for patient reasoning.† All such methods must be discarded in the social ethics of the future. Our ideal must not be the dream of romance but one which we have slowly evolved from the developing life around us. From this point of view the sociologist is a kind of oracle, revealing to each age the age's highest needs. Already we seem able, to some extent, to forecast the social ideal of the twentieth century. The great Western nations are settling down into one or two well-defined groups. Of course there are wars still, but this preservation of the "balance of power" among one or two nations, is undoubtedly an influence in the direction of peace.‡ Once, however, the political ideal has begun to be realized, there will remain the social ideal still to be attained. How are we to reconcile the interests of groups of men and classes within the federated states? How are we to put the citizens on a level in the "struggle for existence"? We may certainly take it for granted

*Tolstoy, "Patriotism and Government," p. 12.

†Take, for example, the dogmatic way in which Tolstoy selects and harmonizes an evangel for himself from the Christian Gospels, and Nietzsche's massing of Platoism, Judaism and Christianity together as teaching the same lesson in history.

‡*Cf.* Stein, "Das Ideal des ewigen Friedens und die Sociale Frage," pp. 44-65.

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at the outset that, so long as a complex society exists, so long there will be struggle, whether that struggle has been moralized or not. A stagnant state, such as Mr. Spencer dreams of, where everybody will be so delightfully adjusted to his environment that the whole may be wrought by machinery, if need be, is an ideal which one does not like to contemplate at close quarters. The human will is always restless; it cannot be satisfied with what it has already done. As soon as it has at any time adjusted itself, it will launch out again into more extensive combinations. But if our social ethics is comprehensive, it should show us how to regulate the "struggle for existence." Rivalry, in that case, may become not a jealous scramble for material goods which all the combatants want and which, obviously, all cannot have, but a good-humored spirit of emulation in a state where all can help and where the good of one is the good of the community. In a poem lately published, Mr. William Watson has expressed his doubts as to the possibility of such an ordered progress:

> "Rather some random throw
> Of heedless nature's dice
> 'Twould seem, that from so low
> Hath lifted man so high."

But we are rapidly outgrowing these artistic fears. It is the task of social ethics to point out to us our ideal and to carry it back to our help in the field of history.

As a result then and as an extension of the foregoing argument, it is now possible to ask the reader's assent to three important conclusions:—

In the first place, we cannot hide Ethics among the social sciences, like some modern babe in the woods buried among the leaves of the forest. Every cause can only be made fully evident in the light of its effect and every aspect of life and science has its ethical side. If we draw up a "Table of the Sciences," we must draw a vertical line by the side of such division and along the course of this line, we must write the word "Ethics."

In the second place, it is a misjudgment of the facts to contrast the "cosmic process" with the ethical or sociological process and to brand the former as unethical. The "cosmic pro-

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cess" is ethical after its kind, but its end is not the same as the sociological. The sociological process aims at producing the man whose interests are so perfectly identical with society that you can express his life in terms of the ideal state. The biological or cosmic process simply aims at producing the most successful type of the vital organism. Means that are relevant in view of the latter end are brutal in the light of the former. But we must not make a sudden leap from one order of being to another.

In the third place, we must not therefore assume, as some later sociologists do, that the sociological end must be taken as the unifying principle of the whole universe. More comprehensive than the world of knowledge is the world of values—the world of art, religion, and the great idealistic systems of philosophy. If M. de Greef goes to the history of art and religion only the ninth and tenth places in his hierarchy, we must remember at the same time that a work of art is not the same as the history of its production or contents nor a system of metaphysics an accident of the *milieu* in which it has been brought to birth. The highest results that ethics reaches in the domain of sociology, the most complex of the sciences, are simply stages in the long progress to ultimate and perfected truth.

J. H. HARLEY.

LONDON.

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AMERICA'S DUTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.*

THE American spirit was perhaps never more impressively manifested than in the declaration with which this nation went to war with Spain—not the control of Cuba, but the emancipation of Cuba was solemnly stated as our aim. And after the triumphant close of the war, after the victories in Manila Bay as well as elsewhere, the same spirit found eloquent expression on the lips of the Chief Magistrate of the nation. "The splendid victories we have achieved," he said, (and he said it here in Chicago), "would be our eternal shame and not our everlasting glory, if they led to the weakening of our original lofty purpose or to the desertion of the immortal principles on which the national government is founded. . . . The war with Spain was undertaken not that the United States should increase its territory, but that oppression at our very doors should be stopped. This noble sentiment must continue to animate us, and we must give to the world the full demonstration of the sincerity of our purpose." The American spirit, in and of itself, is neither for nor against expansion—unlimited expansion, so it does not sin against liberty, is consistent with it; it is only against expansion when accomplished by force—our late President tersely expressed it when he spoke of "forcible annexation" as "criminal aggression." This is the fixed star by which the nation must guide its action.

The question that is now before the nation and has been for more than three years is whether the "noble sentiment" with which it took up the cause of Cuba, shall "continue to animate us." If when we took Spain's title to the Philippine Islands by the Treaty of Paris, we had declared that while we had the title, we had no wish to enforce it against the consent of the Filipino people, and that when they succeeded in establishing a government capable of fulfilling governmental functions we should turn over our title to them if they so desired, there would have been no trouble in the Islands. The process of establishing such a government might have taken longer than a

*An address before the Society for Ethical Culture of Chicago.

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similar process is taking in Cuba—much longer; but however long and however difficult the process might be, no haunting fear would be disturbing the minds of the Filipinos that we might interfere and attempt to permanently rule them ourselves; they would know that the difficulties were on their side not on ours.

It would have been a noble occupation—this nursing a growing state, this encouraging the self-help of a people. America would have raised our estimate of human nature, our estimate of the possibilities of human government in so doing; it would have set a novel example to old Europe; it would have become not merely America enlightening, but America enfranchising the world. Nor is such a thing an Utopian dream. We actually set out to do this in Cuba, and I believe we are going to do it. To my mind, barring the abatements that we must make in speaking of all human and particularly governmental achievements, our relations to Cuba are one of the brightest and most beautiful pages in history. Why could we not have done or be doing the same thing in the Philippines? Alas! we forgot ourselves. Let us not say it was our late President's fault. Probably nothing contributed so much to an outbreak of hostilities as his cablegram of December 21, 1898, proclaiming United States sovereignty, uncoupled with any declaration that the United States would pay respect to the wishes of the people. But it must be remembered that he had no right to make a declaration of this kind*—that was for Congress to do, if it was to be done. Nor can we impute all the blame to Congress; for did not Congress represent the country, and who can say that the country was in the same mood of magnanimity then that it had been eight months previous, when it approved the declaration to Cuba? It was really people like you and me that were at fault: our high principles were momentarily lost to sight, we thought possibly that we had now a prize that we had better keep, and which no pledge like that to Cuba prevented us from keeping, for new markets, for new investments; many of us imagined, too, that the Filipinos were a lot of sav-

*I waive the question whether he had the right to proclaim sovereignty at all, before a ratification of the Treaty by Congress.

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ages, or at best a medley of warring tribes, incapable of united action and self-government—so that for their good as well as our own it would be better to keep control over them. And so we were confused, undecided, at cross purposes with ourselves; we consented to only assertion of sovereignty over the Filipinos, and what we should do with them, or whether we should have any respect to their wishes, we reserved to the future to determine.

In a situation like this, the instincts and aspirations of the Filipinos being what they have proved to be, trouble was bound to come. One clear reassuring word from the President, or from Congress, coupled with whatever assertions of temporary sovereignty, would have allayed their suspicions; but the absence of such a word, joined to an absolute ignoring of the efforts at self-government which the Filipinos were already making, and a half-contemptuous slighting of their army, which had made common cause with our forces against Spain, could only be interpreted by the Filipinos as meaning that whatever their fate was to be, they were to have no hand in shaping it. They took to arms, then, as any self-respecting men would. War was inevitable, they being what they were, and the circumstances being what they were. It matters little who fired the first shot; as it happened, a sentinel of our forces did, but that was an accident.

We have lost a great opportunity and have brought upon ourselves as well as upon the Filipinos untold disaster. It is high time that we came at last to our mind.

We cannot, alas! undo what is done, we cannot raise the thousands dead, who have fought on the one side to defend their liberties and on the other as loyal soldiers of the United States; but the long future is before us, and we can do our best to set ourselves right henceforth. There was a pitiful remark by a member of the House of Representatives not long ago when a number of Philippine bills were up for consideration; he said, what perhaps many more felt, that the question was not whether this bill should pass or that one, but what are we trying to do? The nation is now like a brave, stout vessel at sea, ready to fight any storms that may assail it, but without a chart, without a course marked out, without even a port to sail

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to. We have been making good our title in the Islands, we conquered Spain and now we are conquering the Filipinos—but what our object is in all this, what the goal is we are aiming at, whether to make the Islands a colony, or a United States territory and possibly future state or states, or whether we are to concede to the Filipinos an independent national existence, if they desire it, we have not decided and we do not know.

As a possible help to clearness, let us first realize the present situation—what the war has brought us to. Second, let us with the help of such knowledge as has been gathered and is now accessible to us in reliable documents, get a clearer idea of who and what the Filipinos are. Then in conclusion, we may draw our inferences, in the light of facts as well as of principles, as to what the nation ought to do.

The war, or "insurrection," as we are pleased to term it, has lasted for three years—this though Governor Taft had said that within sixty days after the defeat of Bryan the "last vestige of insurrection" would disappear. The larger part of the Islands has been subjugated—"pacified" is the official word. However, in January President Schurman admitted that fighting was still going on in territory inhabited by about a quarter to a fifth of the population*—and there has been no noticeable change since, though the rigor of the "concentration" camps will undoubtedly make a change. How superficial the pacification may sometimes be is shown in the fact that some islands that had been turned over from military to civil rule have been turned back to military rule again. Forty-two per cent. of the territory or thirty per cent. of the population are still under military rule—or were in November (as reported by Secretary Root). Every now and then we hear of instances of those who had been supposed to be submissive and loyal, showing their hostility when an occasion arose; secretly they furnish ammunition to the insurgents or they openly take arms again. General Chaffee is reported to have said indeed that the natives are all traitors to American sovereignty, have their hearts set on independence.† Senator Bacon, who was in the Philippines last summer and mingled much with the army, says‡ that "with

*"Philippine Affairs, a Retrospect and Outlook," p. 55. †Ibid., p. 106.
‡*Army and Navy Journal*, February 8, 1902.

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scarcely an exception the opinion was expressed by them [army officers] that at heart the Filipinos are unfriendly to Americans, that they are intensely hostile to American rule, that where they profess loyalty to our government it is feigned and insincere, and that where hostilities have ceased it is because the natives have, of necessity, laid down their arms in submission to the power which they could not resist."

The methods we are now coming to use to subdue or "pacify" the Filipinos are extreme. I do not refer now to ordinary acts of cruelty such as are apt to accompany all war—or even to the "water cure," an exquisite mode of torture which Governor Taft describes as consisting of pouring water down the throats of men until they swell up and, becoming frightened, tell what they know: for instance, where guns are hidden. I am glad to believe that these are isolated acts and against orders. What I refer to is extreme measures taken by military orders—I mean the so-called "concentration camps." It may be described as a method of winning submission by starvation. Zones are established around our garrisons within which all inhabitants of the country round about must gather themselves. Any outside are liable to be shot or hanged. No neutrality is permitted. Every inhabitant must be either an active friend or treated as an enemy. Those inside must take the oath of allegiance to the United States, and they must prove their sincerity by going out and locating insurgent rifles and supplies—if they have been insurgents, they must be ready to publicly participate in operations against their former leaders: as the Manila *American* patriotically puts it, "they must prove their good intentions by good deeds." As a result, fires are seen in every direction around the camps, villages, farms and growing crops are destroyed; and inside we are manufacturing informers, spies, hypocrites, or loyal Americans—it does not matter much by which term we describe them. It is a method we appear to have learned from old Spain. We are humaner, no doubt, and take better sanitary precautions; but in principle the camps are the same as those of Weyler in Cuba. We have actually army officers saying now that "Weyler knew his business." We are not even up to Aguinaldo's standard, who in his first proclamation in 1898 forbade the maltreating of

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neutrals and made it a criminal offence to do so. One of our late President's demands on Spain in 1898 was "the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration" in Cuba, and now we are officially issuing orders of reconcentration ourselves! This is one of the things the war is leading us to.

Another extraordinary official measure is our treason and sedition laws. Do we realize that it is now a crime in the Philippines to advocate the independence of the Islands, even if the means urged for reaching such an end are peaceable—that free speech and a free press are virtually annihilated there, that if anyone should speak or write there as I am doing here to-day, he would be liable to fine and imprisonment? Yet these are the provisions of Section 10 of Act No. 292 of the United States Philippine Commission.* President Schurman, a member of the first Philippine Commission, and a man of weight, urged eventual independence as a solution of the Philippine problem in a notable speech in Boston in January—a speech that has been printed† and should be read by every thoughtful citizen—and straightway the cable announced that one of our Philippine commanders, General Wheaton, said that men had been sent to prison in Manila for such remarks as those. This is the condition of affairs. It has its effect even here at home. But the other day Governor Taft was asked before our Senate Committee whether a recent speech of Senator Hoar's would not, if circulated in the Philippines, subject the author to arrest; and the chairman of the committee rushed in to check such a line of investigation, and Governor Taft begged to be excused from answering. In Chicago this past week one of our generals, who captured Aguinaldo by a

*The following is the text: "Until it has been officially proclaimed that a state of war or insurrection against the authority of sovereignty of the United States no longer exists in the Philippine islands, it shall be unlawful for any person to advocate, orally or by writing, or printing, or like methods, the independence of the Philippine islands or their separation from the United States, whether by peaceable or forcible means, or to print, publish, or circulate any handbill, newspaper, or other publication, advocating such independence or separation.

"Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be punished by a fine of not exceeding $2,000, and imprisonment not exceeding one year."

†"Philippine Affairs," already cited.

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trick, was commenting on two negro deserters to the Filipinos, who were caught and hanged, and said, "it would have been more an act of justice had we hanged some of the people who signed the recent petition to Congress asking that we confer with the Filipino leaders in an effort to secure peace." Terror in the Philippines and terror at home would seem to be the policy of this brave little general. What demoralization when such rubbish is listened to without a protest by a company of representative Chicago men! The general made much of Filipino assassinations—bad and vicious enough, surely. But how about the assassination of liberty? How about putting the gags on a Senator Hoar, or a President Schurman—yes, on the sacred shade of an Abraham Lincoln, who said, "Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves," and who being dead yet speaks to us?

Yes, to a still graver consequence is the war leading some of us. There can be little question, if this war has been right, the Declaration of Independence is wrong. And some of us are following the inexorable logic. We are lapsing into the tone taken in the old slavery days when the principles of that immortal document were called "glittering generalities." There is a fresh outbreak of the old, pagan, barbaric doctrine that might makes right—a doctrine that all civilization is a protest against. Even college professors are losing the fine edge of their moral sense. Professor Hart, of Harvard, urges, in so many words, in his recent "Foundations of American Foreign Policy," that we must give up our contempt for other nations which rule with an iron hand and must abandon the principle that all just government depends on the consent of the governed. This degradation of our ideals is the saddest, the most mortal injury that the war is inflicting upon us. In frank harmony was the question addressed to one of our Congressmen, who was in Manila last summer, by an army officer there with reference to the translations of the Declaration Independence as well as of the Constitution that had been circulated under General MacArthur—"What do you think of circulating that d—— incendiary document, sir?" he was asked.* I see no reason for blinking the fact—no way of

*The *Nation*, January 23, 1902, p. 60.

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evading the force of the blunt soldier's question; the document is an "incendiary" one over there; it stirs up the very spirits that we wish to down and suppress; it is a piece of folly from the military standpoint to circulate it. But what a pass the war is bringing us to, when it is raising the question whether we ought not to hide and conceal an enunciation of the principles on which this nation's life was built!

These are some of the things that the war is leading us to—if for no other reason, is it not well to reflect a moment and ask if the war was really necessary?

Who and what are the Filipinos, for whose subjection we have been resorting to such measures, and incurring such grave risks? Unquestionably information has been gained in the last few years that we did not have at first. If any of us had been asked four years ago who were the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands, we should probably have answered, if we could have said anything at all, that they were a lot of savages. Only ethnologists and travelers knew. The popular impression lasted long. And it was made good use of. It was proclaimed on a thousand stumps during the campaign of 1900, by men who might have been supposed to know, that Aguinaldo was a savage like Sitting Bull and that the population of Luzon and the Visayans were to be compared to the Comanches and painted Sioux. More recently a United States Senator has placed them intellectually on a level with caribou bulls. And yet if we had been intent on the matter we might have learned differently very soon. General Anderson wrote in July, 1898, "We have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own." The information won by scholars before and since has been made accessible to us in a special chapter of the report of the United States Bureau of Education for 1901.* The real savages on the Philippine Islands comparable to our Indians

*See extracts in the *Philippine Review* (The Philippine Information Society, 62 Wall street, New York; 12 Otis place, Boston.), December, 1901. Students of the subject are greatly indebted to the painstaking and thoroughly unpartizan work of the Philippine Information Society, the results of which are embodied in the *Philippine Review,* and in an earlier series of pamphlets, entitled "Facts About the Filipinos."

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are a minority—at best not more than a sixth or seventh of the population. With them the United States has practically had little or nothing to do—they living far in the interior of the islands. There are also the Mohammedan Malays of the southern islands. They are quite distinct from the Christianized Malays of Luzon and the northern islands, and it is with the latter alone that we have had any trouble. They are the Filipinos proper—the only ones that count or are to be reckoned with in the present situation. Their ancestors were dwellers on the coasts and had even a measure of civilization when the Islands were discovered by the Spaniards. They carried on trade with China and Japan. Philippine vessels were seen in Malacca by the Portuguese on their arrival there in 1511—twenty years before the Spanish Magellan discovered the Islands. The representative men of the Filipinos are educated professional and business men, the best of whom are on a par with the corresponding classes elsewhere in the world. President Schurman says that to have met and known these educated Filipinos, to have had social intercourse and official relations with them, he counts one of the pleasantest and most interesting recollections of his life. The first Philippine Commission testified to the high range of their intelligence, and also to their social refinement, the grace and charm of their personal character. They "are the equals of the men one meets in similar vocations—law, medicine, business, etc.—in Europe or America." Those who have met Senor Sixto Lopez, who has been in this country, can credit the truth of the statement. Of course, these educated men are in the minority (though as the Commission said, "far more numerous than is generally supposed"); and yet Lieutenant Gillmore, who was a prisoner early in the war and traversed some of the wildest and most mountainous parts of Luzon, says that though wretchedly clothed one could not fairly call the people he saw uncivilized, that in every bamboo hut there was a book or two and that the priests kept school in every village and the native children were compelled to attend.* It is true that this Filipino civilization, as

*See Lieutenant Gillmore's account of his experiences, in *McClure's Magazine*, August and September, 1900.

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the same witness says, was, like that of all people under Spanish rule, a couple of centuries behind the time—it was thought enough for girls, for instance, if they learned to read the catechism and the prayer book; and yet it is surprising to hear that the ability to read was more general than in many of the provinces of Spain,*—that ten per cent. of the six hundred Filipino teachers who attended the preliminary term of the Manila Normal School, established by the United States, could already speak English quite well, and the majority of the remainder could understand the elementary instruction when given in English;† that there was a university at Manila with 1681 students in 1895-1896; that there were nine other secondary colleges throughout the archipelago, with an attendance that same year of 8070, besides sixty-seven private Latin schools, and a school of agriculture, a nautical school, a superior school of painting, sculpture and engraving, and a military academy; that the number of primary schools in the Islands was 2167, there being two schools for each sex in every town of 5000 inhabitants, three for each sex in towns of 10,000 inhabitants, and so on.‡ All this hardly looks like a stage of culture such as that of the "painted Sioux." The ridiculousness of such a notion is palpable also when we become aware that in the civil tribunals that Governor Taft's Commission is setting up in the Islands there are always some Filipinos. For example in the justice's court in each of the 765 municipalities that have been organized, the justice is a Filipino; in the larger district courts six out of the sixteen judges are Filipinos, and there are three Filipinos in the Supreme Court—one of them, to quote President Schurman's language, "the wise, high-minded and capable Florentino Torres, and another, the Chief Justice, that model Filipino, Cayelario S. Arellano, a man of spotless integrity, a lawyer of great eminence and renown, and a gentleman of learning, culture, and the most charming refinement of life and manners."§ If these men, like that other

*C. B. S., in *Outlook*, September 7, 1901.

†F. W. Nash, in *Educational Review*, October, 1901.

‡"Report of Commissioner of Education" (for 1901), ch. xxix., summarized in *Philippine Review*, December, 1901.

§"Philippine Affairs," p. 6.

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leader of the people, Aguinaldo, are more properly to be compared to Sitting Bull, our Commission surely has misplaced them.

Another fact. Though the relatively ignorant are the large majority, and the educated a small minority in the country, the majority take the minority as their natural leaders. By universal testimony they are not an anarchic, willful, but a docile people—the popular tendency, says Schurman,* is to admire and almost worship their educated men, and Governor Taft remarks† that they are, if anything, too easily controlled by the educated among them. In this fact lies the possibility of political coherency for the people.

Still further. Our first Philippine Commission reported that the idea of independence arose for the first time in the summer of 1898. We now know that this was a mistake. Recently the constitution drawn up during the uprising against Spain in '96 and '97 has been discovered, and that document declares for a separation from the kingdom of Spain in order to establish an independent state. In fact there has been a seminational, or at least a strong racial consciousness, on the part of the Filipinos for some time. It appears in such circumstances as Governor Taft speaks of when he refers (before the Senate Committee) to their "pride of country"—they have a "greater attachment" for their country, he says, than the Chinese have for theirs. It appears, too, in such a fact as that, through three long centuries of Spanish rule, the people have tenaciously preserved their own language or dialects—not five per cent. of them speaking or understanding Spanish. This is somewhat extraordinary in view of the contrary fact that Spanish became the universal language of Spanish South America and Mexico. There was some vital, sturdy consciousness of its own particular self, that could make a people thus hold its own. Somehow, too, Spanish oppression seems to have more or less united and cemented them. There have been many insurrections—in 1622, in 1629, in 1649, in 1827, in 1844, in 1872; these and particularly the last and more general one of '96 and '97, with its illustrious martyr Rizal, con-

*P. 48.

†*Philippine Review*, February, 1902, p. 142.

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tributed to intensify the national feeling. In any case the extent of the sway of the government improvised under the leadership of Aguinaldo in the summer of 1898 was something remarkable. It was recognized practically throughout Luzon. The prisoners whom I have already quoted found orderly, peaceful communities far in the interior, with the educated and wealthy class prominent in the control of affairs, and enthusiastically supporting in most instances the insurgent government. The Visayan islands, too, coöperated, and practically all the islands of the archipelago save those in which the Mohammedan world had control. The Tagals of Luzon were the leaders, but our special Commissioner of Education says in his report that they are "the natural leaders of the islands," being the foremost in energy and intellect, and the sense of a common interest and danger seems to have temporarily drowned the suspicions and enmities of the inhabitants of other islands.

We alas! took no account of these things at the time, and the most charitable view is that most of us did not know of them. We knew only of the sovereignty that we had inherited from Spain, which we proceeded to enforce as energetically as ever Spain had hers. The fact is that the Spanish dominion was in the first place for the most part peacefully secured—the Filipinos having first been Christianized by Spanish Catholic missionaries and then willingly becoming the subjects of the King of Spain, a step which they seem to have regarded almost as a consequence of baptism. But America unhappily fell into war from the start—and now, marvelous to relate, our very efforts to subdue a rebellious people have made them more a people than ever. Dr. Schurman says, "The Filipinos have condensed the experience of centuries into these last half-dozen years."* He speaks of the emergence, during this period of storm and stress, of a community of attitude, interest, sentiment, and aspiration, that was undiscoverable or at least undiscerned [a wise qualification] before. They have, he says, dreamed of liberty and they have fought for it, and so real has become the consciousness of nationality, that he credits the reported dictum of General Chaffee that they are all traitors to

*P. 88.

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American sovereignty and have their hearts set on independence.* It is sometimes said that it is only the poorer, the more ignorant classes that are against us—those that have nothing to lose; but that the men of property and education are with us. But this is an illusion. There are of course wealthy and educated people, who have accepted American sovereignty, but they are a small party and an unpopular party and at present a stationary party†—they are known as Federalists, and are mostly in Manila. But the mass of the people, of all classes, are against American sovereignty—however for reasons of policy they may appear to submit to it. Sometimes it is the wealthy classes that are singled out for special reprobation by our authorities. In the concentration orders one reads a passage like this, which throws a flood of light on the real situation: "The wealthy and influential and town and insurgent officials are therefore those against whom our most energetic efforts should be directed. The common people amount to nothing. They are merely densely ignorant tools who blindly follow the lead of the principles."‡ It is evident to anyone who will use his eyes that we are face to face not with a hostile faction but with a hostile people. The war has been all over the islands, said recently Governor Taft. General MacArthur reported in 1900 that there was substantial unity among the Filipino people in their opposition to the United States. Even now that they are beaten (or being beaten), there appears to be no less opposition.

It is this sense of nascent nationality that is the commanding fact in the present situation. A people that does not aspire to be a people may have no right to be one, but a people that does so aspire has the right. To deny such a right, to choke such aspirations is a kind of political murder. It is as if you should strangle an unborn child. Schurman says that Gladstone—venerable name—said that struggling nationalities are the jewels of history, the hope and promise of the world.

But, it is said, the Filipinos are incapable of self-government.

*"Philippine Affairs," p. 106.

†See *Philippine Review*, March, 1902, p. 179*ff*.

‡Order of General Bell, as given in the *Army and Navy Journal*, January 25, 1902, p. 510.

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How do we know this? If they were anarchic, if they recognized no principles of subordination, we might say it. But the essential political virtues (for any people making their first experiment in statehood), loyalty to leaders and obedience, they have. Moreover, they showed political capacity in the government they created at Malalos. They had peaceful municipal and provincial government far more widely throughout the islands than we have to-day. A major in our army, writing in the February *Forum*, says that this government was a strong one, exercising real power while it lasted—that it was distinctly an advance on Spanish rule. Still more, our present Philippine Commission testifies that the native officials that are now at work under our supervision have proved reasonably capable in the administration of affairs.

What, then, I ask, is to hinder us from saying and publishing to the Filipinos, that as soon as they can build up a really effective government, we are ready to surrender our sovereignty to them? But why can we not call an assembly of the people, just as we called an assembly of the Cuban people—or at least prepare to issue such a call, and announce that we shall issue it—and if that assembly is really representative and its work anywise commends itself to us as sound and just, then give over to it the title to self-government which every united and aspiring people ought to have?

I believe that something of this sort is our only ultimatum—the only result with which the great heart of America can be satisfied. To found subject colonies is not American business. The only possible line of aggressive action for us is to keep free and to make free. We may proceed tentatively in the Philippines—we need not withdraw our helping hand at once. We may train the people for a little while, as the Taft Commission is proposing to do and is already in a measure doing. We may coöperate with them, we may give them of our experience, of our ideas of law, of our ideas of education. But we can only do this effectually, we can only get one particle of sympathy from the mass of the people on the proviso that we distinctly state that we wish to do no violence to their sense of nationality, that we wish to respect it, that we view our only

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office to be to help it to come to a triumphant and glorious birth. Then we shall become friends to the Philippine people; then we shall be not a master, but an elder brother to them—then they will as willingly take the hand of friendship as they hated the hand of force. In vain is all we are doing for them till we do this. In vain are our schools or our roads or our civil justices, without liberty, or at least the promise of the same. They will take these things, but they will not thank us for them—for they know that till we grant them liberty, we do not respect them, much less do we love them.

From recent events my hopes run high that the nation will yet take this magnanimous course. I believe that many have consented to the nation's silence and indecision through ignorance of the situation and that the light will spread. I cannot think that the heart and conscience of our people have any sympathy with violence to the prinicples of the Declaration of Independence. They will right themselves on this point, give them time. I take confidence in the soberer tone that is coming over our high officials—instead of "gems and glories of the tropic seas" we now hear that we have "a great burden." The Taft Commission itself says that "what the Filipino people desire is a definite knowledge of the intention of Congress with respect" to them. President Schurman urges granting to the Filipinos representative institutions at once. He thinks that the day of their safe and rightful liberation may be near—nearer than he believed possible three years ago. Secretary Long has made a notable utterance. While putting the time further off than President Schurman, he said, when the time comes that our trust is executed and the ability of self-government is assured, then the question of their political status will be for the people of those islands themselves to decide. "Whether they will walk alone and independent or whether they will walk hand in hand with us, as Canada walks with England, they—whoever they shall be—will decide. And as England respects the wishes of Canada in this regard, so shall we then respect, and ought to respect, the wishes of the Philippines." Even our Chief Magistrate has used language which on the face of it means only one thing. "We hope," he said in

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his message to Congress of last December, "to do for them [the Filipinos] what has never before been done for any people of the tropics—to make them fit for self-government after the fashion of the really free nations." Why shall not Congress have the large mindedness, the supreme political wisdom, to draft these views into a definite statute? Why shall not the "noble sentiment" that found expression in its memorable declaration with regard to labor assert itself once more? When this happens, the war will stop in a day. When this happens, it is even possible that something of the old Filipino feeling may come back that had touching expression on one of those glorious July days in 1898—for when the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet and in the after-dinner speaking the Filipinos said they wished to be annexed, but not conquered, and one of our officers in reply assured them that we had not come to make them slaves, but to make them free men, a singular scene followed: All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and one of them, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: "We wish to be baptized in that sentiment." And he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads. Possibly, I say, a touch of this joy and exultation might come again—however deep and black the shadows of the last three years. Why shall not Congress act, I repeat, and put an end to the miserable indecision in which the nation stands? Yet the leaders of our leaders are the common people of the land. The question I raise, great as it is, is primarily your question and mine. Ponder it, I ask you, as a matter of personal duty. Clear up your mind as to what you think is right, and then stand for it steadily, unflinchingly, in public and in private; join with others who think like you, until your insight and will are written into the law of the land. Till the majority of the people are right, the country inevitably goes wrong.

WILLIAM M. SALTER.

CHICAGO.

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DISCUSSION NOTE.

Prof. D. G. Ritchie does not wish to re-open the controversy with Mr. John M. Robertson, but would ask readers of the "Further Rejoinder" in the January number to compare it with p. 498 in the number for July, 1901. [MAN. ED.]

BOOK REVIEWS.

THE ENGLISH UTILITARIANS. By Leslie Stephen. London: Duckworth & Co. Three vols., pp. viii. 326; vi. 382; vi. 525.

Whatever opinion may be held as to the positive value of the Utilitarian theory, the work of the English Utilitarians has two chief features, which will always give it importance for the student of ethics and politics. On the one hand, it is the most thorough and sustained attempt in the history of philosophical thought to develop logically the hedonist theory of life, and on the other hand, it is at every step in the closest contact with the practical problems of the society in which its authors lived. It is not often that logical theory and practical reform are so intimately combined, and this combination makes the system peculiarly instructive, whatever be the lessons we draw from it. Hitherto, however, there has been no thorough and comprehensive account of the whole Utilitarian movement in all its reaches, including its ethics, politics, economics, logic, psychology, history and religion, and our warm gratitude is therefore due to Mr. Leslie Stephen for his elaborate and most interesting treatment of the subject. No one could be better qualified to do the work with ability, learning and discriminating sympathy.

As he indicates in an introductory chapter, Mr. Stephen writes not so much the history of a philosophical doctrine as the history of a school or sect, holding certain beliefs which it endeavored to carry out practically in political and social reforms. His ultimate object is to "throw some light upon the intrinsic value of the Utilitarian creed and the place which it should occupy in a definitive system," and with this in view he writes "an account of this phase of thought, so as to bring out what were its real tenets; to what intellectual type they were naturally congenial; what

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were the limitations of view which affected the Utilitarians' conception of the problems to be solved; and what were the passions and prepossessions due to the contemporary state of society and to their own class position, which to some degree unconsciously dictated their conclusions." The Utilitarians are accordingly represented not merely as authors, but concretely as men and citizens, and a very large part of the book is devoted to biography and to the exposition of the social and political conditions of the time. The three great names of the Utilitarian succession, Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and J. S. Mill, are each made the centre of a volume, in which the works of numerous other doers and authors (on all sides of the controversy) are explained and discussed. Such a biographical method, with its separate accounts of lives and writings, has a certain advantage of concreteness, as is well argued by Mr. Stephen in his introductory chapter; but it increases the difficulty of putting together the material in each volume, so as to give it a sufficient unity. As the whole work is a history of thought and action, in which the author's own position is merely indicated in lines of criticism, and as it expounds and discusses a vast mass of varied opinion, it seems best to devote the greater part of this review to a general indication of the contents of the book.

In the early chapters of Vol. I. (the Bentham volume), Mr. Stephen gives an interesting account of the political and social conditions in England, which set the problems of the Utilitarian period and determined the mode of answering them. He lays stress upon the better side of English government in the latter part of the eighteenth century. "On the whole the system was a very good one—as systems go. It allowed free play to the effective political forces." It suited the conditions of the time, the predominance of agriculture and the imperfect development of manufactures. In England, as distinct from the continent, the ruling class "had not retained privileges without discharging corresponding functions." "The landholder was powerful as a product of the whole system of industrial and agricultural development; and he was bound in return to perform arduous and complicated duties." No doubt he did not always perform them well. As a legislator he was "clumsy, not intentionally cruel; and the laws, though sanguinary in reality, were more sanguinary in theory than in practice." Again, the system of justices, whose power was the centre of gravity of the whole administrative order, does

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not appear to have worked badly. In spite of the manifold evils of the government, it is not to be regarded as simply corrupt and mean-spirited, and later critics have scarcely given due credit to the unhesitating confidence of Englishmen in the fairness of the system. One of its main features was political and administrative individualism, "the combination of an absolute centralization of legislative power with an utter absence of administrative centralization. The units meeting in Parliament formed a supreme assembly; but they did not sink their own individuality. They only met to distribute the various functions among themselves." These general political conditions are admirably illustrated by a consideration of some of the chief English institutions, the army and navy and, more especially, the Church and the Universities, and Mr. Stephen indicates three main points in the theory which correspond to this practical order, (1) the constant reference to tradition and precedent, implying an empirical rather than a speculative theoretical basis, (2) the close association of privilege and duty, the functions of government being "assigned to men already powerful by their social position," and the ruling classes not so much considering "their privileges to be something granted by the state, as the power of the state to be something derived from their concessions," and (3) the doctrine of individualism which is implied throughout. "The individual rights are the antecedent and the rights of the state a consequent or corollary."

This individualism, in a new form, was also a main characteristic of the industrial movement, which gradually effected an organic change in the social order. The progress of this change, with its principles of self-help and education, its jealousy of government and its faith in "the glorious spirit of improvement," is traced by Mr. Stephen, and the expression of the general spirit of the time in agriculture is shown by an account of the works and writings of Arthur Young and Sir John Sinclair, and by a contrast of the condition of things in centralized France and in decentralized England. Upon this there follows an excellent statement of the social problems which, under the new conditions, pressed for solution,—such immediate practical problems as those of the poor-law, the police, prisons and education, as well as the wider questions of the slave-trade and those which were raised by the French Revolution. As a result of this survey Mr. Stephen again emphasizes the individualism which character-

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ized the whole social and political order. It was, however, rather a practical than a theoretical individualism, for Englishmen, "satisfied in a general way with their constitution, did not want to be bothered with theories." And it was an individualism by no means inconsistent with humaneness and philanthropy, for "the most marked characteristic of the eighteenth century was precisely the growth of humanity," although this very growth itself led succeeding generations to denounce their predecessors as cold and heartless. Passing from the politics to the philosophy of the time, which "barely existed," Mr. Stephen gives us some account of Horne Tooke, Reid and Dugald Stewart, especially dwelling upon Stewart's "inverted Utilitarianism" and the Utilitarian misconception of his position, and suggestively pointing out that the position of the Scottish school "was in philosophy what Whiggism was in politics."

It is unnecessary to say much regarding the second half of this volume, which is occupied with a full and valuable expository discussion of the life and works of Bentham. Mr. Stephen brings out very clearly the close relation of the thinking of Bentham, who "sprang from the class imbued most thoroughly with the typical English prejudices," to the sub-conscious ideas which ruled his social environment. His chief intellectual characteristics are admirably summarized. "The most real of pleasures for him lay in speculating upon the general principles by which 'people in power' should be guided. To construct a general chart for legislation, to hunt down sophistries, to explode mere noisy rhetoric, to classify and arrange and re-classify, until his whole intellectual wealth was neatly arranged in proper pigeon-holes, was a delight for its own sake. . . . He was in the position of a man with the agreeable conviction that he has only to prove the wisdom of a given course in order to secure its adoption." The practical nature of Bentham's whole work, his foundation "not of a doctrine, but of a method," the delusion involved in his tedious elaboration of detail, ["if a system will work, the minutest details can be exhibited. Therefore, it is inferred, an exhibition of minute detail proves that it will work,"] his opposition to the Jacobin "rights of man" doctrine and his arrival at the same practical conclusions as the Jacobins, are all ably unfolded. Bentham's leaning towards the doctrine of "equality," while he objects to it as a first principle and regards it as derivative, and his general adherence to the *laissez-faire* principle,

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qualified by considerations of "utility," are quite in the line of development of English thinking and practice. Further, Mr. Stephen points out that, while Bentham himself contributed little to economic theory, the "average," "ready-made" man, "the respectable citizen with a policeman round the corner," whom he tacitly assumes as the ultimate individual, becomes afterwards the "economic man." Bentham's political absolutism, with its affinity to the position of Hobbes, and the ethical application of his theories, with special reference to the question whether the Utilitarian system is essentially a selfish system, are critically discussed; and Mr. Stephen concludes the volume with a recognition of the immense real value of Bentham's doctrine, in spite of its limitations and defects. "There is hardly an argument in Bentham's voluminous writings which is not to the purpose so far as it goes. Given his point of view, he is invariably cogent and relevant. And, moreover, that is a point of view which has to be taken." His great merits, in short, are the thoroughness of his reasoning and his "respect for good solid facts." We may agree with Mr. Stephen in admiring these characteristics, although, remembering the "average man" and the pigeon-hole system, we may doubt whether the "experience scientifically organized" to which Bentham appeals is quite concrete enough to be described as "solid fact."

To the first volume Mr. Stephen has appended a very useful note on Bentham's writings. He devotes his second volume to James Mill, Bentham's lieutenant and afterwards leader of the Utilitarians. This volume is chiefly concerned with political and economic theory; but it contains also a critical exposition of James Mill's "Analysis" and of his ethical views, as well as an account of the Utilitarian attitude to the religious and poetic thought of the time. Mill's life is re-told, so as specially to indicate his relations to other political thinkers and workers, and a very interesting personal contrast is drawn between him and his contemporary, Coleridge. The biography of James Mill is followed by a chapter on the various reform movements of the time, political, legal, economic, ecclesiastical and educational. In most of these movements, as well as in the crusade against sinecures, Mr. Stephen notes the change in the temper of the nation, due to the progress of the industrial classes, and the gradual almost unconscious acceptance of Utilitarian theories. But the Utilitarians exaggerated the completeness of their triumph as they ex-

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aggerated the simplicity of their problem. "Large classes regarded them with absolute abhorrence" as destroyers of all the greatest things in life, and "there were two problems, at least, of enormous importance, upon which it could scarcely be said that any progress had been made," the reform of the Church and the appalling pauperism which had grown during the war, with the attendant discontent and misery of great masses of the population.

The next chapter is devoted to the discussion of political theory. It opens with an exposition of the Utilitarian view as represented by James Mill in his *Encyclopædia* article on "Government," and this is further elucidated by an account of Macaulay's attack upon it. "Mill's 'government,' like Bentham's, is simply the conception of legal 'sovereignty' transferred to the sphere of politics." Here we have another instance of the abstractness of the Utilitarian position, its "simple-minded audacity," its oversimplification of the problems to be settled, so that an indefinite allowance has always to be made for "friction," if the scientific conclusions of the theory are to harmonize with the actual complex facts. Macaulay, on the other hand, "accepts the purely 'empirical' or 'rule-of-thumb' position," "really bidding us take 'experience' in the lump" and trust to unreasoned observation. But although Macaulay accuses Mill of adopting a purely *a priori* method, while he describes his own empiricism as "Baconian induction," he does not really remain in this practically sceptical position. "He argues, just as Mill would have argued, from general rules about human nature." "It is the only line of argument which is possible till, if that should ever happen, a genuine science of politics shall have been constituted." The remainder of the chapter gives an account of the positions (1) of the Whigs, represented by Mackintosh and Jeffrey, in addition to Macaulay, (2) of the Tories, especially Southey and Coleridge, with their views on the question of Church and State, and (3) of the socialist Owen and the reactionary Radical Cobbett. The Whigs had no strong views of their own. Their position was that of "cultivated men of sense, with their eyes open to many difficulties overlooked by zealots, but far too sceptical and despondent to rouse any enthusiasm or accept any dogmas absolutely." The genuine, though somewhat blind, criticism of the Utilitarian position came from Tories, Socialists and nondescript Radicals, who were agreed in attacking, with "a dumb and inarticulate logic, though in the

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loudest tones of denunciation," the industrial revolution and its results which the Utilitarians regarded as the true line of advance of the day.

The sociology of the Utilitarians is embodied in their political economy, to which and its critics Mr. Stephen devotes the next three chapters of his book. "Belief in the Malthusian theory of population was the most essential article" of the Utilitarian economic faith, and accordingly Mr. Stephen gives us an admirable critical exposition of the teaching of Malthus, the real and permanent value of which is that he "introduced a new method of approaching the great social problems." "Earlier writers had been content to single out one particular set of phenomena without attending to its place in the more general and complex processes, of which they formed an integral part." "Malthus's investigations illustrate the necessity of referring every particular process to its place in the whole system, of noting how any given change might set up a set of actions and reactions in virtue of the general elasticity of population, and thus of constantly referring at every step to the general conditions of human life." In its application to politics the Malthusian doctrine supplements the social atomism of the Utilitarian position by pointing to a great cohesive power in the "expansive force of population." This is, "in a sense, the great motive power which moulds the whole social structure; or rather, it forces together the independent units, and welds them into an aggregate." Its action is, of course, indirect. The excess of the instinct of multiplication conflicts with the instinct of self-preservation and thus indirectly leads to the development of social and political institutions, involving inequality, which act as checks upon what is in itself the more powerful tendency. The originally independent individuals are thus, by the very spirit of independence, compelled into society for the sake of self-preservation and the bettering of their own condition.

The propounding of the theory of rent marks the transition from Malthus to Ricardo, whose views as well as those of the Ricardians (especially McCulloch and Torrens) are carefully expounded in the next chapter. An interesting parallel is drawn between Ricardo and Bishop Butler, and it is shown that "Ricardo's doctrine is Malthus carried out more logically." In Ricardo's theory of value, again, there is found " a starting-point of the chief modern socialist theories." The Ricardian doctrines "that capital is 'accumulated labor' and that all value is in proportion to

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the labor fell in with the socialist theory. If value is created by labor, ought not 'labor' to possess what it makes?" "Apply the political doctrine of rights of man to the economic right to wealth, and you have the socialist doctrine of right to the whole produce of labor." Both the Ricardian and the socialist schools, as Mr. Stephen points out, are absolute individualists, though in different senses. The connection is interesting as an illustration of the tendency of an extreme or too abstract theory to refute itself. But Mr. Stephen, while pointing out very clearly the limitations of the classical political economy, thinks that at present the tendency is to do injustice to the common sense embodied in it, to the soundness of its aims and to its value in many practical and immediate questions.

Another chapter is devoted to the Malthusian controversy and the current socialism. The views of Chalmers, Southey, Godwin, Hazlitt and others are discussed, and the general impression one gets is that of the confusion of the issues and the considerable amount of unconscious agreement among the combatant writers. "It must be admitted," says Mr. Stephen, "that neither Malthus himself nor his opponents were clear as to what his doctrine really was. His assailants often attacked theories which he disavowed, or asserted principles which he claimed as his own."

Mr. Stephen proceeds, in a long chapter entitled "Psychology," to discuss the general intellectual conceptions underlying the politics and economics of the Utilitarians. "The difference between the Whig and the Radical temper showed itself in philosophical as in political questions. The Radical prided himself upon being logical and thoroughgoing, while the Whig loved compromise, and thought that logic was very apt to be a nuisance." Stewart was the "accepted Whig philosopher," and Mr. Stephen leads up to his exposition of the psychology and ethics of James Mill by a full account of the doctrine which the Utilitarians opposed, that of Thomas Brown, Stewart's successor at Edinburgh. Brown's philosophy, however, though intuitionist, had so much in common with that of Hume and the Utilitarians that, as regards the all-important question of causation, James Mill was able to accept Brown's view *minus* the 'intuition.' Brown accepts Hume's critical analysis of causation, but substitutes an 'intuition' or unanalyzable belief for Hume's constructive principle of custom or association. He thus "illustrates the gravitation of the 'common-sense' philosophy to pure empiricism."

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It remained for James Mill to substitute for the "intuitions" "indissoluble associations." Here again in Brown's philosophy, one seems to see an instance of the familiar tendency of extreme opinions to pass into their opposites. Yet one is inclined to ask whether Brown's position is not rather to be explained as the result of his having, with an intuitionist mind, read an exposition of Kant.

James Mill's "Analysis" is carefully expounded, along with the comments and criticisms of J. S. Mill, and Mr. Stephen makes some interesting comments of his own. "Mill evades the mysterious and transcendental at the cost of omitting reason altogether. He represents the result of accepting one horn of a dilemma, which presses upon philosophies of loftier pretensions. Those who accept the other horn speak of a 'fact' as though it were a truth . . . . Mill tries systematically to speak of a truth as if it were a fact. The world for him is made up of ideas sticking together; and nothing else exists." And "Mill," Mr. Stephen thinks, "had the merit which is implied even by an unsuccessful attempt to hold by fact." A merit it no doubt is, but is it so great a merit? The crudest common-sense lays claim to it; and after all, is not every one trying, with more or less success, to discover the facts? The merit to be approved is that of a successful method, and "an unsuccessful attempt to hold by fact" is surely little else than a euphemism for a method that will not work. Passing to James Mill's ethics, which he discusses in relation to the controversy with Mackintosh, Mr. Stephen remarks that "James Mill in his ethical doctrine follows Bentham with little variation; but he shows very clearly what was the psychology which Bentham virtually assumed." Emphasis is laid upon Mill's root and branch opposition to the moral sense theory and there is an interesting discussion of his denial of any moral quality in the motive to an action. "The truth is, I think, and it is characteristic of Mill's modes of analysis, that he is making an impossible abstraction. He is separating parts of a single process and treating them as independent. If actions are bad because they have bad consequences, motives are bad because they are causes of bad actions." Mill's failure to see this arises from his insistence on the effects of the action, as distinct from the action itself, and the tendency, which he shares with Bentham, to assume that all men are the same and differ only in external circumstances. This again is due to the fact that both Mill and Bentham regard

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morality as something co-ordinate with law. Mr. Stephen, again, indicates his opposition to the contention of James Mill and other Utilitarians that in acting we are always guided by calculations of future pleasures or pains. "If we are determined by pains and pleasures, it is in one sense as contradictory to speak of our being determined by future pains and pleasures as to speak of one being nourished to-day by to-morrow's dinner. The 'future pleasure' does not exist; the anticipated pleasure acts by making the present action pleasant, and we then move (as it is said) along the line of least resistance. Certain conduct is intrinsically pleasurable or painful, and the future pleasure only acts through the present foretaste." Whatever may be thought of the Utilitarian position, is there not in Mr. Stephen's argument an ignoring of the difference between the pleasure which comes from the contemplation of an action and the pleasure which comes from an action in progress? The pleasure which comes from an action in progress can hardly be described as the motive to begin the action, and the pleasure which comes from the contemplation of an action might lead to continuance of the act of contemplation; but surely something more is required to explain the actual performance of the action. If "the future pleasure does not exist," neither does the "present action." And when we are told that "certain conduct is intrinsically pleasurable or painful," are we to understand that the same conduct which it is "intrinsically pleasurable or painful" to contemplate is "intrinsically pleasurable or painful" to realize? If that were so it would be as easy to "do noble deeds" as "dream them all day long." The consideration of this question leads naturally to that of the power of association in transmuting a "theory of pure selfishness" into a "morality of general benevolence." Mr. Stephen indicates the weakness of the position, but remarks that Mill's argument has value in that "it may be held to represent fairly the historical development of morals," although Mill is hampered throughout by the absence of any theory of evolution.

The last chapter of this volume deals (1) with the Utilitarian attitude to religion, as expressed in the book of "Philip Beauchamp" (a combination of Bentham and Grote) and (2) with the thought of James Mill's non-Utilitarian contemporaries. Beauchamp's position is discussed in relation to the Paley theology, set forth in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, and Mr. Stephen insists on the coincidence of the two as regards their premises and general point of view. "Utilitarians both in ethical and philos-

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ophical questions start from the same assumptions as Paley, and the Paley doctrine gave the pith of the dominant theology." Both are essentially empirical and make "observed facts" the ultimate basis of their position. "The Paley conception of the Deity is, in fact, coincident with Bentham's conception of the sovereign. He is simply an invisible sovereign, operating by tremendous sanctions." As to contemporary thought, Mr. Stephen points out that there was no conscious or systematic philosophy opposed to Utilitarianism. "The contrast between the Utilitarians and their opponents may almost be identified with the contrast between the prosaic and the poetical aspects of the world in general. Bentham frankly objected to poetry in general. It proved nothing. The true Utilitarian was a man who held on to fact, and to nothing but the barest, most naked and unadorned fact." Accordingly we have an account of the poets of the time, Shelley, Byron, Scott, Wordsworth and Coleridge. Attention is mainly directed to Coleridge and to J. S. Mill's critical appreciation of him as correcting the errors or filling the gaps in the Utilitarian system, and the volume concludes with a consideration of the inevitable antithesis between the "Germano-Coleridgians" and the Utilitarian school. J. S. Mill's concessions were not approved by his fellows, and the two schools "regarded each other's doctrines as simply contradictory."

The third volume (on John Stuart Mill and his contemporaries) is on the whole the most interesting of the three. It opens with an admirable account of Mill's life, in which are clearly traced the early influences which formed his convictions, fixed his limitations and at the same time stimulated his desire to overcome them. Thus we read of the "logical mill" through which his father put him, of his French residence and studies, of his reading of Wordsworth and his argumentative intercourse with Socialists and "Coleridgians." Mill was twenty-six when Bentham died and the Reform Bill passed, and after the passing of the Bill the philosophical Radicals soon became played out as a political force. Mill wrote much at this time in the *Westminster Review,* with the double object of supplying "a philosophy of Radicalism, wider than Bentham's, and yet including what was permanently valuable in Bentham" and of rousing "the Radicals to the formation of a powerful party." He tried to bridge the gulf between the middle and the working classes; but the working classes were looking towards Socialism and Mill was a thorough

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individualist. The "philosophical Radicalism died out" and Mill became a recluse, wrote the "Logic" and the "Political Economy," corresponded with Comte and in later years published the essay on *Liberty* and the "Examination of Hamilton." Mr. Stephen discusses the question whether in this period he was intellectually influenced by Mrs. Mill and comes to the conclusion that her influence was mainly emotional. "Mill was essentially formed by Bentham, James Mill and Ricardo; while the relation to Mrs. Mill encouraged him to a more human version of the old Utilitarian gospel." Mill's action after his return to politics is briefly described and Mr. Stephen draws upon his personal recollections ot Mill's appearances in Parliament. He was "virtually helping Demos to get into power, in the expectation that, when in power, Demos would consent to submit to restrictions, not yet, if they ever will be, realized." The chapter concludes with a full and fair estimate of Mill's personal characteristics.

The next two chapters are occupied with a critical exposition of the "Logic" and the "Political Economy." As might be expected, Mr. Stephen raises for discussion a great many questions of importance. In this already long review I can only indicate a general sympathy with his critical attitude, although it seems to me that he insists too much on the "completely empirical base" of our knowledge and is too greatly in love with that mysterious and ambiguous first principle, the "given fact." If there is really a "given fact," how glad we should all be to know it and be at peace! Yet when Mr. Stephen points out, in criticism of Mill, that the "fact" from which we start "is not a simple unanalyzable unit, but something which already is the base of a relation" and that the unit "is not properly a fact, but a truth," he indicates a position in which the "given" fact no longer has the exceptional importance which he seems to attribute to it. Such a position is more properly that of the "transcendental school" than one would imagine from the caricature of that school which Mr. Stephen draws, when he speaks of it as "rejecting experience altogether, treating it with contempt as a mere rope of sand, and inferring that the universe itself is incarnate logic—a complex web woven out of dialectic, and capable of being evolved from mixing 'is' and 'is not.'" Whatever Mill may have imagined the transcendental position to be, this description of it at the present day is surely a little like playing to the gallery.

The "Political Economy" is carefully expounded in its rela-

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tion to contemporary movements in economic thought, and Mill's "expansion or adaptation of Malthus," his belief in peasant proprietorship, and his relation to Socialism, are specially emphasized. Mill, while remaining an individualist in the philosophical sense, was "well on the way to State Socialism." In this we have an instance of the characteristic tendency of all Mill's work, the tendency to recognize the truth that is with the other side in the discussion and, at the peril of consistency, to expand the somewhat narrow Utilitarian theory. "While fancying that he was developing the individualist theories, he adopted not only Socialism, but even a version of Socialism open to the objections on which he sometimes forcibly insisted. Mill and the Socialist are both individualists; only the Socialist makes right precede fact, and Mill would make fact precede right."

Mill's ethical doctrine (discussed, along with his political theory, in another chapter), shows, in Mr. Stephen's opinion, "the source of some of his perplexities and apparent inconsistencies." He attempts "to reach a right conclusion from defective premises," and his error lies in adhesion to the view of James Mill (already discussed), that conduct is determined by a calculation of future pains or pleasures and not, as Mr. Stephen thinks, by "the painfulness or pleasurableness of the whole action at the moment."

The chapter dealing with Mill's politics and ethics is followed by one on the historical method, in which a full account is given of the views of Austin, G. C. Lewis, Grote and Buckle, and which concludes with an interesting discussion of the significance of the "Utilitarian paradox—the indifference to history, combined with the appeal to experience." A long concluding chapter explains and discusses the philosophy of the time, including its theology, in relation to the views of Mill. The interest of this chapter is not to be measured by the necessary brevity of my reference to it. After considering the relations of Mill to the views of Hamilton and Mansel, it expounds Mill's theological opinions and contrasts with them the positions of Maurice, Carlyle and the leaders of the Oxford Movement, especially W. G. Ward and Newman. The discussion of Newman is particularly illuminating and, among other things, Mr. Stephen draws a suggestive parallel between the fundamental position of the Oxford apologists and that of the ordinary Deist of the eighteenth century. In conclusion, Mr. Stephen points out that "the 'dogmatists,' the 'liberals'

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and the 'Utilitarians' are virtually agreed upon one point. The Paley theology was in a hopeless position. . . . The arguments from design and from miracles are radically incoherent. They confuse a scientific with a philosophical argument, and cannot lead legitimately to proving the existence of a supreme or moral ruler of the universe. While accepting scientific methods, they are radically opposed to scientific results, because they tend to prove intervention instead of order, and disappear as scientific knowledge extends." The Utilitarians insisted that religion must conform to the facts, the Liberals maintained that it must also satisfy the philosophical imagination and the emotions, and to the dogmatists "a religion appeared essentially as a system of discipline or a great social organism, governing men's passions and providing them with a cult and a concrete vision of the universe." To found a religion which shall harmoniously combine these elements, if such a harmony be possible, is a problem for the future.

Mr. Stephen has given us in these volumes a vast store of information and discussion, set forth in a style which makes the reading of them a continual pleasure; and the book as a whole is one which will have a permanent value for every student of the subjects with which it deals.

R. LATTA.

UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen. First Series. *The Four Historical Conceptions of Being.* By Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1900. Pp. xvi, 588.

THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL. Second Series. *Nature, Man and the Moral Order.* 1901. Pp. xvii, 480.

The volumes before us offer nothing less than a complete system of philosophy. In them Professor Royce has gathered up the threads of all his previous philosophical discussions and woven them into a single complete and, in many respects, decidedly novel system of absolute idealism. This is the most elaborate, sustained and closely knit effort in philosophical construction that has appeared in many a year. It is a work of scholastic subtlety

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and exhaustiveness, and, we must also add, not wholly free from scholastic prolixity.

The first volume is concerned mainly with the World, the second mainly with the Individual; the first with pure theory,—the meaning of reality in general, the second with the application of that theory to the interpretation of the facts of nature and of man. More specifically, the first volume contains an exhaustive discussion of the concept of Being; the scope of the second "includes a sketch of an idealistic Theory of Human Knowledge, an outline of a Philosophy of Nature, a doctrine about the Self, a discussion of the origin and destiny of the Human Individual, a summary consideration of the world as a Moral Order, a study of the Problem of Evil, and, finally, an estimate of all these views in the light of what seem (to the author) to be the interests of Natural Religion" (II., p. vi).

Naturally it is impossible to condense into review-length a summary of the contents of a work conceived on such a generous plan, and equally impossible to present any adequate criticism of steps in the argument that seem to provoke further discussion. Besides, there is a baffling serenity and self-confidence in the author's manner that make one pause before urging his objections. One feels that his difficulties cannot have been ignored, that his is a point of view that he must find subsumed and transcended somewhere in the course of the discussion if he only search hard enough. When he comes like Indra in the Indian tale to the wise Prajapati with a difficulty, saying, "Master, I see no good in this," he hears ever the same bland reply: "Abide with me yet another thirty years." One feels, in short, that the doubts which remain after a fourth reading a fortieth might dispel. This feeling is intensified by our author's persistent and conscientious endeavor to scrutinize his own doctrine from all conceivable points of view that differ from his own. The "objector" is always given the courtesy of the house. Whatever his trouble he is pretty sure to find himself at some time occupying the floor, and stating his own case with exceptionally convincing power.* Whether or not one finds the author's replies equally convincing, it is apparent that the view set forth gains much, perhaps too much commanding force from the discovery that no serious obstacles in the way of its acceptance have been coolly and deliberately ignored.

It is a very old and very familiar criticism of Absolute Ideal-

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ism, of whatever type, that it leaves no room for the reality of the individual, and, therefore, no room for a genuinely ethical order; that, furthermore, precisely in so far as it fails to provide for the reality of the individual as independent and free at least in his capacity as judge of truth, in just so far does it leave its own conclusions without force, and so, as theoretical philosophy also, defeat its own end. Many and subtle are the defenses that idealists have brought forward, until the question appears well-nigh threadbare. Professor Royce, however, considers the criticism still a respectable one. He had already faced the issue in his interesting discussion in the California Controversy (The Conception of God) and in some of the papers in his "Studies in Good and Evil." In the present work he has given us an independent and exhaustive treatment of the whole question, in which he undertakes "to define God, the World, and the finite Individual, and the most fundamental relations that link them together." The problem concerning the nature of the individual, and the kind of reality to be ascribed to the individual, is held to be involved in the deeper problem: what is the exact meaning of reality in general. The fundamental question then is, what is the real *qua* real? Professor Royce's answer is given in the first volume. It takes the form of a constructive criticism of three historically important ontological positions that have been maintained by philosophers: that of Realism, that of Mysticism and that of "modern Critical Rationalism,"—under which last rubric fall alike the critical idealism of Kant and the Empiricism of later English writers. The author undertakes to show that each of these three positions recognizes a permanently valid aspect of the truth while denying other aspects no less permanently valid; that, taken together, they prepare the way for the fourth—the author's own—conception of reality, which is called "the synthetic or the constructively idealistic conception of what it is to be."

The common mark of all realistic systems is the assertion that "to be real means to be independent of ideas, which, while other than a given real being, still relate to that being" (p. 92). Realism asserts that objects are real "whether or no" you, or anyone else, may be aware of them; that being is entirely independent of ideas, and also that ideas, as mere ideas, *i. e.*, apart from their truth or falsity, are independent of being. Taking the realistic thesis, as thus characterized, strictly, Professor Royce has no diffi-

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culty in showing that it introduces in its notion of entire independence a fatal chasm which it can neither destroy nor bridge; that, in consequence, the would-be real world itself vanishes, and leaves behind a "meaningless wilderness of absolute nothingness." To put the difficulty otherwise, Realism makes hard and fast the distinction between the *what* and the *that* of things. Now this distinction while important and real is, none the less, an abstraction, and, if taken absolutely, leaves us with neither a *what* nor a *that* remaining.

The position of the Mystic is described with a fine fairness that evidently issues from a fond appreciation of its value. Our author seems almost reluctant to point out the fatal defect of inner contradiction which this view contains. The Mystic holds that "*to be* means *to fulfill the inner purpose of ideas.* What is, is as such the perfect, the absolute, the finality" (I., p. 386). To be real means to be in such wise immediate that, in the presence of this immediacy, all thought and all ideas, absolutely satisfied, are quenched so that the finite search ceases, and the Other is no longer another, but is absolutely found. In all finitude is dissatisfaction, unrest. The real in so far as found brings rest and satisfaction; the absolutely real would bring final rest and satisfaction,—the finite would be quenched in the immediacy of the ineffable experience. Now the Mystic indeed holds that this experience is just the opposite of nothingness, "for it is fulfilment, attainment, peace, the goal of life—in a word, all Truth." And yet, inasmuch as he always defines his absolute in negative terms the contrast between the finite life of struggle and the goal is an absolute one. The real, conceived simply as goal, gets its meaning in the contrast with finitude, and if it is to be in reality different from nothing, it must be shown to stand in real contrast with our own *real though finite* life.

The Critical Idealist sees that "our ideas of Being and the Being of which we have ideas must occupy essentially the same ontological position" (I., p. 260)—a truth denied by both the Realist and the Mystic. He sees, moreover, that the assertion that the world is "involves a judgment that (his) present experience is interwoven in the whole context of the realm of valid or of possible experience" (I., p. 248). Knowing the truth consists in reading off the structure of an actually presented experience and thereby discovering a realm of abstractly possible experience (I., p. 257 *ff.*). In asserting the reality of any fact of

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experience one simply asserts the validity of a certain idea about further possible experience. But this view fails to tell us "what is a valid or determinately possible experience at the moment when it is supposed to be only possible;" fails to tell us what a valid truth is "at the moment when nobody verifies its validity" (I., p. 260). The validity of an idea that is tested gets an individual life and meaning by appearing in an individual experience; but what of the "realm of valid truth in general," of the world of nature not presented, and perhaps never to be exhaustively presented in our human experience? (I., p. 261).

Thus by a consideration of these partially true views and their specific defects, Professor Royce leads up to the synoptic view of constructive idealism. The apparently external meaning of an idea, its reference to another, is obviously very largely determined by the selective purpose of the idea itself. Facts are stubborn controllers of ideas only with the ideas' own connivance. Professor Royce, however, undertakes to show that the real to which ideas refer is not only in part but wholly determined by the internal meaning of the ideas. The idea is always a will, a plan ot action; and the object, the real, to which it refers is always just the idea's own conscious purpose embodied in some more determinate form than it now consciously possesses. No finite embodiment is, however, finally adequate. The true internal meaning of any finite idea is a certain absolute system of ideas.

We have not the space to give in any detail the steps whereby this position is independently reached. So far as we now have the conception before us it does not seem to differ very essentially from the view which students of philosophy are familiar with from the writings of Kant and his immediate followers. And, for my part, I must confess that I find the discussion of the Third Conception far from satisfactory. What is there described as the position of Critical Idealism is perhaps a fair account of the attitude of John Stuart Mill, but hardly of the Kantians. Reality for them is not left hanging in the void in company with a lot of abstractly possible but never to be realized alternatives, until the definite experience comes that fixes it in the concrete. It is only in so far as future events may be regarded as at the present moment not completely determined (and for Professor Royce also there are such real alternatives) that real occurrences are left suspended in the limbo of possibilities. In all other respects the real is just the completely elaborated implications of

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any present fact. But our author's view does differ from Critical Rationalism in two important respects: (1) in the persistent emphasis of the active aspect of ideas, and the consequent conception of reality as the purpose accomplished, the plan fulfilled; and (2) in holding that the complete meaning of every finite idea is once for all individuated, completely determined, embodied in a wholly adequate empirical content. In a word, whatever your idea, you mean the Absolute, you mean God. And God sees at a glance, *totum simul,* " the one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual selves, and of all the lives" (I., p. 427, *cf.* Ib., pp. 36, 327, 339, 359, etc.).

This latter aspect of the doctrine, however, whereby our author would preserve the not yet verified facts by giving them a local habitation and a name in the eternally verified, *totum simul,* experience of the Absolute, seems to have been reached by an all too easy transition from the consciousness of just this individual seeker after truth to a supposed single and all-inclusive consciousness. What our argument has shown is that every idea is a partially fulfilled purpose; that, further, just this individual seeker after truth can know when experience gives the larger, more complete embodiment of his purpose; he thus knows relative reality, and he applies the standard which shows that he, as this individual experiencer, possesses the finally complete measure of truth. In other words, it is just this individual life that is his, and while it remains his, that expands to the fullness of the complete life. So we are not entitled to infer from this that the empirical world is "*a* life fulfilling the purpose of *our* ideas" (I., p. 368). Nor should we say: "As really one with its object, my idea in seeking its Other seeks only the expression of its own will in *an* empirical and conscious life" (I., p. 387). Clearly, we should here write "its" for "an." Now it is just by such apparently insignificant substitutions as this that we reach our one omniverous Absolute. Where we need to be particularly on our guard is precisely at this point when we come to view the relation of the individual conscious life conceived in its totality to other individual lives, similarly conceived, and to the Absolute. I am not unmindful of the arguments whereby Professor Royce would exhibit the individual as the object of exclusive interest. But, in spite of his interesting discussion of the individuality of the beloved to the lover, it remains clear that all the deeper human

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relations show that we have in this notion but a partial and inadequate account of the principle of individuation. Nor do I overlook the arguments by which he proves that for me the Other which I am incessantly seeking both in the natural world and in the world of social relations is always the larger and inclusive self, the complete embodiment of my present purpose. But from another point of view, my own purpose fails of its fulfillment, at least in the case of the social relations, unless I and my fellows are contrasted, distinct and independent. This our author explicitly states (*cf.* II., p. 271). Now must not the same thing be true when we speak of the relation of this individual self to the absolute self? In which case we could not speak of the Absolute as expressing his purpose in my life, except in the sense in which I could speak of expressing my purpose in the lives of my fellowmen. Professor Royce would save his absolute from the fate of the mystics' real by making it include in its own being all the infinite wealth of finite expressions, precisely as they are in our finite human lives. Only, he adds, God sees each finite expression in its relations to all others, sees them all *totum simul,* as the complete expression of his single purpose. Now in this last assertion we over-emphasize the Unity of the Absolute to such an extent that, in spite of our repeated assertions to the contrary, we introduce an element of illusoriness into the finite world. Our Absolute is supposed actually to live in the finite, to seek with the seeker, to be baffled when the seeker is baffled, to know not the future at this present moment when for him who lives in this moment the future is unknown. Then, however, we turn around and say: But, from another point of view, all time, with all its contents, for the Absolute simultaneously now is, is the one complete definitive embodiment of the one divine plan (*cf.* II., p. 148). (I can only in passing refer to the interesting, subtle and illuminating discussion of Time and Eternity as contained in this chapter and regret the lack of space to analyze the argument with special reference to this problem of the human individual). Is not this to make God win his way after all by playing a very subtly elaborated game of hide-and-seek with himself?

This is the crucial point in this philosophy,—the application of the theory to the human individual and to the determination of the place of the self in Being; the point specifically discussed in the seventh and eighth chapters of the second series,—the key chapters to both volumes. I must here enter a protest against

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the summary fashion in which our author throughout the work lumps together all types of pluralists and forces them to keep company with the most crude and näive realists and share their hard lot. Surely the subtler thinkers of this type, including even Leibniz (spite of the "windowless monads"), have seen that their independent reals could not be "chopped off with a hatchet." With regard to the dependence, independence and interdependence of their many real beings they have more or less clearly seen that one must pass beyond the *entweder-oder* level of thinking where they believe the strict realist is stranded. The pluralistic idealist does not maintain that his real beings are absolutely independent, in the sense that they are out of all relation to one another, or indifferent to such relation; but he does maintain that relations are intelligible which are in no wise limitations of the members related, that strictly voluntary association is real, and that furthermore we are not by reason forced to carry our formal logic-machine into the heavens to get a bird's eye view which will make all these members moments, of however long "time-span," in the life of a single race self-hood, and give them their whole reality as such. Or, at any rate, if we are forced to take this flight to make our meaning clear, we must ever be mindful of the fact that in so doing we are really entering the world of abstraction, and that, to use the language of our author, to make this abstraction the real world is precisely to defeat the very purpose of the idea that inspired the flight. To make our meaning finally clear we must continually return to the concrete experience of the actual unity in actual independence of self with self. Our author's own epistemology, in its recognition of the part played by the "acknowledgment" of the ethically controlled will in the determination of the facts of the individual's world, has decidedly pluralistic implications when we remember that the will in question is not that of a race selfhood, but that of this individual human self.

Professor Royce shows in a very striking manner the confusing ambiguities attaching to the notion of the self and then points out that the "nobler self," the self of eternal worth that strenuous morality affirms, is not found in some underlying soul-substance, but in the unity of one's life purpose, in the uniqueness of one's task. The self is properly defined in ethical terms (II., pp. 267 *ff.*, 276). Such a self cannot be regarded as caused or teleologically determined by another, for that would be to make this my

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life the expression of a purpose "in some sense *not* my private or individual purpose" (II., p. 329). Thus I the individual exist in one aspect as the expression of nobody's will but my own. Yet I am also an expression of the one divine will. The apparent contradiction here our author thinks is removed by the discovery that it is my will, just as my individual will, that has its place in the Absolute (II., p. 330). It is this view of the human individual, he holds, that furnishes the basis for our belief that man is free and the world a moral order. But then we find our author going on to give us a theory to account for the genesis and temporal origin of the self. The argument here rests upon the analogy with the rise of a new sort of self-hood in the development of the empirical ego within the range of our human experience and seems to me to suffer from the defects usually incident to this type of argument. With that, however, I am not here concerned, but rather with the contradiction involved in holding to the origin empirical or logical of that which is, we are told, neither causally nor teleologically determined, of the ethical self whose conscious purpose is an eternal mission.

In brief, my difficulty is this: I fail to see how we can save ourselves from the mystic's fate unless we can keep God and persons on the same ontological plane, and this we do not accomplish unless the many selves are also eternally real and underived.

Moreover, our author, in his Supplementary Essay, has developed a view that not merely meets Bradley's objections to the possibility of putting positive content into the notion of the Absolute, but also prepares the way for the formulation of his own doctrine in a more pluralistic, more concrete and valid way than he seems willing to employ. In this essay, drawing upon the recent mathematical discussions of the concept of the infinite, Professor Royce has shown how the Absolute may be conceived as a self-representative system, and as such an infinite series may be regarded as given at a stroke, in the very purpose that defines the system, although, serially regarded, there will and can be no "last term." But such an infinite series he further shows to be one of many infinite series within the same system. Here we have in these many infinite series the analogue, but only a rough analogue, of the ethical selves. But then we cannot speak of such selves as having a temporal origin.

There are many important and novel features of this philosophy which we have had to pass over in silence. Particularly note-

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worthy are: the deduction of the categories, the discussion of the logical origin of the contrast between the "world of description" and the "world of appreciation" and the illustration of these two points of view by the mathematical doctrine of the two forms of serial order, and the whole section on the philosophy of nature.

Where so much is given perhaps it is hardly fair that more should be required, but I regret that our author did not find time to bring into sharper contrast with his own doctrine the views which it most closely resembles, as for example the views of Hegel and Fichte and Plato. Very considerable portions of the work might be read as a commentary on Plato's idea of the good as the object of knowledge. We might well place historically one important phase of this view by saying that Professor Royce has read his Fichte with the eyes of Plato, and his Plato with the eyes of Fichte, and then recast the result in the light of recent mathematical discussions of the concept of the infinite.

The author's answer to all such doubts as we have been raising has been given in advance: They "are founded upon a failure to grasp our doctrine of Being in its wholeness," they arise from "persistently dwelling now too exclusively upon this and now too abstractly upon that aspect of our theory, and neglecting to regard the meaning of all its aspects together" (II., p. 337). I am not sure that the answer would not be fair. One must have a large thought-span, must be, in short, in our author's sense, a godlike person to be able to hold before his consciousness *totum simul* all the phases of this subtle and intricate philosophy.

CHARLES M. BAKEWELL.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.

A SKETCH OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHIC THOUGHT FROM THALES TO KANT. By Ludwig Noiré. London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. 359.

It may be doubted whether it was advisable to reissue Mr. Noiré's introduction to Prof. Max Müller's translation of Kant's "Kritik" as an independent work. In the first place, neither philosophy nor the history of philosophy has stood still during the twenty years since 1881, and Mr. Noiré's book is, by an inevitable consequence, in many points already antiquated.

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His account of Greek thought before Socrates, in particular, would need to be entirely re-written to bring it into accord with the new light that has been thrown on the subject by such writers as Zeller, Diels, Baünker, and Burnet since its first publication. Nor are the late John Stuart Mill and G. H. Lewes precisely typical of "the whole English philosophy of the present day" (p. 109) now, whatever may have been the case two decades ago. But there is a more important objection to the appearance of the book as an independent history of philosophic thought, the unnatural and strained character of its principal thesis. The author's avowed object is to exhibit the whole course of speculation from the earliest dawn of the Milesian physics as an imperfect attempt to formulate the truth as it is in Kant, and to present that truth as the final answer to all philosophic questions. Now this kind of hero-worship is more or less expected in an Introduction to a translation of the "Kritik;" we allow for its presence and it does no particular harm. But in an independent history of philosophy we have a right to complain of it as a fatal source of distortions of perspective. It is always dangerous to interpret the thought of the past in the light of a particular philosophic system, and in the case of the Kantian system the danger is exceptionally great. There is some excuse perhaps for the error in dealing with modern philosophy, for Kant avowedly constructed his doctrine for the express purpose of solving the problems which had been raised by Descartes and Locke. But like Spinoza before him he constantly shows himself ill-informed about the thought of the ancients and unhappy in his occasional references to them. Thus the *a priori* probability that the key to Plato and Aristotle will be found in a system constructed in indifference to their work and under quite other influences is exceeding slight. Nor does history give much support to the view that Kant's severance of the unknowable world of realities from the knowable but unreal world of appearances is the last word of human reason upon its own problems. If it is true that wherever Kant's influence has pentrated it has proved the most potent incentive to philosophic thought, it is surely no less true—and it is perhaps Kant's chief title to a central position among modern philosophers—that nowhere has philosophic thought been content to rest within the limits Kant would fain have prescribed. Hegel, Herbart, Fries, Schopenhauer, Green, Bradley, they are all in a sense Kant's spiritual children, but the thought of each of them is

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essentially an endeavor by one line or another to penetrate once more to that world of ὄντα which Kant and Mr. Noiré regard as hopelessly unknowable. And if we try to discern the movements of contemporary thought outside the strict limits of the schools from current literature, we seem led to the same result. The "systems" of antiquity may, as Mr. Noiré says, have "passed away for ever" (p. 111) as systems, but the thought of Plato and Aristotle and Plotinus—to say nothing of the great "dogmatists" of the seventeenth century—is with us still, and to all appearance is likely to remain so. If ever prophecy was ever falsified by history, Kant's anticipation that the system of criticism would forever supersede previous thought has been so.

With his worship of Kant Mr. Noiré conjoins a curious belief that the true basis of philosophy must be sought in the history of language (p. 2 *ff.*). The rapidity with which one philological system after another has first reigned supreme and then been ignominiously dethroned even in the space of the last half-century scarcely augurs well for the stability of a philosophy built on such shifting foundations, nor does the apparently complete supersession of the philologist by the anthropologist as the one authorized interpreter of the mind of "primitive man" tend to restore our shaken confidence. What is more vital still, the proposal to detect the *a priori* elements in human thought by an appeal to the history of language appears to involve a confusion between psychological priority and epistemological a-priority against which, one may conjecture, Kant would have protested no less vigorously than Prof. Münsterberg.*

To descend to some points of detail. Mr. Noiré's determination to read the Kantian theory of cognition into all previous philosophy compels him—at the cost of historical accuracy—to find the antithesis of sensation and thought everywhere. Parmenides (p. 10) by a time-honored "howler" is made to assert the identity of thought and being, and to distinguish between sensation and thinking, in spite of the positive and emphatic testimony of Theophrastus that he made no difference between φρονεῖν and αἰσθάνεσθαι Heracleitus is equally misrepresented (p. 12) when his saying that "eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men whose souls do not understand their language," is distorted into the view that the "eyes and ears are liars." By a still bolder misrepresentation his

*See "Grundzüge der Psychologie," I, 163.

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naïvely materialistic explanation of the comparative irrationality of dreams is tortured (pp. 12, 13) into a presentiment that knowledge is "constituted by two factors." Of "all the philosophers of antiquity" it is roundly asserted that they made it their principal business "to distinguish between phenomena and noumena" (p. 25), and the statement is expressly applied to Heracleitus, one of those pre-Socratics of whom Aristotle tells us not once nor twice that τὰ ὄντα ὑπέλαβον εἶναι τὰ αἰσθητὰ μόνον. Plato and Aristotle fare rather better, though the former in particular suffers more than once from the author's weakness for inaccurate citation. Thus (pp. 44, 45) he is charged with ascribing "the perceptions of sense directly to the organs," though Mr. Noiré on the very next page gives a reference to the passage ("Theaetetus," 184) where Plato, for the first time in the history of philosophy, makes the very distinction between the agent and the organ of perception on which Mr. Noiré is insisting. It is difficult to be sure of the author's interpretation of the doctrine of Ideas. He repeatedly insists, correctly enough, upon the objective character of all ancient philosophy, yet (pp. 48, 97) he elsewhere uses language about the ἰδέαι which involves the double error of ascribing to Plato the psychological interpretation of ἰδέα and εἶδος as "ideas in the mind," and of further failing to distinguish, within the limits of the subjective interpretation, the "idea" in Locke's sense (the immediate *object* of the mind) and the "idea" as a "mental image." His account of Aristotle once more is rendered almost unintelligible by inaccurate interpretation in the light of various subsequent systems. Thus (p. 52) Aristotle's ultimate "mover" is actually identified with "mechanical natural force," an interpretation which suggests that Mr. Noiré has forgotten the κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον of "Metaphysics" Λ; on p. 63 the stoic doctrine of the world-soul and a theory of the innate creative activity of matter* like that of Bruno are read into Aristotle, though both doctrines are in flagrant contradiction with the genuine Peripatetic theory of the "first mover," which is correctly given two pages further on. The laudation of Aristotle as an empiricist

* There appears to be here some confusion in the writer's mind between ὕλη and φύσις. It is true that to Aristotle φύσις is ἀρχὴ κινήσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ; but it is precisely because of their relation to a supreme "first mover" who is pure form without matter that things have such an internal ρχή. ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

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(p. 52) seems to ignore the fact that empiricism is a method and not a dogma, and that an inductive method was *not* the ideal of the author of the "Posterior Analytics." For these and similar reasons I find it hard to admit that Plato and Aristotle have been proved by the author to be only "in the outer court of metaphysics." Perhaps they are in that unsatisfactory position, but at least Mr. Noiré is in the outer courts of Platonic and Aristotelian exegesis.

Space forbids me to say much of the section on "Mediæval Philosophy." I cannot, however, help calling attention to the profound misunderstanding involved in the treatment of Plotinus and Porphyry along with the mediæval schoolmen instead of in their true place as continuers of the classical thought of Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. It is to be hoped that the recent excellent work of Mr. Whittaker on the Neoplatonists will make this historical mistake rarer in the future than it has been in the past. The two doctrines quoted by Mr. Noiré from Plotinus, by the way, as instances of the gulf between Neoplatonism and classical antiquity (p. 77) tell the other way. That the "place of the world" is the soul" is the doctrine of the Timeus (see especially 36 E) and that time has no existence apart from the soul is a simple inference from the Platonic propositions that time is regular and equable succession and that the soul is the only source of movement. The author's illustrations of the growth in mediæval thought of the interest in the subjective psychology of conception are striking and suggestive, but it is hard to find any justification for his quaint theory that Christian monotheism is pantheistic in spirit whereas ancient thought, because polytheistic, is essentially pluralist. Whatever the "plain men" of ancient Hellas may have thought, it is pretty clear that to Anaximander or Heracleitus the existence of "gods" did *not* mean the interference of conflicting personalities with the course of nature.*

With the philosophers of modern times Mr. Noiré is much more at home and rightly devotes the major part of his sketch to them. In the main his account, if inevitably one-sided, as any treatment which regards the whole course of modern speculation as a preparation for the Critical Philosophy is bound to be, is a careful and often acute analysis of the Kantian elements in pre-Kantian

* And what of the Stoic εἱμαρμένη or of the Epicurean worlds which run their course "*opera sine dirom*"?

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thought. Thus he rightly insists on the subjective character once for all impressed on modern philosophy at its inception by the Cartesian *cogito* as a prophecy of the Kantian reduction of outology to epistemology. What one desiderates both in his examination of Descartes and his very sympathetic account of Spinoza is a clearer perception of the difficulties created for both philosophers by their purely mechanical conception of the physical world. Mr. Noiré sees the immense value of the mechanical conception of nature for the purposes of mathematical investigation into physical processes; he does not see quite so clearly the fundamental contradiction between mechanism as a philosophical theory of nature and a spiritual philosophy of mind. Thus he explicitly lauds Descartes (p. 141) for admitting that mind can alter the direction though not the quantity of motion; an admission which really involves the complete renunciation of the mechanical hypothesis. This failure to see that *direction* and "quantity of motion" are inseparable, taken along with the curious passage on the next page (142) where body is explained, after Kant, to mean "space filled with force," suggests that the author's own ideas upon the nature of physical concepts stand in need of some clarification. Similarly in the account of Spinoza, though the writer correctly calls attention to the extreme difficulty of reconciling Spinoza's parallelism with the existence of individual things, he accepts the two-attribute doctrine itself without misgiving, failing to see that the whole question is whether "parallelism" itself is not a self-contradictory concept. He does not distinguish, any more than Spinoza himself, between the *fact* of at least approximate concomitance between a mental and a physical series and the metaphysical *hypothesis* of parallelism which Spinoza offers as the explanation of the fact.* A deeper misunderstanding is betrayed by the criticism that human thought, being "only an ephemeral *modus* of the infinite substance," cannot conceive that substance *sub specie æternitatis*. The objection only holds from the standpoint of Kantian Phenomenalism, and Spinoza was no phenomenalist, nor was the human mind to him an "ephemeral" but an *eternal* modus cogitandi. Mr. Noiré's chapter on Locke, remarkable in its way as a successful compression of the long and often confused argument of the "Essay" into a few pages, suffers,

* *Cf.* the rhetorical language on p. 225, where a loose statement of the problem itself is confidently offered as its solution.

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as does Locke's book itself, from the failure to distinguish historical research into the origin of concepts from metaphysical criticism of their validity. Hence Locke's theory of knowledge, as set forth in his fourth book, comes off without any really serious critical examination. With Leibnitz the author deals sympathetically and more than once vindicates him successfully from the unjust aspersions of Schopenhauer. It is however a serious mistake to censure the "Harmony" as a mere dogmatic excrescence on Leibnitz's thought (p. 268). Whatever we may think of the theory as a piece of metaphysics it is an inevitable consequence of Leibnitz's fundamental assumptions. Leibnitz had convinced himself that there is a plurality of real substances, and that every substance is the ground of its own states. The first of these assumptions excludes the parallelism hypothesis, the second the doctrine of an *influxus physicus*. Thus there was only one way in which Leibnitz could avoid pronouncing the existence of a world-order a standing miracle, and that was the way he adopted. Again, Mr. Noiré is right in asserting against Schopenhauer the solid value of the Leibnitian principle of sufficient reason, but he fails to see that what gives it its value is its teleological character. In the form in which he criticizes it it is, what Schopenhauer called it, a piece of empty tautology. Mr. Noiré is less happy in his criticism of the Leibnitian physics. Like others before him, he is enthusiastic about the introduction of the concept of "force" into physics; like others also he fails to give any precise definition to this unhappy and ambiguous term. I confess that I do not know how to reconcile his approval of Leibnitz's criticism of the Cartesian "conservation of motion" with his assertion that Descartes' distinction between quantity and direction of motion is "the true solution" (p. 308) of the autonomy of liberty and necessity. The treatment of Hume, with which the book ends, follows strictly conventional lines, and is almost exclusively confined to the problem of Causation. All citations are made from the "Enquiry" and the author appears to be unacquainted with the far-reaching investigations of the "Treatise" into the question of personal identity.

A. E. Taylor.

Owens College, Manchester.

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THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA. By Alfred Caldecott, D. D., Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy in King's College, London, formerly Fellow and Dean of St. John's College, Cambridge. London: Methuen and Co., 1901. Pp. xvi, 434.

The author of this work thinks a conspectus of what has been done over the theistic field particularly desirable in this present time, when the thought of the nineteenth century is passing into that of the twentieth. "Such a conspectus it is the aim of this volume to supply." Dr. Caldecott's survey is confined to Britain and America, and in this he has done well. But it may be questioned whether he had not done better by restricting attention to efforts in Britain alone. His treatment might thereby have gained in unity and force, as it certainly would in scientific completeness. At any rate I cannot think his treatment of the American literature equal to his handling of the British. There are too many important omissions on the American side, and even on the British there are oversights of work more able and relevant than a good deal that is dealt with. These, however, do not seem to me so serious in the British part of the work, where the selection—since selection had to be—is on the whole well and judiciously made. The time spent on the American part of the work would have more than sufficed to make the treatment of the subject exhaustive in Britain alone, whereas neither one part nor the other is complete. This somewhat partial or incomplete character of the treatment being allowed for, one becomes free to say that Professor Caldecott has accomplished the work on the lines of his own choosing with great care, very considerable acumen, and singular skill and competence. And, no doubt, the inclusion of the American writers will impart an additional interest to the work for readers who may be little versed in the transatlantic developments, which are indeed so eminently worthy of study that they might well have a volume to themselves.

The plan of the work consists of a First Part, in which thirteen different types of Theism are described. This is followed by a Second Part, consisting of thirteen historical chapters, in which theistic writers are classed under one or other of the thirteen types so delineated. Now, such a method easily lends itself to adverse criticism, but it must be said, after every allowance for the possible objections, that the lines of Dr. Caldecott's volume are, on the

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whole, extremely well drawn, and that the work is one for which we are bound to be cordially grateful. No one with any serious interest in Theism can afford to neglect it. It is a distinctly valuable contribution to theological progress, for though, being mainly historical and critical, it cannot itself yield much in the way of constructive presentation, or as a positive contribution to Theism, yet in its systematized form it greatly helps to a scientific treatment of the manifold forms or types of theistic thought. The work has for its chief aim to be a History of Theism, and this important and needed end it usefully and successfully realizes. Its exposition of the various types in the opening part seems to me well done, although some of the types are much better dealt with than others. Partly, of course, this is due to the fact that some of them lend themselves more easily to expository treatment. Transcendental Theism is particularly well done, which is the more necessary to remark, alike from the importance of the subject and its difficulty, Dr. Caldecott having felt how almost every sentence might be open to objection. It seems to me rather surprising, however, that Dr. Caldecott evinces so little appreciation of the great differences in the way exponents of Transcendental Theism maintain and conserve "Theistic reality." A lack of perception or real appreciation of these differences seems to me somewhat extraordinary. Transcendental Theism, he tells us (p. 33), "claims that it exhibits a Theistic world." Well, the Transcendental Theists to whom Dr. Caldecott devotes most attention are at excessively little pains to "claim" anything distinctively "theistic" at all—a fact which might surely have struck any one before this time of day; and even if they had shown any particular "theistic" concern, the important thing would still be how far their teaching did preserve true core of "theistic reality." Of course, Dr. Caldecott is not unaware (p. 41) of the defects charged on some of the chief forms of Transcendental Theism on this score. I say "some," but Dr. Caldecott does not so discriminate, although the remarks on p. 41 "(2)" would be absurd and impossible in respect of some of his samples of Transcendental Theism. This lack of appreciation for that wherein the strength of a true "theistic" position lies is apparently due to his admiration for logically self-consistent schemes having weakened for him, as for so many, appreciation of those elements or aspects on which a really vital and strong theism must lay stress. Else he would surely have shown—as he can do on occasion—more de-

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cision of mind. I speak of this point, because it appears to me to be the gravest defect in the book, touching as it does the prime requirement in a "theistic" exponent of this time, wherein so many influences combine to weaken the sense of the reality and worth of Personality in God and man. This line of inquiry, for example, would prove of more momentous import for testing "theistic" values of the system, say, of the late Principal Caird, than merely to discuss (p. 38), whether it be not too intellectual. Not, of course, that both should not be done, but it seems strange that the weightier issue should be left as good as untouched. By the way, would not the criticisms of the Cairds here (p. 38) be in better place when the critical matter relative to their own works is introduced later? The critical matter there is not very plentiful, and is weakened the more it is broken up. Further, the real issues as to Transcendental Idealism and the question of Immanence are not put with anything like sufficient force (p. 41), and are left with a total lack of decisive thinking, such as Dr. Caldecott himself severely—I do not say wrongly—blames Dr. Flint for on p. 125. Dr. Caldecott may say he is writing a History, but these things are headed "Reflections on Transcendentalism," and reflections they should be.

Dr. Caldecott's discussion of Ethical Theism also is in parts very able and interesting. He seeks to vindicate a high rational worth and value for it. To this there can be no objection. But I should think Transcendental Theists, at any rate, will disallow almost the whole line of reasoning by which he seeks, in a series of comparisons, to prove no inferiority attaching to Ethical Rationalism as against Speculative Rationalism, but even superiority at certain points. For myself, I reject his whole line of comparison as meaningless, absurd, and quite misleading. But if Ethical Rationalists find any comfort or imagined strength in such a line of presentation, Speculative Rationalists need not grudge it to them. I must express surprise that neither here, nor elsewhere, does Dr. Caldecott give any hint of any perception, on his part, of the one-sided tendency observable in some of his leading examples of Ethical Theism, to sacrifice thought and all else before a purely moral interest and human valuation—a tendency just as one-sided as that of the Hegelism they oppose. He utters, I mean, never a word of misgiving before systems or positions that treat all "argument about God as simply waste of time," save in so far as it is based on some antecedently and extraor-

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dinarily conceived infinity of worth and value in "human life."* One might have hoped a thinker so acute as Dr. Caldecott would have paused before teachings that make it of no consequence to the Universe—a mere "waste of time" to consider—whether there be a God or not, if only "human life" be not first found a thing of infinite value and significance." But I must not begin to discuss here views which make God a mere pendant of human life, and there is less need since I have done so elsewhere. On the other types there is not room to dwell.

In the Second Part, many of the summarizings of systems or works are most admirably done. This is particularly true of the longer notices. The shorter notices often do unintentional, but inevitable, injustice by the very fact of their being so short, which makes the thought of authors appear far more disconnected than it is. A great deal of careful and thorough thinking, and of honest intellectual toil, have, however, been put into the work of this Part. Opinions will necessarily differ as to how far praise or blame have, in the critical parts, been wisely meted out. On the whole, Dr. Caldecott seems to have maintained his intellectual independence pretty well, and his most critical portions are often the most valuable and interesting portions of the book. One almost wishes they been a little more evenly distributed, and the same may be said of his praise, which in stray cases becomes by contrast rather effusive. The instances in which Dr. Caldecott allows himself to assume a somewhat inappreciative tone are happily few. One of these is, for example, when he says of Dr. Samuel Harris (p. 101) that his work is one "which few will be able to read through." This seems to me a somewhat dangerous style of criticism: it is precisely what some people, who grow only too soon tired of what theistic writers, great and small, have said, will say of Dr. Caldecott's own book, but we do not think the less of the book on that account. We prefer to congratulate the "few" rather than blame the books. Another instance that might be taken is Dr. Conder, who might also have had more credit given him for his work, at least as compared with some instances treated in reverse fashion. I mean such an instance as, by comparison, the far too laudatory notice (p. 159) of Dr. Momerie's excessively slight and tenuous endeavor. Not that Dr. Conder's work carries any particular interest for us, or that anything is to

*A. Seth, "Two Lectures on Theism," p. 63.

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be said for any lack of knowledge of the literature of the subject which it may have shown (in common with a good many others here favorably dealt with). But his work had its own usefulness for its time, and too much should not be made of its having been the work of a "solitary" thinker. For the "solitary" thinker might well enough have escaped these defects and there are important senses in which the best work noted in Dr. Caldecott's book has been that of "solitary" thinkers. It is, in fact, a form of disparagement which requires to be carefully and cautiously made, lying, as it does, so near the conditions of the highest (and indeed the only real) excellence. The proof-reading of the book seems to have been carefully done, but misprints like "Farebrother" (p. 154), and unusual forms of spelling like "insistance" (pp. 103, 122, 124, 150), and "Nazienzen" (p. 185), attract attention. The style is generally clear and good, and adapted to the subject.

The work, as a whole, is probably as well done as one mind could reasonably be expected to make it, and Dr. Caldecott is to be cordially congratulated on the measure of success he has achieved in his laborious undertaking. We take it as an earnest of better things to come from his pen. The work is of a kind that all too seldom springs from the great Church to which he belongs, and is a credit at once to it and to the author.

JAMES LINDSAY.

KILMARNOCK, SCOTLAND.

WHAT SHALL WE THINK OF CHRISTIANITY? The Levering Lectures before the Johns Hopkins University, 1899. By William Newton Clarke. Charles Scribner's Sons. New York: 1899.

The question What is Christianity? may be approached historically or philosophically. If the former method is chosen, an answer may be sought by defining the thought of the founder himself, or by describing the religious ideas and practices that have been recognized as Christian. If the second method is preferred, an endeavor may be made to find some essential principle, or principles, characteristic of Christianity in all its historic forms and differentiating it from all other religions.

Ritschl and his school made the most consistent effort to identify Christianity with "the historic revelation of God in Jesus." The ideas and principles of Jesus, his spiritual attitude and his

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manner of life,—these were Christianity. All later accretions, whether of cultic performance or of philosophic speculation, were heterogeneous elements and signs of deterioration. There is a truth in this position. The water is purer in the Alpine lake than in the mighty stream that flows from it through the lowlands. Men of surpassing genius, in one field or another, pour forth from the depths of their nature a fullness of thought and sentiment that succeeding generations only in part are able to embody in creed and life, leaving ever a residue to inspire new developments. But the difficulty in this case is that, when the right of literary and historical criticism is recognized, it becomes an exceedingly precarious task to determine what Jesus actually thought, and said, and did.

It seems a fair contention that Christianity should be judged by the church, the organization that through eighteen centuries has represented it. But the differences are so great between what has passed for Christianity in one part of the world and in another, in one age and in another, that one despairs of arriving at any conclusion by historic investigation. There is no doctrine and no practice of which it can be said that it has been maintained *semper ubique et ab omnibus.* Theologians like Dorner would therefore seek for a principle underlying the various phenomena of Christian life. In this they are no doubt right. As each nation has its peculiar physiognomy and psychology, however greatly its members may differ, so Christianity unquestionably has certain peculiarities that everywhere and at all times mark it off from Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Judaism and other distinct forms of religion. But aside from the fact that scarcely two thinkers would agree as to what elements should be eliminated as not essential, the principle remaining would approach so closely to what by a similar process would prove to be the essence of any other religion, that differentiation by the accidental appears more feasible than by the underlying principle.

In his Levering lectures, Dr. Clarke deals both historically and philosophically with the subject. The main purpose, however, appears to be neither historical nor philosophical, but practical, apologetic in the best sense of the term. The lectures are designed to commend the things that occupy the author's thought and make his life, his Christianity. Shall we think well or ill of Christianity? It is this question Dr. Clarke answers by placing before us the Christian People, the Christian Doctrine, and the

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Christian Power. What noble men and women Christianity has made! Is it possible to think otherwise than well of a form of religion that creates the characters we most admire? It may indeed be asked whether it is possible to think ill of any form of religion when only its best representatives and only their noblest qualities are considered, and also what in each case may be due to national and racial characteristics, physical and social surroundings, or general religious inclination, rather than to specific Christian doctrines and practices. But even so the cumulative impression would remain very strong.

But what is Christianity? On one side it is doctrine, reflecting "five great realities, the fatherhood of God, the saviourhood of Jesus Christ, the friendhood of the spirit, the supremacy of love, and the transforming power of divine grace." On the other hand, it is power, since these are realities and whenever they are felt to be such. Again it is possible to inquire whether, in view of Jesus' attitude in preaching not himself—but the father in heaven and the kingdom of heaven, the saviourhood of Jesus is an essential part of Christian doctrine, whether the friendhood of the spirit is a different thing from the fatherhood of God, and whether the objective reality of the thing believed is guaranteed by even a feeling strong enough to influence conduct in a profound manner. One is not quite certain as to the meaning of the words used. Dr. Clarke's language is of an admirable simplicity and beauty. But the technical terminology he so wisely avoids had at least the merit of being definite through long usage. Precisely in what sense does Dr. Clarke use the term "saviourhood"? Does he mean by it simply the helpful influence of a good life, marked by high aspirations, clear thinking, deep and reverent feeling, noble and courageous deeds, or does he to any extent associate with it the idea of a gracious performance of special acts having a meritorious value? It is a significant indication of Dr. Clarke's independence of thought that he does not class among the great Christian doctrines that of the resurrection or an eternal life. But it also shows how large an element of subjectivity necessarily enters into every definition of this kind. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that Dr. Clarke has set down not only the great articles of his own Christian creed, but also positions as generally held among Christians as they are intrinsically important.

Probably no living teacher of systematic theology exercises so widespread, morally uplifting and intellectually emancipating an

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influence upon the large Protestant denominations of America and England as Dr. Clarke. His writings have a peculiar charm, the reflection of a large, well-poised, love-inspiring personality.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

FIELDS, FACTORIES AND WORKSHOPS. By Prince Kropotkin. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1901.

Prince Kropotkin is such a charming and interesting writer that the issue of a new edition of this book at the price of one shilling is an event upon which the public must congratulate themselves. But appreciation should not take the place of criticism. An efficient critic would need to have almost as great knowledge of agriculture and small industries as Prince Kropotkin has himself, and the present critic will therefore limit his observations to what he conceives to be the general trend of the argument apart from the mass of interesting detail in which it is enveloped.

What is the author's argument? What is the book about? It is not easy to say. The sub-title is, "Industry Combined with Agriculture and Brain-Work with Manual Work," but whether the thesis is that this combination *will* or *ought to* take place is not so clear. The book is constructed from or based upon a series of magazine articles, and hence is not in very coherent form, but the main proposition which Prince Kropotkin wishes to establish appear to be as follows:

(*a*) There is a tendency for nations to become self-sufficing and for foreign trade to disappear.

(*b*) By proper systems of agriculture and market-gardening the total product of the soil can be enormously increased.

(*c*) There is a tendency to combine industrial and agricultural work.

(*d*) All the above tendencies are for the good of mankind.

It hardly seems true that nations are becoming self-sufficing. Protectionists wish it and make great efforts to attain this end. The struggle over the new German tariff illustrates how powerful a political force protectionists are, and yet in spite of everything European countries are becoming increasingly dependent on foreign supplies of food, as has recently been pointed out by Sir R. Giffen in his address to the Economic Section of the British Association, 1901. Whether the general effect of foreign trade is good or bad is a matter on which opinions may be expected to

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differ, but *prima facie* it is an ill thing for a nation to be isolated from the rest of the world.

Intensive agriculture no doubt will yield a greater product per acre, but at what cost? Are not the capital and labor required for intensive agriculture employed in a more remunerative way in other industries? The fact that Jersey market gardeners can afford to cultivate so carefully and intensively depends chiefly on the fact that there are a large number of rich people willing to pay enormous prices to get new potatoes a week earlier than somebody else. If everybody forced early potatoes and there were no millionaires to buy them, £100 worth of vegetables would not be produced on every acre of land. Whether agriculture or market-gardening is a better pursuit than manufacturing is again a difficult question. The intellect does not appear to be much stimulated by agriculture, but the moral character may be improved by an outdoor life.

But the two can be blended in more than one way. Factories can be removed to the country. This is already occurring and for the present the tendency seems likely to continue. High rents in towns tell on the factory owner in two ways. He has to pay more for the ground on which his factory stands and he has to pay higher wages to his workmen to enable them to live in the town because house rent and the cost of living generally are higher than in the country. But another method is more attractive in theory. It is to have industry carried on at home or in quite small factories in the country and to have agricultural operations at the same time carried on by the same workmen. Such a system is at present extremely costly. Perhaps in time it will be possible to lay on electrical or other power in such a way that the small factory will be as economical as the big one. At present, home industries often result in long hours, low pay and bad conditions.

There is a great danger in exaggerating the advantages of home labor and country life. The outside observer sees the charms more easily than the defects. Yet the charm is undeniable. Are the defects necessary? That is the issue. Whether Prince Kropotkin's views are true or false they afford much food for reflection. His book contains a very large number of facts presented in a most attractive and stimulating way.

C. P. SANGER.

LONDON.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

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Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
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INTERNATIONAL

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JULY, 1902.

ORIGINALITY.

I.

MANY thinkers complain nowadays, that the individuals of which our society is composed lack originality. The complaint is a serious one, for it is lack of personal force and of the energy to create in the people at large, which has brought many a nation to the dust and put many a civilization to shame before the world. Nations, like individuals, must work out their own salvation or cease to be. They must be constituted by men of vigorous and independent mind, or they cannot stand the strain which the law of progress puts upon every living creature. Uniformity is just as benumbing in national life as in religious life.

To a small degree at least, Britain is suffering from this deadening formality at the present moment. The discipline of the political party which has been in the ascendant for the past few years has made the people too acquiescent in its policy, and there has been a consequent loss of vigorous originative force in its counsels.

This inertia always tends to creep into the national life of highly civilized States. Amid the stress of those strenuous battles which work out the freedom of a nation and give it a high place among its brother nations, men of commanding

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mind always arise to fulfil the genius of the people. This demiurgic task accomplished, so far as national existence and importance and political freedom are concerned, it often happens that great men cease to appear and to devote their vast energies to further national construction. Their efforts tend to create a society too well regulated and too comfortable to be vigorous. It is when these nation-builders—soldiers, statesmen, patriots—who perform what are after all the rougher tasks of the organization of society, have done their work, that spirit-builders ought to begin definitely to rear their subtler superstructures in the minds of men. But it is just at this point that national failure oftenest occurs, and that whole societies go to pieces. It is here that originality ceases to show itself, or that any originality which does show itself is scoffed or neglected or ostracized into silence. The nation, no less than the individual, reaches crises when that struggle ceases which gave it an assured position in the world and which was carried on with naïve directness.

We live in a self-conscious world to-day, a world very largely of display, of fashion and of vulgarity. We live more for appearances than for inner realities, and act in accordance with the opinions of others rather than in harmony with our native thoughts. This untruthfulness is fatal to our originality. It makes us dull and parasitical and even turns some of us into whited sepulchres. Yet many people think that it is a necessary evil because confusion would prevail in social life, if everybody had strong individual opinions, which he represented in action with resolution and persistency. But the general laws of life are such that difference does not produce discord. Indeed, the world is a beautiful framework into which individual men can only fit themselves by maintaining their various characters. It is true that there would be an almost disastrous clashing of ideas and actions did all men possess creative power. On the other hand the possession and utilization of constructive ability by every individual man, is an absolutely necessary condition of social unity.

The notion that in disagreeing with a man on any special ground we create discord between him and ourselves rests on a

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misconception of the nature of individuality and originality. People who are too lazy to exercise their own powers, are fond of excusing their dullness by identifying originality with mannerism or peculiarity or eccentricity. In truth originality consists in obedience to the general laws of society and not in the disposition to forsake the beaten track. Yet originality is never dull or tiresome. George Eliot very well expresses its nature when she speaks of "such originality as we all share with the morning and the springtime and other endless renewals." Emerson gives the same truth a very beautiful form. He says: "The sense of spiritual independence is like the lovely varnish of the dew, whereby the old, hard, peaked earth, and its old self-same productions, are made new every morning, and shining with the last touch of the artist's hand." In another passage this profound thinker tells us that every man is by nature a poet.

When we come to consider the grounds of this opinion, we find that originality is nothing but honesty. If all men thought what their nature constrained them to think and spoke only what they thought, the poetry of their natures would declare itself. At first, however, it is difficult to see that perfect social honesty would be consistent with harmony. Our individual natures compel us to differ radically from the majority of our fellow-men, so that we could hardly avoid hurting their feelings if we declared ourselves on all occasions without disguise or prevarication. But the fact remains that we differ, however conciliatory our words may be. Word agreement can never be anything else but artificial. As men become more thoughtful it is therefore to be hoped that the rule of society which brands mere outward agreement with others as polite and forbids the mention of mistakes and faults to their faces, though it countenances gossip behind their backs, will be changed for one which recognizes a more spiritual and lasting kind of social unity.

After all it can only be because we deify our opinions that we are afraid of uttering them honestly to anybody and everybody. When we come to consider the value of our opinions, we learn that they are due to our ancestry, our training and

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our individual experiences, which inevitably hem us in and render us incapable of perfectly understanding the opinions of those whose education has been altogether different from our own. Whenever, therefore, we form a really adverse judgment about another man, we manifest ignorance. What we really mean, for instance, when we condemn an atheist, is that we do not think, or have not thought, as he does, and cannot therefore understand the grounds of his conclusions. If we are candid we shall probably acknowledge also, that our own idea of God is so vague, that it cannot have the smallest value for our lives. Instances like that of the atheist make it plain to us that we are finite. This acknowledgment might serve as the basis of a new social rule that would obviate all the disingenuousness which the old one occasions. If any man with whom we are obliged to come in contact be particularly disagreeable to us and if his opinions clash with ours, there is no reason why we should not plainly acknowledge our disagreement, with an apology to the effect that we may not be in a position to understand him, and if possible with a statement of the causes which led up to the formation of our own opinions. Such a confession would be far more friendly than the mere pretence of agreement with others which we sometimes make because we think that the expression of antagonistic views is inconsistent with politeness. As, moreover, this rule would involve an appeal to truth more general than that within which peculiar circumstances have confined our own characteristic ideas, it would tend to destroy class animosity, while so far from creating discord, it would do much towards giving us more humor and sympathy, moderation, tolerance and humility. Of all these virtues it is humility, perhaps, for the growth of which a social rule of honest speaking would provide the best opportunities, for such a rule would make self-depreciation quite as heinous an offence, as open disparagement of others appears to be according to the artificial rule of society. Self-depreciation is hardly ever sincere, and it is, therefore, quite incompatible with humility. Society in branding self-praise as ungentlemanly, is only extending favor to those who

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are mean-spirited or weak-willed enough to be and to do that which they disapprove.

> "Nur die Lumpe sind bescheiden,
> Brave freuen sich der That."

If another rule were adopted which recognized that truth is many-sided, and that the share which individuals have in the great whole is bound to be strictly limited, perhaps men would have a good chance of forming clear and just judgments about themselves. If healthy outspoken egotism be tabooed, men think more about themselves than they ought to do. They hope and scheme for themselves in secret and value the praise and blame of others above their own conscience. Such deviation from the truth upraises many a barrier between man and man. It makes us not only nervous, reserved and self-conscious, thin-skinned, cowardly and parasitical, but even blind, hypocritical and insincere.

Every day we perform all kinds of small disingenuous acts in obedience to customs which it never occurs to us to criticize. For instance, a convention exists among us according to which we must express approval of any presents that are given us. They may give a violent shock to our feelings, yet we must speak of them as if they gave us pleasure. Suppose, for example, an amateur painter presents a friend with a picture which is so badly executed that it is positively excruciating. According to the doctrine of society, it is the duty of the receiver, in this painful case, to say that he is very glad to have the picture, and even to hang it up every time the giver visits his long-suffering friend and take it down again when the visit is over. When we come to examine this case. we find the whole spirit of it so unlovely, that even the blunt, vulgar avowal of the truth seems more friendly to us than the veiled falsehood. But if the rules of society were framed in harmony with the deeper nature of man, no such jarring rudeness would be necessary, and it might be possible for the bad painter to learn that he had atrocious taste—a lesson which would be far more wholesome for him than any flattering thoughts he might entertain about his skill. A mere recognition of the finite nature of our understanding and the complexity of one

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another's characters, would make speaking the truth possible on all occasions. If the giver understood that his friend would value the spirit of giving quite apart from the thing given, he would not be chilled at finding that his present was not acceptable. His pleasure would consist in learning to understand his friend better, for that friend would unfold a little piece of his mental history in explaining how his wishes had been misinterpreted, and such explanation would probably involve some amusing disclosures of the incongruity existing between mind and mind and would teach the giver to understand himself so much better, that the effort of self-adjustment in which the discipline of social life consists, would be appreciably easier for him in the future. Moreover, if the giver expected criticism and not mere flat praise as the consequence of his giving, he would not be tempted to give from a desire to patronize others, or to perform a duty, or to be in the fashion, rather than from the genuine hope of giving a worthy expression to friendship. We do not realize how magically so simple a talisman as pure, kind-hearted honesty would act in unlocking our hearts and disclosing the human treasures that lie concealed there. It can only be because we are at heart indifferent to one another that we neglect this source of human knowledge. The fact is, that we have not yet learned to be citizens and we are still only an aggregate of frigid units. The little moral habits which make up the life of a nation are not sound enough to bear any lofty superstructure.

Until our social system and our code of etiquette makes room for originality, we shall never learn to be a true society. Our present system perverts us at an early age. There are few of us who do not remember how we woke up from the heaven of childhood to find that we must speak with regard to the opinion of others, and not with the pure simplicity of truthfulness. Perhaps we admired a sermon which we did not understand, or a picture, the praise of which would, we vaguely thought, reflect some glory on our powers of discernment and gain us credit for having good taste. At first we were ashamed of falsifying ourselves for the sake of other people's opinions,

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but society seemed to demand constant self-repression and we became used to our dishonesty. Many people who had little originality to start with, will find on reflection that a process of this kind has been carried on in their minds, and that consequently they do not in reality possess a single opinion which belongs to them, even though they may be extremely dogmatic and may entertain very decided views.

The system of preying upon and robbing the individual until he is destitute of himself is obviously unjust. It is, moreover, most detrimental to society and obstructive to progress, for it props up and maintains men of weak uncertain character, while it battles down those whose native force only just falls short of the genius that frankly abandons itself to a heroic lawlessness. It is harmful alike to the timid and to the aggressive man and it lays a particularly heavy load upon those few proud-natured men, who are endowed with a wealth and depth of fine feeling, but who hide themselves bitterly beneath a harsh and cold manner because they cannot cast their pearls before swine.

A little more tolerance would prevent all such perversion. We ought to be willing both to be ourselves and to let other people be themselves. We ought to go even so far as to countenance, both in our case and that of others, those thoughts and actions which on some grounds appear almost outrageous to us. Emerson goes so far as to say: "I shun father and mother and wife and brother, when my genius calls me. I would write on the lintels of the doorpost WHIM. I hope it is somewhat better than whim at last, but we cannot spend the day in explanation." So vigorous a doctrine of individuality seems at first anti-social, even if we take into consideration the deep pathos of the last sentence, with its brave recognition of what is often the tragedy of individuality. But all men belong to the same cosmic order. If they could all say with Emerson, "Nothing is at last sacred but the integrity of your own mind," or "No law can be sacred to me but that of my own nature," they would soon be one in spirit. Hans Andersen gives this truth a very fine and simple expression, in the well-known story of the Emperor who walked in proces-

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sion through the streets, in what he imagined to be a robe with a sweeping train. He was highly delighted with the fit and with all the splendid ornaments of the costume, though in reality he was wearing nothing of the sort. But the train-bearers solemnly pretended to hold up something in the air, while all the people gazed in admiration and made flattering remarks. Then a little child exclaimed—"But he has no robe on!" and then all the rest of the crowd shouted, "Why he has no robe on!" until the Emperor himself came to know the truth. The spirit of the child had made the crowd one, and it was found that the truth was the same for all. The spirit of truth would make all men brothers. It would not promote ὕβρις or anarchy or irreligion or peculiarity. It would make us all lovers of nature and all promoters of progress. Then there would be joy in mere living, and the inevitableness which is the charm of the works of genius would characterize our common acts. The legality of our social life would be the rhythm of music and not the regularity of machinery. Natural laws cannot harden into conventions, because they are new every morning and fresh every evening. We can never weary of doing that which answers the necessities of our nature, which are constantly arising We need not look to little children and so-called innocent savages and far-off golden ages for refreshment, if we are only true to ourselves. The path of progress lies straight ahead of us. We cannot live on the borrowed past and we need not be sentimental helpless Rousseaus, crying out for a return to nature. We have merely to be honest and we shall be true to the nature which civilization has built up and which will enable us to climb the giddy heights of the future with the steady faith of a child. The task of this age is, therefore, the creation of a distinctly human atmosphere in every place where men live and work.

To perform the task men evidently require more knowledge. As Lowell tells us, men of great original powers are not raised "by some Deucalion and Pyrrha process." The only sound basis of original work is knowledge of the past and the present, well assimilated and adapted to modern needs. No thinker in pleading for a society of independent-minded

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men, could ignore the value of study and the dangers of giving unbounded liberty to uneducated men whose mental possessions are of mushroom growth. It is no longer the rough sense-life of the child and the savage which is natural to the civilized man. In the higher stages of men's development the work of Nature is the work of culture.

II.

Obviously much responsibility lies with the universities. The reason why these institutions fulfil their mission so imperfectly is, probably, that they separate science from art. They make education a matter of transplantation and absorption, rather than of conception and production. They do too much pattern work and make far too little of expression. The lecture and the examination system does not call forth originality. The range of expression for which this system allows is too narrow. University methods are adapted to call forth the powers of those who express themselves naturally in lecturing or teaching or writing, but they do not make provision for the very large proportion of the students to whom such expression is unnatural. The few, moreover, for whom they do provide, are just those men who need no provision and whose originality is so distinctive that they would be themselves and work out their destiny in spite of, and not in consequence of, their education, no matter what that education might be. The criticisms on university training put forth by such men as Wordsworth and Gibbon are illustrations of this truth. Perhaps all the university did for these men was to produce an atmosphere in which the higher life can develop. If the universitives confined themselves to doing the same work for all students, the ordinary man would have a much better chance of developing on his own lines. The work of the university ought to be the creation of that kind of environment in which the soul can develop most freely. The present system sends quite unpractical men into the world. They may be unworldly, but they cannot make their unworldliness effective. The consequence is, that they often soil their

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ideals in the conflict of city life and allow themselves to be subdued to what they work in. Some of them, either because they are nervous, or because they have had little practice in expressing themselves in their own characteristic way, do not seem to have ideas enough, or sympathy enough, to enter with spirit into a common conversation or debate. The university cannot, of course, be expected to give up its high ideals and to vulgarize culture for the sake of the unregenerate Philistines outside its walls. It is, however, bound to bridge over the gulf that separates the vulgar citizen from the man of culture, and if it do not fulfil this duty its higher work is bound to fail, for all spiritual structures must have their roots deep planted in the consciousness of the people. Let the man of visions and ideas soar far away from his age, and he becomes a foolish wanderer.

The universities would fulfil their mission to the people by paying more attention to the education of the senses. What is needed to make our university teaching practical and useful to the people is some such system as that of Froebel, adapted to the conditions of the mature mind and worked out on distinctively British principles. The universities ought to be the promoters of art and even of craft. Since every man is by nature a poet, the aim of the universities ought to be the establishment of conditions of living under which a man can realize in action what he thinks and what he is in potentiality. The student does not get enough will-training. He is taught at college to receive rather than to make. What he receives is truly great and grand; it is a human heritage of which any man might be proud: but if the conditions of the outer world be such that he cannot use this mental wealth, he is not only unable to receive any interest on his capital, but he is necessarily debarred from making any further conquests in the rich world of thought and vision. Every man of genius has felt this limitation which the world imposes upon him. We cannot wonder if the same cold influence chills the ordinary cultured man into acquiescence in the dull ways of the unthinking multitude. Instead of leaving college with the determination and the power to mould circumstances in accordance with his

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best thoughts and to stem the dull drift of mere custom, he finds himself strangely homeless in the world. He is a determined and not a determining factor in society, for he has not learned to obey the law of endless progress which is the inexorable law of life. The glorious world of vision becomes a dim unreality to him and "the curtain of the horizon descends," as a modern thinker writes, "round the material things and the pitiful duration of human life." In the case of men who have very sensitive natures, this descent from the world of thought and desire to the outer realities is so steep, that it causes actual madness. Many men of genius have suffered in this way.

All such world-loss could be prevented if men were only taught at the universities to make their own world honestly and fearlessly. The wide-spread popularizing movement which is going on among British artists, and to a less extent among continental artists, to-day, ought to give university teachers a hint as to how they are to awaken the poetry of life in all their students. The British artist of to-day is not so anxious to produce easel pictures, as to beautify common life. The healthy spirit of the craftsman is reviving, even in the midst of philistinism and vulgarity and commercialism, and artists are becoming more and more architects, weavers, bookbinders, enamellers, embroiderers, metal-workers, furniture makers, carvers, rather than painters and sculptors. To be sure we still need those works of genius which have no apparent connection with the insistent necessities of the hour, but we also want that sort of artistic work which links the life of the people with that of the dreamer and the thinker, by spreading amongst them the pervasive influence of culture. If they train their students in the spirit in which these workers educate their generation, the universities will be doing much to create the true democracy. The task of the colleges, however, is much wider than is that of the artists. The university should aim at producing artists in the widest sense of the term—artists of life. Its teaching should prompt a man to express every side of his nature freely. The ideal university would teach men to weave words and sounds, form and color

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into harmonies with equal ease. In this age of advanced specialism, we cannot realize this ideal, but we ought to keep it in mind, because the exercise of the three greatest of the fine arts together gives the mind the soundest and most comprehensive foundation which could be made for the building up of spiritual knowledge and power, in which the twentieth century ought to progress as much as the nineteenth century progressed in material science. At present the results which only a broad and comprehensive spiritual training can bring about might be produced in some degree by coöperation. Musicians, writers, men of science, business men, thoughtful men indeed of all professions, often call in the artist nowadays, to decorate their houses and to remedy the defects of their own minds. The university would do well to follow their example. The university buildings ought to be beautiful. Every detail of their structure ought to be instinct with the individuality of an artist. Perhaps the newer colleges have a better chance of supplying this kind of education than have the older ones. It is not always that the best kind of culture is what has been described as

> "The Past's incalculable hoard,
> Mellowed on scutchened panes in cloisters old,
> Seclusions ivy-hushed and pavements sweet
> With immemorial lisp of musing feet."

Great futures are also before those colleges into the buildings of which it is possible to infuse the healthy modern spirit which is stirring among the people. Culture realized in the palpable forms of music and painting and sculpture would give the student an impulse of this spirit, and he would face the world at the conclusion of his college career with the conviction, that learning is after all translatable into the vulgar language, and that the student, whom Emerson calls "the favorite of heaven and earth, the excellency of his country, the happiest of men," is at heart in sympathy with the commonest man in the land. He would be ready to deal in a practical spirit with the problem of the age which is, a modern writer tells us, "the transformation of culture from an intellectual accomplishment into a spiritual grace." Emerson has

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stated the problem as it touches the student by saying that the inspired man "should occupy the whole space between God or pure mind and the multitude of uneducated men." It would be better that the universities should be turned into mere technical academies for the teaching of craft, than that the student should neglect this great mission. Perhaps he can maintain his office by acting as a guide to the fine and high arts and can continue to open the way to the remoter steeps of thought and vision, without making craft a part of his curriculum, if he do further work in the popularization of culture through such institutions as Extension lectures and Settlements, which are characteristically British institutions. The age must work out its own destiny. No one can say precisely what form the spirit of a nation or an age ought to assume.

III.

No one who studies everyday life can doubt that it is the duty of the university to set the mind free. Imitation, which is always productive of deformity, seems to be the supreme rule of conduct in all classes. It is not necessity, the proverbial mother of originality, but outward constraint, that determines our actions and habits. The higher classes set the tune and the lower classes dance. The people of the middle classes think they have been educated beyond vulgar pretentiousness. They would scorn the very thought of attempting to live in the style of the wealthy and high-born. But if they consider some of their customs, they will find that many of their daily practices are suited to a rank of life which is much higher than their own. The high and great of the land set the fashion and all those who are inferior in rank assume the position of dependents, though they may not be inferior in good feeling and intellectual ability, the possession of which gifts will alone be regarded as constitutive of good birth, if the establishment of the spiritual aristocracy which has been the dream of philosophers for many a long age, ever be effected on this earth. Imperceptibly, slavish customs have come to dominate men, until they fail altogether to distinguish natural customs from

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artificial ones. One of the customs which we owe to imitation, is that of keeping late hours. In most countries throughout history, there seems to have been some subtle connection between artificiality and having dinner in the evening. This institution seems innocent enough, until we come to think about it. Then we find that it originated at the courts of kings and that it has a tendency to become later and later as time goes on. The royal dinner which is now not very far from being a midnight feast, took place in Queen Elizabeth's time before noon. There would have been no objection to the modern dinner, with all the late evening work which it entails for the servants of the rich, if the lower people had been content to go their own way and let the court alone. But they have adapted the time of their own work to the habits of royalty, and lose on the average quite two hours of the most invigorating time of every working day, in order to toil away late at night in glaring gas or blinding electric lights. Yet the nervous inhabitants of our vast modern cities would probably be much healthier and sturdier, if the business world began work at six or seven in the morning and ended at four or five, so that winter lectures and entertainments and summer sports and bicycle rides allowed every man to get his natural share of beauty sleep.

Our houses, again, are all built and furnished on the imitative principles and are therefore ugly. If we were to turn out of our houses everything which is not strictly useful, we should probably reject quite half our goods as mere ornamental rubbish, and if we could look on the world with the eye of the artist, we should be only too glad to make the clearance, for then we should understand the teaching that artists are dinning into our deaf ears to-day. We should understand that beauty and necessity are inseparable, and that culture is simplification. Our narrow commercialism and shopkeeper instincts make us look on beauty as occasional and unnecessary, not as structural and pervasive. We cannot separate the idea of beauty from that of display, and this idea has a falsifying influence on our life and manners, which makes us live for appearance rather than for truth and progress. Our commer-

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cialism has given us a rage for cheap things and we suppose that decorative things would be extravagant and luxurious. The supposition is false, for if we held to the principle that nothing is beautiful which is not useful, we should spend less money and yet have goods of priceless value. An artist can build a house almost as cheaply as the meanest jerry-builder can run up the hideous tumble-down shanties in which most of us dwell, to the infinite detriment of our thoughts and manners. As long as our houses exhibit sham representations of oaken beams daubed on their exteriors, grained doors, marbled mantel-pieces, curtains and blinds the office of which is to shut out the light and to be cleaned, open fireplaces that cause currents of air to be drawn from beneath the door, and other inconveniences and deformities, we shall be neither a scientific nor an artistic nation.

In our dress we are as parasitic as we are in our house-furnishing. The very fact that we dress with particular care for special occasions shows that we do not appreciate beauty and look upon it as something adventitious, rather than as the framework of daily life. Perhaps the most glaring example of this kind of imitativeness is that of the skirt with which women sweep their houses and even clean the steps of trains and omnibuses, and which originated with a class of women whose business it was to do nothing but look after their houses, dance at balls, and weep over their tapestries for their absent warrior lords.

But the people of the lower classes are not the only imitators in our society. Our English elegance, which is a besetting sin of the aristocracy, is a perfect expression of the French genius, but it has an element of the ludicrous in it when it is assumed by a class of people who are serious at heart, however frivolous they may sometimes be on the surface. If we knew how much of this elegance originated in the not too wholesome court of Charles II., which was so imbued with the French spirit, perhaps the rich and great would be content to be real English people. Lowell has exactly hit off the incongruity of this unnatural polish in the words: "No observer of men can have failed to notice the clumsy respect which the understand-

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ing pays to elegance of manners and *savoir-faire,* nor what an awkward sense of inferiority it feels in the presence of an accomplished worldliness. The code of society is stronger with most persons than that of Sinai, and many a man who would not scruple to thrust his fingers in his neighbor's pocket, would forego green peas rather than use his knife as a shovel. The submission with which the greater number surrender their natural likings for the acquired taste of what for the moment is called the World is a highly curious phenomenon, and however destructive of originality, is the main safeguard of society and nurse of civility."

That we seek excitements in order to get away from ourselves in these days of hurry, is another proof that we are not sufficient to ourselves. The eager rush of the age to places of amusement almost justifies the solemn meaning which Dean Trench attaches, in his naïve way, to the word "diversion." Amusements are to the man whose life is not a work of art, what ornaments are to the inartistic house or garment. They are adventitious and cannot give permanent satisfaction. Refreshment should be supplied in the course of daily life, which ought to be a varied and continuous progress. Just as no work of art can properly be called ornamental, so no well rounded life can properly be called exciting. In a perfect work of art the ornament is so intimate a part of the whole, that the effort to analyze the composition is almost painful. The bare outline is itself beautiful and the motive spirit is clothed with such exquisite fittingness, that structure and detail go together in the mind and almost refuse to be separated. The man whose mind is original and self-supporting is like the work of art. His life needs no outward adornments and his mind no diversion, because his work is a perpetual refreshment. The fact that an obscure poet has immortalized himself by singing the never-to-be-forgotten lines beginning,

"My mind to me a kingdom is,"

which are too well known to be repeated, shows that the artist life is the natural life. But we do not exert ourselves to live the natural life and are not willing to let other living

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creatures work out their genius. We treat animals, for instance, as if they existed primarily to refresh our inert minds and are not ashamed to modify profoundly even those of their functions which constitute all their beauty in order to amuse ourselves. The charm which a caged bird has for us is its pathetic contentment with unnatural life-conditions and its disposition to act out its own nature with an almost conscientious directness, under difficulties analogous to those social conditions which have perverted our own complex natures in spite of ourselves. We even treat our children sometimes as mere toys and laugh at their pretty natural ways as if there were something ludicrous in them.

Perhaps all these little habits appear to us insignificant. But they are important in that the idle spirit to which they are due enters into the great affairs of the nation, notably religion and politics. Religion, as a great prophet tells us, "must always be a crab fruit." Yet there is no branch of thought in which men have been more sheepish. Religion has been so notoriously a matter of profession and of derived rather than immediate interest, as almost to justify the invectives hurled against it by Shelley, a man from whom we have yet much to learn, even in social doctrines, over which he was so often foolish. Sometimes, indeed, religion is so insincere and hypocritical as to be practically valueless. All along its history it has taught men to approve of themselves and to look upon other men as very wicked—a theory which we carry out in these days of tolerance, by trying to impose upon savage tribes a religion which is quite foreign to their genius.

The same spirit pervades our political life. A recent writer has criticized the political methods which are dictated by this spirit in the words: "A nation wins respect just as it wins a command over the spiritual elements in its own destiny, as it builds its own political foundations and rears its own fabric of government upon plans of spiritual excellence. In the long run we can do more for Africa by civilizing the East End of London than by putting an end for ever to the iniquities of the Kalifa in the Soudan."

The fact is, that until we learn that charity begins at home

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in our own minds, we shall never do our parts towards making national and international union possible. We have been dazzled by the splendor of court life and by material achievements, and have, in consequence, woven an artificial link of imitation between class and class. We need to revise our morals much in the same way as Descartes revised our knowledge. Our method need not be nihilistic, but it would certainly establish our independence of mind if it started with doubt of the foundations of all our habits and actions.

It is in the form of a reconstruction of moral ideas that the problem of the age presents itself to the educated classes. It is they who ought to resist the natural tendency of thought to outstrip action, which is so fertile a source of hypocrisy. But the student has more than common temptation to let action lag behind belief, because his thoughts are so far-reaching and so enchanting, that their fulfilment calls for constructive ability almost amounting to creativeness and for energy of more than common intensity. But if they would only be true to their thoughts in action, the educated people could very well do the work for which society is waiting, for their habits are simple and their thoughts fresh, and they know very well that the simple recognition of the naturalness of many processes of our bodies and minds of which we are ashamed, would make people much more childlike, pure-minded and upright. But they have not the courage to reveal their thoughts in action to the vulgar. A very homely instance will serve to illustrate this truth. An educated man or woman can see nothing undignified in bowling a hoop or using a skipping-rope in the street. Indeed it may appear to him a very sensible and time-saving way of getting exercise. Such recreation is no more ridiculous than hockey or tennis or bicycle-riding for pleasure, and it may do a great deal of good to anyone who cannot afford to join a games club or buy a bicycle. It can only be convention which condemns a grown-up man who bowls a hoop as mad or childish, but magnifies a champion who gives up his whole life to cricket or football into a hero. Such rules make us stiff and old, and they are benumbing because we do not really believe in them. A little honest and direct thinking would make

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the world young again and would banish from our society those helpless people who talk about golden ages, and who expend servile admiration upon the man of genius who can do as he likes because he is a man of great original powers, while they themselves are only ordinary folks. If we appreciated the ordinary folks more, perhaps we could educate men to abhor the industrial system of the day which makes toilers mere machines. We should cease to be conservative and should do all in our power to get our material work done by electrical power, that our working classes might have more leisure and more varied lives. If all that work for which the application of power is necessary were done by the new methods which we already half understand, we should save so much time as a nation, that the lower classes would again have leisure for craftsmanship and their ample days would flow on towards a broader spiritual future than most of us have dreamed of, for if all men were independent and free, there would be room in society for creative as distinct from constructive originality.

IV.

The chief characteristic of the creator, who is always a leader among men, is his honesty and independence. The reason why men look upon him as either a god or a monster is that he is a little ahead of his age. His calling is the introduction of new truth, the characteristic truth which his generation needs and which is, therefore, absolutely new in form, if not in substance. He is not uncommon. He is simply honest. "The Poet," Emerson teaches us, " is more ourselves than we are," and the same truth is applicable to all artists. The man of genius is the child of his age and no foreigner. "He who would be truly great," Lowell writes,

> "Must understand his own age and the next,
> And make the present ready to fulfil
> Its prophecy, and with the future merge
> Gently and peacefully, as wave with wave."

It is his relation to the future, of course, that brings down the scorn of his age upon the man of genius. Perhaps no edu-

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cation of society can ever save him from his loneliness. Perhaps

> "Disappointment's dry and bitter root,
> Envy's harsh berries, and the choking pool
> Of the world's scorn, are the right mother-milk
> To the tough hearts that pioneer their kind."

But if men would cease to identify genius with eccentricity, they would not make the life of the pioneer one long agony by chilling the atmosphere in which he lives. His work would not be easier if they loved him, but it would be richer and higher and less limited. It is to be hoped, therefore, that in the future the lives of great men will not be soured and darkened by the hypocritical usages of a stupid world. We have sacrificed such men as Beethoven and Swift by our embittering conventions. It is to be hoped that our tolerance will forbid us to stone our prophets in the future.

During the nineteenth century when the pressure of outward things was greater than it has ever been in past ages, Emerson and Carlyle and Ruskin preached with unflagging zeal a doctrine of individuality. They bade us build the human world in which alone the soul of man can breathe and grow. They bade us be makers. In the twentieth century we ought, in obedience to the prophesies of these teachers, to begin to build "The City without a Church," for which some of us are hoping, and which will be also a city without amusements. It will be a city of practical and all pervasive truth and beauty, where men will be

> "From custom's evil taint exempt and pure;
> Speaking the wisdom once they could not think,
> Looking emotions once they feared to feel,
> And changed to all which once they dared not be."

It is time that the learned and great began to bring the Promethean fire to men. As soon as they learn that except they become as children, they cannot enter the Kingdom of Truth, they will begin this work. And perhaps the originality which consists in perfect truthfulness actively realized, will be the best of all preparations for the future life. Mr. William Watson pleads for his art with England as the maker of men. All artists might plead their cause with their fatherland on

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the same ground. Art is the maker of men, of spiritual men. And perhaps it is a maker in a far-reaching sense that few of us dream of. Perhaps the poetic capacity which lies dormant in each one of us, is the earnest of a world to come where we shall enjoy the ideas of Plato by progressive effort. Perhaps our surroundings in the coming life will be all of our own making and we shall mould circumstances to our desires—a life-process which is foreshadowed, very likely, by the doctrine of the sensuous world as a product of our thoughts which is feigned in the imagination of many a philosopher. But the doctrine for the hour is that life and learning should not be separated and that all men's efforts should be a striving towards the creation of a distinctively human atmosphere which high and low alike can breathe.

M. E. Robinson.

Bangor, N. Wales.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF TRADE UNIONISM.

In the United States to-day there are one million and a half of trade unionists and their number is growing with tropical rapidity. All of them are adults and the overwhelming majority of them men. They form an intelligent, disciplined, well-ordered army, strong enough to dictate legislation in both Congress and the industrial States, able to paralyze the whole country should they go on strike together, capable of improving the intelligence and status of manual labor should they be wisely governed. They will form a permanent feature of our social life whether the future industrial development be Individualistic, Corporate or Socialistic. Their influence must be out of proportion to their numbers, for exclusive of the farmers, they include the most skilled and intelligent of the workers, and their increase is favored by that growth of cities which is a characteristic of our epoch. Should they appreciate their possible political power they could create a Labor party which would be the most formidable third party since the Civil War and would possibly supersede the Democratic party. They are

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better united to-day in the American Federation of Labor—with stronger, shrewder leaders, with a saner policy and with larger funds than they ever had before. Their strength and politic tactics have now forced the courteous consideration of trust magnates; their magazines receive contributions from the ablest economists; their meetings are reported in friendly spirit by the most influential papers. Altogether they form a potent factor in our social and industrial life.

Therefore it is valuable to consider what is the influence of Trade Unionism on the character of its adherents and on the ethical standards of the nation. Fenianism was strong but pernicious; some new religious sects have a million of adherents, but all may be besotted with superstition. Does loyalty to trade union principles affect the morality of a workman? Does it make him a fitter citizen? Would a State wholly organized on Trade Union principles be better or worse than a State in which freedom of competition between individual laborers was unchecked and unguarded? These are the questions to be considered in this article.

The trade union grows as manufacturing industry develops. It did not appear in the States as a continuous organization before 1825. Till the Civil War it had a precarious life not only because the old law of conspiracy made it illegal, but because the industrial conditions were unfavorable to its development. So long as the inhabitants of the country were either farmers tilling their own land, slaves without political liberty, or artisans who could move away and take a farm, there was not the division of industrial classes, the permanent separation between the capitalist and the workman, upon which the union is founded. Only when there arose classes of laborers who must accept service under others as their life portion did trade unionism become a necessity. Therefore its establishment denoted the growth of a new class-consciousness. In Europe this class-consciousness was more marked before Trade Unionism was founded; there the unions indicated the effort of the workmen to establish themselves in a higher class. But in America the very existence of the union denotes a class division which did not exist among the Puritans. This class

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division was the result of economic changes beyond the control of the workers. In itself it is perhaps a lower moral state than the social homogeneity which preceded it, because the economic solidarity of a people favors kindly relations, the development of fine feelings, more than class separation can do. Each decade the line of cleavage has struck wider and deeper. Trade Unionism immediately follows the creation of the class division between master and workman; the forces which produce the fissure produce also the union; and, therefore, confounding effect with cause, some have accused Unionism of making class divisions, of "setting class against class." But the birth of the unions is only the recognition of an economic fact, not its origin. The opposition of the immediate economic interests of the buyers and sellers of labor is developed historically; the unions are established afterwards to secure for the seller a fair price, to protect the weaker party in the bargaining.

But, granting the inevitableness of the class divisions, do the unions accentuate them and aggravate division into hostility? Doubtless the unions are based on the conviction that the individual workman is at such a disadvantage in bargaining with the employer that, left alone, he will, in the long run, be oppressed. He has neither the power of holding out, the knowledge of the conditions of the market, nor the practice in the art of bargaining necessary to get a fair price for his labor. His union teaches that the average employer will necessarily take advantage of this weakness to drive down wages to the minimum of subsistence and that the humane employer, unless specially protected by patents or other bulwarks, will be driven by competition to fix wages as low as his harshest competitor. This danger to the isolated workman increases as the consolidation of capital proceeds. "The alarming development and aggressiveness of great capitalists and corporations, unless checked, will inevitably lead to the pauperization and hopeless degradation of the toiling masses," says the preamble to the constitution of the Knights of Labor. In similar spirit the declaration of principles adopted by the American Federation of Labor at its formation in 1881 was to the effect that "a

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struggle is going on in the nations of the civilized world between the oppressors and the oppressed of all countries; a struggle between capital and labor which grows in intensity from year to year, and will work disastrous results to the toiling millions if they are not combined for mutual protection and benefit." The unions, by declaring this struggle, however, do not arouse it. In districts where there are no unions it is sometimes keenest and its incidents most savage. In the anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania, for instance, there was hardly any organization of the men from 1887, when the Assembly of the Knights of Labor was defeated and destroyed, down to 1900 when the United Mine Workers made rapid headway in the district. But nowhere was the struggle "between the oppressors and the oppressed" more bitter and remorseless, though the men were so helpless they could not fight in a way to draw general public attention. Their wages were lowered, they were charged exorbitant rates for their powder, truck or "pluck me" stores flourished, and they were forced to mine more than 3000 pounds to a ton. Economic oppression was there, though it was not accompanied by picturesque strikes over wide areas. Peace reigned in Pennsylvania as peace reigned in Warsaw according to the despatch of the Russian general after its desolation.

This brings us to consider the social influence of the unions in their attitude towards the workmen's final appeal, industrial strikes. Granting the hostility between the capitalist and the worker, does not the union, by precipitating needless strikes and harassing industry, keep open the conflict and arouse fiercer passions?

Unquestionably the unions are organized to fight in the last resort by withholding the labor of their members simultaneously. The right and the power to do this is of the essence of their being. The American Federation of Labor declared at Denver in 1900 in an appeal to the wage workers of North America: "While reducing strikes to a minimum, yet to resist a wrong or to obtain a right, as a last resort, it (the Federation) strikes, and through that method, as well as by legislative and political action, prevents the curtailment of the lib-

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erties of a portion of the people for the advancement of another. Though strikes do not always win, even those that are lost at least induce employers to forbear and teach a lesson not soon forgotten—that labor is the most important factor in production, and is entitled to consideration and consultation regarding the conditions under which labor shall be performed, and thus the union paves the way to conciliation and prevents disputes."

The Knights of Labor, that numbered a million members at the zenith of their prosperity and have now dwindled to insignificance, finally lost their hold on the workers when they accompanied the refusal to allow national organization of trades with the declaration that "It is but a step from a National Trade Assembly to a national Trade Union and trade unions and strikes are relics of barbarism not to be tolerated by the Knights of Labor." So soon as the toilers found that the Knights, by their unwillingness or their inability to support the final arbitrament of war, were, in the last resort, unable to help their members effectually, the fate of the organization was sealed.

But, though the unions, like nations with armies, have the purpose to fight rather than yield their rights, they know the cost of conflict and almost always prefer peaceful negotiation to armed combat. The stronger the union the less likely it is to enter lightly upon a strike. Young unions, that have not cut their wisdom teeth, rush most readily into battle; and where there are no unions spasmodic rebellions are of frequent occurrence. Just as between small tribes skirmishes are common, while between great nations a war is too frightful to be begun light-heartedly, so where the workers are disorganized the disputes are frequent while great International Unions wage war but rarely. On the lower East Side of New York, among the unorganized or semi-organized immigrant workers, there is hardly a week without a strike; but the national Union of Bricklayers, an old and powerful organization, has not supported a strike from the National Treasury since 1894. The leaders are more cautious than the rank and file and labor incessantly to avert disputes. At the miners' convention at

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Indianapolis this year the delegates were unwilling to accept the terms offered by the operators and only by the urgent arguments and entreaties of Mr. Mitchell and his fellow officers was a wide-spread struggle postponed. The organ of the Boot and Shoe workers, in a recent number declared: "In arriving at a decision as to permitting a strike it should always be remembered that a strike is a dead loss to employer, to employed and to the community." And the British Federation of Trade Unions, founded in 1899, makes this explicit statement: "The existence of the federation is not a menace to the industrial peace of the country, but a guarantee that everything will be done to avoid dispute; this being not only the policy of the Management Committee, but distinctly set forth as the first object of the Federation. Such peace cannot be obtained by want of organization on one or both sides, but by organization on both. Our desire is, therefore, for peace."

These declarations genuinely represent the trade union spirit. They cannot be overthrown unless the critics of the unions can answer the challenge of Mr. Gompers, the President of the Federation of Labor, "Has any labor organization ever refused to deal with representatives chosen by employers?"

In the course of economic evolution, I have said, the division between masters and workmen arose without the formal consent of either. This, among other social results, has followed. The owners and managers of big factories and corporations cannot maintain personal relations with their workmen without more self-sacrifice than they are usually able and willing to make. The men become "hands" to them; they become "money bags" to the men. Under these circumstances it is a social gain if a medium of communication can be provided through which masters and men can treat with each other as equal human beings and talk over their difficulties in a friendly spirit. The trade union supplies such a medium, which is being utilized, more than it ever was before, by the arbitration committee of the National Civic Federation with Senator Hanna as its chairman. But here and there its value was previously recognized. The coal owners who have their offices in New York, Chicago and Pittsburg cannot individually meet

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the quarter of a million of miners scattered through Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Virginia; but at the annual conference hundreds of representative miners and owners meet for a week's open discussion and friendly intercourse. The representatives of each side return to their districts acquainted not only with the arguments of the other side but with its personnel. Owners find that picked "hands" are capable gentlemen, and the workmen learn that operators may be kindly good fellows. Such personal knowledge allays the ill feeling which would make the peaceful settlement of disputes impossible. Without the union this negotiation through representatives would be impracticable and would, indeed, not have been desired. The union offers the only means available when industry is organized on a large scale for adding the human to the cash relationship, for bridging under competitive conditions the fissure which economic forces have caused.

A further advantage to society of the existence of the unions lies in the fact that they are great schools of democracy, training their members in the art of self government more effectively than the regular political organizations. Few citizens attend the primaries, which, in the cities especially, are arranged for the suppression rather than the cultivation of self government. Even in the small New England township, where the town meeting is really open, it comes so seldom and attracts so few citizens that the educational influence is small. But the Trade Union weekly local meeting, with rare exceptions, must be attended for the payment of dues. I have heard unionists speak with fine scorn of embryo women's organizations in New York because they need to send round an officer to collect the dues in the workshops. At the meeting there is absolute equality among the members—free expression of opinion, decision by majority vote, and unrestricted choice of officers. No "boss" dictates the nominations. The practice in self-control, the necessity to give and take, and the friction of minds upon questions that directly affect each member's interests are an unsurpassed training for general citizenship. The government of the National Unions has a like result. The National Conventions are democratically representative, but

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the tendency in America is to submit all important decisions to a referendum vote of the members. In England more power is given to the representatives because the wide scope of the referendum was at first so much abused as to hinder unduly the dispatch of business. But in both cases the delegates, who are usually the pick of the local officers, show a dignity of bearing, a businesslike habit in debate and a knowledge of the subjects they discuss equal, if not superior to, the behavior of members of Congress, of the House of Commons, or of the Chamber of Deputies.

The union thus cultivates in the members a power of coöperation, a sense of solidarity within the trade. Now the power of coöperation, the social instinct, is at once a sign and an essential of social progress. In the words of Karl Pearson: "If the struggle for existence has not led to the dominant portion of a given community having strong social instincts, then that community, if not already in a decadent condition, is wanting in the chief element of permanent stability. It is the prevalence of the social instinct in the dominant portion of the given community which is the sole and yet perfectly efficient sanction to the observance of social, that is, moral, lines of conduct." Of course the unionist's social instinct, as a unionist, is limited. It does not embrace the whole nation any more than the statesman's embraces more countries than his own. But to bring the unionist to consider his fellows in the trade, and, through Federation, his fellows in all trades, is a great social gain over the condition when "his hand was against everyone and everyone's hand was against his." This trade solidarity sometimes involves sacrifice, but it stands the test. For instance, when the Flint Glass workers of England established a uniform national scale of wages the members at York first protested because it would bring to them a reduction of wages; but when the advantages of the system to the other members was explained to them they accepted the sacrifice and, in the words of their journal "the vote against the catalogue was only the miserable total of nine." In the rich thick-veined mines of Southern Illinois the miners were formerly receiving the lowest wages in the State; and their

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fellows in the northern, poorer mines, in order to equalize competitive conditions and give the miners in all districts a chance of employment, have now helped them to get higher wages than they themselves get. To raise your fellow from a lower to a higher position than yourself chiefly for the benefit of thousands of men you have never seen, is a display of trade solidarity that has a high moral value.

Here we meet with an answer on the ethical side to the objection that Trade Unionism prevents a specially good workman from getting extra pay. The charge is false in fact, for the union sets only a minimum, not a maximum; but even if it were true it would surely be to the credit of the man of finer skill that he should belong to a union and sacrifice his personal profit for the general good. It is paradoxical that teachers and moralists should object to his action, since any personal renunciation for the good of the whole is socially, that is morally, advantageous. Especially in a sympathetic strike this subordination of self to society is often shown in heroic proportions. Men who, content with their own conditions of labor, will leave their work and face starvation that they may help some of their fellows to break what they deem oppression are displaying a social sense of high value whatever the economic results may be. "I am my brother's keeper" is a maxim adopted more thoroughly by the trade unions than by the churches. Whenever a strike is raging, though some are deterred from returning to work against orders though their selfish interest or the fear of boycott and punishment, most are restrained by loyalty to their union, by their sense of duty to their fellows. A "blackleg" is the meanest creature in the trade union inferno because the "blackleg" is guilty of anti-social behavior.

So far I have considered the directions in which the action of the unions is socially advantageous. But, adopting the same line of argument, their action in other directions must be condemned. If the social value of the union depends largely upon its cultivation of the social sense, upon the feeling of mutual interdependence among the members, evidently this value is curtailed by any exclusive action. American unions are oc-

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casionally guilty of an exclusiveness which is as selfish as it is short-sighted. Though the commonest rates of initiation fee range from $1 to $5 a few strong organizations levy considerably higher rates. The bricklayers charge $10, $15, $20, or more. The painters of New York charge $25. The Theatrical Stage Employés, in places where they monopolize their occupation, charge $25 and sometimes even $50. Small, local, highly-paid unions have virtually closed their ranks by demanding as much as $100. Sometimes they discriminate against immigrants. The Flint Glass Workers admit Americans for $3; but foreigners must pay $50; the Glass Bottle Blowers ordinarily charge Americans $5 and foreigners $50 to $100, according to the decision of the general officers, the door being half-opened or tightly closed as the monopoly spirit dictates. Such a policy has been forbidden to the local branches by the National Garment Workers' Unions and is condemned by the best leaders because, in the end, it is detrimental to the union's own interests. In addition it limits the union's social usefulness by shutting out some members of the trade from friendly consideration, by outlawing them through no fault of their own. When immigrants are thus forbidden to work at their trade the morality of the exclusion is the same as when one people forbids a weaker people to establish manufactures. It is a repetition of the tyranny of England towards Ireland and America in the eighteenth century, a recrudescence of monarchical methods in a democratic organization, as certain to bring revolt and defeat as they did to George III.

However, these cases are not typical and to the off-setting credit of the unions must be reckoned their constant efforts in the textile, iron, steel, coal and other industries to get all immigrants into their organization, the noble aid they have given to the Americanizing of this raw material, and the stubborn resistance of the American Federation of Labor to discrimination against colored workers in the South. It not only refuses to admit to the Federation any union which excludes colored workers, but it sends out organizers to convert the African to American industrial democracy. Monopolistic action, copied from the methods of the trusts, is strongest in small

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unions that have control in limited areas. As the size of the industry increases and more groups of workers are consulted the tendency to exclusion dissipates until, in the Federation of unions, which has under its shelter all organized manual workers, it is thoroughly discountenanced.

The same tendency to exclusiveness is observable sometimes in the regulations limiting the number of apprentices and in the hostility to trade schools. In both cases some oversight by the unions is requisite to their own existence. A large oversupply of labor in any trade, especially if it be only half-skilled, can be used as a hammer by employers to beat down wages and the reserves may be rallied during a dispute to destroy the men's organization. Apprentices so-called are too often boy workers who are taught nothing systematically, are allowed to pick up only a fraction of a trade, and are then set to work at this fraction continuously that they may produce a man's output at a boy's wages. Trade Schools, if unregulated, may equip a quite unnecessary number of men in the few trades they teach, who will either be unable to obtain work or will drive out others, in each case increasing the number of the unemployed in the trade and making the drain on the union's funds for out-of-work benefits more exhausting.

With respect to apprenticeship the unions attempt restriction which is socially disadvantageous only when it becomes excessive. The ratio of apprentices to journeymen most commonly enforced is one to five, a proportion sufficient to double the number in the trade every fifteen years—ample to replace the natural waste and to allow for the expected increase in population. But sometimes the ratio desired is one to ten and occasionally as low as one to fifteen is named. Such rules, if universally enforced, would cause the depletion of the trade and the gradual loss to the community of the skill its workmen transmit from generation to generation. Therefore they are anti-social, or immoral, not only through their denial of the right to learn a trade to the unionists' and their fellow-worker's children, but through the injury they inflict on society at large. They are contrary to what I have shown to be the essentially fraternal spirit of unionism.

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Towards Trade Schools the feeling of the Unionist forces, in New York, for instance, has been franklv hostile. Refusing to follow the lead of their officials, men more far-sighted and statesmanlike than the rank and file, they have declined to countenance the schools by accepting invitations to help in managing them. Their hope and desire has been to prevent the formation of new schools, to compel the old schools to close their doors, and to force learners to rely on apprenticeship for mastering their craft. The social result of this attitude depends upon the circumstances. Apprenticeship, as a mode of replenishing trades, seems to be dying out; but the unionists, conservative by instinct and fondly thinking that their tedious apprenticeship gives the value to their skill, are reluctant to recognize the distasteful fact. Their own fundamental principles logically adopted require that they shall eagerly send their delegates to the Boards of Management of Trade Schools, that they may there insist on thorough training and the adjustment of the numbers to the requirements of the trade; and that the unions shall welcome with friendly handshake the workman who by his skill can prove his fitness for union membership.

Since organization requires intelligence, fidelity, and mutual trust, the ablest workers, in the main, organize first. They then secure more favorable conditions of work even than the better intelligence of the individuals would win, and the superiority and security of their position tends to make them neglectful of the wider interests of the manual workers as a whole. So far as this tendency takes effect it limits their social usefulness and they are open to the taunt of being an aristocracy of labor, of making class-divisions instead of bridging them. Some strong societies, such as the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, have refused to federate with their fellows and are practically a superior caste, with high wages, large mutual insurance funds, and some scorn for underlings. But this attitude is exceptional. The vast majority of the unionists, through the Federation of Labor, employ labor missionaries to go into dark industrial regions and carry the good news of unonism to the unconverted. Thirty-five of these mission-

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aries are under salary and give their whole time to the work, while over eight hundred give their leisure time for small payments disproportionate to their efforts. This proselytizing is a sign of a praiseworthy, noble desire to bring all the manual workers under one banner and to bind them together by the strongest bonds of mutual interest. In proportion as it succeeds the spirit of economic solidarity extends. The limits of the operation of this spirit are very wide. It may include brain as well as manual workers. Already the teachers of England have their union; and as the great industry continually enlarges the size of the industrial unit the number of employers decreases, the brain workers are also subordinated to capital, they become an educated proletariat such as exists to-day in Germany, and for self-protection they also must organize. Gradually, then, an increasing proportion of the population and a greater variety of callings are brought into the army of unionism.

The spirit of the movement is splendidly inclusive. It overleaps mountains and rivers; it passes State boundaries; it is blind to distinctions of race; it is as strong a cementing force as nationality. When the Australians telegraphed large sums to aid the London Dockers in their strike and when French and German unions interchanged fraternal greetings, they showed that this spirit can overcome national rancour and can engirdle the earth. It promises to be one of the forces to promote International peace. Already many American unions have branches in both the States and Canada, all under one general management, and the Machinists and the Carpenters have lodges with common funds in England, America and the British colonies. Such trade solidarity, as it increases, will be effective to check the hostility produced by the fight for markets between the commercial classes of different countries. Men in allied unions will not sanction war with their brother workers in other countries any more than New York bricklayers would take up arms against Chicago bricklayers or the tobacco growers of Connecticut would forcibly invade the tobacco States of the South. The delegations now exchanged between the conventions of the National Trade Union Federa-

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tions of America, England, France, Germany and Belgium will probably lead to closer alliance for mutual service, an alliance which may supersede political treaties and may be more effective for International friendship than the leagues of potentates and the resolutions of parliaments.

JOHN MARTIN.

NEW YORK.

THE CONVERSION OF ST. AUGUSTINE.

IT is a singular fact that no humanist writer of recent years has been tempted to give us a psychological and ethical study of St. Augustine. The great bishop of Hippo appeals to all time, not only as a commanding and interesting personality, but as one who lived at a notable crisis in the intellectual, religious, and political development of Europe, and who sprang forward with alacrity to meet every movement of his day. In this there is obvious promise of deep human interest; yet the life of the Afro-Roman bishop has been entirely abandoned to writers who sacrifice both psychology and ethics to the requirements of a narrow theology. There are capable studies of his intellectual side—Reuter's "Augustinische Studien," Grandgeorge's "S. Augustin," and especially Nourisson's "Philosophie de S. Augustin,"—but these partial inquiries only suggest, particularly where they deal with ethical opinions, the larger interest of the complete study. Germany has only given us biographies of the usual perverse ecclesiastical type, the chief of which are the works of Bindemann and Cardinal Von Rauscher. The principal French life is from the pen of a layman, M. Poujoulat; but it is a work that seems eager to redeem the laity of the writer by a surcharge of the conventional psychology of a saint. In England the only work of use in any direction is written by an Irish priest. All these works are constructed on the same perverse *à priori* form. Up to the time of his conversion Augustine must be portrayed in uniformly dark colors. Then, of a sudden and with utter contempt of all the laws of the psychologist, the flood-gates of light and

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grace are opened, and every line must henceforth be written in letters of gold.

Now, this kind of work may seem to lend a sort of empirical confirmation to certain dogmas, but it has spread an entirely false impression of that most notable event in a notable life, the conversion of Saint Augustine. It is true that Augustine himself is primarily responsible for the misfortune. The hagiographers only reproduce the theory of the "Confessions." In this autobiography Augustine is feverishly anxious to envelop the whole of his youth and early manhood in one dark mantle of sin. He cannot even grant his infancy the conventional innocence. The shadow of future crime is painfully and laboriously traced in his boyhood. The notorious connection of his youth is touched in lurid phrases; and his conversion is described with a seductive eloquence. Readers are apt to forget that the book was written nearly fifteen years after his conversion. It is expressly a theological or didactic work, in which the Bishop of Hippo Regius and light of the Western Church holds up to the Christian world, as an awful example of nature without grace, the rhetorician of Thagaste. The ground of his earlier years is now covered in the light of a refulgent ideal, in which even the stealing of a few pears casts an appalling shadow. That is very well for the theologian; but the humanist would rather have the outer life given in conjunction with the inner life that accompanied it, and judged by the ideal which was present at each step. For instance, more than twenty years after his conversion we find a Donatist bishop of character and repute, and a friend of Augustine's, gravely chiding him for his moral deterioration since the days when they were school-fellows together at Carthage—the very lowest depth of Augustine's career in the usual hagiographer! We may hold lightly the censures of Bayle and Gibbon, but here is one of many prominent indications that the autobiographer and those who have taken their inspiration from him have deceived us. A careful study of Augustine's conversion will make the point clearer and disclose what a vast amount of moral interest is hidden behind the mechanical structures of the hagiographers.

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In the first place, then, it is entirely wrong to suppose that the well-known struggle which preceded Augustine's return to the church was a struggle with sin. Readers of the "Confessions" will remember how Augustine had been intellectually prepared for admission to the church. He had some years before discarded the heresy of his youth, Manicheeism, alleging —as impulsive young men allege to-day—scientific difficulties and suspicion of hierarchic disorders. But two broad obstacles lay between him and Christianity; he could not conceive anything spiritual, and could not embrace the crude stories of the Old Testament. Ambrose of Milan removed the latter difficulty by showing, in his sermons, that the Old Testament need not be taken literally. Ambrose was incompetent to remove the philosophic obstacle—it was probably well for Augustine that he had not time to attempt it,—but a lucky introduction to some newly translated Neo-Platonic works helped him over it. It seems probable that it was the "Enneads" of Plotinus that Augustine read at this time; at all events Grandgeorge and Nourisson trace most of his "Platonic" ideas to Plotinus and Porphyry. There he was initiated into the Platonist idea-world, the world of spiritual and immutable yet thrilling realities—truth, virtue, beauty, etc. The last intellectual gulf was crossed and he now turned to St. Paul with entire faith and submission of mind. Then began the profound moral struggle that culminated in the famous garden scene.

In order to understand fully the falseness of the ordinary view of this struggle, it is necessary to appreciate Augustine's character better in the earlier years. This may be done from the "Confessions" themselves, read with that discretion which the circumstances of their appearance recommend. The general determination to paint everything as darkly as possible is apparent, but passages occur which weaken the impression for the thoughtful reader. Thus in describing what we may call his college-life at Carthage he unconsciously presents himself as much superior to his fellows. He describes a group who resemble the "Mohawks" of old London (the *eversores*), and says how he shrank from their company. He tells that he would not join even in the lesser disorders which were general

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—boisterously disturbing the classes, and so on. In fact he makes the curious admission that he had to lie and invent in order not to seem too different from his companions in morals. All this is fully confirmed by the Donatist bishop, Vincent, whom I mentioned. He declares that at Carthage Augustine was considered "a quiet and respectable youth." On one occasion a kind of private haruspex offered to discover what his chances were of winning the crown at the theatre by his oration. "If the crown were made of imperishable gold," he replied, "I would not have a single fly killed to procure it for me." That is not the language of a licentious youth. There is, of course, the notorious fact of his unmarried connection. I cannot here enter into the morals, Christian and Pagan, of the fourth century, but the briefest inquiry will make it clear that even a Christian youth, if unbaptized, would take a mistress in those days without a suggestion of moral compunction. The letters of Jerome, the sermons of Augustine, and the work of Salvianus, fully establish this. An interesting poem of a pious and penitent elderly Christian of the time—the "Eucharisticos" of Paulinus of Pella—presents the prevailing sentiment very clearly, and practically gives it the sanction of age and piety.

> "Carumque memor servare pudorem
> Cedere et ingenuis oblatis sponte caverem,
> Contentus domus ill ecebris famulantibus uti."

Augustine's faithfulness to his companion for fourteen years implies, in that age, a rare moderation of character.

However, the mother of Adeodatus was discharged in 385. Augustine had resolved to marry, but the young lady his mother had chosen—for her dowry, one regrets to find—was only in her tenth year, and the marriage was postponed for two years. This change had been proposed, it must be noted, not for ethical reasons but on social and financial grounds; it is the episode of Augustine's career where a merely human feeling is most indignant with him. It is quite true that Augustine had sought another companion for the intervening period, but he had now embraced the idea of matrimony. It would be preposterous to suppose that the storm which swept

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his soul in the summer of 386 sprang from the idea of waiting a year for his marriage, or that other nuptial arrangements could not have been made if he were of so frail a temper. One can see clearly enough, not only in the facts of his life at that time, but in his express words in the "Confessions," that it was not the abandonment of sin, but the sacrifice for life of all love, even consecrated, that stirred the roots of his soul.

The real explanation of the conversion of Augustine, the profound conflict, carries us beyond the personal question, and into the very heart of early Christian ethics. The hagiographer, who is generally a theologian, has good reason to shrink from too close an inquiry into the episode, for it discloses a most unhappy condition of the best Christian thought of the time. It is frequently advanced that the ideal of entire continence was the most fitting one to set up in so corrupt an age. Writers who affirm this are usually found to have a disproportionate idea of the vice and virtue of the time. Even if we take the two chief censors of the second half of the fourth century, Ammianus and St. Jerome—and one might as well depict modern France exclusively on the witness of Nordau and Zola —we do not find a situation worse than that of England under the Georges, as Mr. S. Dill says in his admirable study of the fifth century. M. Gaston Boissier, another careful student of Roman life, says the period "recalls the age of Trojan and Antonine." Ecclesiastical writers rarely do justice to the fine group of patricians who clustered round the figures of Praetextatus and Symmachus. We may trust that the sentiments attributed to them in the "Saturnalia" of Macrobius, confirmed as they are by the letters of Symmachus, are genuine; and in these we have a fine yet sober ideal of conduct proving as effective as it does in any other age. However that may be, all the Christian leaders of the time insisted on the ideal of continence as the test of a sincere and generous acceptance of Christianity. St. Ambrose wrote in ardent praise of virginity, promising the worldly wise that God would increase the fertility of their matrons in compensation. St. Jerome poured his characteristic scorn on marriage; "it is all very well," he says in one of his letters, "for those who are afraid

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to sleep alone at night." The Greek fathers were no less insistent. All were violently opposed to second marriage, and in various other ways found an element of repulsion, if not sin, in all carnal conjunction.

The Epistles of St. Paul were the natural source of this sentiment, and it was to these Epistles that Augustine turned when Plotinus had conjured away his intellectual difficulties. Augustine saw at once, what the modern divine generally refuses to see, that Paul made carnal abstinence the test of real discipleship. Marriage was a concession to the weak, a little less ungraciously conceded than it was by Jerome. Augustine looked into the Church, he says, and found that "one went this way and one that." But the Pauline theory of a Christian life was unmistakable. The way of the strong and the generous was the way of mortification, especially in the matter of love. Augustine was one of the strong. The earlier worldly ambition, lit up by his study of the "Hortensius," had been converted into an even stronger spiritual ambition. He wanted no concessions, to escape "burning" or the fear of sleeping alone. He felt that Christ was asking him to sacrifice every pleasure and interest that was purely of this world. The desire of wealth he had given up in the philosophic fervour kindled by the "Hortensius," but had recovered in the quasi-Epicurean (for he had very hazy notions of Epicurus, and all the other Greeks) period of his early days at Milan. He now abandoned it once more without difficulty; the curious passage in which he accuses himself even later of a tendency to excess at table, and on which Bayle has enlarged with no small delight, cannot be taken seriously. But he was grievously tormented by the prospect of sacrificing love. Everyone knows the beautiful passage in which, fourteen years afterwards, he tells how the recollections of his joy "plucked his fleshly garments, and asked: 'Dost thou cast us off for ever?'" The beauty and force of the passage are entirely lost by those who would have him refer merely to the dismissal of his unlawful companion of the year. It was the unhappy stress which the Christian ethics of the time laid on the sacrifice of love as a test of fervent discipleship that caused the pro-

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longed struggle. Then came the narrative of Simplicianus, from whom he learned that frail women and unlettered men were daily taking the step from which he shrank as something heroic. After one last and memorable conflict with his old self he leaped the abyss of pain, and was converted.

That is the true story of Augustine's moral development, as it is told in the "Confessions" and in passages of his other works. We have to follow an orderly and an interesting growth, instead of being forced to accept a theory of moral chaos which is supernaturally brought to order by a flash of the spirit. The conversion was not a conversion at all in the ethical meaning of that word—it was not a conversion from sin. It is obvious there would have been no struggle at all if the matrimonial arrangement had not fallen under the ban. Réville has observed that "most of the religions which have given a large place to morality have foundered on the rock of asceticism." Here, at all events, we have an instructive illustration of the effect of the ascetic ideal in early Christianity.

It may be asked whether the struggle, perverse though it may have been from the point of view of a theoretical ethic, was not wholly justified in the power it lent to Augustine in after years. I have neither space nor occasion here to enter in any detail into Augustine's later career, but there is one page of it that is rarely written, and that it may be useful to consider in connection with his conversion. I am thinking of the group of short treatises in which he deals with questions of love and matrimony. It is well known that he held views on these questions which even the modern divine regards as perverse, but few imagine to what lengths his logical faculty compelled him to go. Brucker, premising a half defiant and half apologetic remark to the effect that "a spade should be called a spade," observes (in his "Critical History,") that "the whole moral philosophy of the fathers was rather weak," and that "Augustine does not take his place in the front rank of philosophers." Certainly the views which Augustine advances in these works, and which were more or less shared by Ambrose and Jerome, exhibit the principles of the early Christian ethics in a pitiable light. As to woman herself,

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Augustine soon became almost contemptuous. One of the first and sternest rules of his monastery and seminary—and a very necessary one—was to exclude even his own sister most rigorously. The reaction deepens with his years. After a time we find him writing to a young man, who hesitates to quit the world on account of his mother: "We have to beware of Eve in every woman, no matter who she is." That painfully recalls Jerome's advice to Heliodorus to thrust his mother aside "if she loose her hair and bare the breasts he has sucked" to keep him at home; though Jerome modified his feeling after his sojourn at Rome, and lived for years in constant and tender intercourse with women. In his later sermons and writings, Augustine is frankly contemptuous of woman. When he asks, in his commentary on Genesis, why she was created at all, his fertile imagination can think of nothing but procreation. He does not even show the least disposition to welcome the increasing worship of the mother of Christ. The sermons quoted on her festivals in the Roman breviary, and attributed to him, are undisputed forgeries.

But when we come to examine the treatises on sex-questions of his episcopal years, we find some remarkable opinions. The root-idea of his whole philosophy is, of course, that there is something unhallowed in the very essence of sexual feeling and, especially of sexual intercourse. The most direct and obvious consequence of this was a high estimate of physical integrity, and Augustine wrote a glowing eulogy of it in a small work "On Continence" soon after his conversion (or about 395). Five or six years later he was concerned to hear of the success of the monk Jovinian in attacking the cult of virginity, and he defended and developed the ascetic view in two works, "On holy virginity" and "On conjugal love." It is in the latter work that he advanced his most singular opinions. Matrimony being a divine institution, Augustine has to seek in it the element which consecrates or legitimizes the sexual indulgence it implies. This he finds in procreation; though in one place he timidly adds its utility in removing the stress of temptation. Naturally, there are strange corollaries to so narrow and forbidding a view of wedded love. In the

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first place the accompanying pleasure is unholy, and must not be desired or enjoyed in itself. Then, those who cannot be persuaded to abstain from matrimony altogether, should be exhorted to be continent in matrimony; and all men and women should be warned to abstain on holy festivals. It is always the same unhappy idea of an inherent evil. His next step is somewhat amusing. It occurs to him that his theory now enables him to answer the gibes of Manichees about the extensive families of the patriarchs of the Old Testament. Since procreation was the essential matter, and the human race called for rapid increase in those early days, the conduct of the patriarchs was clearly moral and commendable; "they acted from a sense of duty, not a feeling of lust," he says. On the other hand, continence is more commendable in his own day; for Augustine, though he never explicitly grants it, vaguely shares the general apprehension that the end of the world approaches. There are modern Christian nations which call for increase of population as urgently as the patriarchal age. And Augustine is actually driven to admit a similar conclusion from his principles in another way. If procreation is the essential aim, and a man's wife is proved to be barren, how can you forbid him to have a mistress in addition for the purpose of rearing children? Augustine confesses that he cannot forbid him, if the wife consents; "it was lawful to the patriarchs; whether it is lawful now or no I should not like to say." Such is the peculiar and awful penalty of logically applying the ascetic Christian view of marriage. Nor does Augustine improve his position much when he considers the converse hypothesis of the man proving sterile. He will not allow the wife a paramour, because "it is in the nature of things for there to be only one lord and master." He is only saved from disaster by his contempt of women. He has no idea of her equal worth and dignity. Fortunately, in the end, when he is confronted with a pagan application of his principles—the case of Cato—he throws logic to the winds and says: "In our marriages the sanctity of the sacrament is of greater moment than the fruitfulness of the womb." But of the human

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holiness and beauty of marriage, of the sacrament of love, this light of many ages has no conception.

There are three other works in which he develops the same principles. In the treatise "On the blessedness of widowhood," he strongly urges widows to take a vow of continence, —declares that a breach of this vow by remarrying would be worse than adultery. It is obvious enough what practical conclusions would be drawn from this principle in that age of widows. Five years afterwards he published a work "On adulterous marriages." The marriages he has in mind are chiefly the unions of divorced people, which he sternly denounces. But he incidentally enunciates a theory which is largely reversed in our day. He says that men are more culpable for this infidelity than women. Why? "Because they are men," he bluntly replies, with his customary depreciation of women. Finally, in the treatise "On marriage and concupiscence," he explicitly describes sexual feeling as an unmitigated evil, born of original sin, and quite accidental to marriage.

The last-mentioned work was written during the controversy with Pelagius, but all the others were written before that amiable heresiarch disturbed Augustine's views with his sturdy defence of human nature. The dogma of original sin, gradually developed in the stress of the controversy, came to complete his unfortunate ethical theory. But even before he began to bewail the primeval corruption of human nature his anthropological view was vitiated by the prevailing doctrine of sex-relation. For Augustine and his contemporaries, St. Paul was the starting point of this doctrine, and it is entirely beside my purpose to trace it beyond him. But the conversion of Augustine and his subsequent development illustrate very vividly the prejudicial character of that moral aberration of a great church.

JOSEPH MCCABE.

LONDON..

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"THE PROBLEM OF CONDUCT": A CRITICISM.

WHEN a philosopher boasts that he has riddled with contradictions the scientific, moral and religious experiences of mankind, one is forced to ask whether he has not after all been firing at dummies. The principle of contradiction is doubtless a valiant weapon; but sometimes "the engineer is hoist with his own petard." Before we believe that science is vitiated by error to an unknown degree, that morality is at root hypocrisy, and that religion "inevitably contains and rests upon an element of 'make-believe,' " we must be assured that the metaphysician is dealing with human experience and not with figments of his own elaboration.

In criticizing Mr. Taylor's book* I propose to ask two questions. I shall inquire how far on the one hand his theory gives an adequate account of experience, and on the other how far it is consistent with itself. If at any time I appear dogmatic I ask indulgence. I have endeavored to attain clearness at all costs. Sitting on the hedge suggests discomfort; and although a sprinkling of saving clauses appears more modest and is perhaps more judicious, yet it tends to obscure the question at issue. And this would be most undesirable. We cannot afford to treat the problem of conduct like the Scottish minister who exhorted his brethren to look certain difficulties in the face and pass on: this question has got to be faced and answered.

I propose first of all to give a short account of Mr. Taylor's main line of argument. This is the more desirable inasmuch as his essay contains much matter, interesting perhaps and suggestive, but liable, like pianos and kitchen-ranges in a mobile column, to distract attention and encumber movement.

After some general remarks on the nature of metaphysical truth and scientific explanation, Mr. Taylor proceeds to attack the school of moral philosophy associated with the name of T. H. Green. His aim is to expose the fundamental fallacy in

*"The Problem of Conduct: A Study in the Phenomenology of Ethics." By A. E. Taylor.

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every system of ethics, which regards it as a teleological science in distinction from an empirical investigation. He assails Green's contention that a theory of morals should be preceded by a metaphysical analysis of the nature of the self, maintaining that the psychologist is competent to deal with all the facts of morality. Finally he holds that the notion of an eternal self-conscious principle is absurd, and could in no case be of any value for the solution of the problem of conduct.

The ground being so far cleared, the roots of Ethics are discovered in the moral sentiments of mankind. Theories about motives and obligation, conscience and freedom are rank with popular confusions and fallacious metaphysics. In the words of Paul Somerset "Right and Wrong are but figments and the shadow of a word; but for all that, there are certain things that I cannot do and there are certain others that I will not stand." It is in the feelings or emotions of approval or disapproval, with which men review past or anticipate future actions, that the moralist must find the foundations of his science. Beginning here the student of ethics will find his groundwork almost completed. For the sentiments awakened by different kinds of action are already embodied in the judgments of the market-place, the pulpit, the club and the statute-book. With these as his base the moralist may proceed to give an historical account of the development of ethical feelings and ideas; or else attempt to discover the main principle or principles presupposed in the fluid masses of popular opinion, and by their help to construct a consistent moral ideal. After a short survey of the evolution of the conceptions of obligation and responsibility, conscience and moral personality, Mr. Taylor attacks the main problem of his essay.

At the outset he discovers an irreconcilable dualism permeating moral practice and moral theory alike. For men approve of two principles of conduct that are both ultimate and incompatible with one another,—self-assertion and social service. Even in the biological world this radical divergence may be traced. The evolution of the species demands at once the instincts of self-preservation and self-sacrifice. There, as

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in the moral world, the two principles no doubt do not conflict as a rule; but there are cases where self-devotion is required and no compensation allowed.

Many have attempted to bring one of these principles under the other; but this appears impossible. Altruism will not cover all the facts. For as Shakespeare says, "Self-love is not so vile a sin as self-neglecting." A life devoted to social service appears self-contradictory; and is not wholly approved by the sentiments of mankind. Neglect of æsthetic and intellectual self-culture, abnegation of the joys meted to man by a parsimonious nature, a life of drudgery for the moral or spiritual benefit of others, does not always excite the admiration which is due to complete virtue; and on what ground of reason can we claim that we ought to secure for others what we do not think worth securing for ourselves? Nor can egoism assume the sole title to the throne. Consistent pursuit of personal satisfaction, sincere cultivation of science or art, thorough devotion to full and harmonious self-development, must involve a man in actions towards others which would call forth the indignation of society, if not the severity of the law.

Neither egoism nor altruism meet with the full approval of mankind; and yet there is no recognized principle upon which decisions can be based when these conflict. A compromise is necessary: for no man can succeed in serving with equal devotion two masters, himself and his fellows. We are only prevented by the arbitrary dictates of established usage from "oscillating perpetually between the two equally ultimate and quite irreconcilable poles" of self-assertion and self-surrender. This radical flaw in morality becomes clearer, if we ask the question, whether either type of moral ideal can be pursued without some departure from that singleness of purpose which is inherent in the nature of every true ideal. The answer may be best summed up in the words of the author: "If your object is self-culture, you have to choose between self-mutilation in one direction for the sake of development in another, and mere superficial dilettanteism, and neither really answers to your original ideal. If your object is social amelioration you can only procure it at the expense of inflicting the very wounds,

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which you regard it as your mission to heal" (p. 278). For "herein lies the truly laughable paradox of benevolence; benevolence has its spring in our pity for the unfit and incapacitated, yet the moment you organize it on such lines as to prevent it becoming a social pest, it stands revealed as a potent agent in the work of their extermination" (p. 272). In short there is "a hidden root of insincerity and hypocrisy beneath all morality" (p. 243).

This theory is reinforced by a review of moral progress. On metaphysical grounds Mr. Taylor holds that all progress is illusory. However far the human race may appear to go, the advance cannot be real from the point of view of metaphysics; *ex nihilo nihil fit;* every change has its sufficient cause in the totality of its conditions; and therefore, if we could "see life steadily and see it whole," we should find that "the complete reality after the change is identical with the complete reality before it" (p. 284). Progress in one quarter only implies retrogression in another; human endeavor with its victories and its failures means no more than that the Absolute is shuffling the cards.

These abstract considerations are supported by some reflections upon the price that has to be paid for civilization, and the impossibility of finding any real satisfaction in the moral life. Literary, artistic and scientific culture may be enjoyed by a few; but it must be bought at the price of an industrial organization, which condemns multitudes to joyless toil and many to ever increasing penury and distress. Along with the cruelty and turbulence of our forefathers civilization threatens to rob us of their courage, their self-reliance, their promptitude in action. Yet "the Koran or the sword" is still our war cry. We are really exterminating the peoples whom we are pleased to think we are civilizing, in order to prepare the way for the creation of a race that is to share our ideals. "Sometimes the extermination is effected by Maxim guns, sometimes by the maxims of the missionary and the school-master" (p. 366). After all we believe that might is right.

Finally the goal of ethics is beset with an insoluble antinomy. If we are not doomed to irremediable failure, the end

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must be something that can be won and enjoyed within the limits of the individual's present life. But a moral end must in its very nature be incapable of attainment. An end worth striving for must be "infinite and therefore infinitely remote" (p. 401). And thus we seem to be damned from our cradles to internal contradiction. The moral life is a kingdom divided against itself.

If then the practical life is to be saved at all it must be by falling back upon religion. In Mr. Taylor's opinion the essence of religious experience consists in a union of feelings of deep humility and extreme exaltation, of humility, as we contemplate the infinite distance that separates us from the ideal, of exaltation, when we reflect that we are "as functions of the perfect universe already perfect." Before God the good and the bad are alike guilty. The universe demands for its perfection vessels of dishonor as well as vessels of honor. God is "a consuming fire" and "a night in which all cows are black." But it is our misfortune that we cannot enjoy these elevating conceptions without hypocrisy. We must strive to be good; for, though the wicked man may be in the eyes of religion already perfect, he does not and cannot, alas! know himself to be so. But goodness, as we have seen, is unattainable; and effort is only an illusion. Hence "all religion inevitably contains and rests upon an element of 'make-believe'" (p. 489). Thus it appears that the practical life is throughout "based upon more or less subtly disguised compromise" (p. 488), and is therefore self-contradictory and absurd; and it only remains for the metaphysician to transcend both morality and religion, and in the rare atmosphere of ultimate truth to recognize the "final identity of 'God' and 'Dévil'" (p. 492).

Such is a brief outline of Mr. Taylor's argument, presented largely in his own words, and, when that is not the case, I hope with scrupulous fidelity to his thought. And I think it may be at once said that no one will be allured into acceptance of his conclusions by their attractiveness. A theory which makes nonsense of life could only claim our assent by demonstrating that its presuppositions are inevitable and its reasoning sound. Some may find it possible to live and work even though they fear that

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there is and must ever be an internecine war between practice and speculation. But not even "the vulgar" share with the metaphysician the happy facility of saying yes and no at the same moment, of endeavoring to write a book on the problem of conduct to prove that problem and endeavor alike are illusory, of rejecting human science as false "to an unknown degree of error," in favor of a "knowledge about the ultimate constitution of things," which is after all merely "formal." Before we declare that reason is bankrupt, we must make ourselves quite sure that the accounts are stated correctly.

And it is the bankruptcy of reason that Mr. Taylor proclaims. He speaks no doubt as though the metaphysician has access to a sphere of truth closed to the practical and religious man; but his claim is mere words. His contention that there is a radical flaw in the practical life is suicidal. For the distinction between practical and speculative aspects is, as he acknowledges, merely logical (p. 470). Our thoughts are always directed to the attainment of an ideal goal; our actions are our actions only because they are impregnated with thought. But instead of examining rigorously this fundamental interconnection of thinking and striving, Mr. Taylor would summarily dispose of conation in a few paragraphs in the middle of his essay; so that, despite his boast that the panoply of psychology renders his argument invulnerable, he appears to have forgotten his breastplate.

To consider this question in detail—Mr. Taylor holds that all the phenomena of mental activity or effort, described by the term "conation," are analyzable into elements of cognition and feeling. He says, "If 'conation' is something psychical, it will be identical with a peculiar combination of kinæsthetic sensations with varying emotional tension; if it is something more than this, it is apparently identical with muscular contraction, and is thus purely physiological" (p. 172). For an analysis of successful conation reveals the following facts only. The pleasantly or painfully toned anticipation of a certain experience happens to be followed by a series of complex sensations of sight, pressure, contact and the like, the last term issuing in the expected experience. "Throughout the series the

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emotional tension arising from the conflict between the feelings awakened by the anticipation and those awakened by its continuance in the merely 'ideal' form is constantly changing" (p. 171), until at last it becomes zero as the anticipated pleasure is actually enjoyed.

In a theory which knows only of cognition and feeling the phrase "emotional tension" seems out of place, and therefore challenges our scrutiny. Emotional tension arises, we are told, "from the contrast between the pleasure of the anticipation and the unpleasantness of its non-realization" (p. 173). Now as Mr. Taylor reminds us elsewhere a pleasure or pain that is not felt is a psychological monstrosity (p. 114). Hence he must mean that two ideas are present to consciousness at once, the one attended by pleasure, the other by pain; and that these two quarrelsome retainers fall to fighting with each other, and thus produce the necessary emotional tension. This of course is outrageous "symbolism," and contradicted by what Mr. Taylor says in another place. "It should never be forgotten," he says, "that in speaking of the pleasurable or painful character of a particular sensation or idea [in distinction from the whole content of consciousness] we are indulging in exactly the same abstracting process as when we describe an explosion as due to the lighting of the fuse" (p. 121). But if we remember this, and insist that emotional tone never belongs to a single sensation or idea, but to the whole content of consciousness only, what are we to make of the "emotional tension" which is so prominent a feature in conative processes? We cannot say that the whole content of consciousness is at one and the same time both pleasantly and painfully toned; but, as this is impossible, where are we to find the contrast or conflict of pleasure and pain?

This reasoning is no doubt of the nature of an *argumentum ad hominem;* but wherever an attempt is made to get rid of conation it will be found to return in disguise. If then emotional tension is cut out of Mr. Taylor's account, nothing is left save a series of kinæsthetic sensations. But these alone afford no ground for the distinction of reflex from volitional actions. I take snuff in the pleasant expectation of sneezing. The action

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is followed in due course by the desired effect over which I have no control. I rise to propose a toast anticipating with pleasure the resumption of my seat; but the intervening five minutes are filled with feelings of intense effort. In each case I have expectations succeeded by various sensations; but in the latter the sense of endeavor is great, in the former it is, if it can be said to exist at all, a negligible quantity.

And moreover, how can a theory which identifies conation with kinæsthetic sensations deal with the case of a man who is trying to understand a book or work out an idea, as we say, in his head? Nowhere is the sense of effort stronger; but where are the sensations of sight, pressure, contact and the like? And if Mr. Taylor, following certain eminent authorities, should assert that here the contraction of the eyebrows, the setting of the teeth, and the like, give the requisite sensations we would ask in return, how it is possible to experience these sensations and yet not try to understand anything at all, and *vice versa.*

But in truth those who extrude conation from psychology remind one of the proverb of not seeing the wood for the trees. In the greater part of our waking life we are pursuing ends, trying to realize ideas, be they far-reaching or trifling, with varying effort and success. As Mr. Taylor insists, all truly human conduct is "telic" or purposive (p. 188), determined by the more or less definite anticipation of an end or result. But does not this imply an active principle "which constitutes selfhood, without which there would be no self and strictly speaking no humanity at all?" Discard activity, attention, endeavor, and you withdraw the rivets without which life would never be other than a chaotic manifold of sensations and feelings. The psychologist must choose one of two courses; either he must recognize activity—the fact that we more or less systematically direct the focus of consciousness, so to speak, to this or that part of the total field,—or else he must admit that ideas somehow hold together "like the bits of stick and sand with which the young caddis covers its nakedness." If he dislikes the latter alternative, he must acknowledge conation. Perhaps the term "conation" is not quite appropriate for the element I wish

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to indicate. It suggests effort, which is a special form of activity, and presupposes a felt obstacle that must be overcome. In the same way the popular use of the term "attention" implies a conscious attempt to fix an idea or bring some part of the content of consciousness more fully into view. But even where there is no sense of effort, where introspection cannot discover anything which may be confused with kinæsthetic sensations, emotional tension and what not, we still seem justified in insisting upon the activity of the mind. In reverie we keep our ideas in the channel that pleases us, we select this aspect and reject that, although we have no such experience of strain as we suffer when we determine to listen to a very dull sermon. If it is true that Mozart composed and Scott wrote without effort, it is absurd to think of them merely as passive observers of their ideas. Even observation means activity.

But Mr. Taylor will have nothing to do with the concept of mental activity. Since he deals with human conduct upon the platform of popular opinion and natural science, he demands that ethics shall use only the categories of physics and chemistry, although he is quite ready upon occasion to employ the higher conceptions of teleology. Such confusion seems inevitable if one determines to base morals upon the uncriticized sentiments of mankind, without any preliminary investigation, whether called metaphysical or not, into the point of view from which ethical conduct ought to be regarded. Mr. Taylor regards the ideas of activity and free cause as worthless. For, he tells us, science requires a concept of causal relation which can be applied indiscriminately to the changes in the organic and the inorganic world. The organic world apparently includes both the physiological and psychological aspects of life. Otherwise why should ethics not employ such a concept as that of a free cause? But it is difficult to gratify the desire for a conception of causality that shall be equally applicable to physical and psychical changes. For however closely cerebral and mental processes are intertwined, it must be admitted that there is no such continuity between them as is found in physical and chemical changes. There is no common element. In the former the amount of energy—actual or po-

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tential—remains constant; in the latter the atomic weights remain the same. But where is the identical element in the idea of lighting my pipe and the nervous and muscular movements necessary to its realization? A natural science may believe that it has found a true cause when it has discovered the definite conditions under which a given change will regularly occur, and without which it will not take place. Natural philosophy has no doubt made great advances because it has concentrated its attention upon the discovery of "unconditional antecedents," without troubling about the perhaps insoluble question, how physical changes do occur. But until physicists have made a real conquest over psychical life, instead of blustering about it in inappropriate metaphors drawn from physics, electricity or chemistry, they have no right to command psychologists, as Mr. Taylor does, to substitute for "force" some such phrase as "rate of change of momentum" (p. 20), or denote by energy only what "can be calculated in terms of mass and velocity." Those who hold that we have no direct experience of activity should attempt to explain how it is that children and savages inform all objects with it, and only learn by long experience that things are not persons. Activity, force, energy are so far from being the merely symbolic expressions of "spiritualist philosophers" and scientific obscurantists that they are among the most elementary facts of the experience of a child.

Having rejected activity, Mr. Taylor naturally relapses from time to time into psychological atomism. On the one hand, it is true, he recognizes Hume's failure to destroy personal identity, and holds that "the self," to which the contents of all my adult experiences, in so far as they are attended to at all, are related as "its" experiences, cannot possibly be identified with any one in the series of experiences, nor yet with the mere succession considered simply as a succession of atomic psychical events" (p. 71). But on the other hand, when discussing the nature of the self, he says, "in the empirically ascertained fact that the organic sensations and the accompanying feeling-tone are *relatively* stable within long periods of life, we have *all that is necessary* for the growth of a distinction between

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the permanent self and its incessantly changing sensations and ideas" (p. 73). I freely admit that relatively stable organic sensations and generally speaking a relatively stable environment are essential to personal identity, so far as we know it. In wonderland Alice might well exclaim "Who in the world am I?" But are relatively permanent organic sensations all that is necessary? To what are they relatively permanent? To the self? But the self is their product. Surely here the admitted absurdity is committed of identifying the self with certain of its experiences. The self is reduced to an aggregate of sensations which have been strong enough to force themselves into the forefront of consciousness. For as Mr. Taylor says, "Attending to a presentation seems to be no more than another name for the fact that that presentation is successful in detaching itself from the larger mass of undifferentiated consciousness" (p. 11). A fictitious self receives within its fictitious embrace those presentations which jostle most vigorously against it. This is indeed psychological atomism, which, however serviceable, is admitted to be "inadequate to the point of absurdity" (p. 85).

We may now take leave of Mr. Taylor's psychology and turn to his metaphysics. He holds that it is a "radically mischievous" error to regard progress as real. On the contrary "All progress is an illusion—a phenomenon which disappears the moment you cease to concentrate your attention on some one subordinate part of the whole world of facts to the neglect of all the rest" (p. 281). What from our point of view is sheer loss and retrogression would, if our outlook upon the world were from a different quarter, appear as pure gain and progress. "In the universe as a whole there is neither gain nor loss but simply compensation" (p. 283).

I should like in passing to protest against this notion of compensation. It may be applicable to changes in a material system, and to whatever can be adequately translated into terms of money, but to say that the extinction of a human soul can be balanced in the account of the universe seems to me nonsense. If a life rich in experience and character is snuffed out, that is sheer loss; a loss in no sense made good by the transference

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of the germ of life to some distant constellation whether on the meteoric fragments of an exploded planet or otherwise (*cf.* p. 283).

But ultimately compensation, according to Mr. Taylor's argument, is unintelligible. For it means change and change even within the universe is mere appearance. There may be a redistribution of energy within a partial system, while the total energy of the system and its relation to other systems remains the same (*cf.* p. 314). For from the wider point of view the partial system is seen to maintain its identity through its changes. But how is it possible "to find a point of view from which a whole, standing in no relations to anything outside itself, can be seen to be the same whole though it appears now as A now as B" (p. 314)? The problem is insoluble. Either the identity or the changes must be sacrificed. Either we must say "there is not really a *whole* at all, but only disconnected and utterly disparate successive states, which are states of nothing" (p. 314); or we must conclude that "change and becoming" would vanish altogether, if once we could take in the whole contents of reality in a single comprehensive experience (p.315).

Mr. Taylor accepts the latter alternative and draws the fitting corollary that the universe is already perfect; that endeavor is a delusion; right and wrong are but figments and the shadow of a word; ignorance no less than knowledge, misery no less than happiness, crime, lust, murder no less than courage, purity, justice are necessary to the unspeakable blessedness and perfection of the Absolute.

Perhaps only "the vulgar" would accept this inference as a sufficient refutation of a metaphysical theory. I must therefore endeavor to examine it on its own ground, although it would be presumptious to hope to do more than offer a few well-worn suggestions upon so important and well recognized a crux as change. First then we may note that however absurd it may seem to speak of identity in difference, to say that one and the same thing passes through successive phases, it is the one kind of experience that is always with us. We change; our environment changes; yet we cannot say with Heracleitus πάντα ῥεῖ

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θὐδὲν μένει. We abide. Otherwise how could we possibly experience any series of events?

Further it seems absurd to attempt to extract the identity or the differences from the whole and isolate either of them. For a bare identity would be nothing. And differences that were not differences of something, that, however disparate in themselves, were not at least united by their presence to one consciousness, would not be differences at all. Yet certain critics offer us a dilemma based upon the assumption that reason should be able to segregate these mutually dependent elements. They challenge us either to separate the one self from its many appearances, as though they were chemical elements, and produce them bottled, sealed and labelled; or else to admit that personal identity is a fiction practically convenient perhaps but intellectually ridiculous.

In regard to progress, Mr. Taylor holds that either the identity of the whole or its changes must be sacrificed; and whichever operation is chosen, progress is doomed. I cannot see that we are bound to grasp at either horn of the dilemma. It is as true, or false, to say that identity is an accidental aspect of change, as that change is an accidental aspect of identity. Both are necessary. No doubt science demands that the complete reality after the change shall be identical with the complete reality before it. But science also demands a process. Causal explanation would be meaningless if antecedent and consequent were telescoped into one timeless existence. Evolution in the same way compels us to adopt both points of view. The embryo is in one sense the full grown animal; in another sense it is not. Or what would be the meaning of the growth?

But perhaps it will be said; "Human experience does indeed presuppose identity in difference, the permanent in change; but that fact does not make it a whit more rational; on the contrary it demonstrates its unintelligibility." Now I do not contend that human thought has found adequate expression for the fullness of its experience. We are compelled to shift our ground continually in order to view this or that aspect; so far are we from being able to see life steadily and see it whole. But I do hold that it is unphilosophical, first to call one aspect

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reality, and another mere appearance; and secondly to talk of human experience as vitiated to the core by self-contradictory principles in contrast to the pure experience of the Absolute. Such a philosophy is the counterpart of that mysticism which is so absorbed in the beauty and holiness of the unseen and eternal as to regard this world as altogether hideous and vile. For, if human experience is so radically afflicted with discord, hypocrisy and vanity, as Mr. Taylor would lead us to suppose, what meaning is conveyed by the phrase "pure experience of the Absolute?" To say that it is harmonious and comprehensive conveys to me at least nothing. To say that it is eternally the same suggests to me only boredom. In a word if we may not assume that the constitution of the human mind is on the whole truthful and trustworthy, we may as well give up philosophy as but an idle amusement not worth the trouble. If those conceptions that make experience possible are vicious through and through, it is nonsense for men to claim that they possess a science of metaphysics which can throw light upon the ultimate constitution of things.

So far I have endeavored to cut the ground away from Mr. Taylor's feet by indicating what appear to me as radical defects in his psychological and metaphysical presuppositions. I shall now attempt to exhibit the fallacy in his argument that morality is vitiated by an irreconcilable dualism. He contends that there are two ultimate moral principles, egoism and altruism, neither of which alone comprehends all the facts, while no higher category can be found to adjust their rival claims. The one principle says "Enrich yourself at all costs; find out and satisfy your inclinations; discover your powers and cultivate them resolutely though the heavens threaten ruin." The other replies "Spend yourself in the service of others; do what you most dislike; deny all if only you may make others happier." "Build for thy soul a lordly pleasure house" sings the one; and the other answers harshly "Live laborious days." Such are the twin principles of morality, implicit obedience to either of which would render life intolerable if not impossible. Compromise is therefore necessary; and compromise is only a fair name for hypocrisy. Few will deny that if egoism and altru-

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ism, as just presented, are ultimate ethical principles, then morality is distracted by an irresoluble contradiction. Altruism is absurd; for it bids us trample on that pearl of great price which we are morally bound to save for others. Egoism is absurd; for it bids us fill with a sieve a broken pitcher. And no sane man could hope to effect a compromise. But *are* egoism and altruism ultimate moral principles?

Had Mr. Taylor confined his illustrations and arguments to proving this, his demonstration of the bankruptcy of morality would hardly have appeared plausible. But he has confused the self-assertion of Thrasymachus or Callicles with the Hegelian idea of self-realization, and the self-sacrifice or altruism of popular text-books with the Platonic conception of social justice. A careful reader of "The Problem of Conduct" will I think find this accusation fair. Apart from such phrases as "The Hegelian egoists of the school of Green" (p. 224), self-realization is constantly used as equivalent to self-culture, self-assertion and egoism, and justice is made a variant for social service, self-sacrifice and altruism. "The highest and most perfect expression of the principle of moral altruism" says Mr. Taylor, "seems to be found in that law of justice," according to which the duties of each individual are determined by the common good of all (p. 202). But how can this principle be fairly identified with altruism, unless altruism is regarded as a principle, which attempts to decide as to the relative claims of self and others, and does not arbitrarily make over everything to the latter? But if this view is accepted, Mr. Taylor's refutation of altruism falls to the ground.

But perhaps the Platonic ideal of justice is as absurd as altruism in the stricter sense of the word. This is Mr. Taylor's view. For, as he says, the demands of the common good "may prevent a man from doing full justice to his own powers and capabilities of intellectual or physical development" (p. 204); he may be compelled "to mutilate himself" for the sake of his family or his country; the state may hinder him from purchasing the satisfaction of his tastes and passions with the sweat and blood of his fellow-men. Doubtless this is a serious difficulty, if egoism is to be accepted as an ultimate moral principle. But why

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should one make this assumption? Why should one accept egoism as the ultimate principle of morality? Who is the egoist? Is he the man, whose archetype is the dog in the manger; one who snarls and grumbles over what is worthless; who cultivates himself, yet grows not; a dilettante in art and literature, a man of the world? Shuddering at the thought of arrested development and self-mutilation, he sneers at the hypocrisy of the vulgar in catchwords borrowed from a philosophy he has never taken the pains to understand. Can this man be one of our moral ideals? We appeal to Mr. Taylor's jury, the moral sentiments. The case goes against him by default. This egoist dare not challenge the popular verdict.

But perhaps this species is too tame. The true egoist is one who has many and great lusts and is determined to satisfy them. He desecrates love and beauty, then tosses them aside; his meat and drink are robbery, rape and murder. Have we found our ideal? The jury need hardly be asked to consider their verdict.

But, I shall be told, these sketches are unfair. Mr. Taylor does not mean by egoist either of these monsters. It may be so; for he does not make his position clear. Many of his illustrations point to one or other of these types; and I confess I cannot see any other issue, if the cleavage between the self and others is logically maintained. If a man considers every act with his eye concentrated upon his own private satisfaction, regardless of the claims of others, his family, his neighbors and his country; if he rejects all ideals the realization of which will transcend his own finite experience, then his life will approximate to one or other of the extremes that I have indicated, the direction being determined partly by the vehemence of his passions, partly by the opportunities of his environment.

But Mr. Taylor is too adroit to leave egoism in this sorry plight; he summons the theory of self-realization to aid. The strenuous pursuit of an ideal of art or knowledge is introduced as an aspect of egoism. But how can the chasm between the self and others now be kept open? If a man is sincere in the desire that a certain ideal should be realized, is it essential that he should privately enjoy the satisfaction of its realization?

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Will he not lay down even his life for it? Must he not in any case suppress many sides of his nature, leave idle many capacities, "mutilate" himself, if he would seek the pearl of great price? As Mr. Taylor has shown, his type of egoism, the scholar, is in many respects the type of self-sacrifice. He sacrifices money, position, health; deserts many an enchanting isle if only he may get a glimpse of the truth; and how often when evening comes he is found but as a little child gathering shells upon the sea-shore.

Thus the fundamental contradiction of morality seems to vanish. Altruism is absorbed in social justice; egoism is taken up into self-realization. And these do not conflict. For Plato's theory of social justice is only the theory of self- realization, presented in a form such as was suitable when the conception of the city-state seemed to represent the richest, most harmonious and comprehensive type of society possible. In the realization of the common good each individual attains his highest development and fullest satisfaction.

But, I shall be told, even if it is inaccurate to describe morality as a thinly disguised hypocrisy, yet satisfaction can never be expected from it, since the moral ideal must be "infinite and therefore infinitely remote" (p. 401). However we strive, we are not a jot nearer our goal at the last than at the first; whatever we do, we "fall equally short of the 'heart's desire' " (p. 395). But is an ideal that is "infinite therefore infinitely remote?" Is there not here an equivocation in the use of "infinite?" We say the moral ideal must be infinite, meaning that it must be complete, perfectly satisfying, conditioned by nothing beyond. But when we speak of space as infinite, we mean that it can not limit itself. The phrase "infinite distance" is really unintelligible, since it implies an extensive quantity at once definite and indefinite. One might as well talk of invisible colors or inaudible sounds. It does not therefore seem to follow that an infinite ideal must be infinitely remote. And an appeal to experience surely shows that Mr. Taylor's assertion is unfounded. Complete satisfaction in any sphere of human life is doubtless out of the question. Conditioned as we are by a physical organism which grows and decays in the world

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of time and space we cannot hope to exhaust the fullness of the world. But there is a difference between complete satisfaction and no satisfaction at all. If the ideal is never actualized here, yet it need not altogether elude us. So long as he has strength, the plain man is content to go on working as well as he can. Something is accomplished; and he is not unhappy. Why be like an unwholesome schoolboy who is always counting the number of hours until the holidays, and never enjoys them when they come? But time forbids me to pursue these reflections any further. I trust that my arguments have not been unfair. But a book which makes nonsense of life must expect unveiled hostility. We do not want a philosophy "which finds bad reasons for being what we cannot help being" (p. 201), and then spurns human experience, permitting, if anything, what seem the deepest and truest views of life to be retained merely on scientific sufferance. We want an idealism which, having reached some peak of speculation, can tell us the true relations of what we from the valleys see fitfully amid the storm and the mist. But for the true philosopher, as for the poet and the artist, we must await the favor of heaven. In the meantime, however, there is employment for the humble spade-worker. He may prepare the ground for the new seed, by trenching diligently and trying to subvert the luxuriant aftermath of the last philosophical harvest.

ALFRED J. JENKINSON.

HERTFORD COLLEGE, OXFORD.

SCHOLARS OF THE CLOISTER: A DEFENCE.

IT is one of the commonplaces of history that spiritual or ecclesiastical Rome did not fall with material, political Rome. The Roman Church was a product at once of Latin and of Christian influences, being in its splendid organization a special tribute to the Roman Law and in its peculiar power a witness to the vitality which the spirit of Christianity gave to the Law, and in consequence it was able to withstand the barbarian

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hordes that brought destruction to Rome's temporal power and conquering one leader with his numberless following after another to turn defeat into victory. An old story, that has at least the truth of legend, was thus once more enacted; the floods came, but the church rode safely upon the devastating waters and saved to the world the life, the thought and the achievement of the past. Monarchs and nations arose and politically they had or claimed to have independent sovereignty, but spiritually they were avowed subjects of the Pope, the members of one empire. In order the better to understand this do but reflect how even in very modern times Christianity is constantly giving evidence of its great vitality. In its Protestant as well as in its Catholic form it still retains an imperial sway. Now also, as then, men abuse and try to subvert its imperialism, hiding their own selfish ends under its spiritual truths, but in the first place men are never quite as bad—nor yet for that matter quite as good—as they seem, and in the second place the true empire simply grows in power, while the false empires, as if pagan in spite of their modern dress, rise only to fall again, suffering defeat after defeat.

Towards the close of the eighth century Charlemagne rose in power and according to all the historians he stands out as the supreme representative of this spirit, which was peculiarly mediæval, of subjection of the secular to the ecclesiastical, of the natural to the supernatural. He was "at the same time feudal lord and dearest son of the Catholic Church." All of his great social and political successes he turned to the advantage of the church, and by no means the least important example of his devotion was his interest in the Cloister Schools, which he may even be said to have established. There had been schools before, and at his time there were many, some pagan and some Christian, but his Cloister Schools, besides being under Christian control, developed rapidly into places where men came to be thinkers as well as reciters and copyists, philosophers as well as priests. The philosophy, moreover, which found expression among them is generally known as Scholasticism, while the philosophers themselves were the Schoolmen.

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Scholasticism, whose special doctrines and controversies may be set aside for the moment, established itself, as well it might in view of its origin, upon the principle: *Credo ut intelligam*; and many would argue that such subordination of reason to the church would result in almost anything but philosophy. I must, then, say at once with emphasis that Scholasticism was philosophy; in disguise perhaps, but still philosophy. The fact is that philosophy always begins in just such disguise. It always seeks to justify what men are believing. Contrary to popular prejudice it is always the friend of faith, seeking not the overthrow of creeds and traditions, but only fulfilment of them by discovery of their inner truth, by liberation of their spirit from the confining letter. Thus Scholasticism was philosophy serving Christianity by liberation of its spirit.

Of course this is hardly the common view of Scholasticism, which it has been the fashion to abuse roundly. At least until more recent times anything like a devotion of reason to faith has been very offensive to our age of "pure" science. Scholastic has even been a word of sharp reproach, which—for example—reviewers have among the more convenient epithets of their professional, mayhap "scholastic" repertory. But I shall certainly be understood when I say that the conceit of the present is never a safe basis of judgment of the past. The formal phrases, the mere intellectual gymnastics, the enslaved reason of the Scholars of the Cloister are to my mind much more the creations of an overbearing imagination of to-day than the findings of true history. Only approach Scholasticism with an open mind, which means—among other things—with some sense of the conditions of its time, and one is sure to find in it human life and passion, expression of the freedom of the human spirit.

Above I did allow myself for the moment to take the more conventional view and speak of the spirit of subjection as the characteristic spirit of mediævalism and I was even so bold as to refer to so great a genius as Charlemagne as the supreme representative of this spirit, but I was telling only half of the truth. Suppose in these times—and of course this is more than

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a mere supposition—schools should be founded and should even be held strictly to the service of some cult, political or religious; then not only would their influence be to make a blind faith see but also in the very fact of their establishment there would be conclusive evidence that faith had already lost some of its blindness, that the prevailing ritual and creeds and institutions of life had already become, at least in some degree, symbolic. Let us know, say those who found and those who attend schools, perhaps Cloister Schools, perhaps modern universities or even sectarian colleges, what these outward signs really mean.

And are we to forget that Charlemagne himself, so true to the spirit of mediævalism and first patron of Scholasticism, by common consent was a man who added to his powers as a political leader and to his services to the church a love of learning for its own sake? "The eagerness," says one writer,* "with which this extraordinary man applied himself to acquire learning for himself and to extend it throughout his dominion is truly admirable, when we remember the enormous labors in which he was engaged." Or, again, are we to forget, as if children ashamed of their old-fashioned parents, that our modern Christianity grew up as a fulfilment of the mediæval Christianity, that our modern science, *even* our modern science, grew up as a fulfilment of that "dark, church-ridden, phrase-bound" thinking of the Scholastics?

But take the worst view possible, if you must, and suppose in those mediæval times no freedom of life, no freedom of thought. Suppose the Cloister Schools were only the nurseries of priests, where the scriptures and other manuscripts were copied, illuminated, committed to memory, where arguments were contrived in slavish support of creeds, where men hurled their Latin phrases back and forth in mere chivalrous rivalry for the favor of the church. Would all this have borne no fruit? The penitent was going to the confessional once, twice, a thousand times, and in the end found, what perhaps he had never really lost, his own conscience. The alchemist and the astrologer were busied with their mystic arts, and in the end

*A. T. Drane, "Christian Schools and Scholars," ch. 5.

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came to a sense of law in nature. Tillers of the soil, by their very submission to nature, were becoming mechanics, skilful and independent. The subjects of kings were themselves learning the art of government and so making ready for democracy. People everywhere were living with reference to the hereafter, only in time to become convinced that the future life, the other world, was all but come, and then, as if in answer to their beliefs and prophecies, that after all it was only a fuller and deeper expression of the life here and now, a larger and broader relation to the present world. And, with all these changes, can we suppose that the Scholars of the Cloister, reverent and devoted as they were in their subjection to the church, never turned from copying to thinking, from proving only what they believed, to believing only what they proved? Why, service, be it never so implicit, always sets men free; and so surely does the time come—as it came to the church—when the master must choose between subjection to his own slaves and sympathy and coöperation with them, that we have to doubt if they ever were really enslaved. Might, I know, often seems to be all that makes right, but then also weakness needs leadership, and leadership, even the severe leadership of might, strengthens and liberates. The simple principle that action has its equivalent reaction is not less true of might in the relations of men than of force in the relations of things physical.

Schools require books, text-books or their equivalent; and the Cloister Schools were not behind in this respect. They had the Bible of course and in those days there was a good deal of patience with the Bible. They had also other books or manuscripts of a directly religious character. But besides their Christian literature they had the pagan literatures and upon these they became more and more dependent, notably—if not notoriously—upon the works of Aristotle, which came to mediæval Europe in part through the Arabic and in part through the Latin. Was the church lacking in foresight when it admitted the pagan writers to its schools? Possibly; but, if so, the mistake was made centuries before, when Greek thought and Christian or Hebrew thought met in Alexandria

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and became so involved in each other that the Bible itself, as we have it even to-day, is a monument to their relationship. Whatever may be said of Christ himself, of Christ the Hebrew, Christianity both scriptural and doctrinal was a result of the unification of Mediterranean life openly begun by Alexander and completed by Cæsar and, to vary a familiar phrase a little, what God had joined together the Christian Church, however powerful, could not possibly put asunder. Indeed the Christian church could not even wish or will a separation. Besides, was the church that had conquered so many barbarian hordes likely to fear or even to have any reason to fear defeat through pagan manuscripts? The Schoolmen themselves, as if with the reverence that supernaturalism feels for all the things that are as well as particularly for its peculiar objects of worship, or perhaps even out of a feeling of justice to the facts of history, were wont to think of the literature at their command as the Word, the Logos. Hence their patience in copying, illuminating and annotating. Hence, too, as already suggested, the presence in mediævalism of something more than a mere mediæval Christianity. But the use of the pagan authors in the Christian Schools was fraught with momentous consequences. Unconsciously, implicitly it was an argument from the natural to the supernatural and it had all the effects of such an argument. It naturalized the supernatural and ever more and more clearly men came to recognize what it had done.

In so many ways the mediæval church seems to have defeated its own interests. It converted barbarians only to adopt their architecture and to incorporate into its customs many of their traditions and myths. It instigated the crusades only to have the crusaders return from the Jerusalem which they never really reached more secular and cosmopolitan than ever. It fostered painting and letters only to turn faith toward the life of Christ into a rational regard. And it cherished the Cloister Schools only to produce a Giordano Bruno, who insisted on finding God in nature. What, then, can one say but that the church was always building better than it knew or perhaps

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that back of what the historians can see there was in the church what we have come to call the modern spirit?

Dates always blind one to true history, but if dates are now asked, the Scholars of the Cloister belong to the period between Charlemagne of the ninth century and Louis XIV. or Oliver Cromwell of the seventeenth. Some put the end of the period much earlier; some even later; and some are not sure that the end has yet been reached. For my part I should not feel safe in saying that it really had. Nothing is more interesting than the way in which all the old-time periods of history have lengthened out in recent years, as historians have seen more clearly and more deeply.

Names are also blinding, creating as they do invidious distinctions, but it has been common to recognize as most important John Scotus Erigena, Roscelinus, Abelard, Albertus Magnus, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Occam. These men, according to their special teachings, were Realists, Nominalists or Conceptualists, terms which refer directly to different views of the import of a general or class name, a common noun. Does the common noun imply a reality, as if a universal type or standard, that exists quite apart from individual things and is accordingly of quite a different substance, being spiritual or ideal, or is it only a name, only so much breath, a mere convention with no reference at all beyond the individual things to which it is applicable? Realism took the first position, believing in the real "universal"; Nominalism took the second, believing in the only nominal "universal"; and Conceptualism saw truth in both positions, suggesting in so many words that God's natural philosophy would be Realism, while man, talking and writing of what he can not see, has no choice but Nominalism. For man "universals" can be only after-thoughts. Scholasticism, then, was a doctrine or a group of related doctrines of the "universal," and its phrases *universalia ante rem, universalia post rem* and *universalia in re* were the weapons of many exciting tourneys. Yet, if I were to stop here, the mediæval philosophy might seem to some to deserve all the opprobrium that has

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been cast upon it and the lofty claims which I have already made to be quite without foundation.

So let me say at once that those wonderful tourneys were more than mere Scholasticism—if I may adopt the abusive use of the term. In our own day the psychologists have been disputing in an abstract over-technical way about pleasure and pain and one might very easily imagine that their disputes are only so much idle "Scholasticism," but how wrong such a view would be. A doctrine of pleasure and pain, however abstractly formulated, is a doctrine of heaven and hell and the psychologist in his modern cloister, the study or the laboratory, is only taking his part in the development of the new theology, for which the pure enjoyments of the traditional heaven and the unmixed agonies of the traditional hell are as impossible morally and spiritually as pure or unmixed pleasure and pure or unmixed pain are impossible psychologically. So the centre of Scholasticism may have been the doctrine of "universals," but in its mediæval form as well as in its modern Scholasticism had a circumference as well as a centre.

The more recent histories of politics and economics, to mention no others, give at least external evidence of this, for they are as much concerned with the Schoolmen as the histories of technical philosophy. The Canonist Doctrine, for example, is mediæval and scholastic, but it is the subject of an important chapter in Professor Ashley's "English Economic History," showing that the Schoolmen did not confine their interest to those Latin phrases. Also in the following manner, that may be mentioned here, although with a slight digression, Professor Ashley shows respect for Scholasticism. "It is to be observed," he says (p. 380), "that the conception of political economy as primarily a 'science' is one that dates only from Adam Smith; and that even English economists have of late found it impossible to restrict themselves to purely 'scientific' exposition. Moreover even English economists are finding it necessary to take into account certain popular conceptions, such as that of 'fair wages,' which the last generation of economists contemptuously disregarded; and these conceptions are in many cases essentially the same as those which influenced

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the mediæval theologians. If there is this slight link of sympathy between the Canonist of the Middle Ages and the English economists with an influential group of recent German economists the bond is far stronger. For they, at any rate, are ready to allow that political economy ought to 'treat material interests as subordinate to the higher ends of human development'; and, although the modern definition of these 'higher ends' may differ from the mediæval, in recognizing the need of an ethical standard they occupy substantially the same ground as their theological forerunners." Excuse so long a quotation, and then regret, if possible, its important witness to a modern Scholasticism or—the same thing—to a modern spirit in the mediæval Scholasticism.

But in another way than that of the value of the Schoolmen to economics and politics and in a way even more to the point we can see that the technical doctrine of "universals" was not a centre without a circumference. A doctrine of language or rather of the import of the terms of language may assume very technical form, getting to be as academic or as cloistered as you please, but no power on earth can prevent its becoming in time as general, as far-reaching as human life. Language is only one of the means, or media, of man's self-expression; it is only one of the "ways" by which man has to go; it is the medium of his spoken and written thought; but the "ways," the media, are of indefinite number, and only as we apply Scholasticism, doctrine of mediation that it was, to them all can we truly appreciate it. Apply it to the ritual of the church, to the exactions of government, to the conventions of literary composition; apply it to the person of the king, who set himself up as politically the universal individual; apply it to the person of Christ, who spiritually was the universal individual; apply it to Latin among the languages, to Rome among cities, to the Bible among books, to gold among commodities; and you will begin to see that the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages, albeit in an abstract over-technical way, were discussing an issue that was not less vital than that of pleasure and pain, of heaven and hell. In those Cloister Schools between the Realists who held that language was burdened with

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the truth of another world and so that man need but slavishly repeat its dead phrases in order to bring his thought into touch with reality, and the Nominalists who held that language was simply a convention, a device of man, the conflict between absolutism and democracy, with all that these imply for political life and religion, for literature and for science, had been fought out, as if in rehearsal, before its open expression, with which history is so much more familiar, in the great upheavals that made modern Europe.

And when one fully appreciates this Scholasticism once for all must cease to be the thing of the past which so many imagine; it ceases to be a mummy in an historian's museum; it lives and breathes with the life, the invigorating atmosphere of all genuine thought. Thought is always life preparing for a leap, and while it may for a time seek the seclusion of a cloister and protect itself still further by abstraction of its subject matter and technicality in its method, it is bound sooner or later to break from its self-imposed bonds and enter with its strength into the larger sphere of passionate human life.

Scholasticism dead? No more than science is to-day. The Cloister Schools bound to the service of the church? No more than our modern places of learning, our universities and colleges and public schools to the same service. The Schoolmen themselves not thinkers? In their academic retirement and in their academic way they rehearsed, as all thinkers rehearse, the life that was to come.

Credo ut intelligam is the principle of thought now as well as then. Now, as then, understanding as it comes only justifies faith, liberating the spirit from a confining letter. Do I destroy history by thus bringing past and present together? Possibly, but at least I give a real meaning to the unity of human life.

ALFRED H. LLOYD.

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.

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INTUITIONISM AND TELEOLOGY.

Many writers on ethics look upon intuitionism and utilitarianism as antagonistic theories. This is, however, not necessarily the case. We may interpret intuitionism in a broad and narrow sense. We may mean by it: (1) the theory which holds in a general way that morality is based upon innate factors of the human soul; or (2) the theory that there is a specific innate faculty, called conscience, which pronounces upon the rightness and wrongness of acts. We may also use the term utilitarianism in two senses. We may mean by it: (1) the general theory that the effect or end realized by acts is, in the last analysis, the criterion of their moral worth. This is really the etymological meaning of the word, for which the expression *teleological* theory is often substituted to avoid confusion. Or we may mean by it: (2) the theory that the greatest good (pleasure or happiness) of the greatest number is the highest good and ultimate criterion of morality. This is the historical meaning of the term, the one appropriated by those who coined the word. Now in whatever senses we may use either of these terms, there is no necessary contradiction between the fundamental tenets of intuitionism and utilitarianism. To say that the effects which acts naturally tend to produce, or the end at which they aim, constitute the ultimate criterion of morality, does not prevent the acceptance of the theory of intuitionism. Nor is there any contradiction between the statement that conscience is innate, and the statement that the final standard of right and wrong is to be sought in the ends of action.

Let us see. According to the teleological theory an act is called good or bad according to the end or purpose which it tends to realize. Acts which make for a certain end are called good by mankind. The end or purpose itself, however, which is realized by such acts is one *absolutely* desired and approved by humanity. Teleologists may differ somewhat as to what that end is, but they agree that the end is some ultimate desire in human nature the existence of which cannot be further ex-

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plained. "It appears evident," says Hume, "that the ultimate ends of human actions can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason, but recommend themselves entirely to the sentiments and affections of mankind, without any dependence on the intellectual faculties. Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep his health; if you then inquire why he desires health, he will readily reply, because sickness is painful. If you push your inquiries farther, and desire a reason why he hates pain, it is impossible that he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection."*

All this means, of course, that there are certain innate principles in human nature, if we choose to call them so, certain fundamental instincts or desires, which form the basis of man's moral nature. He has developed the codes of morality which he has developed, because his will is constituted as it is constituted, because he desires and approves of certain ends. Interpreted in this sense, Kant's view is correct that the categorical imperative is the expression of the human will. The will unconditionally or categorically commands or desires a certain end, it desires it absolutely, not for the sake of something else, but for its own sake. What the human will desires in this sense, it approves of, regards as absolutely good. Indeed, that is good which the will commands categorically, hence it is true in this sense, that "a good will is good in itself," and, "acts in so far as they spring from the good will are good." The teleologist is therefore an intuitionist himself, and it is not true that his basis of morality lies outside of the human heart. He will not deny that morality finds its original source in man's own nature, and will agree that it is not something foistered upon man from without. Indeed, his theory can find no basis for morality except in human nature, in human im-

*"Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals," Appendix I., v. See also Plato, "Philebus," 20*ff*; Aristotle, "Nicomachean Ethics," Bk. I., chap. v.; Mill, "Utilitarianism," chap. I.: Spencer, "Data of Ethics," chap. III., sec. 9; Paulsen, "Ethics," p. 249.

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pulses or instincts or faculties, whatever we may choose to call them. He will not be able to justify any act, in the last analysis, without referring it to some principle in human nature. This act is right, he will say, because it has such and such an effect, or serves such and such a purpose, but this effect or purpose is something absolutely desired and approved of by man, why no one can tell. It is a law of nature to desire certain effects or ends; and what the will desires, it approves of, sets a value upon, that is all.

When we say that man desires or wills a certain end or purpose, for example, life or happiness or perfection, we do not mean, of course, that he has an abstract idea of the end and an abstract desire for it, but either that he desires acts which happen to realize that end or that he desires the immediate effects of these acts. We mean either that he instinctively performs certain acts which happen to realize a certain end without knowing anything about that end, or that when he performs an act and experiences its effects, he naturally turns to them or shrinks from them. He does not necessarily know what the final end is which is realized by the acts which he desires, but he is so constituted that he cannot help assuming a certain attitude toward the immediate effects of these acts and ultimately toward the acts themselves. Thus, for example, we are so fashioned that we turn from acts which give pain to ourselves and others, without necessarily being aware of the *ultimate* consequences of such acts (*e. g.*, destruction of life), and without always being conscious of their pain-producing effects. We love our neighbors without always knowing that love of neighbor makes social union possible. Hence to say that man has an innate desire of some end or other, means that he cannot help desiring the acts and effects which make for that end. We cannot, in the last analysis, explain the existence of these desires; we have to accept them as facts and base our morality upon them. Psychical elements which we cannot reduce to simpler terms and whose origin we cannot explain, we call innate. The teleological theory, therefore, correctly understood, makes the human being the final judge of right and wrong; not the particular, individual human being, but man

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in general. That is, certain desires or instincts are universally present in man which make life possible. These have an absolute value for him, he desires them for their own sake. Particular or temporary instincts or desires and acts are judged in the light of these fundamental desires, and accepted or rejected accordingly by the race. Individual desires may and do conflict with the fundamental will, but the fundamental will triumphs in morality.

In the other sense, also, the utilitarian or teleologist can agree with the intuitionist. The intuitionist repudiates the theory that the end which acts tend to realize, constitutes the ultimate criterion of their worth, because he believes it contradicts his conception of an innate conscience. He reasons as follows: We have somehow an intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. We do not first compare our acts with an external end or purpose, but pronounce judgment directly, because we have a conscience. This faculty is inborn; every human being possesses an innate knowledge of right and wrong, and does not first *acquire* that knowledge by reflecting upon the defects of acts.

To this the teleologist might answer: (1) It is true that we do not necessarily compare our acts with the end or purpose they are supposed to realize, before pronouncing judgment upon their rightness or wrongness. The teleological theory does not assert that we do. The question concerning the psychical mechanism preceding the judgment of right and wrong, is a question for psychology to decide, and does not affect the theory as such. (2) We are also willing to grant that conscience is innate. We approve of the right and feel obliged to do it. The moral feelings, as they make their appearance in the adult consciousness, are either innate themselves or are based upon feelings that are innate. In fact, we may say that all feelings, hope, fear, love, and hate, are innate in the sense that we have them, and cannot tell where they come from. We may analze our states of consciousness and reduce them to their simplest elements; we may show that certain states are composed of other, simpler states, but we finally reach a point beyond which we cannot go. We say these states are innate,

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which means we do not know where they come from; we have them, and that is all. We hope and fear, we love and hate, because "it is our nature to." We have already seen that the teleologist reaches such ultimate principles beyond which he cannot go. He finds that morality is based upon these, that man's moral judgments are, in the last analysis, based upon man's nature. Man *evaluates* as he does because he is what he is. His values are human values; if he were not an evaluating being, there would be no morality. He desires life and happiness, and values them, approves of them, because he is a man.

Hence there need be no quarrel between the intuitionist and the teleologist on the score of innateness. The teleologist admits that conscience is innate in a sense. Now can the intuitionist admit that the end or purpose which acts tend to realize is the ultimate criterion of their moral worth? It seems to me, he can. There is no contradiction between the thought that conscience is innate, and the notion that the ultimate criterion of morality lies in the end which it realizes, the purpose which it serves. To say conscience is innate, means that we can distinguish between right and wrong without having *acquired* that knowledge. To say that morality serves a purpose, that right acts realize a certain purpose, and that this is ultimately the reason of their rightness, is not a contradiction of the other statement. Conscience tells me what acts are right and what acts are wrong, and the acts which it tells me are right realize an end which those which it tells me are wrong do not realize. Whether this conscience be innate or not, will not affect the truth of the proposition. Whether it be innate or not, the teleologist asserts that it serves a purpose, and hence is really a means to an end. Man's will, as we saw before, is directed towards a certain end, and conscience is an instrument, as it were, which helps to realize this end. That is, the acts which conscience enjoins have certain effects, and these effects are really desired by man, while those which it prohibits have the opposite effects, and these are rejected by him. His conscience is an apparatus for distinguishing good effects from bad effects without knowing what these effects are.

Now the question would naturally arise, How does a man's

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conscience happen to have this prophetic knowledge, how does it happen to hit upon the right acts without having any idea of the end they realize? There seems to be a wonderful harmony between this conscience and man's fundamental nature. And it seems to be a case of the left hand not knowing what the right hand does. We have here, it seems to me, a problem similar to the problem of instinct. Animals have certain instincts, we say; they happen to do the very things which they ought to do under the circumstances; they fit into their surroundings as keys fit into their locks, as Professor James puts it, I believe. Different explanations are given of this wonderful phenomenon. Some say, these instincts are divine gifts; God endows these animals with the faculties necessary to their preservation; others say, these instincts are the product of evolution; still others declare that they do not know where they came from: that they are innate. But all agree that these instincts are useful, that they serve a purpose, that they are means to an end, the preservation of the animal and its species. Similar theories are offered for the explanation of conscience. According to some, conscience is a gift of God; according to others, it is a growth, a development, the result of evolution. But all agree, unless they have a particular theory to defend, that this conscience serves a purpose; that men do well to obey it. And they do not contradict themselves in saying this. The instinct, we may say, tells the animal what to do. Now the scientist reflects upon the instinct, and judges of its value; he decides whether it realizes its purpose, the welfare of the animal and its species, for example, and pronounces it good or bad, accordingly. Similarly, the moralist needs a criterion by which to measure conscience. He finds in general that conscience enjoins acts which make for a certain end, the welfare of the race, let us say. He also finds that the impulses of man are directed toward this end. So he concludes that conscience is a means to a higher end, welfare, just as the scientist regards the eye as a means to the preservation of the body.

The extreme form of intuitionism, the view that we have an immediate knowledge of right and wrong, and that this knowledge is peculiar to human reason as such, an eternal, inalienable

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possession of the mind, is rejected by modern teleologists, not because it makes against the fundamental tenets of their theory, but because it seems to them to fly in the face of the facts. To say that the adult civilized conscience is innate in the sense that it knows *a priori,* without experience and education, what particular acts are right and wrong, is equivalent to abandoning all explanation. If conscience, as we find it now, can be reduced to simpler terms, and if it can be shown to be, in a large measure, the product of race and individual experience, the extreme intuitionistic position must be given up. The modern teleologist begins where the old intuitionist stops, and seeks to explain what the latter declares is unexplainable. The controversy between the two schools is, in my opinion, generally based upon a misunderstanding of their fundamental positions. The intuitionist rejects teleology because particular teleologists happen to antagonize the view that conscience is innate. Particular teleologists reject intuitionism as such because intuitionists deny the relativity of the moral law. To both we may apply the German saying: *Sie schütten das Kind mit dem Bade aus.* The fact is, one may accept both intuitionism and teleology without contradicting oneself.

There is another reason why intuitionists often attack the teleological theory. They identify teleology with the view that *pleasure* is the highest good and ultimate standard of right and wrong, and so repudiate the former with the latter. But it is plain that this form of teleology, which is called hedonism and sometimes eudæmonism, is not the only possible form, and that the teleological theory can be true even if the particular phase of it which is so distasteful to the nativists, is false. Moreover, there is no necessary contradiction between hedonism and intuitionism, as such. The hedonist may admit that conscience dictates acts which have a pleasurable effect without knowing anything about that effect. He may also grant that conscience is innate, although as a matter of fact he does not regard it as innate in the old-fashioned sense.

There is one respect in which the teleologist cannot agree with the intuitionist. He cannot admit that the dictates of conscience are absolute ends in themselves, that conscience has

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absolute worth. He will not admit that man was made for his conscience, but that conscience was made for man. Conscience is a means to an end, not an end in itself; it receives its value from what it accomplishes; it has relative and not absolute value. The moral law is not the highest good, but a means of realizing the highest good. In a certain sense, of course, it is a partial end in itself. Conscience is a human function, and if the development of the human soul is the highest good, then conscience as a part of that soul is a partial good, just as the human eye as a part of the human body, constitutes a part of the purpose realized by the human body (preservation, for example), and is thus a partial end in itself.

FRANK THILLY.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI.

THE OPTIMISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF IDEALISM.

MODERN idealists, both pluralists and monists, much as on first thought they would doubt it, in the last analysis construe optimism in terms of hedonism. Though indeed they both admit it is impossible to attach moral predicates to pleasure and pain as such, yet in one way or in another all idealists recommend virtue through happiness. Despite the fact that this view contains an uncritical yielding to a very human and universal prejudice, it has, nevertheless, plausible empirical justification.

I.

Free and strenuous moral endeavor demands, seemingly, that life shall have somehow an optimistic basis—shall be affirmed as worth while, on grounds psychological or moral,*

*Psychological optimism is either the evaluation of life strictly in terms of egotistic hedonism, or the willing acceptance of life as it comes in the belief "that the goal of moral progress is the complete coincidence of goodness with happiness."

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real or assumed.* Instinctively loving life as we do, we prize it naturally in the first instance for the pleasurable experiences it contains. Along with each moment of consciousness goes a universal quality, namely, some degree of pleasure or pain. Empirically viewed the moments of pleasure are intrinsically desirable. If man's conscious existence contain an appreciable balance of pleasure over pain, life is good; if contrariwise, life is evil and without justification. This conclusion is inevitable, if man is merely a creature of sentiency.

So far, however, we are at the point of view only of sentiency, and of good as "psychological good." It may be that we cannot thus conclude regarding "moral good." Yet here again the positive affirming of life as worth while demands an optimistic basis construed, as before, it appears on first view, in terms of happiness (pleasurable content of consciousness). Relevantly to this matter, although in a different context, no one has written so well as Professor William James. He says: "Probably no one can make sacrifices for 'right' without to some degree personifying the principle of right for which the sacrifice is made and expecting thanks for it. *Complete* social unselfishness, in other words, can hardly exist; *complete* social suicide hardly occur to a man's mind. Even such texts as Job's, 'Though he slay me, yet will I trust him,' or Marcus Aurelius', 'If the gods hate me and my children, there is reason for it,' can least of all be cited to prove the contrary. For beyond all doubt Job revelled in the thought of Jehovah's recognition of the worship after the slaying should have been done; and the Roman Emperor felt sure that the Absolute Reason would not be all indifferent to his acquiescence in the gods' dislike. The old test of piety, 'Are you willing to be damned for the glory of God?' was probably never answered in the affirmative except by those who felt sure in their heart of hearts that God would 'credit' them with their willingness

*"The capacity of the strenuous mood lies so deep among our natural human possibilities that even if there were no metaphysical or traditional grounds for believing in God, men would postulate one as a pretext for living hard and getting out of the game of existence its keenest possibilities of zest."—William James, "The Will to Believe," p. 213.

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and set more store by them thus than if in his unfathomable scheme he had not damned them at all."*

In the last analysis, then, at least as empirically viewed, it does seem that men would not affirm life to be good, if pain should be forever a real evil and not merely an incident in social and moral evolution, or a blessing in disguise; if suffering and defeat, despite virtue and loyalty to the cause of righteousness should be forever the inevitable concomitant of high moral endeavor. In the last analysis, that is, optimism must seemingly be construed in terms of happiness. Yet in reality there is in this a purely psychological interpretation of optimism, and, philosophically viewed, a complete burking of the ethical (idealistic) problem of optimism.

Before, however, passing to criticism and reconstruction, we must see clearly that the monists precisely in the same degree, if not wholly in the same way, as the pluralists, make the optimistic implications of idealism hedonistic. In the view of the pluralists, the divorce between virtue and happiness is "unnatural"—a phase of social and moral evolution; and when man shall have been made perfect through suffering and virtue have become "natural,"—effort having passed into full and free activity and duty into love,—then shall we know the supremest happiness. "I think we must . . . admit," says Prof. James Seth in concluding the sanest and most sympathetic statement and criticism of Hedonism yet written, "that while the mere distinctions of feeling, as pleasant or painful, are not, as such, moral distinctions, and do not always coincide with the latter, yet these distinctions are naturally connected and coincident. If pleasure is not itself the good, it is its natural and normal index and expression, as pain is the natural and normal index and expression of evil. . . . The Christian world has drawn its inspiration from a Life that has seemed to it the fulfillment of the Platonic and Prophetic dream—a life of transcendent goodness, which was also a life of utmost suffering . . . . We must indeed believe that the goal of moral progress is [contains] the complete coincidence of goodness with happiness. But at present it is not so, and the lesson of

*"The Principles of Psychology," 1st Ed., p. 316.

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the best lives is that the way to that goal lies through suffering."*

In the view of the monists, on the other hand, though pain and defeat shall never cease, the brave who have fought and triumphed in their finite degree, shall experience in the midst of pain and defeat a deeper joy—the very joy and peace of God. "It is the fate of life," says Professor Royce, "to be restless, capricious, and therefore tragic. . . . One thing only that is greater than this fate endures in us, if we are wise of heart; and this one thing endures forever in the heart of the great World-Spirit of whose wisdom ours is but a fragmentary reflection. This one thing . . . . is the eternal resolution that if the world *will* be tragic, it *shall* still, in Satan's despite, be spiritual. And this resolution is . . . . the very essence of the Spirit's own eternal joy."† And again: "We have found [by the method of absolute idealism] in a world of doubt but one assurance—but one, and yet how rich! All else is hypothesis. The Logos alone is sure. The brief and seemingly so abstract creed of philosophy: *'This world is the world of the Logos'*, has answered our questions in the one sense in which we can dare to hope for an answer. The rest is silence—and, here on the earth, endless labor in the might of the Spirit, for whom and in whom is all sorrow and bitterness, and all light and life—and peace."‡

With a kind of poetry, therefore, which appeals immensely to the most primordial sense in us—the sense of "our manhood's prime vigor"—rather than to the pure moral imagination, the absolute idealists, despite a doctrine that seems on the surface of it a philosophy of despair, win us into affirming the good of life. Yet they win us with a very hedonistic optimism. Goodness, triumphing goodness, means not only the perfecting of the life of God, which is the ethical ideal, but also thereby—and this, if Professor James is right, is the ultimate justification of human moral endeavor—a very divine happiness for finite individuals.

*"A Study of Ethical Principles," 5th Ed., p. 148.

†"The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 264.

‡"The Spirit of Modern Philosophy," p. 471.

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II.

After showing that the monists, with even greater plausibility than the pluralists, construe optimism in terms of hedonism, we may pass to criticism and reconstruction. Since psychological optimism is indeed the inevitable outcome of the pluralist's presuppositions, but in nowise involved in those of the monist, we are here concerned with the objective proof of ethical optimism. And for this the absolute idealist has the necessary metaphysic.

What leads to the fallacious interpretation of optimism in terms of hedonism, on the part of the absolute idealist, is a wholly empirical and human confounding of the objective worth of the life of the Absolute with its subjective worth. Since, in our own experience, subjective worth invariably is the pleasurable content of consciousness, the subjective worth of the Absolute Experience receives from the idealists a like hedonistic evaluation. Now while indeed it is true that a worthy view of man means a worthy view of God, to proceed thus, empirically, from the nature of man to that of the Absolute is logically to conclude *only* that the unity and worth of the Absolute experience must be *at least* as spiritual and happy as man's. One can indeed accept life, if in the end man's life is to be as spiritually significant and happy as the deity's—and by hypothesis the deity's must be supremely happy. This is excellent enough in the view of the pluralist. But the absolute idealist must proceed deductively, must interpret the worth of human experience in terms of the Absolute Experience. The problem of optimism, then, from the monistic point of view, is not a question whether private human moral experience in and by itself is good. If that were the question, it would be altogether a matter of temperament how we should accept life—whether we should stand for self-realization in some lower or higher hedonistic sense, or for self-abnegation in some Stoic or Buddhistic sense, or for vulgar suicide. But, as it is, from the monistic—that is, from the strictly universal point of view—the problem of optimism is the question whether the Absolute Experience is affirmed by the deity him-

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self, despite pleasure or pain, or if it be so, in virtue of pain, to be good.

Seemingly, in thus putting the nature of the problem of optimism, we win our way through a truism; since, by hypothesis, the Absolute, *qua* the constitutive principle of all experience, necessarily affirms his life to be good. This, however, is to forget that the only objective "proof" of optimism that the idealist can offer, must be "analytical"; the predicate must appear to be contained in the subject. Now, by hypothesis, man, as the Hegelians say, is the "organ of the universal": man's true life must be identical with that of the Absolute. So that, if the Absolute sees to it, as he does, by actively constituting the moral world, by actively condemning and defeating evil, that his own life is good; then also, by implication, must man's *true* life be good. To say this, however, is to assert that the category of the finite moral life is neither "self-realization" in and through the Absolute, nor "self-abnegation"—resignation of a final and private happiness of the individual—for the Absolute: it is to say rather that the category of the moral life is "coöperation" with the Absolute, not in order that man's life (as if his life were merely his to be given or not given to God, as man in his caprice might indifferently determine) may be made "happy," but in order that reality may be a spiritual whole, and that the spiritual whole itself may be thus made perfect. And perfection in one's own kind is the only ultimate justification of being. But one's own finite *self* is real only in so far as it is *made* real: one's life is good only so far as it is *made* good: finite selfhood and life are made real and good only by man's active identification of himself with the mind and will of God. "We must indeed," says Professor James Seth, "think of our life and destiny, as like the course and destiny of the worlds, ultimately in God's hands, and not in our own. If man is an 'imperium' he is only an 'imperium *in imperio*.' . . . . All human experience

> 'Should teach us
> There's a divinity that shapes our ends,
> Rough-hew them how we will.'

Yet man cannot regard himself as a mere instrument in the

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divine hand, a passive vehicle of the energy of God. Activity (ἐνέργεια) is the category of his life, and his highest conception of his relation to God is that of Coöperation (συνεργία). He must regard himself as a fellow-worker even with God. This is his high human birthright which he may not sell."*

This is indeed excellent from the monistic point of view; but it cannot be, consistently, the judgment of the pluralist. For, from the pluralist's point of view, God and man are externally related to one another: and are, therefore, to use Aristotle's so common representation of the sculptor's task, at work *on* something foreign, which is obedient, no doubt, to the will of the worker, but still more or less intractable. The divine and the human task are not, in that case, really identical; man is not *inwardly* a co-worker with God. But if, as Aristotle said, the essential being of the Absolute is pure thought (νοησις νοήσεως, θεωρία), pure activity (ἐνέργεια ἄνευ δυνάμεως), then the form and the matter of the divine life are identical; the holy life is an absolute and inward "creation." And if man's life has its constitutive principle in the Absolute, then, too, the form and the matter of human life must be identical, inwardly, with that of God's. If, therefore, men, without any mere mysticism in disparaging the contradictory "forms" of space and time, take the objective or organic point of view,—namely, that in nature, origin, and function they and the Absolute are one; and if in this spirit they actively affirm the life of God, then shall they, despite pleasure or pain, or rather in and through, as Professor James has it, complete social suicide, know their life to be good. But if they, in their blindness, oppose their wills to the will of the Absolute, whether by brute sinning or by striving after an "infinite expansion of (their future) *self*-consciousness," then shall they know, in God's own season, that their life is bad. And deeper yet, they shall know their life as utterly bad, for they shall know the profoundest irony of evil fate—that in their deliberate blindness or sinning they became the very ministers of God's triumph.

Criticism rather than a constructive argument for ethical

Loc. cit. Sup. p. 397.

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optimism is the object of this essay. But it is worth while in closing to submit a summary review of what should be the general "movement" of a constructive argument, on the monist's part, for ethical optimism:—Goodness, divine or human, exists only as an activity of the will—only as the active condemning and defeating of evil. In the world of the Absolute—the *one* spiritual world—evil shall never cease, because the activity of the Absolute, which is in its nature good, cannot cease. As the task of the Absolute will is infinite, so man's moral task—namely, the affirming of the mind and will of the Absolute—shall remain immortal. And, therefore, as man fulfills in greater degree his moral task, makes, as we say humanly, moral progress, he shall experience more and more of what men call unhappiness—eternal pain and defeat, and, it may be, even annihilation. Yet the world of the Absolute is not a world of evil, nor human life a life based in despair. For still nothing is good intrinsically except the good will: and he who forever wills the good, namely, the perfection of the Absolute life, thereby creates the reality of spirit, and secures, in a world where evil must be present, the supremacy of the good. This, then, is our optimism—that by active identification of our wills with the will of the Absolute *we save, in Satan's despite, the spirituality of the universe.*

To the strenuous moral agent idealism can offer no hedonistic consolations. The eternal world, it holds, contains Gethsemane. Its last word is: Courage! for the winning of universal spiritual life.

J. D. Logan.

The University of South Dakota.

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BOOK REVIEWS.

THE HEART OF THE EMPIRE. Nine Essays by Different Authors. London: Fisher Unwin, 1901.

That a volume of 415 pages containing nine separate essays by Cambridge men on various importunate social questions of the moment should, in spite of the almost universal frigidity of the press, have aroused considerable sympathy and attention is matter for congratulation. Most of the authors, if not all, are presumably young men, and the surprising excellence of the bulk of their work will bring comfort to those who may have fancied that a resolute and practical Liberalism, enthusiastic without sentimentality and combative without fanaticism, was a spirit existing no longer in the land. The writers, although considerable divergencies of temperament are unavoidably noticeable, start from a common standpoint of profound discontent with the existing state of things coupled with an earnest desire to discover practical remedies. Not that they have attempted to face each and all of the diseases of modern society. They have, perhaps wisely, narrowed the field and concentrated their energies on some of the most obviously alarming, all, it would seem, propounding to themselves the question, What are we going to do in view of the growth of giant cities on a scale hitherto unprecedented in the history of the world and the resulting fact that a new species of man, the city type, is being developed? Accordingly the book consists of discussions from various points of view of some of the problems raised by the condition of the poorer population of our great cities in general and London in particular, together with a paper on imperialism as "a natural pendant" (p. 9). Some account of each of the essays thus separated in form but linked in spirit may be useful.

It was perhaps, to begin with, a little unfortunate that the *pas* should have been given to Mr. C. F. G. Masterman's rather lengthy paper entitled, *Realities at Home*. It is difficult to avoid a suspicion that as a result of this arrangement many reviewers as well as the general public, arrived at the end of Mr. Masterman's essay, must have shut the book and "read no further therein" either that day or any other. Presumably the idea was to open with a statement of the case. But in a statement of the case greater brevity and clearness would have been desirable;

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and although it is in a way impressive from the writer's evidently extensive personal knowledge of the miserable districts which he describes, the impression is spoiled by bad style and an apparently ungovernable tendency towards crescendoes of sacerdotal rnetoric. Criticism of style may seem out of place where the flame of enthusiasm against evil burns with so powerful if smoky a flame. But the writer brings it upon his own head who, abandoning simple description and statement, is eloquent about "the denizens of dull streets," "the massed multitudes" and "packed populations" of London; who invariably speaks of the meaner quarters of the town as "the Ghetto"; who sprinkles the word "aggregation" an unnecessarily large number of times over the same page; and who finally has the heart to conclude on the following note:—"But if the cry 'Back to the Christ,' which so many observers note as a manifest sign of the coming years, be but the herald of a deep and earnest attempt of the Churches to realize once again the life and the teaching of their Master, then to the anxious watcher the night may indeed be far spent—dawn be nigh at hand" (p. 51 *sq.*). The duty of cavilling under this head will be sufficiently performed by quoting from Mr. Masterman what is beyond doubt the worst sentence in the book. On page 29 he writes: "Literature is symbolized by the penny Sunday paper . . . . . or the halfpenny hysterical daily with its bastard imperialism and fabulous information—the reading of which, however, being, perhaps fortunately, usually confined to the racing results."

Mr. F. W. Lawrence's admirable essay on *The Housing Problem* can be properly criticized only by the expert who might or might not approve of the conclusions at which he arrives. But to the lay mind it commends itself at once by its thorough information and the robust yet penetrating common-sense with which the author analyzes the amazing fact that under modern conditions the poorest of the population are living on the dearest land, and is fully worthy of the reputation gained for the author by his previous work on "Local Variations in Wages." As it is perhaps the solidest and most striking contribution to the book, a short summary may be acceptable.

Mr. Lawrence divides the problem into the two main heads of rural housing and urban housing, the latter being subdivided into the four problems of the housing of single persons, the housing of families, insanitary areas, and what he calls "the

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towniness of towns." The housing of families again falls into three divisions:—the housing of clerks; of artisans and regular laborers; and of the casual laborer. The towniness of towns separates itself into the two evils of overcrowding to the acre and of the moral, physical and æsthetic degradation consequent upon living at a great distance from the country.

The problems of rural housing and of the housing of single persons in towns, not being very complex, are briefly dismissed. Coming to the question of housing families, we find that owing to the house famine in large cities and particularly in London, the families of respectable, not really poor artisans are poorly housed, while the laborer who is merely poor is very poorly housed, the accommodation being regularly a class worse than the means of the people would indicate. The lowest class of all is housed in almost inconceivable foulness with disastrous results to the race. Passing over the figures as to the death-rate of insanitary areas, and Mr. Lawrence's calculation, mysterious to the uninitiated, that the true measure of the towniness of towns is the square root of the population, we reach his very lucid account of the manner in which a town like London grows, "by the addition of successive coats, like those of an onion" (p. 73). As the pressure of business increases, the dwelling-houses at the centre are supplanted by offices and warehouses, so that depopulation ensues, the inner belt first growing, and then, as the outer belt grows, becoming in its turn depopulated. This once understood, it is evident that the really ultimate solution of the housing problem lies in devising some means whereby the growth of suburbs shall be properly organized and regulated. Mr. Lawrence accordingly proposes the creation of a new authority with jurisdiction extending twenty or thirty miles in each direction farther than that of the London County Council. His proposal involves two schemes, which will doubtless arouse much short-sighted opposition; one for taxing the unearned increment, not for general purposes, but to enable the town to grow healthy; and another for the compulsory purchase by the community of agricultural land on the outskirts of large towns. Building schemes such as those of the London County Council do not really strike at the heart of the evil at all. Insanitary areas, when demolished, should be left as open spaces in spite of objections on the ground of expense.

Equally unqualified praise can not be given to Mr. R. A. Bray's

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paper on *The Children of the Town,* which deals mainly with the question of education. On the one hand it is impossible to sympathize too cordially with his forcible condemnation of the vulgar theory that the aim of education is to qualify the child to become a successful money-making machine and with his indictment of the class selfishness which looks with suspicion on any measures likely to advance knowledge and restiveness. His remarks again as to the urgent need for reconstruction of the educational organization, with the suggestion that a single educational authority should be established for each district, are practical and acute. Nor can any objection be raised to his sweeping criticism of the already nearly obsolete pupil teacher system; nor to his statesmanlike treatment of the difficult question of Voluntary Schools. But on the other hand there are points of detail, perhaps not essential to his main thesis, which provoke criticism; and at least one fundamental point is open to grave question. To take the less important first, his account of the psychology of the town child as contrasted with that of the country child does not carry conviction. It would of course be impertinent to question the accuracy of the actual observation of one who has had exceptional opportunities for watching the children of the town; nor is it meant to suggest that the town child is not excitable, sharp and quarrelsome, untruthful perhaps—the father, in a word, of the cockney man. But what is fairly open to question is the writer's psychological account of the causes contributing to this result. According to him "a child left to the influence of Nature will acquire a large amount of what may rightly be called knowledge" (p. 119), whereas owing to the continually shifting panorama which passes before him there is no permanent element in the mental attitude of the town child, "nothing that will subject phenomena to its own purposes instead of adapting itself to them" (p. 119). Surely there is no real meaning in this dark saying. The purport which the writer himself appears to attach to it is that the town child does not, owing to his kaleidoscopic environment, connect cause and effect, present and past. It might be contended with some truth that, as far as mental training derived from observation of cause and effect is concerned, there is little to choose between the processes of Nature and a more or less unbroken succession of passing cabs and wagons, and that the knowledge which the child draws from the observation of street life is just as much knowledge as that derived from the

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rising and setting of the sun and the interchange of seasons. Of the difference on æsthetic feeling and even on morals there can of course be no question; but the author has fallen into error through failure to draw this important distinction.

Again on p. 136, Mr. Bray, with perfect truth, says "a child is naturally metaphysically inclined." He has arrived at this truth by observation, but unfortunately proceeds from it to unwarrantable deductions. He implies that two things are necessary to the encouragement and confirmation of the child's metaphysical bent; religious training, and the contemplation of Nature. It is at least doubtful whether a country life as such is more favorable to infantile metaphysical tendencies than a city life would be. There must be many who, like the present writer, looking back connect their first vague questionings not with trees and streams and clouds, but rather with some perfectly trivial object, such as a rectangular wooden brick, which, although evidently existing, was the cause of much perplexity by existing in an incomprehensibly different way to oneself. Again one of the commonest movements in the mind of a philosophically inclined child is speculation as to his personal identity—speculation arising at unaccountable moments, half-way upstairs or during a meal, and emphatically not connected with the open-air life of Nature, where all was apt to be lost in the excitement of violent exercise.

As to the influence of religious training, general experience does not support Mr. Bray's opinion that it is favorable to speculation. Much might be said on this subject, but it is enough to point out here that religion, as taught to the child, presents itself in a perfectly definite form, depressing and vexatious indeed, but intelligible. It is painful in the midst of much good sense to find a plea based on Goethe's Wilhelm Meister for what is called "symbolic education" and explained to be ritual accompanied by incense, lights and music as practised by the Roman Catholics and the High Church party.

These points having no essential connection with Mr. Bray's exposition of our present lack of educational system, nor with his proposals to remedy it, it would have been superfluous to dwell on them at such length, were it not that, apart from their forming a transition to his theory that the teaching of religion is necessary to morality, they are typical of much in the volume. All the authors have observed their facts honestly and carefully, and have conducted their diagnosis and prescribed their remedies in

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an equally temperate and scientific spirit. At the same time they have almost all—Mr. Lawrence is a conspicuous exception—slipped at times into vague theoretical generalizations, which, as not affecting in any way the practical value of the work, might well have been curtailed if not omitted. The practical value is very high; and it is cheering that the authors should have avoided on the whole sentimentality in their observation and discussion of facts. That they should have occasionally succumbed in their ultimate analysis is deplorable indeed, but hardly surprising in view of the rarity at all times of minds capable at once of profitable comment on the tangible facts of the world and of really philosophic reflection.

Messrs. Noel Buxton and Walter Hoare collaborate in a very full and interesting paper on *Temperance Reform.* They advocate, after full consideration, certain instalments of experimental legislation into which it is impossible now to enter, and raise, but are far from entirely disposing of a momentous question of principle—that of *laissez faire* as opposed to interference. Meanwhile one minor detail may be noted. They challenge (p. 181) those who sneer at making people "sober by Act of Parliament" to advocate abolition of the Acts which limit free trade in alcohol. But surely it would be no very great inconsistency in an adherent of the *laissez faire* doctrine to acquiesce in the existing Acts, which after all are only mildly paternal, rather than deprive the country of one of its most important sources of revenue.

The theme of Mr. P. W. Wilson's essay on *The Distribution of Industry* is the elaboration of a point touched upon by Mr. Lawrence in connection with the housing problem; namely the tendency for London to become impossible for manufacturers and others who, under the pressure of high rents and wages in the capital, find it profitable to transport their business into the country. What merit the paper possesses in a wealth of lively and various detail is largely counterbalanced by the ill-connected and pointless nature of many of the remarks, as well as by its singularly jocose and jarring tone. It contains however some useful criticisms, written with special railway knowledge, on certain schemes for remedying the evils of the day by improved facilities for transit.

The purpose of Mr. Pigou's article on *Some Aspects of the Problem of Charity* is, in his own words, "to focus some of the things that are already known rather than to break new ground"

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(p. 236), and all that can be said is that he has fulfilled his task with efficiency and discretion.

Mr. F. W. Head has furnished a remarkable paper on *The Church and the People,* which may stand next to Mr. Lawrence's in point of solid value. Its impressiveness lies in the fact that the author is confessedly (p. 306) a Churchman and therefore presumably a Christian. So forcible and clear an exposition of the utter unsuitability of the Church to the age in which we live should do much for those who still regard that institution as useful. It would be hard even for an opponent of Christianity, confining himself to purely mundane grounds, to present a more convincing picture. Nor does the author shrink from the most sweeping reform. He would have the Church disestablished and at least partially disendowed, subscription to the Articles and the use of the Prayer Book done away with in order to encourage union with Dissenters, the incomes of Bishops curtailed, the monstrous monotony of the Anglican service broken, and so forth. But, while giving full credit to what under the circumstances is an extraordinary achievement of impartiality, we should not forget that even reforms such as these are merely a tinkering of old pots, and that, supposing them practicable, it would probably not be in the interests of humanity to secure a new lease of life to the religious body. Fortunately however they are far less likely to be realized than are for instance Mr. Lawrence's proposals for the regulation of the growth of cities or those of Messrs. Buxton and Hoare for the reform of the Liquor Laws. Except in the not very probable event of a recrudescence of violent religious feeling the matter can only be considered as pressing on the economic ground of waste, the existence of the Church meaning the loss to the nation of a certain quantity of intellect and a far greater quantity of money which might have been turned to profitable account. None but a few extremists will ignore this aspect of the evil by which it is differentiated from, for example, the drink question.

With the main moral of Mr. G. P. Gooch's essay on *Imperialism,* that it is wrong for the nation to pursue power and bulk at the expense of goodness, it is impossible not to agree, although exception may be taken to some of his applications of the principle.

The book closes with a short paper by Mr. G. M. Trevelyan on *Past and Future,* which is simply a stirring appeal for more

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effort on the part of individuals in the common cause, in order that through artifice the way may be found back to Nature from the evil conditions of modern life. When it has been observed that the device of printing sentences like "the Conservative Party is the Evil" in capital letters (p. 414) is calculated to alienate rather than inspire, nothing remains but praise for one who wears the mantle of Carlyle and Ruskin worthily.

Apart from the higher note struck by Mr. Trevelyan the permanent value of the book lies entirely in its practical parts. It would be hard to find work better done than the accounts of schools, of the drink question, of the inadequacy of the Church, of the South African question, and the proposals for reform in each case. With reference to Mr. Lawrence's treatment of the housing problem the opinion of the Chairman of the Housing Committee of the London County Council may be quoted, who writes, "It is about the best paper on the subject I have read. I have the book constantly by me for reference."

The misfortune of the authors is that at the same time they have not shrunk from raising, without making any original or valuable contribution thereto, a number of important theoretical questions which it would require an Aristotle to coördinate. Among these may be mentioned the question of *laissez faire* as opposed to "socialistic" or "paternalistic" legislation, skimmed by Messrs. Buxton and Hoare; international morality, most inadequately discussed by Mr. Gooch; and the nature of the obligation for individual effort towards the common good, which Mr. Trevelyan takes for granted. But the subject which has received the fullest and the least satisfactory treatment is that of religion. It is too easily assumed that religious instruction is the best way of inculcating morality. Mr. Masterman looks to a regenerated Church for the solution of social problems, and can not really get away from the idea that the Church, as such, has certain "claims and calls." Mr. Bray thinks that religion is necessary for morality and has fallaciously implied that it is necessary for intellect. Mr. Head also thinks that the Church has a future.

In a way the criticism which it arouses is the measure of a book's value; and this is especially true of the observation which "The Heart of the Empire" finally suggests—that the work is incomplete and that a sequel is necessary. No criticism of the defects of our national life can be really effective which does not grapple with the problems, no less involved and distressing than

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those of the poor, presented by the wealthy and aristocratic classes. We look forward to this necessary supplement of a work so well begun.

S. P. WATERLOW.

LONDON.

CHAPTERS FROM ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS. By J. H. Muirhead, M. A. Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, Mason University College, Birmingham. London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1900. (Pp. ix., 316).

To bring the main ideas of Aristotle's Ethics before English readers, and in so doing to treat that great work as a living contribution to philosophy, still affording invaluable guidance, still deserving the most serious criticism, is a task worthy of all praise, and Professor Muirhead has performed it in a way to earn the tnanks of many. Throughout he tests the views of Aristotle in the light of modern thought and modern problems, and his method, at once respectful and alert in criticism, prevents the Greek from ever growing dead in his hands. In view of the needs of the general reader the language has been kept singularly free from the jargon of the schools.

The book consists of two parts: the first a discussion of what are taken to be the salient points in Aristotle's conception, the second, a series of passages translated from the Nicomachaean Ethics, selected and arranged so as to emphasize Professor Muirhead's own interpretation. There are obvious dangers, of course, in such a treatise on such a subject, and it may be hoped it is not churlish to say that Professor Muirhead has not escaped them all. Perhaps the difficulty of his task was increased by its origin, the preparation of a course of lectures to teachers of which these "chapters" were the foundation. It is this which accounts for the absence of "all reference to Aristotle's famous treatment of Justice in the fifth book, which falls rather to the side of politics than education," (Preface, p. viii). Still it is impossible not to regret the disturbance in proportion due to the omission. One may regret even more the absence of chaps. i-v in Book III. with treatment of moral purpose and the difference between voluntary and involuntary action, but it may be that Professor Muirhead was wise to avoid such ground in a book of this scope. It is harder to see why he should have left out the con-

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cluding chapter of all, which might be thought the most valuable from a teacher's point of view in the whole work. Not only does it abound, in its short compass, with the most striking sayings on education itself (*e. g.,* on the comparative merits of private teaching and the influence of the State), but it completes the great scheme in Aristotle's mind by the stress it lays on the intimate connection he feels to obtain between education, moral virtue, politics, and the one supreme end, the "heaven" alone ultimately worth striving for. One is also inclined to cavil at the removal of the praise of that heaven, the heaven of "Contemplation," from its impressive place in the last book to the middle of the work.

But the most serious omissions seem to be those in Book VI. and especially that of the opening section where Aristotle criticizes expressly the only definition he has so far given himself of the "mean," viz., that it is that which is in accordance with "right reason." And this leads us to what are perhaps the most interesting questions raised by Professor Muirhead's treatment. This dictum, Aristotle says is "true, but not definite." We, who want to know what we ought to do, find ourselves, when we have got it, no better equipped than a man would be for doctoring if he were told that the right remedies were "those which medicine or a medical man prescribes" (Book VI., ch. i, sec. 2). What does Professor Muirhead make of this passage? Does he consider it an interpolation, and, if so, why? In any case, how does he think Aristotle would have met the objection? Apparently only by using the conception of the "whole" of human life as something which was more than the parts and could guide the parts. "To the Greek, the word 'reason' introduces the conception of a standard which is the same for all. If we ask where this standard is to be sought, the answer has already been given in the metaphor of the artist. It is the 'whole' of human nature, to express which in the detail of conduct is the ideal of the good man, in the same sense as it is the ideal of the artist to harmonize the details of his picture to the conception of the whole" (p. 89).

But how, without the "unwarrantable straining" that Professor Muirhead rightly wishes to avoid, can we find in the Ethics this conception of the "whole of human nature" as an *ultimate* guiding principle? And would it have satisfied Aristotle? Would he not in the first place have answered, and answered sadly, that if this were so there could be no difference in value between the "right-

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ness" of a good man's life and the rightness of a prudent pig's? (See his distinction between the many kinds of Prudence, some of which are possessed by animals, and the one and only Wisdom), (Bk. VI., ch. vii., secs. 3, 4). To say, as Professor Muirhead does elsewhere, that Aristotle appeals as the ultimate authority, "to the form of universal life *for which nature has marked man out*" (p. 194), to "the good man as the individual embodiment of the system of life to which man's *true* nature points" (p. 205, italics mine), is surely to use phrases which may be quite correct, but which just cover the difficulty. For the question rises: Do the words "true," "marked out by nature," imply an objective standard, *i. e.*, a standard other than man's own character, or do they not? And did not Aristotle think that in Wisdom, the σοφία which included νοῦς (Bk. VI., ch. vii., sec. 3), and which could therefore contemplate the ultimate ἀρχαί (Bk. VI., ch. vi.), he had found something in man which could see the absolute truth and the absolute good? Compare Met. A. 2, 982 *b*, where Wisdom is spoken of as "the most ultimate of knowledges," and as "that which understands for the sake of what each thing ought to be done, and this means the Good in individual cases, and in general the Best in the whole of nature." But in the second place, would not Aristotle have found the mere conception of "the whole" unsatisfying because it did not answer the question, "*What kind of a whole?*" Very likely he did believe that a man's life ought to be, as every true work of art is, "a whole," but there are different works of art, planned on different principles, and a vital question for man is, "*what kind of a work of art* ought I to make myself?" And did not Aristotle think that through the use of σοφία man could see that the principle of his "whole" was and ought to be Contemplation, θεωρία? To sum up, did not Aristotle believe that he had got a standard which was not only strictly objective but also definite?

Starting with this interpretation of Aristotle's meaning one seems in a better position for attacking the problem as to the relation of Prudence and Wisdom. Wisdom knows the ultimate principles, ultimate not only in reference to man, principles which alone completely justify "right" action: Prudence does not. Wisdom is always conscious of a definite end: Prudence is not. It is difficult to be sure how much of this view Professor Muirhead would accept. He does not seem to entertain the idea of an absolute good or of an end more definite than the realization of man's

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nature. Yet he speaks of Wisdom as higher than Prudence and as resulting "from the clear apprehension of *those ultimate principles of reality* which Plato called the good" (p. 137, italics mine). Elsewhere he seems to identify Wisdom and Prudence (p. 68, par. *a*).

The matter is further complicated by his apparently accepting the view that in speaking of "what can be different" as the sphere of Prudence and Deliberation in distinction from "those elements of reality which depend on unalterable principles," and which form the sphere of contemplation, Aristotle overlooks the fact that "the forces which we set in operation in seeking to realize an 'end' . . . . act according to laws as eternally fixed and unalterable as the stars in their courses, and, if we only knew enough, could be calculated as exactly." But why need we put Aristotle into this awkward position? Suppose we hold that the two chief points he had in his mind were: (1) A distinction should be made between the practical and the theoretical reason, in the sense that the practical reason refers to the future and to deeds which it is in our power to do or not to do (Book III., ch. iii., secs. 3-7; Book VI., ch. ii., sec. 6), *i. e.*, to *things which can be different* in the sense that it is in our power to give them the color we choose, not in the sense that they are phenomena we do not fully understand and so can imagine to be due to chance. (2) The insight of the ordinary good man in everyday life, (the treatment of which forms at least half of Aristotle's task), is not, and cannot be expected to be, more than the union of an instinct, as it were, for the right thing to aim at, the "mean," with a real desire to reach it, and a happy power of hitting on the best way of doing so. With these thoughts in his head Aristotle builds up his conception of Prudence φρόνησις drawn, as he expressly tells us, from observation of the men around him, (Bk. VI., ch. v., *init*). It is less than Wisdom, σοφία, for it has no vision of the ultimate ἀρχάι; it is different from scientific knowledge, because it aims at action. Finally, an essential part of it is said to be Deliberation, (Bk. VI., ch. v., sec. 1), and no man deliberates about what he knows thoroughly—"we do not ponder how we ought to write." (Bk. III., ch. iii., sec. 8). Therefore we cannot consider Prudence as an assured mistress even in her own sphere. To make his divisions formally complete Aristotle ought perhaps to have added to his enumeration of the intellectual powers a practical Wisdom or a supreme Prudence, a real ἀρχιτεκτονική φρόνησις. But the description of the

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life of the Wise Man in Bk. X. may be held to fill this gap, and as for Prudence, a Prudence that was instinct with complete knowledge could scarcely be called Prudence at all, for the element of Deliberation would have passed out of it.

I have only space left to indicate the chief of the other topics touched on in the book, *e. g.,* (1) the relation of pleasure to happiness, Professor Muirhead's view being that the two discussions in the Nicomachaean Ethics practically result in the same conclusion, a conclusion to be accepted as valid, viz.: that pleasure of a certain definite kind is to be welcomed, and necessarily waits upon the activity which is the end; (2) the position of friendship as in some way adding a new glory to the social life; (3) the nature of self-control, temperance, and courage. Here, as throughout the book, Professor Muirhead shows much skill in using the history of the questions to throw light on the solutions offered.

F. MELIAN STAWELL.

LONDON.

GREEK THINKERS. A History of Ancient Philosophy. By Theodor Gomperz. Professor at the University of Vienna and member of the Imperial Academy; Hon. LL. D., Dublin; Hon. Ph. D., Königsberg. Authorized Edition. Vol. I. Translated by Laurie Magnus, M. A., Magdalen College, Oxford. [London: John Murray, 1900. Pp. xv. 610.]

This volume forms the first instalment of Dr. Gomperz's great history of ancient thought, published at Leipsic, in three volumes, in 1896. In the complete work Vol. I. brings us down to the era of the Sophists and Thucydides. Vol. II. is devoted to Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. III. contains the account of the Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics. The work has obtained a deservedly high reputation among German readers, and the translation, if it maintain in the later volumes the high standard of the present one, will be equally popular in England and America. The English is not only free from Germanisms but is throughout pleasant in style. Whether the translator has succeeded in his object of "conveying in the English language the brilliancy and charm" of the original must, of necessity, remain a matter of opinion, but he has undoubtedly produced a rendering which is clear and readable. Accuracy in the reproduction of the author's meaning is guaranteed by Dr. Gomperz himself, with whom

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"every doubtful point has been thoroughly discussed in proof and revise." Dr. Gomperz, in addition to a knowledge of English philosophical literature manifested in every part of his work, has a perfect command of English. One or two small misprints, *e. g.*, "discreet" for "discrete" (p. 203 twice) occur occasionally. They in no case obscure the meaning, but should be corrected in a second edition.

The author's ideal is a high one, viz., to provide "for wide circles of cultivated readers a comprehensive picture . . . . of the different tendencies of ancient thought, to consider them all impartially and to judge them fairly." He confesses frankly that this ideal "could only completely be realized in an exhaustive universal history of the mind of antiquity," but hopes that until "so monumental an undertaking has been successfully effected" his own work, which summarizes the labors of a lifetime, will be of value. It is important to note the two distinct references in this ideal aim—(1) the comprehensive impartial picture, (2) the cultivated reader. Taking the latter reference first nothing could be more suitable, in charm of style and soundness of judgment, for such a reader than the author's treatment of his subject. This work is not a handbook to "Ritter and Preller"—it is of no direct use to the student preparing for university examinations; though in justice it must be remarked that, to an undergraduate who already knows his Ueberweg or Burnet, a perusal of "Greek Thinkers" would have inestimable educational value. The reader for whom the book is intended, and whose needs it will excellently supply, is the man of mature intellectual interest who seeks to understand the part played by ancient thought in building up the structure of modern mental civilization. It is here that the important question arises as to the author's truthfulness and impartiality. Is he as successful in realizing this part of his ideal as he undoubtedly is in the other?

Dr. Gomperz takes for his motto Maine's dictum, viz: "To one small people it was given to create the principle of Progress. That people was the Greek. Except the blind forces of Nature, nothing moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin." To avoid the unfairness of judging a man too strictly by his motto let us look at the more detailed expression Dr. Gomperz gives (p. 528) to his attitude towards the study of Greek thought.

"Almost the whole of our intellectual culture is of Greek origin. A thorough comprehension of those origins is indispensable if we

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are to escape from the overpowering despotism of their influence. It is not only highly undesirable, but in this case simply impossible, to ignore the past. Even those who have no acquaintance with the doctrines and writings of the great masters of antiquity, and who have not even heard the names of Plato and Aristotle, are, nevertheless, under the spell of their authority. It is not only that their influence is often transmitted to us by their followers, ancient and modern: our whole mode of thinking, the categories in which our ideas move, the forms of language in which we express them, and which therefore govern our ideas,—all these are to no small intent the products of art, in large measure the art of the great thinkers of antiquity. If we are not to mistake a result of development for something aboriginal, and a product of art for a natural product, we must try thoroughly to understand this process of evolution."

This is the language of whole-souled enthusiasm, and in so far as such enthusiam tempts the devotee to read a little too much modern enlightenment into the simple utterances of early thinkers Dr. Gomperz may be said to fail in his attempt to "consider them impartially." On the other hand the failure affects but a small portion of the work—one or two "Pre-Socratics"—and more than redeems itself by the splendid success to which it indirectly leads. It is not paradoxical to say that "partiality" of this kind results in a truthfulness and comprehensiveness of description far greater than a more detached but less devoted attitude could produce. Further, if we apply the comparative test and ask how far is the author "fair" to individual thinkers in relation to each other, no question of partiality can be raised. Dr. Gomperz belongs to no school; he is entirely free from any bias to exalt one teacher at the expense of another; he attempts only to describe, with sympathy and completeness, what each did and how he did it. As a secondary consequence the work is especially valuable in showing the importance of teachers (*e. g.*, the "Physicians") whom ordinary Histories of Philosophy treat too slightly. Still more valuable, perhaps, is the account given of the part played in Greek development by the historians whom, to a certain extent excusably, such histories ignore altogether. Dr. Gomperz clearly recognized the evil inherent in these partition walls, especially in dealing with an early stage at which boundaries which, to us, are a matter of course, had not yet been even thought of.

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The word "boundaries" suggests, finally, what in some ways is the most valuable part of this book, viz: the treatment of Greek thought in relation to the influences—internal and external—which did so much to shape, sometimes even to originate, it. The geographical, climatic, social condition of ancient Greece and, above all her relations to Egypt and the East are described in fascinating pages. "Greece looks East and South." It is impossible to understand the Greek mind if we confine ourselves to Greece alone, and few writers, if any, have grasped this truth so clearly or expressed it so well.

W. H. FAIRBROTHER.

LINCOLN COLLEGE, OXFORD.

A STUDY OF THE ETHICS OF SPINOZA. By Harold H. Joachim, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford. Oxford, 1901, Pp xlv, 309.

This is a very admirable and very useful book. It differentiates itself from other English treatises on Spinoza, by confining itself to the Ethics, and by offering a very detailed commentary on them. Mr. Joachim knows how to avail himself of the work of previous commentators, while keeping the independence and individuality of his own. This book will not, I think, prove a good introduction to the study of Spinoza, but it will be invaluable to those who have already gone far enough to perceive for themselves the difficulties with which Mr. Joachim deals.

Of these difficulties, the one which meets us almost on the threshold of the system is the question of the objectivity of the Attributes. On this point Mr. Joachim is clear—surely rightly—that the Attributes are not merely subjective forms by which the intellect conceives substance. Nor does he admit that this is inconsistent with the *"quod intellectus percipit,"* of the fourth definition. "The conception of Attribute," he says, "is Spinoza's way of expressing that the Real is what is known. Commentators have simply stepped outside this attempt to identify 'what is' and 'what is known,' and have said brutally, *'Either* Reality *or* what is known or knowable.' There are difficulties enough in Spinoza's conception; but it is no use to begin by postulating dogmatically the ultimate severance of that which he conceives as fundamentally one" (p. 26). This comment seems to me to just express the truth as to Spinoza's general intention. But the definition can

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scarcely be saved from verbal inconsistency when we remember, on the one hand, that we know the *Propria* of Substance, which are not Attributes, and, again, that we only know two attributes out of an infinite number.

With regard to the relation of unity and plurality in God, Mr. Joachim finds Spinoza's conception to be inconsistent as to the Attributes, but not as to the Modes. The Attributes "are not only in a sense determinate, but further must retain that determinateness in the unity of God's nature" (p. 105). Now God is conceived as excluding all negation, and therefore all determination from his being. And this is incompatible with the existence of the Attributes, so that the system is, at this point, self-contradictory.

But with the Modes it is different. For "the Modal apprehension of the Reality is (at least in part) illusory." And this permits the determination and negation of the Modes to be transcended in Substance. "Spinoza's substance is one (not as a unity of diverse but related elements, but) as a unity which has overcome and taken into itself the distinctness of its diverse elements, and this absorption is so complete that in it there remain no 'elements,' no distinction, no articulation" (p. 108). And again, "How in detail, this is possible, we cannot explain. But the principle of the union of oneness and variety is that the 'limitations' and distinctions are defects and unresolved differences only for an imperfect apprehension; that in God, of whom the Modes are states or degrees, all such limitations are overcome, since for a true apprehension they are bare negations which are not negations *of* God" (p. 111).

This, it is evident, gives Spinoza's Substance a nature not materially different from Mr. Bradley's Absolute. Is this correct? Mr. Joachim admits (p. 115) that such a conception of God is not held invariably and consistently by Spinoza, but that he "constantly lapses into language which implies that God's unity is abstract." On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that much of the system is quite inconsistent with any conception of God which is not as concrete as Mr. Bradley's conception of the Absolute. But shall we say that Spinoza sometimes, though not always, adopts the more concrete conception, or only that he held opinions which logically involved the more concrete conception?

The difference between those two alternatives is not very great, and it is with unfeigned diffidence that I venture to disagree with

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Mr. Joachim. But I cannot avoid the conclusion that Spinoza never really asserts the more concrete view, while he does assert the more abstract view. Mr. Joachim, I take it, admits that, for Spinoza, it is a fundamental truth that all determination is negation, and that his doctrine of God is very largely determined by this. Now to reconcile this with the more concrete view of God's nature, we should have to take negation as something which was not *merely* negation. It would have to be considered as something which had a more or less—doubtless, mostly less—positive nature. For it has to be transcended and reconciled in God. And, while we can conceive that apparently contradictory realities can be reconciled on the level of a higher reality, there is no meaning in suggesting that the mere blank of absolute negation could ever be reconciled with anything else.

Can we say that Spinoza ever had this conception of the negation of determination being, in some sort, positive? I cannot see that he ever takes it as anything but a mere negation, so that all the characteristics which make such a mode what it is, and separate it from the others are simply unreal and have no part, even as transcended, in God's nature. And so, though with great hesitation, I should say that his treatment of God as the cause of the essences of modes should be attributed to inconsistency in following out his own conception of God, and not to the presence of two inconsistent conceptions.

Mr. Joachim's treatment of the most fascinating problem in Spinoza—the *scientia intuitiva* and the intellectual love of God—also invites careful attention. He finds, if I understand him rightly, no inconsistency between these doctrines and the earlier part of the Ethics. Such a view affords, no doubt, a useful corrective to the crude antithesis according to which the system is a rigid and consistent mechanism till the Twentieth Proposition of the Fifth Book, and then becomes almost completely idealistic. But the new theory is nearly as one-sided as the old one. Even if we adopt Mr. Joachim's view of Spinoza's Absolute, this will not make the *scientia intuitiva* compatible with the rest of the system. For in the *scientia intuitiva* the human mind perceives how itself as individual, and how other things as individuals, follow from the nature of God. As Mr. Joachim points out, it implies a self "which is at once permanent and necessary, and individual" (p. 302). And in the same paragraphs, he says, "the self of complete knowledge is an individuality, which has universal, necessary and

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permanent being in its oneness with God, but is yet concrete and uniquely characterized." This is equivalent, as far as I can see, to saying that in God the individual is preserved and not transcended, though, of course, many of his apparent qualities are only preserved in so far as they are transcended.

Now an Absolute in which the individual is an eternal and adequate manifestation of God is not even the Absolute of Mr. Bradley. It is, at the very least, the Absolute of Hegel. And surely it cannot be maintained that the conception of God in the earlier parts of the Ethics is in the least degree Hegelian. For these reasons it seems to me impossible to bring the doctrine of *scientia intuitiva* into complete harmony with the rest of the system.

I should wish to conclude, as I began, by recommending Mr. Joachim's work to every serious student of Spinoza, as a piece of work which is worthy even of such a subject.

J. Ellis McTaggart.

Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

Robert Browning as a Religious Teacher. Being the Burney Essay for 1900. By Arthur Cecil Pigou, B. A. London: C. J. Clay & Sons. Pp. xii, 132.

As Mr. Pigou hastens to explain on his first page, he has interpreted the phrase "religious teacher" in the widest possible sense, so that in expounding Browning's views on religion in its metaphysical, ethical and emotional aspects, and in attempting "to bring out the relations between them, and to unite them into some kind of system," he really aims at reconstructing for us Browning's theory of life. The objections to, and difficulties in the way of such an attempt are mostly anticipated by the essayist himself. Among objections, perhaps the most serious that could be offered against the subject as one for a prize essay, is that the ground has been already adequately covered by Prof. Henry Jones in his book on "Browning as a Religious and Philosophical Teacher." But, as Mr. Pigou points out, Prof. Jones, being himself a philosopher of the Hegelian persuasion, estimates Browning's teaching from the point of view of its correspondence with or difference from those doctrines which he holds as valid, whereas the humbler aim of this essay is to expound clearly the views held by Browning, and to criticize them, where criticism is ventured on, only on the basis of their consistency with each other.

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He has, we think, succeeded in keeping to this impartial attitude, and every opinion which he attributes to Browning is justified by the passages he quotes and by many others which he might have quoted. But in the attempt "to bring out the relations between them, and to unite them into some sort of system," his success is more questionable, and of this he is evidently well aware, for he expresses his "growing conviction that his (Browning's) moods varied greatly at different times, not merely oscillating about a fixed and constant body of thought, but transforming the whole character of his outlook upon the world and making a unified philosophy impossible for him." It is indeed obvious that it is not fair to look for entire consistency with each other in views extracted from poems belonging to every possible period in a literary life of fifty-six years, from "Pauline," the work of a youth of twenty-one, to "Astralando," published on the day of his death at the age of seventy-seven.

The difficulty of distinguishing between the earlier and later stages of a man's thought is one which besets everyone who tries to write a short account of the system of a philosopher or theologian. But when it is the philosophy or theology of a poet, and tnat poet Robert Browning, that is in question, the matter is still more complicated. For the philosopher is at least bound as far as possible to abstract his thought, in the form in which he gives it to the world, from the influence of his own passing moods, but the poet may be optimist or cynical or depressed in turn, according to the state of the weather or his own digestion. Browning again was wont, as his biographer has told us, to lay special stress on the dramatic character of his works, and resented nothing more than the assumption that they were all revelations of personal experience.

Granting all this, however, it remains true that no poet ever left the imprint of his own personality more strongly on everything he wrote. Not only are his modes of thought as unmistakably his as his literary style, but many definite opinions and views are so predominant in his work that it is impossible not to look upon them as his conscious "message" to the world.

Most of these views and opinions seem to us, as we have already indicated, to be very fairly and clearly expounded in this Essay.

On one or two points the writer's interpretation differs somewhat from that of Mrs. Sutherland Orr, Browning's biographer, and on these we think he has the best of the argument. Although

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we doubt if the poet cared very greatly whether the Gospel story was historically accurate or not, yet in the position which he gave to that story and to its Subject, he appears to have approached more closely to the doctrines of an orthodox Christianity than Mrs. Sutherland Orr will admit. There were times when, as in "La Saisiaz," he chose to put on the philosopher's cloak, and to subject his faith to a coldly rational scrutiny; and when he did this he had courage to admit that what Reason gives us is "hope—no more than hope,—but hope, no less than hope." In other moods, such as that reflected in the beautiful and sad little poem called "Fears and Scruples," not only rational proof but the instinctive, emotional certitude on which he usually relied must have failed him. But the dominant mood of his poetry is one of almost passionate affirmation of the spiritual meanings he found in experience, and above all of the promise which he thought it gave him of immortality. By this he meant, not only what R. L. Nettleship meant by it when he wrote that eternity is the present fact, and again to a friend, "Don't bother about death; it doesn't count," but also what the ordinary man understands by it, *viz.*, the continued duration in Time of his own self-conscious personality. The strength of this conviction was, we think, the source of Browning's almost unfailing optimism,—an optimism which in those who do not share his faith is apt to produce a sense of irritation to which Rudyard Kipling gave mutely ironical expression, when he put the little song from "Pippa Passes," ending "God's in his Heaven; all's right with the world," as a motto before a gruesome story of a slum woman kicked to death by a drunken husband. But even those who find it easier to envy than to share all Browning's faith, must admit that few if any English poets could so well stand the test of an exposition in cold prose of their religious teachings.

ELEANOR RATHBONE.

LIVERPOOL.

THE CASE FOR THE FACTORY ACTS. Edited by Mrs. Sidney Webb, with a Preface by Mrs. Humphrey Ward. Grant Richards.

This book, as its title implies, is an apology for Factory legislation. It aims at convincing and converting a particular public, the women among the leisured classes who denounce factory leg-

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islation on purely theoretical grounds, with little knowledge of the history of the Factory Acts or of their existing provisions, and even less of the conditions of labor which are regulated by them. Mrs. Webb, the editor of the volume, begins her own contribution, "The Economics of Factory Legislation with the Warning." "When modern Factory Legislation was introduced a hundred years ago, women did not concern themselves with such matters. Men did; and it is possible to prove, by the experience of a century, that they began, with the best intentions, by making every mistake that could possibly be made on the subject. Now, the women of to-day are no cleverer than the men of that time. The sole advantage they have over the men of the eighteenth century is their knowledge of what has happened during the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, some of the politically active women of to-day have not acquired that knowledge—do not even know that it is available. They are arguing exactly as the men of their class argued when they, too, had no experience to guide them. Accordingly they are making the same mistakes, and laying down the same nihilistic 'laws,' with the same good intentions, and the same high-minded anxiety to secure, for every working woman, the personal liberty of a householder with at least three servants. My warning is, then, to form no conclusion until you know the facts." Ignorance of the facts is fatal. "It has led men and is now leading women, passionately opposed to tyranny and 'sweating,' to spend their lives in fighting the battle of the tyrant and the sweater against his victims."

It might be maintained that opponents with so small a sense of responsibility for the expression of their opinions are less dangerous as opponents than they would be as partisans. Their views are not shared by the bulk of the women actually affected by the Factory Acts. They have no votes, and do not, therefore, directly affect legislative reforms. Any political influence which their leaders appear to possess is negligible. The formidable opponents of reforms in factory legislation are not women who write letters to the newspapers or form deputations to the Home Secretary, but those manufacturers who fear, with or without cause, the interference of the law, and who are dominant in both Houses of Parliament. The authors of this book, however, think, and they may very possibly be right, that it is worth while to set arguments based on well-established facts before the middle-class wo-

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man who dabbles in social questions in order that she may throw her weight, such as it is, on their side.

The preface by Mrs. Humphrey Ward is admirably adapted to appeal to readers of this type. With its vision of an industrial field of Wagram it has all the attraction of that popular production, the slum novel.

So much for the purpose of the book. The first chapter is by Mrs. Sidney Webb and deals with "The Economics of Factory Legislation." It is practically an abstract of parts of "Industrial Democracy," and this, no doubt, accounts for the oblivion of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1900, implied by the description of the farmer as "under no obligation to take expensive precautions against accidents."

The general line of Mrs. Webb's argument will be familiar to readers of "Industrial Democracy" and the "History of Trade Unionism." The discussion of "Parasitic Industries and Foreign Competition" is likely to uproot one of her readers' main prejudices against factory legislation. She ends by forestalling the reply usually made to advocates of factory legislation by those who have never attempted to put their own precept into practice—"Organize the women and let them obtain protection by combination instead of by legislation." "It is, on the face of it, cruel mockery to preach Trade Unionism, and Trade Unionism alone, to the seamstress sewing day and night in her garret, for a bare subsistence, and to the white lead or pottery worker where health is undermined by wrist drop or "potter's rot"; but though these cases supply the most sensational instances, the disability for Trade Unionism extends over the whole field of unregulated female labor. . . . . No reasonable person could, we imagine, expect the boys and girls (who form in some of the parasitic trades the bulk of the labor employed) to be able to combine to exact from their employers healthy work-places and "half-time" for technical education. When any British statesman makes up his mind to grapple seriously with the problem of the "sweated trades" he will have to expand the Factory Acts into a systematic and comprehensive Labor Code, prescribing minimum conditions of wages, leisure, education and health, for each class of operatives, below which the community will not allow its industry to be carried on."

Miss B. L. Hutchins, in her chapter on the "Historical Development of the Factory Acts," gives a lucid account of the

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growth of factory legislation. Her summary gains from the fact that she does not treat the subject chronologically, but follows the classification adopted in *Die Englische Fabrikinspection*, O. W. Weyer. The extent of application to (a) industries (b) classes of persons is first dealt with; next the scope of protection, including (a) limitation of hours (b) provision for health and safety, (c) education, and, lastly, the method of administration.

The time chosen for the publication of the book was singularly unfortunate. It appeared too late to affect public opinion concerning the recent Factory and Workshop Consolidating and Amending Act and yet, as it was published before the act was passed, a considerable part of its contents is already out of date. This applies specially to Miss Tuckwell's analysis of "The More Obvious Defects in our Factory Code." Her plea for consolidation is fortunately no longer required. All her references are, of course, to sections of the Factory and Workshop Acts, 1877-95, which it would be merely confusing for a student who wished to acquaint himself with the provisions of the new act to consult. The utility of many of her discussions is damaged by the fact of some slight amendment in the new act, such as the reduction of the amount of overtime allowed under the "press of work" exception. The section which deals with laundries also burdens the reader with unnecessary details of proposals which were afterwards abandoned, leaving the law in its original state. These defects are, of course, solely due to the unseasonable production of the book. The chapter is admirable in arrangement and should have been one of the most useful in the volume.

Mrs. W. P. Reeves' essay on "Colonial Developments in Factory Legislation" is devoted chiefly to Victoria and New Zealand where the most progressive laws are in force. She is content to say that: "Both systems (of Victoria and New Zealand) have their lesson for the Mother Country," without entering on the more difficult task of proving that specific measures, such as compulsory arbitration, would be adopted for the different conditions of English industry. Some attempt of this kind seems necessary in order to make such a chapter profitable to the class of readers for whom the book is intended. If they are encouraged to propound theories on the subject without guidance their little knowledge may be to the full as dangerous as wholesale denunciation of factory legislation.

The last chapter of the book by Miss Clementina Black is a

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reply mainly to opponents of such factory legislation as applies to women only. Miss Black argues that there is no ground for the assertion that men trade unionists have tried to regulate the hours of women's employment in order to protect themselves against competition. She also contends that legal restrictions have not had the effect of reducing the number of women employed in regulated trades.

The authors confine themselves too much to ground which has been covered before to make the book of special interest to readers who are already acquainted with the history of factory legislation. But they put their case temperately and persuasively; and will doubtless be rewarded by meeting with less opposition in future.

An appendix contains a short list of books recommended, and there is also a defective index.

MONA WILSON.

LONDON.

DEMOCRACY VERSUS SOCIALISM; a Critical Examination of Socialism as a remedy for social injustice and an exposition of the Single Tax Doctrine. By Max Hirsch (Melbourne). Pp. xxxiv., 481. London: Macmillan & Co.

Mr. Hirsch begins by stating that "Revolting against the injustice of existing social arrangements and the evils thence resulting, preferring the risk of failure to ignoble acquiescence, the advocates of Socialism are, not unnaturally, deaf to merely negative criticism." So our author proposes to demonstrate the worthlessness of Socialism and to show what is equally effective and can be set in its place. Mr. Hirsch's intentions are admirable, and all sensible people will agree that those who want a thing very much are more likely to listen to advisers who can make proposals as well as criticize the proposals of others. But our author will not seem to the Socialists and many others to have demonstrated convincingly the fruitfulness of his method. Moreover, it must be borne in mind, the impartial critic gets a more unbiassed hearing than the rival partisan. The first five parts of the book are devoted to an examination of Socialism, and although at times the author seems to the reviewer to be a little ungenerous in representing the opinions of his opponents and to press his arguments in a way which tells that he too has a scheme which he thinks worth two of any other kind, yet on the whole

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the argument is well stated and to the point. The author is not lacking in the keenness and knowledge which makes criticism incisive. But the reviewer feels sure that very many Socialists would attack with as much zest as Mr. Hirsch some of the proposed institutions which fall under his lash, for instance the following which are said to be involved in Socialism:—abandonment of separate family homes, early separation of children and parents, and transference of the former to the care of the State. Further, if Mr. Hirsch had projected a complete account and criticism of Socialism we should have complained that he had neglected to classify the different kinds of socialism and to examine the conditions of the differences; but as his primary object is to weaken the socialism which works in the public his account is on the whole satisfactory, though he errs in representing the proposals of modern socialists as making up far more of a finished and finite—not to say crude—system than they actually do. Certainly he has taken the trouble to make himself well acquainted with the utterances of those socialists who have the public ear. The greatest weakness of this book, in the opinion of the reviewer, comes out in Part V. which deals with the single tax. Few social thinkers will be able to go with the author either in his justification of the confiscation of rents or in his account of the economic effects of the single tax. As regards the first question Mr. Hirsch falls back for support upon "natural rights." "Freedom to use the earth is the indispensable condition for the exercise of man's faculties and the maintenance of his life. Hence the right to the use of the earth is a natural right, the denial of which involves the denial of the right to the exercise of any faculty, that is, the denial of the right to live" (p. 228). But does it?—meaning by "freedom to use the earth" the absence of proprietary rights over the soil. Here the argument breaks down, and all the author proves is that if the legal rights of property were of a nature which is quite inconceivable, and if social actions were determined as they are not, people might be forced to starve though willing to work. But what does that demonstration profit? It was necessary to find a very forcible argument to meet claims for compensation—hence land-holding is made closely analogous to slave-holding—but there is no doubt that in straining after this argument our author over-reaches himself and loses his foothold. Again, while admitting that Mr. Hirsch displays a good knowledge of economic science and

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argues with ingenuity, the reviewer must point out that the author would get small support for his contention that a tax on land values "would lower rents, induce a more efficient use of land, increase the demand for labor, and therefore tend to increase wages" (p. 380)—at any rate in an appreciable degree—and how, when at its maximum, the tax has to result in "an enormous consumption and production of wealth, an illimitable demand for labor and a distribution of wealth which, denying reward without service rendered, would secure to every one a reward equal to the value of the service rendered by him," it passes my wit to comprehend.

S. J. CHAPMAN.

OWENS COLLEGE, MANCHESTER, ENGLAND.

PUBLIC RELIEF OF THE POOR. By Thomas Mackay. London: John Murray, Albermarle St., 1901. Pp. vi., 214.

This book consists of six lectures given to an audience consisting mainly of those engaged in actual work amongst the poor; a fact which greatly heightens their value from an educational point of view. For their author maintains for them that their treatment of the subject is theoretical rather than practical; and of all difficult tasks that of inducing people already submerged in practical work to pause and consider the principles of what they are doing, is the most difficult.

But though the treatment is mainly theoretical, it is theory based upon a most exhaustive consideration of experience, past and present, and in that sense may be said to be practical in the highest degree. And it is practical also in another sense, for as the author maintains in his preface, if the theory (the possibility of dispauperization) be once established, the details of administration present very little difficulty. This follows from the view that pauperism is an artificial condition, engendered or maintained by institutions expressly devised for its support. The Poor Law is here dealt with as a survival, perhaps rather a revival, of the feudal status, with respect to the poorest section of the population; and it is very helpful in considering the subject to have clearly placed before us the insignificance of this artificial support to the working classes in comparison with the great economic forces upon which their material prosperity is really based. Perhaps readers of this journal will hesitate to accept the *obiter dic-*

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tum of "the ultimate identity of the ethical and economic motive;" but there is much saving grace in the word ultimate.

We surmise that an England without a Poor Law would have been more satisfactory in the author's opinion; but that given the existence of a Poor Law it is possible to make it much less mischievous than it actually is. It is unnecessary to report the arguments in favor of restricting out door relief to the vanishing point; they are familiar, and probably irrefutable. It would be difficult to find a more convincing exposition of them than in the book before us; and if there were any probability of its reaching the minds of those engaged in administering the law we should be on the eve of a great social reformation. But those familiar with the position know how very remote is the possibility that more than an infiinitesimal proportion of Poor Law Guardians will study the theory of the work they are engaged in; and for this reason the last chapter on the future of Public Relief in England is especially interesting. Here Mr. Mackay indicates what developments and changes in administration he anticipates, and gives his reasons for his anticipations.

In the first place he points out the present tendency to amalgamation of public bodies, by which Rural Boards of Guardians have already been amalgamated with Rural District Councils; and which seems likely to proceed considerably further.

Next he dwells upon the fact that with respect to the Poor Law it is no longer the case that taxation and representation go entirely together—*i. e.,* that the spending body is entirely responsible to the persons who contribute the money; "roughly speaking, one-quarter of the sum expended in the maintenance of the poor comes from national, as opposed to local sources of taxation, and the amount seems likely to be increased."

The natural result of these two tendencies will be, he thinks, to make the administration of the Poor Law a natural rather than a sectional responsibility. Of course it would be possible to have a bad Poor Law badly administered under a system of centralized authority; but probably the difficulties of reform would be very much less than under the present system of short service volunteers. Whether however a civil service of salaried experts would not create a new danger in the form of a vested interest in pauperism may be doubted. Probably some combination of selected local volunteers and salaried expert of more au-

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thority than the present clerk to the Guardians would be a safer instrument, and one less likely to cause local friction.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

CHARITY AND THE POOR LAW. S. D. Fuller. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1901. Pp. 68.

This is a little book of very different calibre to the foregoing. It consists of some papers and memoranda somewhat disjointedly put together, by the sometime Chairman of the Paddington Board of Guardians. The Paddington Board is one much esteemed for the carefulness of its work; but its view of the object of Poor Law Relief is somewhat eccentric, and it is that view which finds expression in this book. Briefly put it is that Poor Law Relief is the reward of good conduct, to be given to "the deserving," and to be used for the education of the poor, "as their merits so their reward." The author is however well aware of the dangers attendent upon our out-relief policy, and a strong advocate also of coöperation between Poor Law and Charity.

HELEN BOSANQUET.

OXSHOTT, SURREY.

FACT AND FABLE IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Joseph Jastrow, Professor of Psychology in the University of Wisconsin. London: Macmillan & Co., 1901.

This book deals with a subject which certainly deserves more attention from professed psychologists than it has hitherto received. The subject is described by the general term of "the occult,"—the supernormal phenomena, alleged to be facts, on which the theories of theosophy, spiritualism, thought-transference, occult healing, etc., are based. All this is relegated by Professor Jastrow to the region of "fable." The purpose of the book is entirely critical; he dwells on no more "fact" in psychology than is necessary to expose the "fables." His conclusions are essentially the same as those of Professor Münsterberg in his brilliant essay on "Psychology and Mysticism"; but he gives a more careful account of the origin of the alleged phenomena. Münsterberg's sweeping dismissal of them all would compel us to repeat at our leisure what David is reported to have said in his haste.

The book consists of a series of essays most of which have al-

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ready been published. The most important essay, and the one which calls for most criticism, is the second, on "'The Problems of Psychical Research." Whatever the author may have intended, this part of his work is calculated to convey to the reader the unfortunate impression that Professor Jastrow agrees with such "fine old crusted enemies of superstition" as the eminent biologist to whom Professor James referred (Mind, No. 5, p. 144), "who once said that if the facts of telepathy *were* true, the first duty which every honest man would owe to science would be to deny them, and prevent them if possilbe from ever becoming known." We gather that in Professor Jastrow's opinion it is no part of the *trained* psychologist's work to investigate any of the alleged occult phenomena until their truth and reality is demonstrated far more decidedly than it is at present (p. 73). But from other passages we understand that no one who is not a trained psychologist has a right to investigate them at all. It is the attitude of the proverbial "dog in the manger," applied in science. The author objects to the name "psychical research" as applied to such various inquiries as those undertaken by the Society in question; he objects that "the differentiation of a group of problems on the basis of unusualness of occurrence, of mysteriousness of origin, of doubtful authenticity, or of apparent paradoxical or transcendent character, is as illogical as it is unnecessary" (p. 53); he objects to the investigation of the alleged phenomena in order to see if there is "anything in" them, that is, any evidence of "supernormal" mental powers; he objects that the Society's work has attracted the public interest away from psychology proper (p. 75). Now the present writer holds no brief for the S. P. R. But to him, simply as a member of the outside public, it seems evident that these inquiries were called "Psychical Research" simply for want of a better name; that these investigators have quite as much right to use the name as the laboratory psychologist has, and that the alleged phenomena, which were becoming the hunting ground of charlatans and their dupes, need to be investigated by *some one* in a scientific spirit, if the professed psychologists will not do so—which is usually the case. Further, we notice that the scientific psychologist usually treats *abnormal* facts of mind as *pathological.* And the S. P. R. of necessity was driven to inquire whether there is "anything in" these things, for this is simply the question which is begged by the scientific psychologist: Is there anything abnormal or "supernormal" in mind which is *not pathological?*

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Again, there is reason to believe that our author takes an entirely unjustifiable view of the present status of psychology. Is he prepared seriously to maintain that in a body of doctrine where standpoint, method, and principles are subjects of ever renewed controversy, there is any "logical unity of method and purpose?" Are there not better grounds for holding that there is no science of psychology, but only the hope of one? He says: "However ignorant they may be of one author's facts, the chemist and the psychologist readily appreciate one another's purposes, and find a bond of sympathy in the pursuit of a commonly inspired though differently applied method" (p. 47). As a brief commentary on this statement, I may refer to "The Story of Nineteenth Century Science," a work by a competent student of natural science, which contains a chapter on the progress of psychology during the century. The author speaks of reform in methods of treating the insane; of researches into nerve fibres and the histology of the nervous system; and of cerebral localization. The only psychological topics referred to are Weber's Law and the hypnotic state; these are treated in a very superficial way. In the same way we constantly find that capable students of physical science have no conception of what psychology can be apart from physiology.

Finally, Professor Jastrow says (p. vii): "It is a matter of importance that the dominant interest in psychology should centre about the normal use and development of functions with respect to which psychology bears a significant message for the regulation of life." Now this book is presumably intended for the general reader; hence it is not an *argumentum ad hominem* to ask what the general reader will make of such a statement if he should happen to read Professor Münsterberg's "Psychology and Life." The latter has as much right to speak of the meaning of psychology as our author has; and he makes psychology an artificial construction of the objective aspects of mind out of sensations—a construction which, as he elaborately shows, does not give us the truth and reality of mind, and has no practical bearing on life.

In a word, the reply to our author's attack on Psychical Research is—"Physician, heal thyself."

In the essay on "The Logic of Mental Telegraphy," Professor Jastrow engages in psychical research himself, and finds no evidence for the legitimacy of the telepathic hypothesis. But in the interesting essay on "Hypnotism and its Antecedents," he explains many difficult facts by referring to "unconscious suggestion"; and

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some forms of this unconscious suggestion are not easily distinguished from what has been called "telepathy." In other essays the author shows, with vigor and success, the extraordinary difficulties of accurate observation in the case of abnormal phenomena.

S. H. MELLONE.

HOLYWOOD, BELFAST, IRELAND.

A STUDY OF SOCIAL MORALITY. By W. A. Watt, M. A., W. W. B., D. Phil., Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901.

Mr. Watt is a Glasgow writer who has hitherto written on legal and political philosophy. In this book he enters the field of ethics. It may be described as a discussion of the *axiomata media* of morality. Towards the close of the book, and to some extent throughout it, an idealistic solution of the problem of conduct is more or less suggested. But in the main Mr. Watt is investigating the meaning of such terms as justice, benevolence, virtue, duty etc. The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the standpoint of virtue, and the second with social organization. In this latter part the author discusses the social groups of the family, church, state, etc. Curiously enough two chapters in this part, viz., chapters V. and VI., deal with some aspects of the individual life and with moral rules and resolutions respectively. One would have thought that they come more naturally into Part I. Be that as it may, Mr. Watt writes in an interesting manner. But it must be said that there is a general sense of inconclusiveness, and one may even add want of order, throughout the whole book. This may partly arise from the very attempt to reach "an ethical system of some sort—a resting-place, a few steps removed, as it were from the details of life" (p. 1). The late Dr. Sidgwick has shown in a striking way the incoherence and confusion of ideas in the popular moral consciousness. A system, "a few steps removed" from it, must inevitably share in its defects; though it may be useful as a stepping-stone to something better.

It is impossible within the limits of this brief notice to discuss in detail Mr. Watt's positions. But one may instance his treatment of justice. Justice is made to include "the legal system generally" (p. 3). But there are many laws, the breakers of which are not called unjust, *e. g.*, the gaming laws. Of course

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by a more or less analogical extension of the term, it may, as in Plato, be taken to include the whole of virtue, *i. e.*, in other words what we understand by uprightness. It is even popularly used in a wider sense. We often talk of such and such a candidate as not having done himself "justice" in an examination. But it is surely much better to restrict the term to what Aristotle called Distributive and Reparative Justice. Mr. Watt is however happy in this and many other instances in bringing out different shades of meaning in the terms of the different virtues. The book, though not an addition to ethical theory, may be recommended to the average reader who wishes to study ethics in a popular form.

W. F. TROTTER.

EDINBURGH.

THE NEW WORLD AND THE NEW THOUGHT. By James Thompson Bixby, Ph. D. New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1902. Pp. 219.

Dr. Bixby, whose faithful work in the interests of a science untrammelled by religious dogma and a religion unterrified by scientific injunction is appreciated by thousands in the circles of progressive Christianity to-day, has given us in this last collection of essays a brilliant presentation (or, perhaps, recapitulation) of the position of the sturdy idealist and religious optimist. The topics discussed under the "New Thought" are varied: "The Sanction for Morality in Nature," "The Agnostic's Difficulties," "Evolution and Christianity," "The Old Testament as Literature," etc.; and these few lines devoted to a notice of Dr. Bixby's book as a whole could well be spent on each of the interesting chapters.

On the whole, it seems to us that Dr. Bixby appears at his best in the essay on "The Agnostic's Difficulties." There, with a keen and patient spirit he combats the dogmatic agnosticism of the "know-nothing" school in religion, and shows how, for all its semblance of humility, it is in the end cowardly and unscientific; and, more than that, that it tacitly assumes as a working hypothesis what it strenuously combats as a knowable reality. Dr. Bixby would be neither an Agnostic nor a Gnostic in religious matters. He would rather, with St. Paul, regard our knowledge as partial than as fictitious, inadequate rather than erroneous.

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He would be what we remember Joseph Cook to have designated rather felicitously as a "Meirognostic"—one who "knows in part." And he claims for the organs of spiritual "knowledge" the same right to function, to respect, and to fair criticism as the organs of material knowledge. The polyp shall not frighten him out of his prayers.

Dr. Bixby writes in a charming style. His knowledge of modern philosophic and scientific thought is profound and sympathetic. His command of metaphor and figure is striking. His brotherhood with the poets is attested on almost every page of his book. In short, we would recommend Dr. Bixby's work to the reader who wishes to see how a true, strong soul may rise above the petty questions of dogma and live in the fresh invigorating atmosphere of honest thought.

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

THE MIRACLES AND MYTHS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. By Joseph May, LL. D. Boston: George H. Ellis, 1901. Pp. 190.

In a sub-title Dr. May adds, "With Other Essays and Sermons." His little book, then, as he confesses in the preface, is a collection of sermons having "only the logical connection involved in a common aim." That aim is to help free the true historical personality of Jesus from the obscuring ornament of miracle, myth, and dogma which has been falsely thought to glorify him.

Dr. May represents the most liberal type of the Unitarian minister. With the religious optimism characteristic of his class, he frankly sacrifices (or rather dismisses) the specious comfort found in unsubstantiated dogmas like the Resurrection of Jesus, the Infallibility of Scripture, etc. In the man Jesus he finds the world's religious ideal, and in the miracle of a God-like character his final inspiration. He even waives the question of Jesus' "perfection" in the absolute sense in which the term is used. "Whether Raphael was a perfect painter," he says, "or Praxiteles a perfect sculptor, we cannot decide; neither can we decide whether Jesus was a perfect man. Nor is it essential to decide this question. Either will serve us long as a sufficient standard and type of lofty realization of the ideal to which he strained" (p. 179).

Dr. May makes a slip when he speaks of the new religion of

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"The Bab" as having "spread through India within half a century" (p. 93). The Bab was a Persian; and it is in Persia and Syria that his doctrine has taken root, not in India.

The little book is attractive in its make-up, and dignified in its tone. It is the work of a scholar and a thinker.

DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY.

NEW YORK.

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Articles by writers in Great Britain should be sent to
Prof. J. S. Mackenzie, 7 Richmond Terrace, Cardiff, Wales.
Books to be reviewed, published in Great Britain, should be sent to
G. E. Moore, M. A., Trinity College, Cambridge, England.

ERRATA.

Page 117—After last line at the bottom, ending with "the aims and ideals of," add "modern reformers, than authoritative as the utterance of teachers."

Page 119—Six lines from bottom, for "good thinker" read "great thinker."

Page 361—Second line from bottom, insert "we thought we saw a chance" before "for new markets."

Page 371—11th line from top, for "world" read "Moros."

Page 373—18th line from top, omit "But."

Page 374—7th line from top, for "justices" read "justice."

Page 375—8th line from top, for "labor" read "Cuba."

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